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The Costs of Cigarettes
I. INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. A Brief History of Cigarette Regulation
Cigarette smoking causes over 420,000 deaths annually in the United
States, roughly twenty percent of all U.S. deaths,' making cigarettes the single
greatest preventable cause of death in this country.2 Indeed, tobacco kills more
people every year than alcohol, illicit drugs, automobile accidents, violent
crime, and AIDS combined.3 And not only are cigarettes deadly to smokers;
they kill nonsmokers as well. According to a recent report from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the "sidestream" or "passive" smoke
from cigarettes-so-called environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)-is responsible
annually for approximately 3000 lung cancer deaths, between 150,000 and
300,000 lower respiratory ailments in children, and approximately 37,000 heart
disease deaths.4
Considering the staggering social costs imposed by cigarette smoking, an
outside observer might find it odd that cigarette production and consumption
in this country are, to a remarkable extent, unregulated. It is true that selling
I. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.. SMOKING AND HEALTH Is THE AMERICAS 106
(1992) (reporting an annual smoking-death rate of approximately 434.000). Cigarette Smoking.Attributable
Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-United States. 1990. 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP
645, 645-49 (1993) (reporting an annual smoking-death rate of approximately 420.000. which 'was
approximately 20% of all United States deaths in 1990); see also RICHARD PETO Er AL. MORTALITY FROt
SMOKING IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1950-2000, at A.7 & tbl.I (1994) (discussing the worldwide health
effects of cigarettes and estimating that smoking kills two million people each year in descloping countries
alone).
2. See AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES-1997. at 23 (1997). cf. Carl E.
Bartecchi et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use (pt. I), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED 907. 907-10 (1994)
(noting many adverse health consequences of smoking): Polly A. Newcomb & Paul P Carbone. The Health
Consequences of Smoking: Cancer, 76 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 305. 311-24 (1992) (detailing the various
types of cancer caused by cigarette smoking); Nicholas J. Wald & Allan K. Hackshaw. Cigarette Smoking
An Epidemiological Overview, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL. 3, 3 (1996) (summarizing the health problems caused
by smoking).
3. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44.396.44.398 (1996) ("Tobacco alone kills more people
each year in the United States than acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). car accidents, alcohol.
homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined."): J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege. Actual
Causes of Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207. 2208 (1993). For a general summary of the ill-
health effects of cigarettes, see Graham E. Kelder. Jr. & Richard A. Daynard. The Role of Litigation in the
Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco. 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 63. 64-65 (1997) For a
detailed summary of all the known or suspected ill-health consequences of smoking as of 1989. see OFFICE
ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs.. REDUCING THE HEALTi
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 37-101 (1989) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S
PROGRESS REPORT].
4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY. R-.SPIRATORY HEALTn EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING
LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS 3 (1992) thereinafter EPA. PASSIVE SMOKING]. U S E_,NVTL
?RC 'ION AGENCY, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: SECONDHAND SMOKE IS A PREVEN-rABLE HEALTH
RISK I, 44 (1994) [hereinafter EPA, SETING THE RECORD STRAIGHTI; see also Elizabeth T.H. Fontham
et al., Enviromnental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer in Nonsmoking Women. 271 JAMA 1752 1759
(1994) (confirming the EPA's 1994 conclusions in the largest case-control study ever conducted on the
subject).
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cigarettes to minors is illegal in every state.5 It is also true that a number of
states and municipalities have passed laws and ordinances restricting the right
to smoke in various public domains-from government buildings and health
facilities to, in some cases, private workplaces. 6 And if one compares these
levels of regulation to the level of regulation imposed on, say, bubble gum
consumption, cigarette smoking seems fairly heavily regulated.' If, however,
one compares cigarettes with other products that are considered dangerous but
are comparatively less costly to society, such as heroin or cocaine,8 the level
of cigarette regulation seems inadequate. After all, adult smoking is legal in
all fifty states. Likewise, if one compares the hands-off approach to regulating
cigarette companies with the hands-on approach to regulating, say,
pharmaceutical companies (many of whose products treat or even cure, rather
than cause, serious health problems), tobacco companies appear to be
essentially unregulated. Of the tobacco regulations that do exist, many turn out
to be industry-friendly. 9 On top of all this, until very recently it appeared that
5. See Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry: New
Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 727 n.1 4 (1997).
6. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement,
in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69, 69-70 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 1993) [hereinafter SMOKING POLICY].
7. But cf Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Burning Questions: Tobacco Pact's Limits-and Its
Loopholes-Presage Fierce Debate, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at Al (arguing that cigarettes receive "less
government oversight of [their] contents and marketing than ice cream").
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. Each of the two most significant prior efforts to regulate cigarette manufacturers-through warning
requirements and advertising bans-turned out to favor the cigarette industry. See Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1994)); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). Tobacco companies fought against the warning requirements
imposed by Congress but ultimately used the warnings as an effective shield against some types of tort
suits. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-31 (1992) (plurality opinion); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986) ("It is ironic that the legislation which the tobacco
company sought so hard to defeat now serves to substantially immunize it from liability .... ); Margaret
Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 9 (1997)
(explaining that Cipollone stands for the proposition that federal law preemption provisions may apply to
state tort law claims). When cigarette advertising on television was banned in 1971, see Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act § 6, 84 Stat. at 95 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335), manufacturers
quickly shifted their advertising to other media without any significant harm to their business. One of their
strategies was to place their brand imagery in key places for televised sporting events, thus ensuring
continued TV exposure-without the antismoking ads that had previously been coupled with their own TV
spots (pursuant to the "fairness doctrine" promulgated by the FCC in 1967). See Capital Broad. Co. v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 589 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("The result of the legislation was
that as both the cigarette advertisements and most anti-smoking messages left the air, the tobacco
companies transferred their advertising budgets to other forms of advertising such as newspapers and
magazines where there was no fairness doctrine to require a response."), aff'd mnem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
The ban also had the effect of making entry more difficult for potential competitors. Finally, the ban
"ma[de] it nearly impossible for states and municipalities to restrict or ban the tobacco industry's
promotional activities." Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 68. On net, the advertising ban appears to have
been to the clear advantage of the industry. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 7. For a discussion of the
inefficacy of previous attempts to regulate cigarette advertisements, see RICHARD KLUGER, ASIIES TO
ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 279-80, 298-99 (1996). Cf Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 63 (observing
that "the industry takes an active part in trying to pass weak, industry-friendly, tobacco control legislation
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cigarette companies, unlike most product manufacturers, were effectively
immune from regulation by tort law.'"
How can this be? A good case can be made that the cigarette industry
owes its privileged, lightly regulated status largely to the perseverance and
ingenuity of its lawyers and to an unprecedented level of industry cooperation
and solidarity. By amassing an immense lobbying war chest," by developing
a uniquely aggressive public relations and advertising approach,' 2 and by
adopting a self-described "General Patton" litigation strategy, I' the cigarette
industry has gained a reputation as unbeatable both in the courtroom and in the
public policy arena.
Consider, for instance, the industry's extraordinary ability for many years
to avoid paying a penny to any tort plaintiff. Until very recently, the vast
majority of decided cases and other legal authorities were hostile to the notion
of cigarette manufacturer liability. Cigarette companies had managed not to
pay damages (or to settle for a substantial payment) in even a single case
brought against them by smoking plaintiffs, notwithstanding two "waves" of
tort suits during the fifty years that scholars refer to as the "products liability
revolution."' 4 Until very recently as well, cigarette plaintiffs could find little
at the state level throughout the country that would preempt the authority of local go%,ernmentsr to control
the sale and use of tobacco"),
10. See infra notes 14, 779, and accompanying text.
I1. Senator Edward M. Kennedy said in 1979 of the tobacco tndustr "Dollar for dollar, they're
probably the most effective lobby on Capitol Hill." Robert Pear. A Nest Leaf: Now, the Archenemies Need
Each Other, N.Y. TiMES, June 22. 1997. at DI. Industry lobbying efforts were especially intense in 1997,
including expenditures of over S30 million and the employment of such political heavyu eights as Howard
Baker, George Mitchell, and Ann Richards. See Maureen Dossd. hitegritv Clearance Sale. N Y TIMES.
Dec. 20, 1997, at Al 3. For an excellent summary of the numerous ways in vhich the tobacco industry has
historically employed its lobbying prowess to its benefit, see Kelder & Daynard. supra note 3. at 66.71
See also supra note 9 (summarizing several failed attempts to regulate the cigarette industry). infra note
20 and accompanying text (describing the FDA's reluctance to regulate the cigarette industry)
12. See PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRnIM BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP 17-
18 (1996) (describing the tobacco industry's public relations attack on studies connecting smoking and
health risks); KLUGER, supra note 9, at 23. 71. 292-93.443 (detailing tobacco-,ndustry marketing strategies,
from packaging and labeling techniques to advertisements that appeal to consumer demand for youthful
vigor and social and professional success). For a brief sample of the industry's advertising strategies. see
infra notes 58, 691, and accompanying text.
13. An attorney for R.J. Reynolds (RJR) described the strategy (in an internal memo) as folloss
The aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and disco% cry in general continues
to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensi.e for plaintiffs' las')ers. particularly
sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these case-s was not by
spending all of [RJR's] money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all his
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J 1993) (quoting J Michael Jordan) Very
recent evidence suggests that, in anticipation of possible Itabilit) suits against their clients, some tobacco
lawyers may have stepped outside of professional ethical boundaries. See Milo Geycln. Laivster Shield
Tobacco Firms. Papers Show, WALL ST. J.. Aug. 7. 1997. at A3 (reporting that "lawycrs are said to have
curtailed research into the safety of cigarettes, cleared the release of information about health studies and
even suggested the destruction of unfavorable poll results about smoking and health")
14. E.g., Kelder & Daynard. supra note 3. at 71-72. The first v% ave of tobacco la%%,suits began in the
1950s, resulted in major decisions throughout the 1960s. and tapered out in the 1970s See Robert L Rabin.
Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort LDabuv,. in SMIOKIG POLICY. supra note 6. at
I10, 110. For the most part, the first wave was decided in negligence regimes See id at 114 There
followed a lull in the 1970s, when few tobacco suits ssere brought The second %a'e commenced in the
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reason for hope in the more general trends in products liability law. Whereas
the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by an extraordinary expansion of
liability, reflecting the then-prominent theory of enterprise liability, that trend
largely ended in the mid-1980s. Since then, there has been a substantial retreat
from enterprise liability in the courts.1 5 In addition, one of tobacco plaintiffs'
most promising legal theories, generic product liability, 16 has lost viability.
Courts that were moving toward generic product liability, condemning outright
particular products as unreasonably dangerous (despite the best possible design,
construction, and warnings) and therefore subjecting them to strict liability,
have been repeatedly overridden by their state legislatures., 7 Moreover, the
reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts 8 squarely rejected generic
products liability.1 9
Similarly, for most of this time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
avoided any challenge to the nonregulatory status quo. That decision was due,
not to a perceived lack of jurisdiction, but to a bureaucratic instinct for self-
preservation. In the words of former FDA Commissioner David Kessler:
"There was a sense among many within the agency that you couldn't pull it
off, and the last thing you wanted was to tackle something you couldn't pull
off and have the agency get killed. 20
1980s, see id. at 110, after the passage of legislation mandating warnings on cigarette packaging and
advertising, see Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87; Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282, and after most jurisdictions had adopted
strict liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (imposing strict liability for physical
harm caused by defective products that are unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer). At
the same time, however, considerable public outcry and scholarly opinion began to emerge against strict
liability. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 701-02
(1992).
Only a few years ago, cigarette manufacturers fended off another major attack and successfully
maintained their perfect record of products liability victories. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31 (plurality
opinion) (holding that the labeling acts preempted the plaintiff's claims based on a failure to warn, but not
claims based on express warranty, some types of fraudulent misrepresentation, or conspiracy). In Cipollone.
the industry managed to exhaust a plaintiff and a sizeable law firm that had invested large amounts of
money in the futile effort. See Henry J. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped, A.B.A. J.. Feb. 1993, at 30, 30.
15. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 481 (1990) (noting the increasing percentage
of decisions favoring defendants); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 647-48 (1992) (observing a recent judicial retreat from
broad liability rules).
16. This theory also goes by the terms generic product risk, categorical liability, and product category
liability. See Carl T. Bogus, The Third Revolution in Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (1996).
17. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1315 & n.195 (1991); Joseph
A. Page, Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine Have
a Role To Play?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 108 & n.95 (1996).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
19. See id. § 2 cmt. c, reporters' note at 94-97; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17 at 1314-
15 ("[P]roduct-category liability is not now the governing law in any jurisdiction."). But see Bogus, supra
note 16, at I I- 17 (noting strong academic criticism of the new Restatement). For an important recent series
of articles on generic products liability, see Symposium on Generic Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3 (1996).
20. Freedman & Hwang, supra note 7. The concern was well-founded, as Kessler was later to discover
[Vol. 107: 11631170
19981 The Costs of Cigarettes 1171
Because of the dominant public sentiment regarding smokers and cigarette
manufacturers, the prospect of altering this essentially laissez-faire market has
long seemed remote. Indeed, the inhospitable legal environment reflects-and
is, to some extent, the product of-the traditional American values of self-
reliance and individualism, as well as pervasive public hostility toward
smokers (the usual plaintiffs).2 For a long time, there has been a strong sense
among many scholars, commentators, and members of the public that smokers
who die prematurely get what they bargained for (and, perhaps, what they
deserve) and should not be heard to complain, much less be compensated,
when smoking causes its predictable results.22
Whatever the explanation, cigarette manufacturers have enjoyed substantial
immunities from many of the regulatory mechanisms to which almost every
other product manufacturer is subject. But, as anyone who reads the newspaper
knows, the story does not end there. In the last two or three years. there has
been a partial shift in public sentiment, leading to the beginning of a powerful
political backlash against the industry. -'1 Part of the explanation for this
backlash lies in recent revelations regarding the addictiveness of smoking (and
the extent to which tobacco companies not only knew that smoking is
addictive, but also altered the degree of cigarettes' addictiveness by controlling
nicotine levels) 24  and regarding the cigarette manufacturers' marketing
strategies (targeting children)2 5 and public relations strategies (denying the
when his job and the role of the FDA were threatened bN the Republican backlash to the FDA's initial
regulatory steps. See Jeffrey Goldberg. Next Target: Nicotine. N Y TIMIEs. Aug 4. 1996. § 6 M agazne).
at 22 (describing the harsh responses of leading Republicans. including House Speaker Nest Gingnch and
presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole, to Kessler's aggressi'e push to regulate tobacco. anong other
products).
21. Cf David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders. Outsiders. and Personal Itnuries in an
American CommunitY, 18 L. & SOC'Y REv. 551. 558-59 (1984 (ftnding. in a stud) of a rural county in
Illinois, strong norms of individualism and self-sufficiency running counter to norms that tend to promote
litigiousness).
22. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman. Enemies of Tobacco Po3e Their Own Risks. Ci1 1Ri . Apr 24.
1997, at 19; Richard A. Epstein, Big Tobacco's Big Mistake. N Y TI %IM. June 25. 1997. at A19. Robert
Samuelson, Who Will Finance the Tobacco Settlement ". C1ii. TRiB . Apr. 25. 1997. at 31. of RL -rAmlr.' r
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmi. i (1965) (noting that "'good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous and
therefore producers are not liable for the harms caused b) it") The public's general attitude toaid trial
lawyers, and the unfavorable attention that products litigation has received from commentators and political
leaders, especially in Republican campaigning since the 1980s. has contnbuted to the inhospitable climate
for all products liability plaintiffs. See Carl T. Bogus. Mir on the Connioni Lilt Th7e Stinggle at the Center
of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. I (1995): Stesen P Crole% & Jon D Hanson. Tie Vonpe uinar%
Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages tin Tort Lao. 108 IAR\ L Ri-\ 1787. 1787.89 (1995)
23. See Glenn Frankel. Money Is ipping Big Tobacco's Salej. WASH POST. Apr 27. 1997. at Al
(describing a "massive public backlash against the industry"). Princeton Sure) Research Associates
Telephone Poll, Apr. 19-25. 1996. available ii WESTLAW. POLL Database. Question ID No
USPSRA.051396 R30E (indicating that, of 1751 respondents. 75% described their opinion of tobacco
companies as either "mostly unfavorable" or "\ery unfavorable")
24. See infra notes 144. 161. 219.
25. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3. at 66 ('"[The tobacco industr) denies that it targets minor%
in its promotional campaigns, but evidence garnered from internal industr-, documents points to the
contrary."). For a description of the most recent documents to conic to light indicating that at least one
manufacturer, R.J. Reynolds, aggressively targeted adolescents. see John Mtinz & Saundra Torin. Internal
R.J. Reynolds Documents Detail Cigarette Marketing Armed at Children. WAS1i POST. Jan 15. 1998. at
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health effects of smoking despite knowledge of the enormous risks).26
Partially as a cause and partially as a consequence of these revelations, an
immense third wave of tobacco litigation has emerged, which, unlike either
of the first two waves, appears to pose a considerable threat to the cigarette
industry.28 In addition, in August 1995, after more than fifty years of opting
not to regulate,29 the FDA finally asserted its jurisdiction over tobacco
products and announced plans to regulate tobacco as a drug.30 For the first
time ever, cigarette manufacturers now face a substantial threat of regulation.
Al.
26. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 77 ("[The evidence] makes clear ... that the industry was
well aware of the pharmacologically active, addictive, and harmful nature of its products and that it took
active steps to hide this information from its customers as well as the public at large."); infra notes 144,
161,219.
27. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 70-88 (describing litigation as an effective alternative to
legislative and administrative regulation of tobacco).
28. Previous suits had been brought primarily by smokers themselves. The plaintiffs in those suits
alleged that cigarettes caused their illnesses and injuries, allegations that rang hollow for many judges and
juries who apparently concluded that smokers had no one to blame but themselves. See Robert L. Rabin
& Stephen D. Sugarman, Overview, in SMOKING POLICY, supra note 6, at 3, 16; Gary T. Schwartz,
Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY, supra note 6, at 131, 143; infra note 68 and
accompanying text. The 1990s approach avoids that pitfall: New plaintiffs, such as secondhand smokers
and public health insurers (representing the general population of premium payers) have brought suit. These
plaintiffs have been injured by cigarettes, but cannot easily be said to have chosen to assume the risk. And
the smokers who sue today have newfound evidence suggesting that cigarette manufacturers concealed the
addictiveness of their products, significantly reducing the extent to which smokers can plausibly be said
to have assumed the risks. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 77; see also infra notes 144, 161, 219
(discussing evidence that cigarette manufacturers knew of cigarettes' addictiveness and even manipulated
the levels of nicotine in cigarettes).
Nevertheless, even the most promising third-wave doctrinal theories are, at best, untested, and their
success seems closely tied to the perceived economics of cigarette smoking. See Bob Van Voris, AG Claims
Mere Smoke?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at Al (describing the significance of the economic issues).
Economic theory appears to be gaining in influence in other debates over tobacco policy. See, e.g., Kenneth
E. Warner et al., Criteria for Determining an Optimal Cigarette Tax: The Economist's Perspective, 4
TOBACCO CONTROL 380, 380 (1995) (describing a 1993-1994 debate regarding whether to increase cigarette
taxes and explaining that "[a]lthough political considerations undoubtedly predominated, the debate was
marked by an unusual emphasis on economic theory and analysis").
29. See Saundra Torry, Duel in a Country Courthouse, with Tobacco Regulation at Stake, WAStl.
POST, Aug. 18, 1997, at F7.
30. Jurisdiction was based on the conclusions that the "nicotine in tobacco products is highly addictive,
causes other psychoactive effects, such as relaxation and stimulation, and affects weight regulation" and
that those "responses to nicotine are effects on the structure or function of the body within the meaning
of the Act." Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction over Nicotine-Containing
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,464 (1995) (referring to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)). Based on that jurisdiction, the FDA promulgated
new restrictions on youth access to tobacco products, on tobacco marketing and advertising, and on product
labeling. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804,
807, 820, 897 (1997)). The new regulations attempt to stop the sale of tobacco products to minors by
requiring manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to comply with a variety of packaging, advertising,
marketing, and sales restrictions. See id. The tobacco industry has challenged these restrictions in federal
court. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (invalidating some of the new
regulations). The Fourth Circuit is currently deciding the case. There now appear to be doubts not only
about the regulations' legality, but also about the FDA's jurisdiction altogether. See Torry, supra note 29;
Bob Van Voris, Tobacco: And Now the Appeal, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1997, at Al.
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Consequently, the tobacco companies perceive the threat as real. The once-
unified industry and its take-no-prisoners litigation strategy have given way to
defection in the ranks, historic settlement talks, settlements, and a host of
unprecedented federal legislative proposals. t By far the single most important
development has been the proposed tobacco settlement reached by state
attorneys general and the tobacco industry last June and now being considered
by federal lawmakers. 32 Although the negotiations giving rise to that proposed
settlement seemed rushed, and earlier attempts to regulate have yielded only
modest gains, those active in the process promise that, this time, the
regulations will have teeth.3  This Article is motivated in part by our concern
that this promise will not be kept and that the regulations may fail to address
the problems that sparked them in the first place. More specifically, it is
motivated by the sense that the current debates over smoking policy have
omitted from consideration a type of regulation-ex post incentive-based
regulation-that may well be superior to those being considered.
B. An Introduction to Incentive-Based Regulation and Enterprise Liability
Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists sometimes distinguish
among three types of regulation: command-and-control rules; performance-
based standards; and incentive-based systems. Loosely defined, command-and-
control rules impose specific requirements on regulated firms. For instance, a
polluter might be required to adopt a particular type of technology designed to
31. See. e.g., Placing Restraints on Tobacco's Endangerment of Children and Teens Act. S 1530.
105th Cong. (1997); Healthy and Smokefree Children Act. S 1492. 105th Cong ( 1997i. Uncrs.al Tobacco
Settlement Act, S. 1415. 105th Cong. (1997): see also Judy Fahys. fHatch Unselts tobacco Battle Plan.
SALT LAKE TRIB., No%. 13, 1997. at A9 (pro% iding a brief ocr,,ies, and comparison of these three bills)
One key to the tobacco industry's decision to consider a national settlement was the defeetion of
Liggett Group, Inc., which settled separately with 23 states See Bob Hohler. 23 Ask That Tobacco Pact
Spare Liggett, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14. 1997. at Al10 Under Chief ExecutiNe Bennett S LeBou,. Liggett
has admitted that cigarettes cause health problems and that the industry's marketing strategy targeted
children. See id. Many state attorneys general see the Liggett settlement as crucial to the more general ,,ar
against tobacco. As Minnesota Attorney General Hubert I Humphrey Ill put it. 'Tts is a little like busting
a drug dealer to get at the Colombian cartel." Id
32. See Tobacco Settlement (visited June 25. 1997) <IhttpI//'.,,,, usatoday coinne.l,,,-smoke/
smoke01 .htm>.
33. Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger. for example. was highly slf.-congratulator)
Twenty months ago, when these lawsuits began, nobody would hase dreamed that 20 months
later we would have big tobacco on its heels. becoming the most regulated industry ii this
country. [paying] billions for children's health and the public health
This ... is a historic breakthrough. And I think anybody .,ho wants to question it has the
burden of proof to show what else could have been done to change the .cr, nature of this
industry without banning [cigarettes] .
Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast. June 24. 1997). atailable in LEXIS. News Library. NPR File
(Transcript No. 97062402-210): see also id. (statement of Missisippi Attome, General Mike Moore) Some
policymakers who were not involved in the negotiations %%cre apparently persuaded by such accounts For
example, Senator Orrin Hatch. citing the proposal's public health effects, urged Congress to "-seze upon
[the Attorneys' General] initiative, to improve it . %,,thout jeopardiing any of its basic components."
and to pass implementing legislation quickly. 143 CO'\G RLc S 12.579 (daily ed No% 13. 1997)
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limit the quantity of pollution. Performance-based standards tell firms what
they must accomplish but leave them to decide how best to do so. Such a
standard, for example, might specify the maximum quantity of pollution that
a firm may produce without specifying the means by which the firm is
required to comply. Finally, incentive-based systems force firms to internalize
the total costs of their activities, leaving firms to decide what, if anything, to
do about those costs.-"
Over the past two decades, the clear trend in regulation has been away
from command-and-control rules and toward incentive-based (or, as they are
sometimes referred to, "market-based") systems.35 That trend is consistent
with, and largely the result of, an emerging scholarly consensus that incentive-
based regulatory systems are often the superior approach because they harness
the power of the market to generate efficient outcomes and do not rely on
regulators to attempt to identify and mandate those outcomes. As Susan Rose-
Ackerman explains, an incentive-based system attempts to ensure only that all
appropriate costs are internalized and then permits the decentralized,
independent choices of individuals and businesses to shape policy outcomes.
36
If the institution responsible for administering the incentive-based system can
determine the marginal cost associated with the underlying product (and that
is a big "if"), then it can charge a fee equal to that marginal cost and let the
manufacturers respond.37 This approach arguably avoids the costly and
imperfect process of creating fully specified command-and-control rules or
performance-based standards, yet it ensures that the party with the best
information-the manufacturer-is left with an incentive to self-regulate. Put
differently, command-and-control and performance-based regulations seek to
prohibit or discourage certain market outcomes, while incentive-based
34. For further discussion of the three types of regulation, see infra Part IV.
35. See E. Donald Elliott, Recipe for Industrial Policy: Blending Environmentalism and International
Competitiveness, 19 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 305, 313 (1993) (remarking on the worldwide trend toward "market-
based and incentive-based" approaches to regulation). Moreover, there is a growing consensus among
economists and other policy analysts that the movement toward incentive-based regulation is desirable,
especially in the context of dealing with the external costs of pollution. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 271 (1982) ("Given the difficulties with standard setting, many economists
have urged the use of taxes or other incentive-based systems to deal with spillover problems."); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: Tie Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (making the case for the use of incentive-based
regulations). President Clinton endorsed the trend in a recent executive order on regulatory review: "Each
agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic
incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing
information upon which choices can be made by the public." Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639
(1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1997). The Supreme Court has also encouraged the use of this sort
of regulatory approach by upholding the constitutionality of user fees charged by the Department of
Transportation. See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989). The fees were designed to
internalize the costs of administering federal pipeline safety standards.
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory
Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1215 (1994).
37. As we detail below, there are a variety of types of incentive-based regulation. See infra Part V.
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regulations seek to eliminate the underlying market failures that give rise to
undesirable outcomes.
Enterprise liability, which holds manufacturers liable for all the halms
caused by their products, is one possible ex post incentive-based regime.'" In
other work,4° we have argued that enterprise liability is, on efficiency
grounds, the most desirable products liability regime. This type of regulation,
we have argued, may be particularly appropriate when a product's
characteristics make consumers undeterrable-that is, where tort law can do
very little directly to give consumers incentives to take efficient precautions
beyond adjusting their activity levels."' In this Article, we focus on two
general sources of consumer undeterrability. First, consumers may be
undeterrable if they are optimistic with respect to--that is, if they
systematically underestimate-the risks posed by products. Second, consumers
may be undeterrable if they are able to externalize product risks to third
parties. With respect to the latter, we distinguish between two types of
38. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates. Environtmental Eonoincs A Su,,es. 30 J ECO.
LITERATURE 675, 699-700 (1992) (claiming that incentise-based policies can contnbute to effectie
regulation); Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environnental Problems 1t the Patient
Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95. 95 (1989) (descnbing comntand-and-control
regulation as an approach in which the "regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with
regulations").
39. As we explain infra Part IV, enterprise liability is one of sescral possible forms of mceneti',-bascd
regulation. Although we conclude in that part that some type of (victim-initiated ex post) incentise-based
regulation of cigarettes is likely the most desirable regulatory approach. se ackno%% ledge that enterprise
liability may not be as effective as other incentie-based regulator), options. Neertheless. for the sake ot
simplicity and ease of exposition, we focus infra Parts Il-111 on an idealized enterpnse liabilit regime (%Ve
assume, for instance, that enterprise liability is costless to administer and that causation questions do not
pose a problem for courts. We relax both of those assumptions onfra Part V and compare ditferent
incentive-based regulatory approaches in more realistic terms I Hence. %%e urge the reader to remember that
enterprise liability serves only as a simple and convenient placeholder for the more general concept of e,
post incentive-based regulation.
40. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue. The First-Par Insurance Etternahl n lAi oinnt
Justification for Enterprise Liabiliv. 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990) [hereinafter Hanwn & Logue. The
First-Part), Insurance Externality]; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D Logue. Toward Placing Products Liabiht%
in Context: The Effect of Non-Tort Systems of Deterrence and Other Sources of Undeterabilmt) 21-42 iOct
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter Hanson & Logue. Products
Liability in Context]; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue. Towsard Placing Tort La%% in Contest Taking
Non-Tort Systems of Deterrence Seriously (Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript. on file s ith the Yale latm
Journal) [hereinafter Hanson & Logue, Tort Law in Contextl; see also Jon D Hanson. Kyle D Logue &
Michael Zamore, Smokers' Compensatiot: Toitard a Blueprint for Federal Regulation of C'garette
Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming Spnng 1998) [hereinafter Hanson ct al ]. Crole) & IHlanson.
supra note 22; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson. Rescuing the Retolution 77w Retined Cair for
Enterprise Liabilin', 91 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993) Ihereinafter Crolc) & Hanson. Enterprise Labilirl.
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson. What Labilit Crisis I An AIternatte Etplination for Rece t Et ent
in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. I (1991) Ihereinafter Croles & Hanson. What Liabilia Crtst 'I.
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, A Defense of Pain-and-Suffenng Damage, and Some Thoughts on the
Empirical Side of Law-and-Economics Scholarship (Nos I. 1996) (unpublmshed manuscript. on tile stith
the Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, A Defense of Pain-and-Suffenng Damage',
41. For a more complete discussion of the concept of "undterrabilt)." see Hanson & Logue. Products
Liability in Context, supra note 40. at 21-42. Although we did not then use the termn "undetetrable." %%e
first discussed the idea in Hanson & Logue. Tire First-Part hIsurance Eternalit. supra note 40. at 159.
68, in which we described how the first-party insurance extemalit. produces nonoptinal care le els and
activity levels in consumer product markets.
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externalization: insurance externalities, which occur when consumers have
imperfect first-party insurance for at least some portion of the risks posed by
consumer products, and noninsurance externalities, which occur when a
product causes harm to a third-party bystander.
Insofar as consumers are undeterrable, tort law should place
product-accident costs on manufacturers. Because tort law cannot, by
hypothesis, influence consumer decisionmaking, consumers will take too few
precautions, will fail to demand efficiently safe products from manufacturers,
and will consume too many inefficiently unsafe products. 42 Shifting all the
costs to manufacturers, however, would internalize the relevant costs to the
manufacturers; they, in turn, would pass these costs along to consumers. This
would lead to optimal manufacturer care levels and optimal activity levels.
To see why that is the case, consider as a stylized example an individual
consumer faced with the choice of buying and smoking a pack of cigarettes or
not. If the consumer decides to smoke the cigarettes, she faces the following
costs: $2.00, equaling the nominal price or the purchase price of the cigarettes
(reflecting the production and marketing costs),43 plus another $2.00, equaling
the present value of the future health-related costs to herself and to others
associated with smoking those cigarettes. Ideally, the consumer would purchase
a pack of cigarettes if and only if she valued a pack at $4.00 or higher.
Assume, however, that she does not internalize the health-related costs of
smoking-that is, the additional $2.00 of costs has no effect on her decision
to smoke. In that case, even if she valued the cigarettes at only $3.00, she
would purchase and smoke the cigarettes. Further suppose that the cigarette
manufacturer could completely eliminate the $2.00 per pack risk by investing
an additional $1.50 per pack in safety measures. Obviously, the efficient
outcome would be for the manufacturer to make the investment, thereby
eliminating the risk associated with the cigarettes.44 Assuming consumer
undeterrability and the absence of manufacturer liability, however, the
manufacturer would not invest the $1.50 in risk reduction because doing so
would cause the manufacturer to lose customers. Consumers would not
perceive the $2.00 reduction in risks associated with the additional cost and
would instead purchase cheaper and less safe brands.
Those results would present at least two deterrence-related problems. First,
too many packs of cigarettes would be purchased; in other words, activity
42. By "efficiently safe products," we mean products for which manufacturers have made all cost-
justified investments in safety. "Inefficiently unsafe products" are those for which not all such investments
have been made.
43. We are assuming for purposes of this example that the market for cigarettes is competitive and
that manufacturers enjoy only normal profits.
44. To put this conclusion in terms of Learned Hand's famous formula, see United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), because the burden of preventing the accident ($1.50) is
less than the expected accident cost ($2.00), which amounts to the probability times the magnitude of the
loss, efficiency requires that the accident be prevented.
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levels would be too high. Second, manufacturers would invest too little in
accident prevention; that is, manufacturer care levels would be too low.' - The
economic case for enterprise liability and other forms of ex post incentive-
based regulation, therefore, is that they would force manufacturers, and in turn
consumers, to internalize the total costs of cigarettes. As a consequence, both
activity levels and manufacturer care levels would be pushed in the efficient
direction. Because the nominal price would equal the total real price,
consumers would purchase the efficient quantity of cigarettes." There would,
in short, be no welfare loss associated with the wedge between consumers'
valuation of cigarettes and the total social cost of cigarettes in the market.
Our previous work analyzing these dynamics, like much of the efficiency-
oriented products liability scholarship, was written at a considerable distance
from real-world examples and implicitly assumed that all consumer products
are alike. 7 One goal of this Article, therefore, is to begin to examine the
breadth of the case for enterprise liability by analyzing a specific consumer
product. For a number of reasons, cigarettes are especially worth studying. In
addition to the fact that cigarette-caused harms have become the most salient
products liability topic of the decade, if not of the century," cigarettes present
45. A third problem is that consumers would lack incenti.es to take efficient lc~ls or care in using
products. As we explain itnfra Parts I1-Ill, however. there ma\ be little that tort la\% can or need do about
consumer care levels, especially in the cigarette context
46. Our consumer, who valued the next pack at only S3 00. %%,ould not buy because the price %% ould
be S3.50.
47. This tendency may reflect the influence of the economic analysis of lass,. sich critics claim too
often bases sweeping policy generalizations on simplistic models Or perhaps it is a consequence of the fact
that products liability lav has experienced several dramatic transformations in the p"t tilty Nears.
transformations that make it difficult for scholars to do anything but paint %% ith a broad brush Ne' ertheless.
it seems to us that too little attention has been paid to sshether and precisely hos ,anation, acros products
affect the analysis. Moreover, the specific examples used are often quite exceptional products See e &,
Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?. supra note 40. at 84-90 (discussing a %anets of products and
services, including vaccines, that pose case-specific issues)
48. The legal literature is by no means lacking in articles on cigarette manufacturer liabilit) Many
of the law review articles favoring cigarette manufacturer habilht hae been doctrnal in nature :or
example, there have been numerous articles examining the preemptise effect of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act. See. e.g.. Richard C Ausness. Cigarette Coanpan Labtlht Preemption
Public Polic; and Alternative Compensation Sv'stens. 39 S' RArL st, L Rt\' 897 (1988) [hereinafter
Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability] (arguing that the federal cigarette labeling la%. should not be read
to preempt state products liability claims): Peter F Rile%. Note. 1he Prohwct Liabihri q] the robato
Industr : Has Cipollone v. Liggett Group Finallh Purced the Cigarette Manufiatturers" Aura ol
Invincibilit Y?, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989) (discussing the possibility that Cipollone ssould oscrcome the
industry's theretofore seemingly invincible federal preemption argument) In addition, there hase been
efforts to fashion new theories for holding cigarette companies liable See, e %: . Bogus. upra note 22. at
46-59 (arguing for the application of generic product liability to cigarettes). Kelder & DaN nard, upra note
3, at 64 (arguing that, notwithstanding federal labeling lax. successful products liabithi claims against the
cigarette industry are becoming increasingly likely because of se.eral factors. including the discoscr) o)
internal industry documents detailing knowledge of the destructise properties of itotmne. industry eflorts
to manipulate nicotine, and the unavailability of assumption-of-sk defenses in cases tiled by stale). Irene
Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers' Batter%. 32 Hot s L R-\i 615. 660.87 i 1995) (suggesting
the use of a battery claim against cigarette companies as a means of cireumseniing a-,suttption.of -rtsk
defenses); Alex J. Grant, Note, New Theories of Cigarette Labilitt The Restatement (Third) of Torts and
the Viability of a Design Defect Cause of Action. 3 CORNEu I L & Pt POL" 343 01994) (arguing that
the Restatement (Third)'s reversal of the presumed immunit for cigarette companies and the existence of
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an especially attractive subject of study because of an abundance of relevant
empirical data. And because of a number of important recent developments, we
regard this as an ideal moment to reevaluate the economic case for regulating
cigarettes and for comparing alternative regulatory regimes.49
C. The Absence of Incentive-Based Regulation in the Proposed Settlement
Despite the growing popularity of incentive-based regulation among
scholars and policymakers, the proposed tobacco settlement agreement is
largely devoid of incentive-based regulation. Instead, the proposal relies almost
entirely on command-and-control and performance-based regulations.5" This
omission likely has something to do with the composition of the team that
negotiated the settlement. Lawyers for the plaintiffs and defendants and some
public health experts were present, 51 but no economists or academic policy
analysts participated. Public health advocates have long believed that the
market for cigarettes is deeply and dangerously flawed and that the deceptive
low-tar alternative cigarette designs provide a basis for bringing design defect claims against high-tar
cigarette manufacturers); Bradley M. Soos, Note, Adding Smoke to the Cloud of Tobacco Litigation-A New
Plaintiff. The Involuntary Smoker, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 111 (1988) (arguing in favor of allowing passive
smoke victims to bring enterprise liability claims against cigarette companies). And some commentators
have--as we do in this Article-employed the tools of economic analysis to argue in favor of either sonic
form of absolute cigarette manufacturer liability or an alternative no-fault regime that would place costs
on manufacturers. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An
Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1990) [hereinafter Ausness, Compensation]
(proposing a no-fault compensation system on corrective justice grounds); Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes
and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 (1977) (providing a prescient argument in favor of making
manufacturers liable to welfare agencies that bear some of the costs of cigarettes); Frank J. Vandall,
Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52
OHIO ST. U. 405 (1991) (arguing for absolute cigarette manufacturer liability on cost-internalization
grounds).
49. Specifically, there have been three significant developments. First, on a theoretical level, numerous
scholars have begun to employ efficiency analysis to argue in favor of the status quo and against holding
cigarette manufacturers liable. See, e.g., WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEAUrII
HABITS (1991); ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SMOKING (1992); W.
Kip Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (1992); Schwartz, supra note 28; Gregory P. Taxin,
Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-Related Injuries: "Smokers, Give It Up!", 16 J. PROD. & ToXICs
LIAB. 221 (1994). More generally, an anti-tort and anti-generic-products-liability sentiment has come to
dominate the products liability literature. See generally Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note
40, at 713-67 (summarizing the products liability literature). Second, on a practical level, a great deal of
new evidence has come to light regarding the practices of cigarette manufacturers and the effects of
nicotine and cigarette smoke. For some examples of that sort of evidence, see infra notes 64, 104, 144, 161,
219, and accompanying text. Finally, on a legal level, a third wave of cigarette litigation has emerged, see
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, and dramatic new federal regulation of the tobacco market is
now under consideration, see infra Part VI. As a result of those three developments, this is an opportune
moment to reconsider whether cigarette manufacturer liability or alternative forms of regulation might be
justified on economic or policy grounds.
50. See infra Part VI (reviewing and criticizing relevant aspects of the proposal). Given the proposal's
exclusive reliance on command-and-control and performance-based regulation, it is no surprise that the
debates over the proposal have centered on whether the performance-based standards are properly calibrated
and whether the mandatory command-and-control prohibitions and requirements are too draconian or
whether, instead, they contain too many loopholes to be effective.
5 1. See Saundra Torry, Army of Capital Lobbyists Has Drawn $8 Million on Tobacco Fight, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 1997, at A4.
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practices of manufacturers, coupled with the devastating health effects of
smoking, are evidence enough that the underlying market is in need of
substantial regulation.52 Perhaps because most public health advocates are not
economists, however, these specialists have overlooked the potential market-
correcting role of incentive-based regulation. They recognize that there is a
disease but seek to treat only its symptoms."
In contrast to public health advocates, most of the economists or
efficiency-minded legal scholars who have considered the issue have concluded
that the cigarette market functions well and is in no need of regulatory
oversight.-4 These scholars have therefore not reached the next question,
which no doubt would have been pertinent to the settlement talks: Assuming
that there are problems with the cigarette market, what regulatory mechanisms
should be implemented? 5" Thus, economists have provided little in the way
of relevant guidance.
In this Article, we hope to bridge the void that separates economics and
public health with respect to tobacco regulation and, by doing so, to suggest
a means of improving the imminent resolution of the long-term struggle
between the cigarette industry and those who would regulate it. We offer a
substantially refined version of the public health diagnosis: The unregulated
market cannot be relied upon to produce the efficient level of safety in
cigarette design and manufacturing or the efficient amount of smoking and is
in need of significant regulation. Our prescription, however, is informed by
economics: Some form of incentive-based regulation is the best cure for the
underlying disease.
D. Overview
In the most general terms, this Article attempts to answer two questions:
Should the cigarette market be regulated? If so, how?5' Parts II-III are
52. Interview with Richard Daynard. Chair of the Tobacco Products Ltablat Project. Northeastern
University School of Law, in Boston. Mass. (Dec. 19. 1997): cf Bnon J. Fox & Stanton A Glantz. The
National Tobacco Deal Compared with Public Health 2-6 (1997) (unpublished manuscript. on tile %%,ith t e
Yale Law Journal) (outlining various public health benchmarks that ,,ere established before the proposed
tobacco settlement was announced).
53. There are, of course, "public health" economists %% ho bele% that the cigarette market Is tlv, cd
and in need of regulatory intervention. See. e.g.. Jeffrey E. Hams. TLting Tar and Nt nn. 70 Am ECo',
REv. 300, 300 (1980).
54. See. e.g., MANNING Er AL., supra note 49: TOLuso\ & WAG\ER. supra note 49. V'IS( ., supra
note 49; Schwartz, supra note 28: Taxin. supra note 49 For an o,,erje, of that literature. see Infca
Subsection III.C. I.
55. Arguably, an answer to that question is implicit in much of the economic ,,ork a.sumimng that a
Pigouvian tax--one of several possible types of tncenttvse-based systems-.ould be the appropniate
regulatory approach. See infra notes 436-439 and accompanying text
56. This Article leaves a number of issues for us to address in future ,,ork For e.ainple. ,%c do not
discuss in detail the distributional effects of our proposed ex post mcent'e-bascd regime Nor do e
address the international ramifications of our proposal Instead. this Article is limited to ihe etficiencN
concerns that are relevant to the questions of whether and hov, to regulate the cigarette market in the
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devoted to the first question, and Parts IV-VI are devoted to the second. For
the reader who needs to be convinced that the cigarette market requires
government intervention of any kind, Parts II-III will be essential. For the
reader who already holds the view that government intervention is warranted,
those parts could be skimmed or even skipped, and attention focused on Parts
V-VII.
57
In Part II, we respond to the argument that consumers are adequately
informed of the risks of smoking. We conclude that when consumers are
making the decision whether and how much to smoke they do not (and perhaps
cannot) fully take into account the risks that cigarettes pose. We also point out
how an ideal enterprise liability system could respond to that problem. Part III
then observes that, even if smokers were well-informed of the risks of
smoking, they would still ignore many of those risks because they could
externalize those risks onto third parties either through imperfectly risk-
classified first-party insurance arrangements or through the effects of passive
smoke.
It is worth highlighting one of the most interesting challenges we face in
Part III: providing a response to the economists' arguments that cigarettes do
not, on balance, impose negative external costs on society but instead produce
a windfall social gain because of the savings resulting from cigarette-induced
premature deaths-savings mostly in the form of smokers' unclaimed pension
and nursing home entitlements. Thus, the economists' argument goes, cigarette
consumption should not be deterred, but should be subsidized. In Part III, we
offer both an economic and a noneconomic critique of that position. Whereas
some economists have concluded that cigarettes create a net social benefit of
$0.32 per pack, we conclude-using those economists' data but changing a few
key assumptions-that cigarettes (at the current level of production) produce
almost $7.00 per pack of net social cost. After doing so, we demonstrate how
ex post incentive-based regulation can respond to that problem of negative
externalities.
Part IV looks more generally at potential regulatory responses to the
market failures detailed in Parts II-III. Borrowing from and building upon the
literature in the economics of regulation, Part IV describes the advantages of
incentive-based regulation over command-and-control and performance-based
regulation in dealing with the deterrence problems associated with cigarettes.
Specifically, we explain why one type of incentive-based regulation-victim-
United States.
57. A word of caution is in order here, however. In our experience, many people believe that markets
fail and that regulation is therefore necessary, but do not identify the precise ways in which markets fail.
Thus they do not provide any useful basis for comparing regulatory responses. See Crolcy & Hanson,
Enterprise Liability, supra note 40, at 736-67 (making this point with respect to several prominent products
liability scholars). We offer an extended treatment of market failures because doing so is, in our view, a
necessary condition for offering worthwhile regulatory proposals.
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initiated ex post incentive-based regulation-is generally superior to its
alternatives, including ex ante incentive-based approaches such as Pigouvian
taxes.
Part V then turns to several potential ex post incentive-based regimes and
suggests their strengths and weaknesses. We then provide a very rough outline
of a particular type of ex post incentive-based regime, which we call smokers'
compensation. We also introduce the idea of the cigarette card, a technological
innovation that would improve the effectiveness of any regime for regulating
cigarettes, including enterprise liability and smokers' compensation. Part V also
provides a brief discussion of some of the difficult issues that would arise
when planning a system of ex post incentive-based regulation. In particular, we
seek to address two potential transition problems, first by limiting liability for
manufacturers to the particular amount of harm the), caused (including, to the
extent it is politically possible, the harm they caused already), and second by
suggesting solutions to the problem of judgment-proof defendants. We also
briefly discuss the problems of widely dispersed harm and poorly informed
defendants as challenges to an ex post incentive-based regime.
Finally, Part VI applies the analysis of this Article to the proposed tobacco
settlement agreement. We conclude that the proposed agreement is almost
exactly the opposite of what should be implemented. If comprehensive and
preemptive federal legislation is truly on the horizon, we recommend that
Congress reject the current proposal in favor of a strong form of ex post
incentive-based regulation. At the very least, we recommend that Congress not
eliminate products liability law, as it is the only existing serious deterrent that
cigarette manufacturers face. If forced to choose, we would favor the status
quo over the proposed settlement.
II. THE FIRST SOURCE OF CONSUMER UNDETERRABILITY:
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
A. Current Views of Consumer Risk Perceptions
Most of the debate over how, if at all, cigarette manufacturers should be
regulated has boiled down to a debate over who knew what when about the
risks of smoking. The widely held view today, among both the public generally
and legal economists specifically, is that the vast majority of consumers are
well aware of those risks. It follows (at least for the legal economists) that
regulation of the cigarette market is unwarranted, except perhaps on
paternalistic grounds.
From the early years of this century through the 1950s, cigarette
manufacturers frequently made advertising claims that would seem astonishing
19981
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today, claims that their products were innocuous or even beneficial. 8
Although literature on the ill-health effects of smoking began to appear in the
1950s, 59 it was not until the 1960s that such research came into public focus
with prominent government reports.60 Those reports established the basic
links between smoking and disease that have been reinforced and elaborated
ever since, giving rise to the first efforts to regulate the market for
cigarettes.6 ' Unfortunately, those regulatory efforts did little to reduce the
popular incidence or acceptance of smoking.62 They did serve, however, to
create a widespread perception that consumers were informed of the risks
associated with smoking. Indeed, it was that perception that made it difficult
for smokers to win lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers: Despite the advent
58. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 137. Not all of the claims could be explained by honest naivct6
about the dangers of smoking. Professor Schwartz notes that, as early as the 1930s, the hazards of cigarettes
were referred to in popular discourse, suspected by many physicians, and at least tentatively indicated by
medical research. See id.; see also Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 90, 97 (1986). In that 20-year interim, tobacco companies also did little or no research on the possible
causal connection between their products and cancer. See Edell, supra, at 97-98.
Tobacco industry advertising may have contributed to consumer confusion. According to Richard
Kluger, for example, even after the 1955 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgation of advertising
guidelines, cigarette companies could advertise with language that suggested that their brands were healthy
and safe while explicitly lauding their products' taste and flavor. See KLUGER, supra note 9, at 185.
59. See, e.g., ALTON OCHSNER, SMOKING AND HEALTH (1959) (discussing early evidence against
smoking); see also Schwartz, supra note 28, at 137 (surveying the early literature on the health effects of
smoking).
60. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE 5-7 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]; ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS
OF LONDON, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON ON
SMOKING IN RELATION TO CANCER OF THE LUNG AND OTHER DISEASES 1 (1962). The history of medical
and public health reports has been reviewed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, No
SMOKING 1-5 (1989); SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-10; see also ALBERTA
D. BERTON, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1980) (providing a bibliography
of sources).
61. The Surgeon General's watershed 1964 report, for example, contributed directly to changes in U.S.
advertising regulations and to federally mandated package and advertising warnings. See Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1340 (1994)); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). Ironically, it was these very warnings that the industry
later used to fend off tort liability. See supra note 9; see also KLUGER, supra note 9, at 290 ("[W]hile the
labeling law did not explicitly preclude state liability suits from being filed, it came close to providing the
industry with an ironclad defense .... ).
62. Per capita sales of cigarettes to Americans over 18 actually rose for the first three years after the
1969 Act. See KLUGER, supra note 9, at 377. There are several plausible explanations for the apparent
failure of the warning requirements and advertising restrictions. Some argue that tobacco companies met
the new restrictions on advertising with great creativity, devising new marketing campaigns, such as the
"lifestyle" campaigns featuring the rugged, individualistic "Marlboro Man." See id. at 377, 444. Moreover,
the restrictions freed the industry of antismoking advertisements that had been required by the fairness
doctrine, which was then in effect under the rules of the Federal Communications Act. See id. at 332-35;
supra note 9. Another hypothesis is that consumers were already well-informed of the risks, and the
additional warnings were redundant. Yet another hypothesis is that the advertisement warnings and
information did not influence even uninformed consumers because of the nature of their information
problems. See infra Section II.B.
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of strict liability, juries almost invariably treated smoker-plaintiffs as wholly
responsible for their actions in starting to smoke and maintaining the habit.
6
1
As a general matter, the risks of smoking are not seriously contested
within the medical and scientific communities. The weight of evidence about
adverse health effects of cigarettes continues to increase, and confidence in the
conclusion that smoking poses numerous particular health risks-including
various risks of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and chronic obstructive lung
disease-is greater now than ever.6'
The general public appears to be getting the message. In 1986, for
example, more than 70% of all adults agreed that "any amount" of smoking
is hazardous to health; most of the other 30% acknowledged that *'heavy
smoking" is hazardous.65 Smokers, too, are apparently aware of the hazards.
In a 1985 Gallup poll, 90% of current smokers and 96% of former smokers
reported believing that "[c]igarette smoking is harmful" to health.' Although
terms such as "hazardous" and "harmful" are somewhat imprecise, 7 It is
quite clear that the vast majority of consumers have not assumed that smoking
is riskless (at least not in the recent past). Moreover, most lawmakers, courts,
and juries apparently perceive consumers to be well-informed of the risks."
63. See, e.g., Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28, at 3. 16: Schssartz. supra note 28. at 131. 143. Glenn
Collins, Cigarette Makers Win Verdict in Suit b) a Smokers Faauln. N Y_ T:'tLs. Aug 24, 1996. at 8
(describing the response of the jury in one such case); cf. infra note 68 (describing plaintiffs' strategies to
avoid juries' blame).
64. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. A recent international stud) by the Imperial Cancer
Research Fund goes beyond the earlier one-countr. limited-period reports See PI:TO ft AtL. supra note
I. This study compiles data on smoking mortality since 1950 in deseloped countries around the sorld.
seeking the total picture of the worldwide health effects of smoking and estimating the impact of smoking
on developing countries. Peto and his colleagues estimate that. in developed counties alone, smoking kills
two million people each year, see id. at A.7 & tblI. and that tobacco %%ill have figured in the deaths of
approximately 60 million people bet%%een the years of 1950 and 2000. see id. at A 8 to 9 & tbl 2
Estimating total mortality, the authors compute that half a billion of the %sorld's 5 5 billion people ssill dic
of smoking-related illness. See id. at A.103.
65. SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. supra note 3. at 182 tbl 4
66. Id. at 203 tbl.14.
67. See VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 48.
68. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Heat Is On. A.B.A. J . Sept. 1994. at 60 (quoting a Philip Moms
defense counsel's opinion that the fundamental flaw ssith plaintiffs' cases is that e scoone understands that
tobacco is risky, and thus cigarettes are not dangerous beyond expectations) Indeed. the defining stratcg.
of third-wave cases is to escape the consequences of this perception First. suits have been brought on
behalf of parties who did not choose to smoke cigarettes in any sencs. but %sho ssere neertheless injured
See, e.g., Butler v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 8.1 Tobacco Prods Litig. Rep- 3 I i.%iss Cir Ct 1993)
(complaint) (involving a suit over secondhand smoke): Broin ' Philip Mors The Class Acton on Behalf
of Current and Former Flight Attendants hnured bi Eiposure to Second land Smoke in Airline
Cabins-Setlenent Agreement (visited Dec. II. 1997) <http.//%%%ww.kinsclla.comfbroir/scttagrec html>
(same). These suits may blaze trails for other plaintiffs %%hose health has likel% been affected by proximit
to smokers, either in the workplace or in the home.
Another group of parties that bears the costs of smoking %% ithout any choice is state goernment, and
health care providers that pay for medical care for chronic injuries, man) of %%hich are linked to smoking
Suits by state attorneys general were led by Moore % Ainerican Tobacco Co. 9 2 Tobacco Prods Ling
Rep. 3.35 (Miss. Ch. Ct. May 23. 1994). in which the Attorney General of Mississippi seeks to recoser
Medicaid expenses. The case was based on theories of unjust ennchment and knosing conspiracy to
merchandise an unreasonably dangerous and addicti 'e product to adults and minors. sre Id. and %%as settled
for S3.366 billion over the next 25 years, see Miss. Experts E.tpect Tobacco Funds flui Month S174
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Just as the public has come to perceive tobacco consumers as well-
informed, so too have efficiency-minded legal scholars. As a consequence,
these scholars argue, cigarette manufacturers' virtual immunity from tort
liability should continue.69 Of those scholars, however, W. Kip Viscusi is
perhaps the only one to have studied carefully the nature of consumer
information regarding cigarettes' risks.70 Drawing on "detailed analysis of
large bodies of empirical evidence, not ... conjecture or anecdotal
evidence,"71 Viscusi rejects the conclusion that "individuals are ... ignorant
of the hazards they face ... [or,] if they are aware of the risks, [that] they
ignore them when making their smoking decisions. 72 He refers to the
conception of uninformed consumers as the "stylized smoker" model.73
Contrary to that model, Viscusi argues, the evidence suggests that "smoking
rates [do not] greatly exceed what would prevail in a fully informed market
context. 74 In other words, the evidence is more consistent with what he calls
the "fully rational" smoker model than with the stylized smoker model. 75
Million in Settlement Coining, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Jan. 2, 1998, at A 12.
A second general strategy is to stage a frontal attack on the premises of the assumption-of-risk
defense while continuing to represent traditional, firsthand, "elective" smokers. Under this strategy,
plaintiffs attempt, first, to challenge tobacco manufacturers' professed naivet6 about the health effects of
smoking, both currently and in the past. This requires unearthing evidence that manufacturers know, and
knew, that cigarettes can be lethal, and perhaps concealed the information, or even sponsored studies geared
to show the opposite. The second prong of the attack, already tried during the second wave, see Rabin,
supra note 14, at 123-125; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28, at 16, is to highlight the youth of beginning
smokers and the role of addiction to illustrate the lack of free choice involved in starting and maintaining
the smoking habit. The two prongs can even be combined by showing that cigarette manufacturers were
aware of the addictive properties of nicotine and quietly developed the technology to manipulate nicotine
levels, at least partly to encourage addiction. It was one of these third-wave cases, based on a novel cause
of action alleging a willful tort, that helped lead to the unprecedented March 13, 1996, Liggett settlement.
See Castano Settlement with Brooke Group Ltd. and Liggett Group Inc., 11.2 Tobacco Prods. Litig. Rep.
3.147 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 1996). Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1044 Section "B," 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7426 (E.D. La. 1994), was filed on March 29, 1994, on behalf of all nicotine-dependent
persons against the five largest tobacco companies. See also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-
1044 Section "B," 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13438 (E.D. La. 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss); cf R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (defining a class of all Florida
citizens, and their survivors, who have or had a medical condition or disease caused by addiction to
smoking).
69. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 28, at 156-57 (concluding that strict liability doctrines "turn out
to have no obvious application to cigarettes-products whose hazards (however extreme) are both inherent
and reasonably well known by consumers"); Epstein, supra note 22 (arguing that because consumers are
well-informed of the risks of smoking, "individual smokers should own up to the consequences of their
actions" and "the tobacco industry's liability for smoking-related illnesses should be zero").
70. See Viscusi, supra note 49.
71. Id. at 139.
72. Id. at 144.
73. Id. at 139.
74. Id. at 144.
75. Id. Viscusi imagines a third possible model: the "smoker with cognitive limitations," who is subject
to certain well-recognized cognitive biases. Id. at 139. In his view, the fact that consumers overestimate
risks is consistent with that model. Thus, the evidence does not adequately distinguish between the fully
rational smoker model and the smoker-with-cognitive-limitations model. Either way, according to Viscusi.
there is not too much smoking. See id. at 144.
1184
The Costs of Cigarettes
Viscusi bases his conclusions about consumers' risk estimation primarily
on the results of a study "commissioned by the defense law firms in support
of tobacco litigation efforts. 76 As part of that study, over 3000 subjects in
a nationally representative telephone sample were asked a number of questions,
including the following: "Among 100 cigarette smokers, how many of them
do you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?"" The average
response was that forty-three of the smokers would get lung cancer, leading
Viscusi to conclude that consumers consider smoking to have a 43% chance
of causing lung cancer.7  He observes that this perception substantially
exceeds what he estimates to be the actual lung cancer risk of between 5% and
10%, 79 as well as his estimates of total mortality risk to the smoker
(excluding danger to others from smoking-related fires, etc.) of 16% to
36%.0 In short, "[t]he potential hazards of smoking are not a closely guarded
secret, and if anything risk perceptions for some smoking risks, such as lung
cancer, may be too high."'"
If one takes Viscusi's figures as to the actual lung cancer mortality risk of
smoking as accurate, the survey respondents do appear on average to be
pessimistic with respect to the risks of cigarettes. A tentative inference that
consumers judge smoking to carry with it a 35% to 45% risk of fatal lung
cancer seems, in the abstract, plausible. 2 Based on such an inference, Viscusi
implies that there is no useful role to be served by tort liability."1
Just because consumers are aware that smoking has some risk, however,
does not imply that consumers are filXy informed of those risks. In the
remainder of this part, we use Viscusi's thoroughgoing empirical research as
our foil as we challenge the conventional wisdom that consumers are
adequately informed. Among other things, we argue that the issue of consumer
information is far more complex than is commonly understood. For
76. Id. at 84 n.6. Viscusi emphasizes that the underlying "surey design w-as quite sound- and that.
in any event, he "undertook a variety of sensitivity tests.- including replicating the entire surney on a
sample of North Carolina residents. Id. at vi. "'All these efforts corroborated the survey results " Id.
Although Viscusi explains that -'[r]eaders wishing to validate the sursey can readily do so w ith the aid of
a telephone," id.. we have opted in this Article to accept Viscus's evidence at face Nalue That is. wse
assume that the questions on the survey were asked of a randomized national sample and that the responses
that Viscusi reports are accurate. As we bnefly indicate below. howeser there appear to hase been several
significant defects in the design of the survey itself. See infra notes 795. 824.
77. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 155.
78. See id. at 68.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 70.
81. Id. at 145.
82. Cf. id. at 7 (stating that, from the survey responses. "'the entire population assesses this risk at 43.
and even current smokers have a substantial risk perception of .37').
83. In his discussion of possible policy responses. Viscusi does not een consider a role for tort law
That is consistent with his view that tort law should be employed only in cireumstances where consumers
underestimate risks. See W. Kip VISCUSi. REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 64-65 (1991). see also Croley
& Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 40. at 743-51 (summanzng a substantial portion of Viscsit's
products liability scholarship).
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unregulated markets to work well, we conclude, consumers must be much
better informed than they now appear to be.84
B. A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom
As the previous section indicates, there are two sorts of informational
arguments to which we need to respond: Viscusi's somewhat technical and
survey-specific arguments and the loose common-sense notion that everyone
knows smoking is dangerous. We therefore offer two types of responses. The
first type is directed solely at the surveys on which Viscusi relies and the logic
that he employs in drawing policy conclusions. Because the responses of the
first type are survey-specific, we have opted to place them in an appendix. The
thrust of the arguments in the appendix is that the survey and survey data on
which Viscusi relies are misleading and that, in any case, Viscusi's
interpretations of that data are, at best, dubious. In this section, we provide a
second type of response, which is of more general significance. That is, we
seek to rebut the view that cigarette smokers are adequately informed. We do
so by exploring a number of different ways in which consumers may lack full
information relevant to their individual decisions about whether to smoke. In
particular, we focus on four areas of potential distortion: first, the "third-person
effect" whereby consumers may fail to apply generalized perceptions of risk
to themselves; second, the absence of brand- or type-specific risk information;
third, the underestimation of cigarettes' riskiness relative to other products and
choices; and fourth, information problems related to cigarettes' addictiveness.
1. The Third-Person Effect
Although consumers appear to overestimate the health risks of smoking
when responding to survey questionnaires, it is not at all clear that these same
consumers apply their overinflated risk perceptions to themselves. Indeed,
social psychologist Martin Fishbein has criticized the use of general questions
in smoking surveys (like those in Viscusi's work) on just those grounds.85
Distinguishing between personal beliefs and general beliefs, Fishbein notes that
it is beliefs about the risks to oneself, not generalized notions of risk, that
affect people's behavior: "Although a person may believe that 'Smoking
increases the chances of lung cancer,' this will have little influence on his or
her smoking decision if he or she also believes that 'My smoking is not
84. Moreover, as we argue infra Part III, consumer information levels are by no means the only
relevant factor in deciding whether manufacturers should be liable for cigarette-caused harms.
85. See Martin Fishbein, Social Psychological Analysis of Smoking Behavior, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 179, 183-84 (J. Richard Eiser ed., 1982).
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increasing my chance of getting lung cancer. '  We refer to this
phenomenon, well-known in survey research, 7 as the "third-person effect."
Viscusi concedes that there may be "a discrepancy between the perceived
risk to others and the perceived risk to oneself,"" but he ultimately dismisses
the possible influence of such a third-person effect by pointing to evidence that
"risk assessments influence smoking behavior." 9 His point is that because
smokers overestimate smoking's risks by less than nonsmokers do, smokers'
risk perceptions partially explain their decision to smoke.9° The third-person
effect, however, refers to how people calculate personal risks and not to
whether or not they respond to those risks they perceive.
Viscusi seems to assume that, if the third-party effect were present,
consumers' personalized beliefs would be that smoking is risk-free, but this is
not a necessary implication.9' Suppose, for example, that personalized risk
assessments tend to be, on average, one-twentieth of consumers' generalized
risk assessments. Under that assumption, Viscusi's survey evidence would
imply that consumers significantly underestimate the personal risks of smoking
at the same time that his evidence regarding risk perceptions could still be said
to influence smoking behavior. Because Viscusi does not disentangle the
influence of the third-person effect from other factors, he may well be
overstating dramatically consumers' personalized assessments of smoking's
risks.
Recently published survey results by Michael Schoenbaum strongly
suggest that at least some smokers believe the personalized risks of smoking
are significantly lower than the general risks of smoking. 2 In Schoenbaum's
study, adults ranging from fifty to sixty-two years old were asked to assess
their chances of reaching the age of seventy-five. 9 Schoenbaum compared
86. Id. at 184.
87. See, e.g., Ralf Schwarzer. Optuntsn. Vidnerabilt. and Self.Beluefs as Itealhh-Related Coginitions
A Systematic Oven,iew. 9 PSYCHOL. & HEALni 161. 162-63 (1994) (describing pschological phenomena
of "defensive optimism" and the "social comparison bias. ' % hich g: e rise to beliefs such as, -M) fello%
smokers might get lung cancer one day, but it is less likely that this vould happen to me". loop Van Dcr
Pligt. Risk Perception and Self-Protective Behavior. I EL R PS)CiiOLOGIST 34. 36 (1996) i"lAlhhough
people seem quite aware of the relative risk of specific actiuite,, or behasiors. things tend to change shen
this knowledge is applied to their own behavior. For instance, man% smokers accept the association betvccn
smoking cigarettes and disease, but do not beliese themsches to be personally at risk
88. Viscusi, supra note 49, at 64.
89. Id. at 64, see also id. at I10 (explaining that risk perceptions do appear to play a slight rule in
people's propensity to smoke).
90. See id. at 110. It is worth noting that Viscusi's esidence suggests that %ar ing risk perceptions play
a de minimis role. See id. (reporting that smokers pereee a lung cancer risk of 37%. shmch is only 6c
less than the average perception of the full sample. and characterizing the discrcpancy as "not stark"). id
at 114 (calling the discrepancy a "minor disparity")
91. Cf infra notes 252-253 and accompanying text (explaining lok the "'stlized smoker" model.
which Viscusi concludes is inconsistent with the esidence. ma% be a slra', man because of the extreme
assumptions underlying it).
92. See Michael Schoenbaum. Do Smokers Understand the ,lortalt', l!fect3 el Stmoi.mtinm .iide'iteC
from the Health and Retirement Sun'e%. 87 AMI. J. Pt B HiEAtTi. 755 t1997i
93. See id. at 756.
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those assessments of perceived survival chances with epidemiological
predictions for such individuals, controlling for smoking status. In doing so,
he found that survival expectations of "never," "former," and "current light"
smokers were quite close to actuarial predictions. 94 In contrast, among
"current heavy smokers"-those who smoked twenty-five cigarettes (that is,
1.25 packs) or more per day-expectations of reaching the age of seventy-five
were approximately twice as high as actuarial predictions." Specifically,
heavy-smoking men predicted a 50.1% chance of reaching seventy-five, despite
actuarial chances of just 26.3%, while heavy-smoking women predicted a
60.1% chance of surviving to seventy-five, despite actuarial chances of only
30.8%.96 Contrary to Viscusi's suggestion, Schoenbaum's evidence
demonstrates that heavy smokers underestimate, without discounting entirely,
the risks to themselves. 97 Moreover, Schoenbaum notes, younger smokers
may be even more optimistic. Schoenbaum's sample was aged fifty and over,
an age group in which most smokers have been smoking for more
than 3 decades and have presumably begun suffering adverse health
effects of smoking .... That respondents in this sample apparently
underestimated their risk of premature mortality, possibly to a large
extent, suggests that typical new smokers may be making even less
well informed decisions.98
Schoenbaum's study, therefore, raises significant doubts about Viscusi's
data and the conclusions that he draws from it. In upcoming sections, we
elaborate on Schoenbaum's findings by providing further evidence that all
smokers (and, perhaps, especially younger smokers) are ill-informed.
2. The Problems of Imperfect Brand-Specific Information
Even if consumers did know the generic health risks associated with
smoking, they would need considerably more information in order to ensure
that market outcomes would yield optimal deterrence. In particular, they would
also need to know the risks of individual brands and types of cigarettes. In the
absence of this information, the market for cigarettes would fail in a number
of ways. First, smokers would assume that all cigarettes are equally risky,
which would remove any incentive that manufacturers otherwise had to make
their particular brands less dangerous.99 Investments in safety could not be
94. See id. at 757 tbl.2.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 758. Also in contrast to Viscusi's findings, Schoenbaum found that "no smoking group
appeared to overestimate the likely mortality effect of smoking." Id.
98. Id.
99. This may help explain the failure of the Premier cigarette. See infra Subsection ll.B.4.c.i.
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recovered on the market because, by hypothesis, consumers would not
appreciate them. Manufacturers, in fact, would have an incentive to cut their
safety investments because, by doing so, they could lower their costs of
production without lowering consumers' willingness to pay for their product.
An "unraveling" of cigarette safety might then occur, as each manufacturer
chose to make the smallest possible safety investment."°'
In addition to this lowering of manufacturer care levels, the inability of
consumers to identify the risks of specific cigarette brands would also have
deleterious activity level effects. That is, even if product safety unraveling did
not occur, consumers would nevertheless underestimate the risks of some
relatively risky brands of cigarettes and overestimate the risks of relatively safe
brands. As a consequence, they would consume too many or too few
cigarettes.' 0
Viscusi emphasizes that low-tar cigarettes are safer than standard
cigarettes102  and indicates that consumers correctly perceive them as
such.' °3 It is not clear, however, that so-called "light" cigarettes are any safer
than their "regular" counterparts." ° Indeed, the mistake that Viscusi and
100. For more thorough accounts of this unraeling problem and of ho% enterpnse liability sould
eliminate it, see Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liabihtv. supra note 40. at 776-78. 791-92. and Hanson &
Logue, The First-Parry Insurance Externality. supra note 40. at 177-79. 181. The unraveling phenomenon
is well-recognized in the products liability literature. See. e g. I AMERICAN L-w' l ST. ErTERPRISiE
.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 227 (1991): Howard A Latin. Probleni.Sohting Behatior and
Theories of Tort Liabiliy. 73 CAL. L. REv. 677, 695 (1985). Stccn Shasell. Strict Labhilin Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1980); see also Duncan Kenned). Distribut,. e and Puairnahsti: Motives
in Contract and Tort Law with Special Reference to Coninulsor% Terns and Unequal Bargaitng Pos er.
41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (noting that consumers tend to *'generate fantasies of safet." which leads to
the systematic underpricing of goods). The seminal article describing the unra cling phenomenon is George
A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertaintt and the Marker Atle haiisn. 84 QJ ECO% 488
(1970). As we indicate below, however. the phenomenon has often been o%erlookcd in discussions of how
best to regulate the market for cigarettes. See. e.g.. infra Subsection IVC 2 (descnbing the unraveling
problem created by ex ante excise taxes); utfra note 602 (descnbing ho% class action suits may create the
same problem); infra text accompanying note 641 (explaining hoss the proposed settlement might lead to
unraveling).
101. For a discussion of a closely related activity lesel inefficiency and of ho%% an enterprise liability
regime would eliminate it. see Hanson & Logue. The First.Parrs Insurance Etternalat. supra note 40. at
177-79, 181; and Croley & Hanson, E.terprise labhilitr. supra note 40. at 778. 791-92
102. See, e.g., NV. Kip Viscusi. Cigarette Ta.%ation and the Social Consequences of Smoking. in T
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 69 (James M. Porterba ed. 1995)
103. See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 49. at 37-41 (describing the health-related comparati'e ad% ertising
that has been fairly common in the cigarette industry, especially s ith respect to tar lesels). Viscust. supra
note 102, at 67 ("Individuals who express concerns about the health consequences of smoking are much
more likely to smoke low-tar cigarettes... "').
104. See Mirjana V. Djordjevic et al.. Self-Regulation of Smoking Intensit Smoke )ields f the Lot -
Nicotine, Low-'Tar' Cigarettes, 16 CARCINOGENESIS 2015. 2018-19 (1993). Lynn T Kozlo%%skt et al.
Blocking Cigarette Filter Vents iiith Lips Aore Than Doubles Carbon .lonotile Intake from Ultra-Lou
Tar Cigarettes, 4 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCIHOPIIARMACOLOGY 404. 406-07 11996). Lynn T
Kozlowski et al., Smokers Are Unaware ofthe Filter Vents Now on Most Cigarettes Results aa National
Survey, 5 TOBACCO CONTROL 265, 267-68 (1996): Richard Saltus. Makers To Re% eal Cigarette Additives
Massachusetts Order Is First in the Nation. BOSTON GLOti. Aug 20. 1997. at B I (paraphrasing Gregory
Connolly, head of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program of the state Department of Public Health.
in stating that "most cigarettes advertised as being ver, lo% in nicotine actually deher about as much of
the substance as a regular cigarette because they are smoked more intenselV"t
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many smokers appear to be making is evidence of our basic point: Smokers
(and, at least to date, administrative regulators and scholars) cannot recognize
the riskiness of individual brands of cigarettes." 5 Moreover, the mistake is
a consequence of a third problem of imperfect brand-specific information: The
incentive of manufacturers is not to make their cigarettes safer-as Viscusi has
claimed and as it would be were consumers truly well-informed-but to make
their cigarettes seem safer.0 6 To the extent that manufacturers have
succeeded in creating such an impression, it seems likely that many smokers
have been lulled into underestimating the risks to themselves of smoking and,
thus, into smoking too much."0 7
3. The Problem of Imperfect Relative-Risk Information
Even if smokers overestimate the absolute risks to themselves of smoking
their particular brand of cigarettes, it does not follow that they will be well-
informed. To know whether consumers are making truly well-informed
decisions, it is necessary to know their assessments of the relative risks of
smoking. 08 If, in fact, consumers tend to overestimate some or all of the
105. The Surgeon General's 1989 progress report summarizes an "Adult Use of Tobacco Survey,"
conducted in 1986. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 181, 247. According to
that survey, 50% of then-current smokers believed that "[aill cigarettes are probably about equally
hazardous," and 45% believed that "[s]ome kinds of cigarettes are probably more hazardous to health than
others." Id. at 181 tbl.3. There were four subcategories of responses among those in the latter category. Of
all smokers, 21% believed that their brand was "less hazardous than others," and 13% believed that their
brand was "about the same" as other brands. Only 8% believed that their brand was "more hazardous than
others." The remaining 2% did not know. Even that small percentage of smokers (29%) who believed that
their cigarettes were more or less dangerous than other cigarettes may well have been wrong. See infra note
106 and accompanying text. Viscusi does briefly acknowledge this evidence and its potential significance.
See Vismtsi, supra note 49, at 149-50.
106. This was a distinction that the industry apparently understood and may have exploited with
respect to tar and nicotine levels. Recently released documents regarding a conference of tobacco company
scientists in 1968 demonstrates that several of the scientists at the conference emphasized the distinction
between a "[h]ealth image" or "health reassurance cigarette," such as "a low tar-low nicotine cigarette
which the public accepts as a healthier cigarette," and a "[h]ealth-oriented" cigarette, which is intended to
be truly safer. STANTON A. GLANTZ Er AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 129 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
A very similar story can be told with respect to the introduction and eventual dominance of filter-
tipped cigarettes in the 1950s. See Kenneth E. Warner et al., The Emerging Market for Long-Term Nicotine
Maintenance, 278 JAMA 1087, 1088 (1997) (explaining that filters were introduced primarily as a "public
relations gambit" in reaction to newly emerging evidence of the link between smoking and lung cancer and
that their introduction reversed what had been a decline in per capita cigarette consumption). Cigarette
manufacturers continue to market seemingly safer cigarettes that, in fact, may not be safer. The most recent
example is the current campaign for Winston cigarettes, which are controversially being marketed as free
of additives. See Rajiv M. Rao, All Natural Killers: RJR's Controversial Additive-Free Cigarettes,
FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 1997. at 40; cf. infra notes 210-218 and accompanying text (raising doubts about the
health benefits of RJR's "cleaner" cigarette, the Premier).
107. This source of optimism would enhance the third-party effect described above. See supra
Subsection II.B.I.
108. Indeed, for the reasons that we provide in this subsection, so long as consumers properly assess
relative risks, consumers may act as if well-informed even when they grossly underestimate the absolute
risk levels. Put differently, consumer estimates of absolute risk levels may be irrelevant to the policy
analysis.
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other risks to which they are exposed, they may well behave as if they
underestimate the risks of smoking. That is, insofar as individuals perceive
nonsmoking activities as substantial threats to their health or life, they will
give less significance, other things being equal, to the risks of smoking.'"
The problem of imperfect relative-risk information is particularly important
where smokers significantly overestimate the risks of not smoking relative to
the risks of smoking. For example, smokers commonly claim that smoking
helps them to keep weight off or reduces their stress levels."" If those
smokers believe the risks of obesity or stress are greater than or comparable
to the risks of smoking, then those smokers' decisions are dangerously
misinformed.
As it turns out, there is a substantial amount of evidence suggesting that
smokers misestimate the relative risks of cigarettes. In 1989, the Surgeon
General summarized numerous studies indicating as much."' Between 1970
and 1978, for example, Roper conducted five surveys in which it asked
respondents whether they agreed that certain risks "make a great deal of
difference in longevity."" 2 In each one of those surveys, roughly 30% more
of the respondents answered "yes" when the risk was "a lot of tension and
stress" than answered "yes" when the risk was "smokes a pack of cigarettes
a day."'" 3 In 1983, Louis Harris & Associates conducted a national telephone
survey of 1254 randomly selected adults." Respondents were asked: "In
helping people in general to live a long and healthy life, how would you rate
the importance of' each of twenty-four health and safety factors on a scale of
one to ten?"'5 The low end of the scale represented the response, "of low
importance," and the high end represented "of utmost importance.""' 6 The
study yielded several interesting results. For instance, the lowest mean health
ranking for all the safety factors among respondents was 6.42 (for "drinking
no alcohol"), well above the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that virtually all
health factors were viewed as substantial, including "[gjetting 7-8 hours [of]
sleep" (8.04) and "[e]ating breakfast daily" (7.61)." ' More important, the
perceived mean health ranking of "[n]ot smoking" (8.32) indicated that
consumers had imperfect relative-risk information. Of the twenty-four health
factors, "not smoking" had the tenth highest ranking, placing it somewhere
109. See infra notes 249-250 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 48, at 641 (noting that the tobaicco indusrty ha-, capitalized on such
factors and that one manufacturer encouraged smoking as a a eight-loss method tilh the slogan "'Reach for
a Lucky instead of a Sweet"); McCullough. supra note 5. at 721 (noting that some people smoke to reclc
stress).
IlI. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. 3tifra note 3. at 207.12
112. Id. at 207; see also id. at 208 tbl.16 (summaniing the Roper sure,,s)
113. Id. at 208 tbl.16 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 207; see also id. at 209 fig. 1. 210 fig 2 (summarizmng the Ilarris ,urc
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near the middle, immediately above "[h]aving friends, relatives, neighbors"
(8.18) and below "[n]ever driving after drinking" (9.25), "[k]eeping air quality
acceptable" (9.11), "[k]eeping water quality acceptable" (8.95), "[h]aving
smoke detectors in home" (8.89), "[k]eeping close to recommended weight"
(8.54), "[h]aving blood pressure reading annually" (8.51), "[t]aking steps to
control stress" (8.36), "[g]etting enough vitamins, minerals" (8.37), and
"[e]xercising regularly" (8.32)."8
Those studies, and many others since,' 9 indicate that consumers'
relative-risk information is quite imperfect.' 2 The most recent relevant study
that we came across was completed in 1993 by the American Cancer
Society. i2i That study found that "[a]lthough Americans are generally aware
of the personal health risks associated with tobacco use, the public seriously
underestimates the magnitude of the impact cigarette smoking has on the health
of the country as a whole" as compared to other health risks. 2  When asked
what they consider to be the country's most serious health risk, for example,
36% of respondents mentioned the AIDS virus, whereas only 9% answered
smoking. 23 When asked to select from a list of various health risks the
single risk that they believe is responsible for the greatest number of deaths,
28% of respondents identified car accidents, 16% named illicit drugs, 12%
named AIDS, another 12% answered alcohol abuse, and 7% said murders.'24
Only 21% identified cigarettes as the number one killer.'"' Cigarettes,
however, kill significantly more than all the other causes of death put
together.1
26
When consumers make poor relative risk estimates, even accurate
cigarette-specific risk estimates may not prevent them from smoking too much.
Thus, studies that examine only cigarette risk estimates may substantially
overstate the rationality of smokers' decisions. Unless smokers understand that
gaining, say, ten pounds from quitting smoking is healthier than continuing to
smoke, they will not make appropriate risk calculations.
118. Id. (emphasis added). As part of the project, Louis Harris & Associates also sampled 103 health
experts and asked them to rank the same 24 health factors with respect to the "overall health of the general
population." Id. at 207, 210 fig.2. Unsurprisingly, they ranked "[n]ot smoking" as by far the most important
factor (with a mean ranking of 9.78). See id. at 210 fig.2.
119. The Surgeon General's report, for example, summarizes five more recent studies, all of which
confirm the conclusions of the Roper and Louis Harris & Associates studies. See id. at 207-12.
120. Unsurprisingly, there is also evidence that the problem is particularly acute among smokers,
which may help explain why they are smokers. See id. at 207, 211 tbl.17.
121. See Marttila & Kiley, Inc., Highlights from an American Cancer Society Survey of U.S. Voter
Attitudes Toward Cigarette Smoking (Sept. 9, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law
Journal).




126. See id. at 21-23; see also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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4. The Potential Significance of Addiction and Other Related Sources of
Imperfect Information
In addition to the third-person effect, the absence of brand-specific
information, and the presence of imperfect relative-risk information, cigarettes'
addictiveness has major implications for consumer awareness and
deterrability. 127 Before examining these implications, it is worth highlighting
the increasingly abundant evidence that cigarettes are addictive, evidence that
has accumulated despite industry claims to the contrary. At the end of 1994,
for example, the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention reported the results of a survey conducted on a sample
of some 20,000 adults. 12 The survey found that, of the American adults who
currently smoke, 70% "said they would like to quit completely," and 34% try
to quit in any given year. 29 Of the 34% who try to quit in any given year,
the study revealed, only 8% are successful.' 0 Similar statistics were reported
in 1993 following the Massachusetts Tobacco Survey, which found that 88%
of current Massachusetts smokers were at least thinking about quitting, and
75% had attempted to quit at some time in their lives. '" The Massachusetts
survey also found that 43% of smokers had "quit" for at least one day in the
past year only to resume smoking subsequently, while 28% of smokers claimed
(optimistically, in light of the survey's findings) that they were planning to quit
smoking within thirty days.
32
That evidence-and a great deal more evidence like it" 3-poses a sticky
challenge for economists, who for the most part have failed to provide a
plausible account of the apparent conflict between smokers' revealed
127. Addiction can be understood as a type of information deficit becausc it leads smokers to
underestimate the harms of the marginal cigarette.
128. See Spencer Rich, Study Says Adult Smoling Dropped to 25% in 1993. Researcher Describei
Results as Encouraging, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1994. at A6
129. Id.
130. See 8% of Smokers Who Try To Quit Succeed. Surnei Sa's. L.A. Tit-.s. Dc 23. 1994. at A4
131. See Lois BIENER ET AL., 1993 MASSACHUSETTS TOBACCO SURVEY 6 (19941
132. SeeLOISBIENER ETAL., 1993 MASSACHUSErrs TOBACCO SURVE) APPENDIX TABLIu.s ltbI A3-
A (1994).
133. See. e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL %IA AL Of- Mt-'TAL
DISORDERS 181-82 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (describing "nicotine dependence" and the fact that "[pleople with
this disorder are often distressed because of their inability to stop nicotine use") Cigarette Snioking Among
Adults-United States, 1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORrALmT' WKLY REP 925 (1993) Iresieuing result,, ot
the "National Health Interview Survey," which indicated that roughly 70% of smokers w'ant to quit imoking
completely and roughly 34% attempt to quit each year)
Viscusi finds remarkable some related survey evidence. See VISC. SI. supra note 49. at 90 ("One
would have expected almost all individuals who currently purchase a product to be enthusiastic about it
What we find instead is that there are a large number of negative mentions of cigarettes from the smoking
population."); id. at 88 ("What is most stunning is the overwhelmingly ad%ersc sentiment against the
product, even among current product users.... The diversit) of the adverse reactions to cigarettes its quite
striking and is possibly unequaled by any other widely used consumer product "') Nesertheless. Viscusi
gives this type of evidence short shrift when he argues that the consumption of cigarettes is bascall)
indistinguishable from the consumption of ordinary consumer products. See uifra notes 233-237 and
accompanying text.
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preferences and their stated preferences.'34 The possible explanations for this
conflict, it turns out, undermine the conclusion that consumers overestimate the
risks of smoking. To the contrary, those explanations suggest that consumers
underestimate those risks considerably. We explore several of those
explanations in the subsections that follow. But first we respond to the claim
made by tobacco industry officials that cigarettes are not actually
addictive.
135
a. The Industry's Claims
Most cigarette manufacturers have consistently challenged the proposition
that cigarettes are addictive. 36 For instance, in response to a question about
the addictiveness of cigarettes, William Campbell, CEO of Philip Morris,
answered that "Smoking is not intoxicating. No one gets drunk from
cigarettes."' 137 The problem witl that response is that there is no reason that
a substance's ability to addict users should necessarily be linked to the
substance's ability to intoxicate users. As Dr. Jack Henningfield, a scientist at
the Addiction Research Center, observes, the full spectrum of characteristics
of nicotine that relate to addiction put it "right in the top tier with cocaine,
heroin and alcohol."'138 Cigarette manufacturers also defend their position
with the following interesting statistic: Approximately 50% of smokers manage
to quit. 39 This figure derives from evidence that there are about as many
living ex-smokers as current smokers. Even discounting the inherent inflation
134. There is disagreement regarding whether to measure people's preferences according only to what
they do or according also to what they say they want to do. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 13-14 (4th ed. 1992) (explaining that evidence of "willingness to pay can be determined
with great confidence only by actually observing a voluntary transaction"), with ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 200-03 (1993) (criticizing the assumptions underlying the use of
cost-benefit analysis for policymaking and arguing that what matters normatively are people's "attitudes,"
not their "revealed" preferences), Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 54, 59 (1988) ("[Rievealed preference theory can make claims only about what people choose, not
about how they view their choices."), and Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, 40
ECONOMICA 241, 258 (1973) (arguing that "there remains a fundamental question of the relation between
preference and behavior"). The fact that smokers trying to quit have spent a lot of money on only
somewhat effective smoking cessation programs and products, see infra notes 160, 375, and accompanying
text, indicates that even if one looks solely at revealed preferences, smokers' conduct is not easily
reconciled with the rational actor model.
135. In Subsection II.B.4.e.ii infra, we respond to specific claims made by Viscusi that cigarettes are
no more addictive than other products or activities.
136. See infra note 161.
137. Frontline: The Nicotine War (WGBH radio broadcast, Jan. 3, 1995) (transcript on file with the
Yale Law Journal).
138. Id.; see also U.S. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TlE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL at
iv-v (1988) (reporting that "the processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those that
determine addiction to other drugs" such as cocaine and heroin).
139. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853,
871 & n.114 (1992); cf Epstein, supra note 22 (suggesting that "claims of addiction failed [in tobacco
lawsuits] because too many smokers had already quit").
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caused by the greater mortality of smokers compared to ex-smokers, the 50%
figure remains impressive.' But it also appears inconsistent with the
emerging body of evidence indicating that only a small percentage of people
who attempt to quit succeed.'41
Actually, however, the two bodies of evidence are not necessarily
inconsistent. The industry's 50% figure is cumulative, presenting the number
of smokers who manage to quit, before dying, over all of their years of
smoking, and often after many unsuccessful attempts. That is, if 34% of
current smokers attempt to quit each year, but only 8% of those attempts are
successful, 42 then about 2.7% of smokers will quit each year, leading to a
cumulative 50% quitting rate over about twenty-five years.'43 In twenty-five
years, that is, fifty of 100 smokers will have quit smoking, but those 100
smokers will have made a total of 575 attempts to quit- 11.5 failed attempts
for each success. This average figure, of course, represents a more complicated
reality: A few smokers are able to quit successfully the first time they try,
others require several attempts, and the majority are unable to quit even though
they try time after time. Properly understood as cumulative, then, the industry's
50% figure may dramatize the difficulty, not the ease, of quitting smoking.'"
140. The evidence may be misleading inasmuch as people who smoke cigarettes seem less likel) to
call themselves "smokers" in survey settings (or othersisc) than people %ho stop smoking are to call
themselves "ex-smokers." See Edwin T. Fujii, The Dentand for Cigarettes- Further Empirical Ettdrnce and
Its Implications for Public Policy, 12 APPLIED EcON. 479. 480 (1980) ("he understatenient of the extent
of cigarette smoking in surveys is exactly what we might expect. Long experience %ith surve) esidence
suggests that respondents tend to provide intervieaers with a faorable picture of themseles and hence.
in this case, to understate their extent of cigarette smoking."); Kenneth E. Warner. Possible Increases in
the Underreporting of Cigarette Consumption, 73 J. AI. STAT. ASS'N 314. 314-15 (1978) (suggesting that
evidence of underreporting of cigarette consumption might be explained by the increasing social
undesirability of smoking).
141. See Tara Parker-Pope, Facts About the Global Tobacco Business. WALL ST J . June 23. 1997.
at BI; supra notes 128-133 and accompanytng text.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 129-130.
143. We arrived at this estimate by raising .973 (because 97.37 of smokers remain each )car! to the
25th power (based on the number of years)-a calculation that ) ields .504 This rough calculation pro% ides
some explanation for how the 50% cumulative quitting figure and the 8% likelihood of quitting succcs
are consistent. This calculation assumes that the same percentage of smokers Ines to quit each Nsear. een
though some have already succeeded and thus have left the pool (requinng that, each year. at least an
additional 1.9% of smokers attempt to quit, having never tried before). It also assume, no dilference in
mortality rates between smokers and former smokers. Moreoser. 25 years may understate the number of
years that some smokers smoke before successfully quitting. Estimates of attempts and succc-scs at quitting
are from a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study See 87 of SmoLers Who Trn hp Quit
Succeed, Survey Says, supra note 130.
144. Their public denials notwithstanding, manufacturers seem to understand this perfcctl% ,sell The
consensus view of the industry's own researchers appears to be that nicotine is addjctie See K Michael
Cummings et al., What Scientists Funded by the Tobacco Ihdustrv Believe About the iHazanrs ot Citgarette
Smoking, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 894. 894-96 (1991). Indeed. the recent release of document, tirom Bro,,n
& Williamson and other cigarette manufacturers strongly suggests that manufacturers ha,,c long kno,,,n ot
the addictive properties of nicotine. See Philip J. Hilts. Tobacco Cotpain IIa3 Stlent on lta:ards. N Y
TIMES, May 7, 1994, at A I: see also Sheryl Stolberg. Defectors Helping To Crack Waill Around obact o
Firms, L.A. TiiEs, Apr. 3. 1996, at AI (discussing the affida, its of former Philip Morms enplo',es to the
FDA, which state that company executives interfered ,,ith research on cigarettes" health harms and lied to
Congress about addiction). The Brown & Williamson documents are sureced ehausti'.el. in ,eseral
articles in the July 19, 1995. issue of the Journal ofthie Anerican Medical Association. see 274 JAMA 219
The Yale Law Journal
The question to which we now turn is the economists' response to the
issue of nicotine addiction. Economists have not offered a convincing
explanation of the disparity between smokers' revealed preferences (the fact
that they smoke) and their stated preferences (that they want to quit).'45 In
the next three subsections, we explore several explanations for this conflict,
explanations suggesting that consumers underestimate rather than overestimate
the risks of smoking. Then, in Subsection II.B.4.e, we respond specifically to
evidence offered by Viscusi that cigarettes are not in fact addictive.
b. Identifying the Relevant Margin: The Problem of Path
Dependence
Typically, economists describe consumption choices of rational actors as
taking place on an incremental or marginal basis.146 The question facing the
consumer is typically said to be of the following sort: Should she purchase one
(more) widget? If the answer is yes, that does not imply that the consumer
should continue to purchase widgets on a regular basis in perpetuity. Indeed,
it does not even imply that the consumer should purchase a second widget.
Owing to, among other things, budget constraints and the law of diminishing
marginal returns, the decision whether to purchase each new widget requires
its own independent analysis.
In contrast, Viscusi seems to imagine that consumers conduct a different
sort of marginal calculus. He suggests that consumers compare all of the
benefits that they will receive from the "marginal" decision to become a
"smoker" with "the incremental lifetime death risk from lung cancer to a
smoker."'' 4 7 The question of how consumers frame the smoking decision is
(1995), and are also available on the World Wide Web, see Tobacco Control Archives: Brown and
Williamson Collection (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://www.libmry.ucsf.edu/tobacco/index.html>. Then-FDA
Commissioner David Kessler testified to Congress that Brown & Williamson had spent several years
growing a genetically altered variety of tobacco that contains very high doses of nicotine and had used
ammonia as a cigarette additive to increase the amount of nicotine delivered to smokers. According to
Kessler, this new information lays to rest "any notion that there is no manipulation and control of nicotine
undertaken in the tobacco industry." Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Chief Denies Nicotine Scheme in
Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at Al. Commissioner Kessler also pointed to numerous patents
illustrating that the industry has been working to sustain addictive nicotine levels in tobacco products. These
include patents to increase nicotine content by adding nicotine to the tobacco rod, filters, and wrappers;
patents on the extraction of nicotine from tobacco; and patents to develop new chemical variants of
nicotine. See Companies' Alleged Nicotine Manipulation Is Issue for FDA, Kessler Tells House Panel,
Products Liability Daily (BNA), Apr. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, PLD File (discussing
patents that illustrate the industry's intent to increase the nicotine content of cigarettes); see also Kelder
& Daynard, supra note 3, at 77 ("rThe] evidence [from the FDA, whistleblowers, and internal tobacco
company documents] ... indicates that the tobacco industry manipulates nicotine levels in their products
with the intent of addicting or maintaining the addiction of consumers.").
145. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 25-26 (1988); RICHARD 0.
LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMICS 131-37 (6th ed. 1981); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 447-48 (13th ed. 1989).
147. VIscusi, supra note 49, at 34 (emphasis added). Perhaps Viscusi frames the consumer decision
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critical. As Viscusi briefly acknowledges, perceptions of per cigarette risks
may differ from perceptions of long-term smoking risks. He writes:
Lifetime risks are substantial, but the risks from a pack of cigarettes
or a single cigarette are relatively small, producing a tendency to
overestimate the risk level. An open issue that will affect the direction
bias for smoking behavior is the extent to which individuals are
thinking of the lifetime risk or the individual cigarette risk when
making smoking decisions. 4 '
Thus, Viscusi apparently justifies framing the consumer decision in the unusual
way that he does by claiming that if, indeed, consumers do make their
decisions to smoke on a per cigarette basis, then, for that very reason,
consumers likely overestimate the risks. We disagree.
Even assuming Viscusi is correct that consumers would overestimate
smaller risks, the actual risk of one cigarette or one pack is probably
infinitesimal.I49 Even a consumer who egregiously overestimates this risk is
likely to find it insignificant. In the cigarette-at-a-time decision model, the
health risk from the marginal cigarette is not Viscusi's 43% perceived risk of
lung cancer from being a smoker; it is more likely to be that figure divided by
the number of cigarettes smoked over a "smoker's" lifetime, something on the
order of .0001% or .0002%.so Even if the smoker were to overestimate this
risk by a factor of two, five, or ten, it would appear trivial. Contrary to
Viscusi's suggestion, however, there is conflicting evidence and theory on
whether people exaggerate such small risks. Some scholars argue that, below
a certain threshold, consumers discount risks altogether, treating them as if
they were zero.151 Other scholars argue that, because of certain biases and
in the unusual way that he does because the survey upon which he relies %%as itself implicitl) conducted
from the standpoint of a one-shot, long-term decision model of smoking Surse) respondents ucrc asked
about the health risks to a "smoker." To most respondents. this likel) connoted long-term and frequent
consumers of cigarettes. See infra notes 789-791 and accompanying tcyt
148. Viscusi, supra note 49. at 25.
149. As far as we know, no one has attempted to measure the nsk posed h smoking one cigarette
150. This figure is derived by dividing the 43% lifetime percctsed nsk by one 20-cigarette pack per
day for 60 years (.0001%) and 30 years (.0002%). It assumes. of course. that the smoker pcrceises the total
lung cancer risk as a strictly linear function of the amount smoked, so that the marginal risk from each
cigarette is invariant. That assumption. though questionable, is common (and often implicit) in the literature
See NV. Kip Viscusi, Secondhand Smoke: Facr3 and Fanasy. 18 RLGL LATiOn 42. 43 (1995) (explaining
that government agencies such as the EPA and OSHA hase focused 'on linear dose-rcsponse
relationships"). The assumption is implicit in the recent efforts to estimate the per pack costs atd benefit,
of cigarettes. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL.. supra note 49. at 82-85. Viscust. supra note 102. at 67-94
151. See. e.g., HOWARD KUNREUTER Er AL. DISASTER INSt RANCE PRoTECTtO's PL Bt.IC POLIC'
LESSONS 248-49 (1978) (indicating that individuals often underestimate lot -probabilit, risks, such as those
presented by earthquakes and floods, and often do not %%orry about risks that arc blo% a certain threshold).
Howard Kunreuther. The Economics of Protection Against Lois Prolabdtt Events. tn DECIsiO % MAKING
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY 195, 209 (Gerardo R. Ungson & Daniel N Braunstein cds. 1982) inoling
that consumers may actually ignore low-probability events and their consequences until the) percei'.e that
the probability of such an event's oecumng has risen abo\e a threshold lesel). cf Francis W Ir' in. Stated
Expectations as Functions of Probabdity and Destrabitt of Outcotes. 21 J PERSONALtTn 329. 333 (1953
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heuristics,152 consumers are likely to underestimate risks associated with
products with which they previously had uneventful experiences; thus,
consumers may not associate the overall harms of "smoking" with the
individual harmless cigarette. 153
The question of how a smoker frames his or her smoking decision is, at
bottom, a question of how well consumers are informed. Market outcomes will
not be efficient, of course, if consumers underestimate a product's risks. But
even if consumers accurately estimate, or overestimate, those risks when
framed as a durable decision, the market will still lead to an inefficient
outcome if consumers rarely or only partially apply those estimates to their
own consumption choices. The frame, we submit, will turn in part on a
consumer's perceptions of cigarettes' addictiveness. A rational actor who
believes that cigarettes are addictive-such that any smoking today will very
likely be replicated, if not amplified in the future-will frame the decision as
Viscusi does.154 In contrast, a rational actor who believes cigarettes to be
nonaddictive will likely frame the decision as a comparison between the
marginal benefit of one cigarette (or pack of cigarettes) and its marginal cost.
(providing evidence that people are more likely to state higher expectations of drawing a "favorable"
outcome and significantly underestimate expectations of drawing a "negative" outcome when asked to give
probability ratings in a card-drawing psychology study).
152. For a compendious and influential collection of essays describing the various biases and
heuristics, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).
153. Howard Latin, for instance, argues that, because of the "representativeness heuristic," "[w]hen
consumers use particular products without injury, the 'input' in their assessment of product safety-these
safe experiences-will lead to an expected 'outcome' of continued safety." Howard A. Latin, "Good"
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1230, 1232 (1994). As a
result of such biases, according to Latin, "people often ignore low-probability risks." Id. at 1245. From a
cognitive capacity perspective, ignoring small risks makes sense. See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic.
Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, AM. ECON. REV., May 1978, at 64, 67 ("Unless we
ignored many low-probability threats, we would become so burdened that any sort of productive life would
become impossible."); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 146, at 416 (describing how the "availability
heuristic" may have a similar effect).
Viscusi briefly acknowledges the evidence suggesting that individuals will sometimes underestimate
low-probability events such as earthquakes. See VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 25. He downplays the
significance of the evidence, however, by describing the underestimated events as "hidden" and pointing
to other studies in which respondents overestimated these risks once the risks were called to their attention.
See id. Therefore, Viscusi concludes, "[t]o the extent that cigarettes are among the most-discussed risks in
our society, one would expect there to be an overestimation of these hazards." Id. We have doubts about
Viscusi's attempted reconciliation of the studies. It is not clear that the risks of earthquakes are any more
"hidden" than are the risks of individual cigarettes. Moreover, evidence that survey respondents
overestimate risks that are made salient to them by survey takers simply highlights a weakness in the
survey data on which Viscusi relies. The fact that consumers ignore the same small risks when making
consumption choices that they overestimate when responding to survey questions should make one
suspicious of survey results of the sort on which Viscusi relies. Cf. Latin, supra, at 1246 ("One explanation
for the disparity between experimental evidence that low-probability risks are overweighted and
observations that people often ignore these risks is that experimental methodology forces high salience for
the risks under study while 'real life' experiences seldom make low-probability risks available.").
154. Note that by assuming the frame that he does, Viscusi is implicitly assuming that cigarettes are
addictive, an assumption that he rejects elsewhere in his analysis. See infra Subsection il.B.4.e.
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The latter is true because the decision to purchase a pack of cigarettes by
a person who believes cigarettes are nonaddictive does not implicate the
long-term calculations that might go with a decision to become a long-term
smoker. If the tobacco consumption decision is made strictly one cigarette at
a time, only the marginal risks and benefits of that cigarette are relevant. The
marginal benefit of the next cigarette is likely substantial. The enjoyment of
the next cigarette is not much, if at all, diminished by the number that one has
consumed in the past or expects to consume in the future. It may not be too
much to say that. when a cigarette is consumed, the marginal benefit of that
cigarette equals the total benefit, at that moment, of being a smoker.'" The
marginal cost of the next cigarette, on the other hand, is tiny. It is quite
artificial and most likely not reflective of medical reality to compute the
marginal risk for a single cigarette or pack, given that the harmful
consequences of smoking seem to be caused by regular smoking over a period
of years, not by any single cigarette.' Consumers may therefore, correctly,
view a single cigarette or pack of cigarettes as posing virtually no health risk.
A smoker could smoke one cigarette at a time over the course of a lifetime
without ever making a conscious decision to encounter a health risk perceived
as significant.'57
Consumers may be capable of producing lifetime mortality rate estimates
when someone surveys them, but our argument is that the conditions of their
everyday lives-in particular, the incremental, recurring nature of decision
points-will not produce such estimates. At the margin, the benefit of the next
155. Cf OSCAR WILDE, THE PIc-r. RE OF DORIAN GRAN 87 (Modem Library 19311 (18911 ("A
cigarette is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It is exquisite, and it leaeCs one unsatiltied "'
156. See, e.g., OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH. U.S. DFP'T 01} HEALTH & Ht %IA% SERVS. TilE
HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION: A REPORT OF TIlE SL RGEON GEERAL 92 t 1990) tdiscussing
the harms of regular smoking and the benefits of quitting at any point in life). RG Rogers & E Powell-
Griner, Life Expectancies of Cigarette Smokers and Nonsnoker in he United States. 32 Soc Sci M-D
1151, 1154 (1991) (same).
157. Professors Rabin and Sugarman make a related point
Unlike the sky-diver, skier, or even the alcoholtc. the typical smoker has no feedback
mechanism in the course of her daily routine to tmgger a sense of imminent jeopardy to physical
condition. Indeed, given the long-term nature of the harm from smoking, and the potential for
avoiding serious physical consequences by quitting "soon." tobacco use takes on an especiall)
sinister character: cumulative physical debilitation goes largely unnoticed, and. vheneser
extrinsic risk information is assimilated, a rationale is at hand for discounting one's
concern--the risk can be addressed at a later point in time
Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28. at 11-12.
Unfortunately, one of the federally mandated cigarette %%amings-"Quiiting Smoking Now. Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health," 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1994)-may exacerbate the effects of these
phenomena. Viewed from the perspective of Viscusi's idealized smoker. ssho is making a decision v.hether
or not to continue smoking cigarettes for the indefinite future, the saming sounds like an inducement to
quit. The smoker can eliminate many of the ill-health effects of presious smoking simply by quitting
Viewed from the perspective of the one-cigarette-at-a-time smoker. hosse er. the sarning sounds more like
an inducement to smoke another. The message seems to be that if the next cigarette is the last cigarette.
then there is virtually no health-related reason not to hase it. Not only %%ill one cigarette pose only de
minimis potential health risks, but by not having another cigarette after that one. esen that much risk v.ill
be substantially reduced, if not eliminated.
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cigarette may easily outweigh the harm, resulting in a consumption decision
that might be irrational from the perspective of the one-shot decision that
Viscusi posits. Any new smoker, therefore, who assumes that smoking is
nonaddictive (or who, more likely, underestimates its addictiveness) may well
make an inefficient choice to smoke. 5  For such smokers, the costs of
deciding to smoke will likely be underestimated given the unanticipated costs
of quitting. 159 Since addiction seriously raises such costs, a person might
decide to forego the health benefits of quitting in order to avoid the costs of
quitting (even if the person would never have smoked the first cigarette if he
or she had understood the addictiveness of smoking). 60 In sum, because of
the potentially substantial unanticipated costs of quitting (created by the
addictiveness of cigarettes), individuals may well choose to endure costs (of
continued smoking or of quitting) that greatly exceed any benefits that they
might have anticipated when initially deciding to smoke. 6' The initial choice
158. Arguably, consumers who accurately estimate (or overestimate) the addictiveness of cigarettes
could make an "efficient" choice when they decide to begin smoking. That also assumes, of course, that
those consumers do not underestimate health risks and that there are no other information problems,
including those described in this Article. If consumers, fully informed of cigarettes' health risks and
addictiveness, decide to start smoking, presumably they have done so because the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs. See VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 18, 119-20.
It is not clear to us, however, how consumers could, ex ante, accurately estimate the strength of their
addiction to smoking. And even if consumers are fully informed of the strength of cigarettes' addictiveness,
if manufacturers could have made nonaddictive or less addictive cigarettes but chose not to, then the
choices made by some consumers to smoke may well be inefficient. Under a rational choice model,
consumers must be presumed to take whatever costs are associated with becoming addicted to cigarettes
into account when they commence smoking. If they assumed that addiction was an inevitable property of
cigarettes, however, consumers volunteered to become addicted only because they wrongly assumed that
smoking entailed becoming addicted. If they were aware that the pleasures of smoking were available
without addiction, it is doubtful that they would have chosen to smoke addictive cigarettes. Therefore, it
is not clear that consumers' decisions should be treated as informed, even if consumers accurately estimate
the addictiveness of the cigarettes they were smoking.
159. Viscusi briefly acknowledges this potential source of inefficiency. See id. at 119-20.
160. To be sure, there may be times when continuing to smoke becomes so costly that a person will
quit, but that does not imply that the person will not have to endure the substantial costs of quitting.
The unanticipated costs of quitting may help explain the survey evidence that most smokers regret
having started smoking but cannot manage to quit, see supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text, and
why smokers spend $417.7 million annually in the United States on products to help them quit, see Parker-
Pope, supra note 141.
161. This model of the choice to smoke can be understood as a form of "path dependence." Path
dependence occurs when actors continue to use an inefficient path long after the circumstances warranting
its use have disappeared. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolttion in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641, 643-44 (1996); cf. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 25-27 (1996) (describing
the problem of "lock in"). The path dependency model of cigarette consumption may be well
understood-and perhaps exploited-by the cigarette industry. In a 1973 memorandum, Claude E. Teague,
Jr., the assistant director of research and development for R.J. Reynolds, noted the need to get young
smokers past the initial discomfort of smoking so that they would become habituated:
For the pre-smoker and "leamer" the physical effects of smoking are largely unknown,
unneeded, or actually quite unpleasant or awkward. The expected or derived psychological
effects are largely responsible for influencing the pre-smoker to try smoking, and . . . [to] keep
the "learner" going, despite the physical unpleasantness and awkwardness of the period.
In contrast, once the "leaming" period is over, the physical effects become of overriding
importance and desirability to the confirmed smoker ....
RJR Confidential Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for
the Youth Market (visited Dec. 9, 1997) <http://www.gate.net/-jcannon/documents/730202r.txt> (hereinafter
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to smoke, therefore, may often be inefficient when consumers underestimate
the addictiveness of smoking.
6 -2
On the important question of whether consumers know about cigarettes'
addictiveness, consider survey evidence from the Monitoring the Future
Project, 63 regarding the extent to which young smokers see their decision
to smoke as a lifelong decision. In that study, high school seniors were
RJR Memorandum].
In light of this path dependency model of addiction. consumer information levels in recent years lose
some of their significance. Whatever consumers knew about smoking in 1985. ,,hen the study on which
Viscusi primarily relies was conducted, may provide little insight into the decisions of many indii'duals
to start smoking sometime in the past and to keep smoking today After all. man) of the smokers surseed
likely began smoking well before that date. at a time when the average consumer might ,well hac perceived
a significantly lower risk of smoking. Cf Rabin & Sugarman. supra note 28, at 4 (discussing the steady
increase in public perceptions of the danger of smoking). Viscusi points out that there has long been a fairly
widespread perception that smoking poses health risks. See VISCUSi. supra note 49, at 48-53 As he
concedes, however, the opinion poll questions on which he bases his empirical conclusion "cannot resolve
the issue of whether the absolute level of risk perceptions is sufficient." Id. at 48.
In addition, courts as late as the 1960s found manufacturers not liable because plaintiffs could not
prove cigarettes caused their health problems. See, e.g.. Lartigue v R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. 317 F2d
19 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding for manufacturers partially on causation grounds). The first major studies
indicating the potentially harmful effects of smoking did not appear until the 1960s. See supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text. Information about addiction has been esen more recent. much of it coming to light
in the last several years (after Viscusi's book was published). See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying
text. Moreover, any information that has been made available to the public has arguabl) been contradicted
through the marketing and public relations efforts of cigarette manufacturers, see supra note 12. not to
mention in the congressional testimony of their CEOs. see Alix M. Freedman, The Deposition. Cigarette
Defector Says CEO Lied to Congress About View of Nicotine. WALL ST. J.. Jan. 26. 1996. at Al. John
Schwartz, Tobacco Firm Chief Denies FDA Charges: House Subcommittee Told Cigarettes Were Never
Spiked, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1994, at Al.
162. Viscusi would likely respond to all of this by arguing that the issue of addiction is irrelevant As
we detail below, Viscusi argues that cigarettes are not in fact an), more "addictise" than most other
consumer products. See infra Subsection ll.B.4.e. That conclusion. how ever. is inconsistent wi ith a growing
body of medical research indicating that cigarette smoking is quite addictiie See supra notes 138. 144
Even putting that evidence to one side, Viscusi has a problem inasmuch as he himself implicitly assumes
that cigarettes are addictive in some meaningful sense when he treats the marginal decision as the
"incremental lifetime death risk" of smoking. VISCUSI. supra note 49. at 34; see also supra notes 149-154
and accompanying text (describing how Viscusi's model of consumer decisionmaking differs from the
standard economic model).
Furthermore, the possibility that consumers may var-y in their estimates of the addictiveness of
smoking might explain one of Viscusi's more sinking findings. According to Viscusi, smokers and
nonsmokers have roughly similar estimates of the riskiness of smoking. See ViSC-t Si. supra note 49, at 110;
Viscusi, supra note 102, at 67. Viscusi concludes that the decision whether to smoke, therefore. turns
significantly on consumers' varied preferences for risk. See VtSCUSt. supra note 49. at 110. Viscusi. supra
note 102, at 67. The difference in consumption patterns. however, could as easily be explained by %'anations
in estimates of addictiveness: Consumers who believe that cigarettes are relatively nonaddictise are more
likely to begin smoking, other things being equal.
163. The project is being conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the Umersity of Michigan
The study results referred to in the text are unpublished, but are summarized in U S DEP'r OF HE.ALnI &
HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOLNG PEOPLE A REPORT OF TIlE SLRGEOS
GENERAL 84-87 (1994) [hereinafter PREVENTING TOBACCO USE) The only potentially relevant sursey
evidence that Viscusi discusses comes from a 1974 study that reported that approximately 75% of children
between the ages of 7 and 14 agreed with the statement that "lilt is very hard to stop smoking - VISCtsi.
supra note 49, at 121 tbl.6-1 (citing F.W. Schneider & L.A. Vanmasing. Adolescent Preadolescent
Differences in Beliefs and Attitudes About Cigarette Smoking, 87 J PSYcuOL. 71 (1974)) Of course, that
figure implies that 25% of those children did not agree that it is hard to stop smoking, significantly more
than the current national teenage smoking rate of 16%. See Andrea Adelson. Is AnsbodJ Getting the
Picture? Despite Ads, Teen-Age Smoking Is Unabated, N.Y. TiMES, July 17. 1997. at DI
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surveyed each year for one decade-from 1976 to 1986-and then again five
years later after graduating. In the first stage of the survey, seniors were asked
"Do you think you will be smoking cigarettes in five years from now?"'
64
At the second stage of the survey, respondents were again asked about their
current smoking status. Of those respondents who smoked at least one pack per
day as high school seniors, 32% of them predicted at the first stage that they
would "probably" or "definitely" stop smoking within five years., 65 At the
second stage of the survey, however, only 13% of those graduates had quit,
while nearly 70% continued to smoke more than one pack per day.'66 Of
those high school seniors who smoked about one half pack per day, 42%
predicted that they would probably or definitely quit within five years; only
19% actually did. 167 Moreover, nearly half of those seniors had increased
their habit to more than one pack per day five years out. 168 Finally, of the
seniors who smoked only one to five cigarettes per day, 61% believed that
they would probably or definitely quit within five years. 169 As it turned out,
only 30% managed to quit, while nearly half at least doubled their smoking
rates. 70
As the Surgeon General's Report summarized: "When earlier smoking
behavior is controlled, seniors' expectations to smoke had very limited power
to predict subsequent smoking behavior."'' 7 "[T]he expectation to abstain
from smoking in the future seemed overwhelmed by the strong forces that tend
to maintain or advance smoking behavior once it is established."'7 This
evidence suggests that Viscusi's view that beginning smokers base their
decision on their perceptions of the "incremental lifetime risks" of smoking is
fundamentally flawed. Of all the respondents who smoked as seniors, only
around 8% believed that they would "definitely" be smoking five years
later, 7 3 and thus only that many might have considered the risks of smoking
even for five years.
164. PREVENTING TOBACCO USE, supra note 163, at 84.
165. Id. at 84 tbl. 19.
166. See id. at 85 tbl.20.
167. See id. at 84 tbl.19, 85 tbl.20.
168. See id. at 85 tbl.20.
169. See id. at 84 tbl.19.
170. See id. at 85 tbl.20.
171. Id. at 84.
172. Id. at 87.
173. See id. at 84 tbl. 19; cf TV Spots Hit Smoking witih Graphic Visuals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28,
1997, at A22 ("When I speak to smokers, almost all of them say they will quit within two years ....
When I ask if they expect to quit within the next two weeks, the answer is invariably no." (quoting Howard
K. Koh, Massachusetts Public Health Commissioner)).
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c. Temporal Separation of Benefits and Costs:
The Problem of Myopia
Even if Viscusi were correct that smoking is viewed by smokers as a long-
term decision (in other words, that consumers do somehow understand the
extent of cigarettes' addictiveness even before they are addicted), there are
additional attributes of the cigarette consumption context that may lead
consumers to underestimate smoking's risks. Again, the challenge is to explain
how a person's revealed preferences (e.g., smoking a cigarette) can conflict so
dramatically with that person's stated preferences (e.g., -'I want to quit
smoking"). Economists have offered several plausible explanations for the
seemingly contradictory behavior, all of which relate to the context or structure







The most common explanation relies on the fact that the health effects of
smoking are temporally distant from the pleasures of smoking individual
cigarettes. The intertemporal choice literature suggests that the discount rate
174. In addition to the features of cigarettes descnbed in the next imo subsections that might contribute
to their addictiveness, there is a growing body of eidence indicating that cigarettes are addicti' c because
of their physiological and pharmacological effects. The Surgeon General first addressed the issue of
addiction in 1988, drawing the following three conclusions "-I Cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are
addicting. 2. Nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction 3 The pharmacologic and behasioral
processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those that deternne addiction to drugs such as
heroin and cocaine." U.S. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALT. supra note 138. at 9 In 1964. the Surgeon
General had stated that "[t]he tobacco habit should be characientrd as an habituation rather than an
addiction." 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT. siqyr, note 60. at 34
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that some consumers use to measure the long-term health effects of smoking
(or the costs of quitting) is greater than the discount rate used to measure the
short-term benefits of satisfying a craving to smoke.'75 George Ainslie, a
psychologist, illustrates the point graphically, as depicted in Figure 1.76
Suppose that the individual is choosing between two rewards: a smaller,
earlier reward S, which occurs at t,, and a bigger, later reward B, which occurs
at t2. More concretely, imagine that S is the satisfaction that a consumer would
receive if she were to smoke a pack of cigarettes today and that B is the
incremental increase in long-term health that the smoker would enjoy if she did
not smoke that pack. The lines depict the present utility of the rewards that the
consumer enjoys over time. As George Loewenstein and Richard Thaler
explain:
If the individual discounts the future at a constant rate, that is, if
discounting is constant for different time delays, then the curves will
never cross. However, if discounting decreases as a function of time
delay, as the empirical research suggests, then the curves may cross,
leading to a reversal of preference. When both rewards are sufficiently
distant, the individual prefers B, but as S becomes more proximate, its
relative value increases until at t*, S abruptly comes to dominate B in
terms of present utility. The significance of the crossing curves is that
behavior will not generally be consistent over time.1
77
There is considerable evidence to suggest that this sort of dynamic
inconsistency is common. 78 Loewenstein and Thaler, for example, highlight
the following anecdote: In West Virginia, the passage of a law mandating that
students under the age of eighteen who drop out of school lose their driving
permits led, in only one year, to a reduction in the dropout rate of one-
third.' 79 It seems unlikely that the expected costs of losing drivers' permits
for a few years could tip so many potential dropouts' rational human capital
investment decisions toward completing high school. Instead, the results
suggest "extremely myopic preferences."' 0 Similarly, many more people
175. Note that this phenomenon, if true, violates the predictions of economic theory. See George
Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181,
183. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that the phenomenon is real. See id.
176. See George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse
Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463, 471 fig.I (1975). The diagram provided is a slightly modified version
of the Ainslie original.
177. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 175, at 185.
178. See Ainslie, supra note 176.
179. See Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 175, at 182.
180. Id. Commentators often suggest-as do the examples offered by Loewenstein and Thaler-that
this tendency for myopic behavior is especially acute during adolescence. In that light, it bears noting that
"[e]ighty-two percent of adults who ever smoked had their first cigarette before the age of 18, and more
than half of them had already become regular smokers by that age." Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,396, 44,398 (1996) (citing PREVENTING TOBACCO USE, supra note 163, at 65).
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avoid sun exposure to prevent large pores and blackheads in the short term
than will act to minimize the long-term, much more significant risk of skin
cancer.'8' Because of this sort of intertemporal myopia, even smokers who
fully anticipate the addictiveness and health effects of smoking may be making
irrational decisions.1
8 2
d. Disaggregated Benefits and Pooled Costs:
The Problem of Multiple Selves
Some scholars prefer an alternative to the discount rate explanation for the
conflict between what smokers say and what they do.' 3 For example,
Thomas Schelling, one of the first economists to focus on the issue,
demonstrates that "[p]eople behave sometimes as if they had two selves, one
who wants clean lungs and long life and another who adores tobacco.""'1 To
understand smoking behavior, Schelling argues, it is useful to view individuals
as comprising at least two selves who "are in continual contest for
control."' 8 5 With respect to most consumption choices, there is a "dynamic
programming self'-a sort of referee-that manages continually changing
wants and desires, harmonizing them over time in an evenhanded manner. 1
But with respect to some consumption choices, that referee does not exist.
Instead, there is a series of impermanent selves. Each has its own needs and
desires, and some have preferences about what should be done when other
selves are in command. Thus, the nicotine addict wants to smoke when he is
in charge, but another self is concerned about health and wants not to smoke
even when the addict is in command.'
87
In the wake of Schelling's path-breaking work,' 5 numerous scholars
have offered similar multiple selves models.' It is critical to recognize that
181. See Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 175. at 182.
182. Viscusi describes an extreme version of myopia-one in which "'[t]hc smoker simply ignores the
risk component since these risks are remote." VISCUSI. $upra note 49. at 21 According to his ,ersion.
"'[o]nly the immediate gratification provided by cigarettes dnses consumer behavior" Id- Contrary to
Viscusi's suggestion, however, the fact that consumers ma) apply a larger discount rate to more remote
risks does not imply that consumers ignore those risks or that only the immediate gratification of smoking
matters to consumers. See infra notes 251-256 and accompanying text (arguing that Viscusi has provided
an extreme, straw man version of "'addiction").
183. One perceived problem with the discount rate explanation is that it implies that people have an
astronomically (and, perhaps, implausibly) high discount rate in some circumstances. een .,hen the future,
t,, is only a few hours away. See THOMAS C. SCtIE.LING. CIOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 62-63 (1984)
184. Id. at 58.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 86.
187. See id. at 86-87. Schelling is unwilling to commit regarding the extent to which his multiple
selves model is merely metaphorical. See id. at 96.
188. See also T.C. Schelling, Egonoinics. or the Art ofSelf.MAanagernent. AM Eco%. REV . May 1978.
at 290; Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command ti Practice. ti Poliw. and in a Theors of Rational Choice.
AM. ECON. REv., May 1984, at I.
189. See. e.g., JON Ei.STER. ULYSSES AND TIE SIRENS 103-11 (re, ed. 1984). George Ainslie. Be ond
Microeconomics, Conflict Among Interests iti a Multiple Self as a Determnant of Vate, tit TilE MUL'IPLE
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these models do not assume that consumers are ignorant of the fact that
cigarettes are risky or that consumers completely ignore their risk perceptions
in making consumption choices. Indeed, the models acknowledge that smokers
are reflective creatures who do, at least partially, take into consideration the
long-term risks and benefits of smoking. Moreover, they acknowledge that
other variables, including price, can affect consumption decisions in predictable
ways. A major advantage of multiple selves models, however, is that they help
to make sense of common behavior that, at least on its face, does not comport
with the basic rational actor model. As Schelling puts it:
Many of the skills and maxims and stratagems for coping with one's
own behavior become less mystifying and more familiar if we can
recognize them as the same principles and stratagems that apply to
managing someone else-someone in a close relation, with a
paternalist or senior-junior quality like that between parent and child,
teacher and pupil, missionary and convert, master and apprentice, or
guide and follower.' 90
Individuals "struggle for self-command" through the application of tactics that
are essentially variations on the Homeric episode in which Odysseus ordered
that his hands be tied to the ship's mast so that he could not be seduced by the
song of the Sirens. 9'
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such tactics are routinely employed by
smokers. Some smokers, for example, limit themselves to smoking only
cigarettes that are given to them; they have a "rule" against buying cigarettes,
a practice that many admit is not easily sustained. Similarly, closet smokers
conceal their habits from some or all of their friends and loved ones, a strategy
that can reduce the number of cigarettes smoked but can also have the
unintended effect of reducing the smoker's social encounters. Other tactics
include enlisting the aid of a trusted friend to allocate cigarettes in limited
quantities or smoking only in a limited number of predefined circumstances.
Thomas Schelling, for instance, reports his own rule of smoking only after an
"evening meal," a strategy that ultimately failed.' 92 Many heavier smokers
also apparently attempt to "tie their hands." As Loewenstein and Thaler have
SELF 133 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Jon Elster, Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider Problem, I ECON. &
PHIL. 231 (1985); Ian Steedman & Ulrich Krause, Goethe's Faust, Arrow's Possibility Theorem and the
Individual Decision-Taker, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra, at 197; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); Richard H. Thaler & Hersh M.
Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 (198 1); Gordon C. Winston, Addiction
and Backsliding: A Theory of Compulsive Consumption, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 295 (1980).
190. SCHELLING, supra note 183, at 63.
191. Id. at 76-82 (describing ways in which individuals manage or discipline their many selves).
192. See id. at 77.
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observed, many "smokers buy cigarettes by the pack (rather than by the carton
which is cheaper)."' 93
For many, these sorts of efforts to smoke in moderation fail, driving
smokers to attempt quitting entirely. As Schelling explains, "Just as it may be
easier to ban nuclear weapons from the battlefield in oto than through
carefully graduated specifications on their use, zero is a more enforceable limit
on cigarettes ... than some flexible quantitative ration.""' Efforts to quit,
too, are often fashioned in a self-binding way such that the common self can
justify singling out the current self to bear the initial burden of the decision to
quit. Resolutions to quit smoking are an example. The common self does not
fully control the current self's decision to smoke, but it can raise the costs to
a future self by publicly resolving to stop smoking on a date certain sometime
in the future, invoking shame as an aid to self-government.'9 Another
feature common to many smokers' attempts to quit is that they occur at special
moments, such as on smokers' birthdays or on New Year's Day.' The
multiple selves model may also explain some of the logic behind the annual
"Great American Smokeout," in which smokers are urged to stop smoking
even for just the day.' 9
With those tactics in mind, it seems plausible that the desire to quit
smoking (or not to start smoking) might itself raise consumers' estimates of
the risks of smoking. Survey data showing that respondents overestimate the
risks of smoking, therefore, might reflect merely a desire on the part of many
consumers to trick themselves into overestimating those risks. The problem
with any instrumental attempt to inflate the underlying risks in that way is that
the current self is not easily fooled. The person whose watch is set ahead of
the true time, for instance, will often adjust for that fact. As Schelling puts the
point, "There is one family of tactics common in interpersonal relations that
193. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 175. at 186.
194. SCHELLING, supra note 183. at 77.
195. See id. at 76.
196. See id. The American Cancer Society (ACS) last year sponsored a sseepstakes for smoker vho
purchased Nicorette Gum or Nicoderm patches. The tear-off shelf flyer read in large and bold pnnt 'For
Mother's & Father's Day, Commit to Quit'" AMERICAN CANCER SoCiET-Y Co'trT To Qt rr'
(advertisement, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
197. The ACS has been sponsoring the Great American Smokeout. on the third Thursday of each
November, since 1977. As part of their "Commit to Quit plan." the ACS encourages smokers to choo-e
a date for quitting and to mark that date on their calendar American Cancer Society. Greai Anieruain
Smokeout, Commit To Quit (visited Dec. 9. 1997) <http://wws-.cancer.org/gasplcontract html> Similarly.
the ACS encourages smokers seeking to quit to put their intention 'in writing-and sign it" and makes
available a "Contract to Quit." Id. In their "Quit Smoking Tips." the ACS explains that "Iclold turkey is
the most successful" method of quitting and then advises quitters to "'[tlhro% asay all cigarettes and
matches" and "[h]ide lighters and ashtrays." American Cancer Society. Qut S.oking tps tssited Dec 9.
1997) <http://www.cancer.org/tobaccoltr8.html>. The ACS then encourages those sMho prefer a more
gradual approach to make it harder for themselves to smoke cigarettes-for instance, by buying one pack
at a time and by wrapping up that pack and putting elastic bands around it See id Another tip for the
smoker is to"'[s]moke with your left hand if you usually smoke %% ith your nght"--a nearly literal analogue
of tying one's hands to the mast. Id.
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is peculiarly unavailable, or nearly so, in dealing with oneself. That is
deceit."'' 98 Even so, we think it common that individuals attempt to deceive
themselves, even if they are only partially successful.
For a variety of reasons, these strategies for binding the current self are
likely to be especially ineffective in the cigarette context. 99 Cigarettes are
widely available and relatively inexpensive. Moreover, a smoker can often
conceal the fact that he or she has smoked cigarettes. Therefore, the multiple
selves model of smoking behavior leads to a prediction that is extremely
difficult to square with the basic rational actor model. Specifically, some
smokers favor policies that help smokers precommit to quit or curtail smoking.
Indeed, as Schelling observes, "[i]f there were some way that cigarettes could
be reliably put beyond reach, and people could vote on whether they would
like that done, my guess is that a majority of smokers would elect to deny
themselves the possibility of lighting another cigarette. ' 2° In contrast, if
smokers were rational actors of the sort imagined by most economists, they
would be squarely against policies that made smoking more difficult.
As far as we know, there has not been an extensive empirical test of
Schelling's prediction. That 70% of smokers say they want to quit and many
try to quit but fail,2"' however, should give pause to those who assume that
smokers are making decisions based on a single, stable set of preferences. The
multiple selves conception of consumers may also help explain a result that
Viscusi finds remarkable: Even smokers in the surveys he reports had
predominantly negative things to say about smoking and very few positive
things to say.2 2 The artificiality of the survey context, where the respondent
is not making an immediate consumption decision but is invited to consider his
or her habit abstractly and in the long term, generates an emphasis on the
negative side of the equation. It may be that in the real world (e.g., at the
convenience store counter), exactly the opposite side of the equation is
implicated.20 3
198. SCHELLING, supra note 183, at 78.
199. Cf id. at 69-73 (describing various relevant product dimensions that may affect how difficult
self-command is likely to be).
200. Id. at 74; see also id. at 78 ("Doctors report that when patients are flatly told that their condition
makes it imperative they cease smoking at once, the patients quit not only more reliably than when they
are left any choice, but far more comfortably. Continual indecision ... aggravates both the discomfort and
the temptation .... ).
201. See Parker-Pope, supra note 141.
202. See Viscusi, supra note 49, at 88-95; supra note 133.
203. On the day that the tobacco settlement was announced, some newspapers included among the
stories on the settlement a public reaction section. The samplings of public opinion were by no means
scientific; nor were they intended as a test of the multiple selves model. Still, the responses of smokers to
the news seem to suggest that, indeed, some smokers would support a settlement that made quitting easier.
In the Boston Globe, for example, three of the six interviewees were regular smokers, and only they seemed
clearly to favor the settlement. They did so, it appears, because they believed the settlement might help
them quit. See "How Do You Feel About the Settlement with the Tobacco Industry?", BOSTON GLOBE, June
21, 1997, at A I0; see also Lynda Richardson, The Smokers: Reacting with Skepticism but Also with Some
Hope, N.Y. TtMEs, June 21, 1997, at 8.
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In sum, the multiple selves model is important in two ways to
understanding the results of Viscusi's survey evidence. First, it makes less
relevant the underlying estimate of smoking's costs (because the current self
does not take into account the full costs to future selves), and second, it helps
to explain why respondents might artificially inflate those estimates.
e. The Economists' Response
The issues discussed in this section might be characterized as "addiction"
problems inasmuch as they create a conflict between what a consumer wants
to do and what the consumer actually does. Once one takes seriously the
evidence that cigarette smoking is addictive, the claim that a smoker's decision
to keep smoking is efficient is less easily maintained. In this subsection, we
discuss specific evidence put forward by Professor Viscusi in support of his
claim that cigarettes are not addictive in any meaningful sense. In our view,
the evidence he presents is either unconvincing or, in some instances, actually
supports our contention that cigarettes are addictive. 24
i. The Premier Experiment
Viscusi draws his first evidence from the market for cigarette substitutes,
which he sees as inconsistent with the predictions made by the sorts of models
of cigarette addiction discussed above. Responding to Schelling in
particular,2 5 he points out that such substitutes have been offered but have
failed, suggesting that consumption choices are not driven by any sort of
addiction:
[It appears that most consumers enjoy smoking as a consumption
decision. In 1988 R.J. Reynolds introduced the Premier cigarette...
204. Of course, if cigarettes are not addictive, then the fact that most current smokers began smoking
as minors loses some of its significance. Viscusi dedicates a chapter to revie ing sur,,ey results and arguing
that the smoking decisions of teenagers are just as "'sensible" as those of adults. See VISC"USI. jupra note
49, at 10-11, 119-37.
The observations that we make above and below regarding Viscusi's evidcnce. arguments. and policy
conclusions regarding the smoking decision of adults apply equally to his evidence, arguments, and policy
conclusions regarding that of children. We would add also that the evidence vith regard to children's
assessment of risk seems especially inapposite. Viscusi at one point acknow ledges the possibility that the
young smoker may not "fully recognize how his or her future self will salue health as compared with
smoking," though he concludes that young people make nsk-,ensitive smoking decisions Id at 119
205. See NV. Kip Viscusi, Strategic and Ethical Issues in the Valuation of Life. iti STRATGY AD
CHOICE 359, 372 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1993). Schelling conjectures that smokers would be w illing
to pay a great deal, on the order of S100 billion, for "a reliable way to quit cigarit-to quit ccn wanting
them-without torment or suspense or loss of privacy or any restrictions on mobilit or any ph) sical side
effects." SCHELLING, supra note 183, at 74. The path dependence model implies the same prediction If an
inexpensive way to leave the current path were discovered, decisionmakers wsould be much more likely to
take the new path. Cf. Parker-Pole, supra note 141 (describing current expenditures on smoking cessation
aids).
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[which was] [e]xtemally indistinguishable from a traditional
cigarette .... Smokers of the Premier could enjoy the physical
movements of holding a cigarette and the oral gratification achieved
through cigarette smoking as well as the nicotine that smokers
presumably desire .... Perhaps the only attribute on which the
Premier fell short was its taste. The result was a marketing disaster,
and the new product was withdrawn from the market.
The Premier provided an almost perfectly controlled
experiment.... Surely if cigarette purchases were driven by
"addiction" alone, this product would have dominated the market. It
seems clear that some fundamental taste on the part of consumers for
the smoking experience is at play.2°6
At first blush, the evidence from the "perfectly controlled experiment"
seems compelling. The failure of the Premier seems to prove that the taste of
cigarettes, and not addiction, is the primary reason for smoking. Under closer
scrutiny, however, the experiment appears less than perfect. Even assuming
that the Premier experiment unfolded exactly as Viscusi describes, it would
prove little with respect to the addiction models we discussed above. Those
models, recall, depend not so much on nicotine-based addiction, but on, among
other things, the fact that the good taste is delivered with each cigarette while
the ill-health effects are incurred much later-or, if the smoker quits in time,
possibly never.207 To treat the Premier as a test of, for example, Schelling's
model is to misunderstand that model.08 If the Premier tasted bad, then it
would not be a viable cigarette "substitute" within Schelling's conception. If
each puff is unpleasant, none of a person's "selves" would have any interest.
The Premier experiment nevertheless may indicate that consumers do not
smoke solely because of chemical addiction.2 9 In numerous ways, however,
the experiment was far from "perfectly controlled"; it was badly flawed. First,
it is questionable whether the Premier's purported health advances were
206. Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372 (emphasis added).
207. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text. The path dependence model does depend in part
on nicotine-based addiction. Specifically, because consumers underestimate the costs of quitting (that is,
the addictiveness of nicotine) when initiating their smoking habits, their choice to begin or continue
smoking may not be a welfare-enhancing choice.
208. In a 1993 article, Viscusi described the Premier experiment to help sort out questions Schelling
raised about smoking behavior. Viscusi's framing of questions, however, suggests that he mistakenly takes
Schelling as explaining smoking as the consequence of chemical addiction to nicotine: "Is the authentic self
the smoker or the person who claims to want to be a nonsmoker? What does it mean when individuals
express a desire to quit smoking? Are they physically dependent on nicotine, or is it the act of smoking
that they cannot quit?" Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372 (emphasis added). Limiting himself to those
dichotomous alternatives, Viscusi ultimately concludes that, for reasons we examine and criticize in this
subsection, "there is at least some evidence that cigarette smoking is an action of one's authentic self." i.
at 373-74.
209. This assumes, contrary to our arguments above, that smokers are in fact well informed of the
health risks that they face and would have been willing to trade seemingly trivial taste concerns to reduce
health risks while still getting their nicotine fixes.
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substantial210 or whether the new cigarettes were perceived by consumers as
substantially safer.1 t In addition, a host of nonhealth differences between the
210. As compared to traditional cigarettes. the Premier contained fester of %%hit RJR called
"controversial compounds" like tar. John Helyar. RJR Plans To Market Stikeless Cigarette ai
Breakthrough with Hefty Price Tag, WALL ST. J . Aug. 30. 1988. at 25 [hereinafter Hehlsar. RJR Plansj
It was to produce no ash, less sidestream smoke, and less nicotine than 97% of the brands on the market
See id. The number of chemical compounds was not eliminated, but reduced b) 82% to 96% compared to
low-tar cigarettes. See John Helyar, Scientists Give the Smokeless Cigarette Good Retes s in Prelate to
RJR Report, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1988, at 36. More specificallN. RJR's 744-page s-cwnittic compendium
stated that there were 6.0 mg of tar per cigarette compared to 8 2 to 12 0 mg for leading Io%% -tar brands
See Finn Introduces the 'Clean' Cigarette. ST PETERSBtRG Tmits. Sept 26. 1988. at D3 As a
consequence of these sorts of changes, the Premier %as expected to be less offensie to nonsmoker,. see
Betsy Morris & Alix M. Freedman. *Sinokeless' Cigarette Is Expected To Pose Bit: MarLeting Challenge.
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1988, at 39; Betsy Moms & Peter Waldman. The Death oJ Prefiter. W-ALL ST I .
Mar. 10, 1989, at BI; Peter Waldman & Betsv' Moms. RJR .Vabisco Abandons "SnioLelesi' Cigarette,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1989, at BI, to ease "the social pressure and guilt manN smokers suffer." Mors &
Freedman, supra, and to appeal particularly to %%omcn. see Moms & Waldman, supra
The continued presence of nicotine suggests that the Premier was not substantialls safer Although
tar is believed to elevate the risk of cancer in smokers, nicotine is beliesed to create higher nsk ot heart
disease and is suspected to play a role in the metastatic spread of cancer See Ilouard Wohnk,.
Pseudo-Cigarettes Still Have Toxins. CHI. SUN-T ,iES. Sept 20. 1987. at 14 Further, reduced nicotine
levels, researchers suggested. would not necessarily reduce the le'.el of mcotine-based nsk as compared to
conventional cigarettes. In RJR's studies, test rats exposed to smoke from the Premier %%ere reported to
have twice the level of nicotine in their blood as test rats exposed to regular cigarettes See Firm lintrtpduci5
the 'Clean' Cigarette, supra. Moreover. RJR's claim that ii reduced the nicotine lesel in Premier belok
that of 97% of the brands on the market casts doubt on the status of the Premier as an adequate
"substitute." See Helyar, RJR Plans, supra.
211. RJR did not promote the Premier as a "healthier" cigarette because of the unceramt regarding
its health effects and because such advertisements might hase itmplicitly indicted other tobacco products
and invited FDA regulation. See Don Colbum. 'Cleaner.' But Is It Safer' RJ Reinolds Touts a ei,
High-Tech Cigarette-Very Carefull, WASH. PosT. Sept 6. 1988. at Z6 Instead. RJR suggested onlN that
the Premier was "cleaner," hoping that the consumer ssould read bets ecn the lines See Fir Introdutr
the 'Clean' Cigarette, supra note 210. Health claims made b% RJR should also hase done little to
distinguish the Premier from conventional cigarettes, gten that cigarette manufacturers had long denied
that conventional cigarettes have any significant ill-health consequences See supra note 26. cl supra notes
99-101 and accompanying text (arguing that if consumers do not hase brand-specitlic Inlormation.
manufacturers will have reduced incentives to market relatisels safe cigarettesi
In addition, regulators, health groups, and consumer groups did not treat Preuier cigarettes as nskless
Potential FDA regulation of the Premier as a drug. see FDA Warns RJ Resnhlds That Snwkele5s
Cigarettes Could Be Classified a Drug. ORANGE Cot ,NT Rt-G (Cal ). Sept 3. 1988. at AS, and its ongoing
review until the Premier was withdrawn from the market in Februar. 1989 could ha%,c hindered the he.%
cigarette's acceptance by customers. The hostile response of health groups and antismoking groups similar['
doused the chances that consumers might consider it safer See Firni Initnces the Cl(en C'iu,'ttfe,
supra note 210. These groups joined the Surgeon General in labeling tihe Premier a "drug-dcl %r s ssteit"
and in raising a range of criticisms. New 'Cigarette' Realls a Drun, Koop Claims. L A "'lits. Oct 21,
1988, at 2; see also Smokeless Cigarette Aionncetent Reporteds Set lore Mndas. AP. Sept 13. 1987,
available in 1987 WL 3174997 ("We don't kno%% wshat else is going to be gisen oil Once Nou put plastics
in there you have to be concerned about the compounds in the plastics -(quoting a research scientist at [te
Georgia Institute of Technology)): Scott Ticer & Reginald Rhem Jr. Tie Burning Questiton at RJR .Vos,
What?, Bus. WK., Sept. 28. 1987. at 28 ("[lt's merel% a nes fangled drug-deli'er Nsstei tor nicotine "'i,
Michael Waldholz & John Helvar. FDA Feels Heat on Snokeless Cigarette. \Vtt Si J . Oct 21, 1988,
at BI (reporting that the Premier is seen as easily adaptable for the use of crack cocaline,
Regardless of its veracity, the Premier's bad press hkel) influenced consumers' subjecti% e perceptions
of risk, which are what count in consumer decisions C Viscr St. supra note 49. at 5 tesplaining that "'the
effect of these risk perceptions on their decisions . is tie main matter of interest"i, Joni tlersh & Wh
Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking. Seatbelt Use. and Differenes li lii ge-Risk TrIade-011, 25 J lit %i RitS
202, 226 (1990) (explaining that "individuals' subjective perceptions of the riskiness ot their job is tic
relevant factor governing individual decisions regarding potentiallN hazardous jobs") it a laiti that appears
to be in tension with his suggestion that Premier pro\ ided a "perecl[ controlled eperinient." Viscusi
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Premier and traditional cigarettes undermines the view that the experimental
cigarettes were a viable substitute. The Premier's taste was not merely a
"drawback," as Viscusi would have it, but a fundamental flaw. According to
test marketers, the Premier "smell[ed] like burning garbage,"2 and "taste[d]
like shit." 213 Furthermore, contrary to Viscusi's reckoning, the Premier did
not retain the "look and feel" of conventional cigarettes. "Smoking is a
complex psychological, emotional and mechanical process, 'a total
activity'.. . . 'Smokers like taking out the cigarette, tapping it, playing with
it, blowing smoke."' 2 14 With the Premier, there was no ash and therefore no
flicking. 2 5  For many smokers, "'[t]he smoke itself is part of the
satisfaction,"' and many were not eager to become mere "puffers. ' '26 More
generally, smokers found the Premier cigarettes to be difficult and unpleasant
to consume.2t7 Finally, beyond these issues of "look and feel," Premier
suggests that the government's regulatory interference with the marketing of Premier cigarettes was largely,
if not entirely, to blame for the failure of that and other potentially safer cigarette substitutes. See VISCuSI,
supra note 49, at 147-48 (concluding that "government policies now in place actively discourage safety
innovations in cigarettes.").
212. Melissa Turner, The 'Cleaner' Cigarette Will Make Its Premiere, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 31,
1988, at Cl.
213. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO
112 (1990); see also Bradley Johnson, Cigarette May Fuel Heated Debate, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC.
(N.C.), Sept. 5, 1988, at C8 (reporting that the Premier tasted like "singed hair"); Douglas C. McGill,
Consumers Give 'Smokeless' Cigarette Unfavorable Reviews, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 19, 1988, at
A4 ("It tastes like burning plastic."); John Riley, Smoker Carries a Torch; Aficionado Reflects on 'Weird,'
New Smokeless Cigarettes, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 7, 1988, at 2 (stating that Premier cigarettes were at
first fine, but then "harsh in the mouth and sickening in the nose" and "gave me headaches."); Smokeless
Cigarette Gets Varied Marks in Informal Taste Test, AP. Sept. 4, 1988, available in 1988 WL 3808039
(stating that the Premier smelled "like a tennis shoe burning"). RJR was not entirely surprised by the
reviews. Indeed, its own ambition was apparently not to attract currently satisfied smokers to switch to
Premier cigarettes. According to an RJR executive responsible for the Premier's initial development, the
firm "hoped [the cigarette] would keep smokers from quitting and draw ex-smokers back to Reynolds."
BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra, at 74. That RJR did not target Premier for consumption by currently
satisfied smokers may further impeach the claim that it was a "substitute" for other cigarettes.
214. Morris & Freedman, supra note 210 (quoting Leo Shapiro, a Chicago-based marketing
consultant).
215. See Johnson, supra note 213.
216. Smokeless Cigarette Announcement Reportedly Set for Monday, supra note 211 (quoting Dave
Brenton, head of the Smoker's Rights Alliance).
217. A host of practical complications made the Premier potentially unappealing. To begin with,
Premier did not mix well with matches or even cheap lighters, which only exacerbated the cigarette's bad
taste and smell. See BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 213, at 112. RJR's own CEO at the time, Ross
Johnson, was quoted as saying that when lit with a match, the Premier smelled "like a fart." Id. Even with
a quality lighter, Premier cigarettes took longer than normal to light, and an inadequate lighting caused the
smoker to experience what became known as the "hernia effect," the need to overexert on the inhale
because the cigarette was not lit properly. See Morris & Waldman, supra note 210. To overcome those
problems, RJR provided consumers with four pages of directions on how to smoke the Premier. Each
cigarette was good for around 10 to 12 solid drags before the heat source ran out, but who was counting?
Disposal of spent cigarettes also proved a problem, which RJR endeavored to solve by including with each
pack a plastic case to carry unpleasant cigarette carcasses, but that solution, according to one investigator,
had a negative psychological effect because it reminded the smoker of a junkie's discarded hypodermic
needles. See Riley, supra note 213.
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cigarettes were priced 15% to 20% higher than conventional cigarettes-"at a
time when discount brands [were] taking off.
-218
In light of this history, it seems doubtful that the "marketing disaster"
provides any evidence that cigarettes are not addictive. If anything, the Premier
experiment and other efforts to provide a viable cigarette substitute provide
some evidence of the addictiveness of nicotine. In each of these cases, the
manufacturer has chosen to leave nicotine in its product, despite an ability to
remove the substance and despite knowledge of the hazards it poses.2t9
ii. Evidence of Rational Decisionmaking
Viscusi offers a second type of argument to suggest that "smoking
behavior follows patterns similar to that of other types of consumption
goods, "220 or, in other words, that cigarettes are not addictive. For instance,
Viscusi emphasizes that the elasticity of consumer demand with respect to both
cigarette price and consumer income is "not entirely dissimilar" to those of
other products.22' Specifically, Viscusi summarizes forty-one studies that
were "able to generate estimates that indicated a negative elasticity of demand
218. Ticer & Rhein, supra note 211. It is worth noting finally that. although consumer, had plenty, ot
good reasons not to switch to Premier cigarettes, it was ultimately RJR's decision to pull the product from
the market after only a very brief trial. A number of internal corporate issues ma) help to explain the
'marketing disaster," including uncertainty. disagreement as to RJR's true motises and the Prcmier's
chances of success, concerns over the readiness of the product for market. and corporate maneu'cring
relating to the leveraged buyout of RJR. See BURROLGtt & HUYAR. supra note 213. at 111-12. 119-22.
Bradley Johnson, Up in Smoke, GREENSBORO NEWS & Ri:C (N C). Mar 13. 1989. at 8. MormN, &
Waldman, supra note 210.
219. A sworn statement given to the FDA tn March of 1996 b) Dr Ian Udcss. a former assoctate
scientist for Philip Morris, is enlightening on this point-
Tobacco companies like Philtp Morris learned a long time ago that it %sas hard to get people
to stay with a good tasting product if the nicotne level was too low It ts fairly safe to say that
while taste is a very important component of a smoker's experience ("satslaction") ,,ith a
cigarette, that good taste alone does not sustain a market Philip Morms clearlh understood this
relationship between nicotine level and product acceptability (e.g. that the) could deselop a
market for a medium to high nicotine product that had marginal taste, but that the) sould Ihase
trouble sustaining the sales of a good-tasting product that was too lo% tn nicotine)
Declaration of lan L Uydess. Ph.D. to the Food and Drug Achntinstraton,. II 2 Tobacco Prods Litig Rep
(TPLR) 8.1, 8.6 (1996); see also hternal Memos Show RJ Reynolds Tolico Compran Iiilrgeted Underage
Smokers and Viewed Nicotine as a Drug. 10.6 Tobacco Prods Ling Rep I 157. I 157 t1995) lhereinatter
Internal Memos] ("'Happily for the tobacco industry, nicotine is both habituating and unique in its sanet,
of physiological actions."' (quoting an internal RJR memo)) Smokers choose brands according to their
"individual nicotine dosage requirements and secondarily by a variety of other considerations, including
flavor." Internal Memos, supra, at 1.157; see also supra note 144 (describing %%hat the tobacco industry
has known about the addictiveness of cigarettes and ho%% the industr) may hasc manipulated that
addictiveness). In short, the fact that taste may play a role in people's choices among cigarette brands doe,
not-even the industry seems to recognize-indicate that cigarettes are not addicttse This sort of csidence
led FDA regulators to suspect that nicotine had been manipulated for its addictie effect. prompting the
FDA to enter the "tobacco wars." See HILTS. supra note 12. at 102-12
220. Viscusi, supra note 102. at 66.
221. VIScuSi, supra note 49, at 101: see ulso Viscusi. supra note 102. at 52. 66 (substituting the
phrase "similar to").
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for cigarettes" ranging from -0.4 to -1.4.222 The latter extreme was an
estimate of the price elasticity for teenagers, "who appear to be most sensitive
to the price. '223 Viscusi finds "striking[]" that all the studies would provide
evidence that "as the price of cigarettes declines, consumers increase their
demand for the product" and that "price increases for cigarettes will reduce
consumer demand., 224 He concludes that such evidence "implies that
smoking decisions satisfy a basic but fairly undemanding test of
rationality.' '225
Viscusi also makes a closely related observation that "the character of
individual risk perceptions" also affects a consumer's smoking propensity.
2 26
"Higher assessed smoking risk probabilities decrease the probability that an
individual will smoke. 2 27 For instance, "smokers assess the lung cancer risk
as being .37, which is .06 lower than the societal perception of .43.,,228 This
finding is "also consistent with rational decision making. '229 This is true
because rational actors would treat perceived increases in risk as tantamount
to price increases.23 °
Still more evidence of rational decisionmaking can be found in smokers'
selection of cigarettes. Although a majority of all smokers in the survey
expressed concern about the health risks of smoking, a disproportionate
percentage of those who expressed such concern smoke putatively healthier
"low-tar" cigarettes. 23t Thus, risk perceptions seem to have a predictable
effect on decisionmaking among smokers, just as they do between smokers and
nonsmokers.232
According to Viscusi, "The character of the tradeoffs that smokers make
in other contexts," such as in the workplace, is "consistent with risk-taking
decisions in the smoking domain. 233  Nonsmokers require more
compensation to bear job-related risks of serious injury.234 This is probably
222. Viscusi, supra note 49, at 106-07.
223. Id. at 106.
224. Id.
225. Id. He also points out that the evidence "highlights the potential role of taxes as a policy
instrument for influencing cigarette smoking behavior." Id.
226. Id. at 110; see also Viscusi, supra note 102, at 67.
227. Viscusi, supra note 102, at 67; see also VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 110.
228. viscusi, supra note 49, at I10.
229. Viscusi, supra note 102, at 67.
230. It is noteworthy that Viscusi's own findings suggest that risk perceptions are not especially
influential in a person's decision to smoke. See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 110 (explaining that
differences in risk assessments should help explain consumption choices and then conceding that differences
in smoker and nonsmoker risk perceptions were "not stark"); id. at 114 (describing the "disparity in the
perceptions of smokers and nonsmokers" as "minor").
231. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 67.
232. But cf. supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (describing how "light" cigarettes may be
deceptively dangerous).
233. Viscusi, supra note 102, at 66.
234. See VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 110-115, 143; Viscusi, supra note 102, at 66-67; Viscusi, supra
note 205, at 373.
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the most important evidence, in his view, because it indicates "that smokers
differ systematically from non-smokers in terms of their valuation of the health
effects of smoking. 235
Based on this evidence that the decision to smoke is responsive to price
and risk perceptions and that smokers appear more willing to take risks than
nonsmokers, Viscusi suggests that the purchase of cigarettes is
indistinguishable from the purchase of "automobiles ... or books."2'  Put
differently, "there is at least some evidence that cigarette smoking is an action
of one's authentic self."237 This evidence, however, is perfectly consistent
with the addictive models that we described above.2" The general message
of those models is that some consumers who now smoke might not if the risks
and benefits were presented to them simultaneously in an aggregated fashion
at the moment of decision. Indeed, those models would predict that price
increases and risk perceptions would influence aggregate smoking patterns.
To be clear, it may be helpful to describe in slightly more detail Thomas
Schelling's multiple selves model, which Viscusi's arguments seem specifically
intended to refute.23 In Schelling's view, self-management is equivalent to
the management of someone else--"someone in a close relation, with a
paternalist or senior-junior quality like that between parent and child.2'' '!
Sticking with Schelling's parent-and-child analogy, one would predict that.
other things being equal, the greater the perceived price or risk facing a child's
decision, the more control a parent would seek to exert. Moreover, a great deal
of Schelling's discussion of how individuals manage the contest for
self-control, as well as how the law might assist them, involves altering the
"prices" and the perceived risks associated with smoking.2" ' Indeed, that
effect is what leads some consumers to try to trick themselves into
overestimating the risks of their choice-not unlike the common and more
observable habit of setting one's watch a few minutes fast.2 ! The same point
235. Viscusi. supra note 49. at 112.
236. Id. at 109.
237. Viscusi, supra note 205. at 373-74. Viscust concedes that tnan) smokcr, sunecd expressed a
desire to quit, but states that "the full implicattons of the sur.ey responses are not clear" hi at 374
238. See supra Subsections l1.B.4.b-d.
239. See supra note 205 and accompanying text
240. SCHELLING, supra note 183. at 63.
241. Thus, Schelling is unsurprised by the fact that %khen the Surgeon General %tent public u.th
findings about the risks of cigarettes, smoking decreased. See id. at 82
242. See id. at 78-80. One might explain Viscusi's findings in just these terms That ts. consumers nia,
attempt to trick themselves into believing that cigarettes are extremely dangerous as a means of maintaining
some self-control. If that were true. then Viscusi's evidence could be undermtood as the symptom, not the
absence, of a problem.
Schelling does, from time to ttme. emphasize that hts conceptton of the indtidual is different from
the rational actor conception. He writes, for instance. that "the ordinaty human betng is somettmes not
a single rational individual ... (but] more like a small collectiit) - Id at 93 Consequentl). "indt, iduals
may not make decisions in accordance with the postulates of rationality " hi. A person's choices imay fail
to "display the qualities typically imputed to rational decision, like transittity. irrele'.ance of "irrelesant"
alternatives, and short-run stability over time." Id. at 94. But. again. Schelling does not mean to suggest
that price or risk perceptions will not influence consumers' conduct in predictable va)s Those sanable,
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can be made with respect to George Ainslie's time-discounting model.243
That model also predicts that price increases and perceived risk increases
would lead to decreases in consumption levels. To be sure, the more immediate
the increase, the more dramatic will be the response, but at the margin, average
consumption levels will always be inversely related to price and risk
perceptions: When consumers face a higher price or perceive an increase in the
risks of cigarettes, they will, other things being equal, smoke less (or switch
to a brand that they perceive to be less risky).
Viscusi's evidence is also consistent with the path dependence model of
addiction. In terms of the decision to smoke, the point of the metaphor was not
that smokers would fail to alter their smoking behavior in the face of new
costs. Instead, it was that some smokers would continue to smoke only because
earlier decisions raised the costs of quitting. In the aggregate, however, if price
or perceived risk levels of smoking were to increase, the model would predict
that more smokers would quit.
In addition to the evidence that smokers respond to price variations in
cigarettes, Viscusi presents findings that smokers are, other things being equal,
less likely to wear seat belts and more willing to accept job risks than
nonsmokers. 244 These findings, he suggests, support the conclusion that
smokers are less risk averse than nonsmokers, a conclusion that is consistent
with the rational smoker model. These findings, however, are also consistent
with the addiction models that we have considered. The possibility of varying
tastes across consumers is not unique to Viscusi's rational actor model. Tastes
could just as easily vary across consumers under our addiction models, with
similar effect. Consumers who are especially sensitive or insensitive to risk in
one context will likely be the same in other contexts. 245 For example,
returning to Schelling's parent-child metaphor, if the parent self is especially
will influence which of the multiple selves wins the contest. The self who wants to stop smoking gains
some advantage in the contest for control, other things being equal, when cigarette prices increase. The type
of "irrational" behavior that Schelling has in mind is that of the individual who in one moment is cursing
and forswearing cigarettes as he crumbles a pack in his hand and, in the next moment, is lighting the bent
and busted remains of one of those cigarettes. See id.
243. See Ainslie, supra note 176, at 471, 492-93. Schelling also describes the person whose multiple
selves differ along "the dimension of time preference-of the discount rate to compare present with future,
near future with far future, imminent with remote, or permanent with transient. The idea is that the person
who ... lights that cigarette ... is merely discounting the future with a high interest rate." SCIIHLLING,
supra note 183, at 62.
244. See Viscusi, supra note 49, at 113-14.
245. It may be worth emphasizing in this regard that social scientists have long recognized that
personal or behavioral characteristics likely play a significant role in the smoking habits of individuals. The
Surgeon General's 1989 report summarized that evidence as follows: "Studies have linked initiation of
smoking with rule breaking in school, general delinquency, age at first intercourse, inadequate contraceptive
use, low levels of child compliance within the family, low levels of responsibility, nonconventionality,
impulsivity, rebelliousness, and previous use of alcohol and other substances." SURGEON GENrRAL'S
PROGRESS REPoRT, supra note 3, at 336 (citations omitted). Such correlations are analogous to those
observed "with other drug addictions," id., and as such do not imply that cigarettes are not addictive.
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lax in controlling the child self with respect to one type of risk, then it seems
likely that the parent self would be lax with regard to all types of risk.
There may be another problem with Viscusi's evidence-a problem of
interpretation. In his view, the evidence "is consistent with differences in
individual tastes driving choices in a rational economic manner."2 6 In an
earlier article (with Joni Hersch), however, Viscusi seems to identify two other
viable explanations for the evidence, neither of which suggests that smokers
smoke simply because they value their lives less than nonsmokers, as measured
by job-risk premiums. One "hypothesis that generates similar patterns of
influences is that cigarette smoking and seatbelt use serve[] as proxies for the
production of safety. 2 '47 Alternatively, Hersch and Viscusi concede, the
evidence is consistent with systematic differences across individuals in
estimations of the magnitude of the health loss: "If individuals underestimate
the severity of all adverse health risks from jobs, cigarettes, or automobiles,
they will be more likely to engage in all of these forms of risky behavior.' ' ' ss
Though Viscusi once recognized these other potential explanations for his
evidence, he does not, so far as we can determine, consider them in his work
on smoking policy.
Moreover, there is another viable interpretation of the evidence that
Viscusi seems nowhere to consider. Contrary to Viscusi's implicit assumption,
for instance, tastes may not be completely exogenous-that is, fixed and
uninfluenced by consumer's smoking decisions and other risky decisions.
Instead, a consumer's decision to encounter one risk may well influence the
consumer's willingness to encounter another. Accepting for the sake of
argument that smokers believe they face a substantial risk of illness, disability,
or premature death from smoking, it seems plausible that smokers will have
less distaste for other types of health risks than will nonsmokers. The greater
the chance that a person will grow ill or die prematurely from one type of risk,
the less willing that person should be to invest in avoiding illness or death
246. VISCusI, supra note 49, at 113.
247. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 211, at 225; see also d. at 205 (explaining the intuition behind the
hypothesis). A similar partial explanation that Hersch and Viscusi do not consider is that smokers may be
less productive or more costly (or perceived as less producti e or more costly) on the job. other things
being equal, than nonsmokers. For instance. smokers probably take more breaks than do their nonsmoking
counterparts, for obvious reasons. For summaries of a number of studies that have purported to find that
smokers are less productive or more costly to employ, see David B Ezra. "Get Off Your Butts" The
Employer's Right To Regulate Emaployee Smoking. 60 TENN. L. REv. 905. 910-16 (1993). and Jimmy Goh.
"Smokers Need Not Apply": Challenging Employment Discrimination Against Smokers Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 U. KAN. L. REv. 817. 823 (1991). See also infro note 278 (describing
the potential savings in health insurance costs to employers who institute smoking bans in the %%orkplace).
Some scholars, however, have challenged the evidence that smokers are less producti'.e than nonsmokers-
See, e.g., Alfred Vogel, Are Smokers Really Less Productive Than Nonsmokers', LEGIS. POL'Y. Summer
1985. at 6.
248. Hersch & Viscusi. supra note 211. at 205. The evidence is inconsistent. hoever. with the
hypothesis that "health-related activities capture differences in risk perceptions." Id. (emphasis added)
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from another type of risk, other things being equal. 249 To the extent that
consumers' risky decisions affect their other risky decisions as we have
described, it no longer follows that "it is largely ... differences in taste that
drive the differences in smoking decisions.
' 250
In sum, it seems that none of the evidence Viscusi highlights rules out the
possibility that consumers are addicted to cigarettes, at least as we have
defined "addiction." Perhaps the only model of addiction that Viscusi's
evidence contradicts is the model that assumes that "addicted" smokers are
simply incapable of not smoking at some fixed rate, no matter the price and
no matter the risk. Indeed, it appears that Viscusi has that model in mind. For
example, in a very recent article, he explains that he is responding to those
"observers [who] have hypothesized that even if people understand the risk of
smoking, they may... be addicted to smoking and unable to alter their
behavior.' 251 His definition of the stylized smoker model-which he
describes as the "main characterization of smokers underlying the smoking
debate"-also seems to include that extreme notion of addiction.252 We are
doubtful that such an extreme position is as common as he suggests.
25 3
Similarly, we have nowhere encountered a claim that smokers, in the
aggregate, will not lower their smoking rates in response to price increases and
we do not believe that anyone holds such a view. 4
249. The basic intuition underlying our point here has an analogue in the cynical bumper sticker that
reads, "Eat Well, Exercise, and Get Hit by a Truck," and is related to the argument above regarding
imperfect relative-risk information. See supra Subsection II.B.3.
250. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 114. Finally, we are suspicious about the study results in light of the
absolute wage-compensation amounts that Hersch and Viscusi found. It seems to us implausible that a
sample of blue collar employees of three manufacturing firms (a wholesale warehouse, a laundry, and a
gardening firm), would implicitly value an injury that caused a worker to miss one workday at
$83,217.39-even if the worker is a nonsmoker and a non-seatbelt-user. The point is even more clear when
one takes into account that the "compensating differentials may be biased downward" by at least
$12,608.70. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 211, at 221. Again, it seems odd that workers would demand
what is likely to be well over one year's salary as implicit compensation for the risk of an injury leading
to the loss of one day of work. These results suggest that something is wrong with the methodology of the
study or with the rationality of the subjects studied. Hersch and Viscusi do not, as far as we can tell,
address this issue.
251. Viscusi, supra note 102, at 66 (emphasis added); see also VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 5, 18, 101.
252. VISCUSi, supra note 49, at 5; see also id. at 18 (stating that "if they are cognizant of the hazards,
they ignore these risks in making their decisions"); id. at 21 ("Only the immediate gratification provided
by cigarettes drives consumer behavior.").
253. Indeed, Schelling, the only scholar whom Viscusi mentions by name, devotes considerable
attention to understanding the mechanisms that individuals commonly employ to help with the battle of
self-control. Implicit in Schelling's discussion is the notion that different consumers will have different
amounts of self-control. See T.C. Schelling, Self-Connand: A New Discipline, in CHOICE OVER TIME 167
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (noting that people vary in their ability to stop using cocaine
or cigarettes, to get out of bed at a chosen time, and to do many other things that they know they should
do).
254. After cursorily surveying 41 studies of price elasticity, Viscusi concludes that "most of the
demand elasticities are clustered in the range from [-0.4 to -1.0]," implying that a 10% increase in price
would reduce consumption by 4% to 10%. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 105. His argument seems to be that
if cigarettes were truly addictive then price increases would have little or no effect on overall consumption
rates.
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We have a variety of responses. First. it is not clear that an) plausible model of addiction could lead
to the conclusion that addicted consumers %%ill be %%holly price insetsitie As Gary Becker demonstrated
in a classic article, "[N]egatively inclined market demand curses result not so much from rational beha% tor
per se as from a general principle which includes a 'ide class of irrattonal behasior as .ell - Gary S
Becker, Irrational Behavior and Econontic Theory. 70 J POL ECO%. I. 4 (1962) It is thus unclear ,h,
Viscusi stresses that the "most striking[]" insight from his sure]' of studies ma) be that all the studies
indicate downward-sloping demand or why he asserts that "Ithe price responsieriess of cigarette demand
implies that smoking decisions satisfy a basic but fairly undemanding test of rationalit) " VisCr St. sipra
note 49, at 106.
Still, Viscusi's bigger point may be simpl] that addiction implies that demand cur-e, s ould be
extraordinarily steep. See id. at 101. The claim that cigarettes are addjcti\e. hoseser. does not necessarily
lead to such a prediction. Instead it may suggest onl] that demand for cigarettes %%ill be less price elastic
among current smokers than it would be were cigarettes stripped of their addicti e features te g . nicotine)
But even if Viscusi were correct, we believe the evidence is quite consistent v, th Viscusi's notion of
"'addiction."
To see why, it is necessary initially to point out that, as far as .c can tell. Viscust inappropriatel)
truncates the lower end of the price-elasticity estimates that he sureys From shat % e can obsere, it is
more accurate to state that the estimates cluster between a range of -0 2 and -1 0 See id at 102-05 tbl 5-6
(summarizing the studies). Indeed, it appears to us that roughly one-third of the studies that Viscusi
summarizes include estimates of less than -0.4. See id
Another problem with Viscusils interpretation is that it seems to assume that all smokers are equall)
addicted to cigarettes. Elasticity studies, however. typically measure aerage responses to price changes
It may well be that for a sizable percentage of smokers, price play's little role in the decisions of shether
and how much to smoke. If enough smokers are highly price sensiti,. hoseser. their price reactions %,ill
dilute some of the price insensitivity of other smokers. when the quantity reactions to price increases are
averaged. In other words, averaging may understate the significant problem that many people ha . ii
quitting. To get some sense of the variance of price elasticities. it might be illuminating to ditde the
market into different groups. Long-term smokers, one might predict, are likely to be more addicted and thus
to evince much less responsiveness to price than the aserage smoker and. especially, the short-term smoker
Evidence that young people have the most elastic demand seems to confirm this claim See. e V . id at 104
tbl.5-6 (summarizing an elasticity study of children ages 12 to 17 that estimated a price elasticity of -1 4.
which made children by far the most price-sensitte group in all of the studies sur'eyed)
It is important to note as well that changes in sales wi.ll reflect several variables, including how many
nonsmokers do not begin smoking because of price increases The decision not to become a smoker is.
obviously, unaffected by the addictive quality of cigarettes. because those who are not yet smoker, cannot
be addicted. Consequently, the price elasticities that Viscus summarizes may o%ersate the ease of quitting
(or understate the addictiveness of smoking). given that they, also reflect the decisions of nonsmokers to
remain nonsmokers.
In light of these criticisms. it is illuminating to look closely at the real-sorld signiticance of Visusj's
elasticity figures. What are the implications of his findings on. say. a typical long-terni smoker %% ho smoke-,
two packs (40 cigarettes) per day" Suppose that the price increases b% SO.20 per pack (representing a 1011
increase over the current pack price of approximately S2 00) Our smoker. sho smokes 730 pack, ior
14.600 cigarettes) per year. would have to shell out an additional S146 00 per year to mamntamn current
levels of consumption. According to the elasticity studies that Viseus surseys. hoeser. consumption lesel,
will, on average, likely be reduced by between 2% and 10% Suppose that our smoker %sill respond to the
price increase as an average smoker would. Under the loss 2%r estimate, the price increase %%Ill lead to a
decrease of fewer than 15 packs per year to a total of 715 packs (, hich is equisalent to 14.300 cigarettws
per year or 39.17 cigarettes per day-a decline of less than one cigarette per day ) Under the 107 esitinatc.
the total number of cigarettes consumed per year %%ill drop to 657 packs (13.140 indisidual cigarettes or
36 cigarettes per day). Either way there is plenty of smoking.
Still more can be said about price effects on smoking habits Assume that only half of the oserall
reduction in consumption will be on the part of those smokers .ho continue to smoke And suppose that
the other half of the total reduction will be made up of those smokers ssho quit and those nonsmokers vho
choose not to start. Assume, finally, that quitting and not starting occur in roughl[ equal measure, so that
each is responsible for about one quarter of the overall elasticit response Under those assumptions, the
lower and upper benchmarks would be closer: The elastict ssould be betsseen -0 15 and -0 75. sshich
would imply an expected reduction from 40 cigarettes to be,,seen 394 and 37 cigarettes per day Moreoser.
those who did not quit would decrease their smoking lesels by significantly less than that in light of the
fact that one quarter of the total effect is. by assumption, tie consequence of smokers ssho quit smioking
altogether.
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Given that Viscusi's evidence refutes, at most, the straw man model that
assumes all consumers completely ignore risk and price information, it is not
clear why Viscusi believes his evidence regarding the aggregate effect of
information has any relevance to the underlying question. Viscusi himself
stresses that "[e]ven addictive drugs, such as heroin, exhibit price
responsiveness so that the existence of some price elasticity does not rule out
all addictive properties.""5 Ultimately, therefore, the evidence that Viscusi
offers to demonstrate that the decision to smoke is like the decision to
purchase other consumer goods fails to demonstrate why that decision is not
equally analogous to the decision to inject heroin. The evidence does not help
answer the question that motivated it.
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This discussion should help to put Viscusi's elasticity figures into perspective. The price sensitivity
of smokers, particularly long-term smokers, is likely more consistent with even Viscusi's extreme addiction
model than Viscusi gives it credit for being. In any event, other economists who have looked at such
evidence have indicated that, contrary to Viscusi's conclusion, demand for cigarettes is unusually inelastic
and entirely consistent with medical evidence that cigarettes are addictive. For example, although Manning
et al. concede that "[e]stimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes vary enormously from study
to study," MANNING Er AL., supra note 49, at 170, they also indicate that cigarettes are especially price
inelastic when they explain that "cigarette taxes cause relatively less distortion and tax evasion behavior
than other taxes," id. at 24. Moreover, they make the following observation with respect to income
elasticities: "Apparently the demand for cigarettes is income inelastic, with the estimates ranging from a
low of -0.002 to a high of 0.93. This suggests that cigarettes may in fact be considered a necessity (at least
among smokers), probably because of the addictive nature of smoking." Id. at 171. Another group of
economists recently summarized the price-elasticity evidence as follows: "Cigarettes are widely regarded
as having a relatively low elasticity of demand, with a consensus estimate in the vicinity of -0.4 in many
of the major industrialised nations." Wamer et al., supra note 28, at 381; see also Craig Howell ct al.,
Pricing Practices for Tobacco Products, 1980-94, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1994, at 3. 10 (noting the
"generally low responsiveness of consumer demand for cigarettes to price changes, at least in the short
run"); Jeffrey E. Harris, What Can the Cigarette Industry Afford? Strncturing a Long-Term Settlement
(visited July 28, 1997) <http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/afford.html> ("Economists generally regard the
demand for cigarettes as not very sensitive to price."). It is fair to say that although other economists
recognize that there is a range of estimates, they also view the evidence as indicating that demand for
cigarettes is relatively price inelastic and as entirely consistent with medical evidence that cigarettes are
addictive.
255. ViscusI, supra note 49, at 101.
256. Cf. Croley & Hanson, A Defense of Pain-and-Suffering Damages, supra note 40 (making a
similar critique).
A third and final way in which Viscusi attempts to demonstrate that cigarettes are no different from
"almost all economic commodities" is by pointing to the numerous ways in which the term "addiction" has
been overused:
In recent years the addiction label has been liberally applied to a variety of behavioral
phenomena. Most residents of Los Angeles claim to want to move out of the city but do not.
Similarly, millions of workers profess a desire to leave their jobs, but they do not quit. Self-help
psychology paperbacks provide guidance for overcoming addictive relationships.
Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372; see also ViscusI, supra note 49, at 120. Here again, Viscusi's argument
begs the question. If the addiction label has been liberally applied, that does not tell us whether cigarettes
are addictive. Does the fact that some Los Angeles residents said they wanted to move out of Los Angeles,
but did not, imply that heroin is not addictive?
We suspect, moreover, that the disparity between what unhappy Los Angeles residents say and what
they do may be quite analogous to the problem that we believe some smokers face. Within the last decade
Los Angeles has been plagued by crime, racial strife, natural disasters, and controversial jury verdicts. The
Los Angeles economy, among other things, has suffered tremendously as a consequence. See Natalie
Kostelni, Phoenix Area Led Nation in New Jobs; Los Angeles Posted the Biggest Decline, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 22, 1996, at A2. The fact that some current residents do not move out of Los Angeles does not mean
that if they were currently living elsewhere they would return to Los Angeles Similarly, you will not hear
1220
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iii. Summary
A number of efficiency-minded scholars appear to have concluded that
Viscusi's evidence significantly undermines the case for consumer-protection
laws with respect to smoking.5 7 While we applaud Viscusi's efforts to shed
empirical light on this important question, his evidence does not have the
policy implications that he endorses. In the following section, we explain how
an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime, such as enterprise liability, would
respond to all of the information-based market failures discussed in this part,
including those related to addiction.
C. The Informational Effect of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation Revisited
Having described in detail the variety of information-related reasons that
consumers may be undeterrable, it may be helpful to revisit the question of
how ex post incentive-based regulation would respond.2 s If cigarette
manufacturers were liable for all the harms caused by cigarettes, whether
through tort law or another compensation system, they would have to raise
their prices to offset those liability costs. And through product prices
consumers would internalize the costs of smoking. Manufacturer liability
of nonresidents of Los Angeles stating that they do not want to live in Los Angeles and then moving there.
Residents are "stuck." For instance, many homeowners will lose considerable money if they sell at current
market prices. In other words, some residents of Los Angeles may not move away-and some smokers may
not quit-simply because exit costs are unexpectedly high. Under those circumstances. it is not clear that
the "revealed choice" is efficient. See supra Subsection ll.B.4.b. Whatever label is used to describe such
a state of affairs, it seems inappropriate to be sanguine or dismissive about it. Elsewhere Viscust points out
that "[tihe fact that reversing ... decisions is costly does not imply that the choices are incorrect Instead.
we must be cognizant of the potential losses from mistakes when decisions are hard to alter" VtSC'SI.
supra note 49, at 1I. Perhaps so, but Viscusi ignores that many people might not assume that the decision
is hard to alter. And absent that assumption, consumers have no need to take into account the potential
losses.
Finally, we agree with Viscusi's suggestion that transaction costs might prevent people from doing
what they purport to want to do. See Viscusi. supra note 205. at 372-73 The transaction cost label.
however, which has been liberally applied to a variety of efficiency impediments in recent )ears. is no more
precise or illuminating than the addiction label that Viscusi criticizes. In any event. assuming that Viscusi
does not mean "addictive" as we have used the term (including path dependence). then it is extremely hard
to understand what transaction costs could possibly be incurred by quitting smoking. Although it is easy
to imagine the sizeable transaction costs associated with moving or even with ending a relationship, we are
unable to conjure up similar costs that might result from the decision to stop smoking. If anything, we
would predict a significant reduction in transaction costs, as that terminology has been conventionally
employed. Given that Viscusi must be referring to the withdrawal effects of smoking cessation. "addiction"
and not "transaction cost" more accurately describes the underlying problem.
257. See, e.g., Taxin, supra note 49. at 230-42. 260-63; Jacob Sullum. Up in Smoke. 25 REASON 66
(1993) (reviewing Viscusi, supra note 49) ("Viscusi demolishes this vtew of smokers [as nicotine slaves).
which has long been a basic tenet of U.S. health policy."): see also VIsCUst. supra note 49. at book jacket
(statement of Michael Grossman) ("Viscusi's results--4hat on average, persons overestimate the risk of
contracting lung cancer from cigarette smoking and, that an increase in the perception of this risk Iosers
the probability of smoking for adults and teenagers-have profound implications for public policy with
regard to this behavior.").
258. For a fuller treatment of the general argument. see Crole> & Hanson, Fntterprise Liibihts. supra
note 40, at 770-79, 786-92; and Hanson & Logue. Products Liability in Context. supru note 40. at 23-33
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would, in other words, help to educate consumers concerning the full costs of
each and every cigarette. This is not to say that manufacturer liability would
educate consumers about cigarettes on a cognitive level. The point is, rather,
that consumers would, in reacting to changing product prices, respond as if
they were adding the health costs of smoking to what had been the nominal
costs of smoking. They would do so precisely because under enterprise liability
the nominal costs of cigarettes would reflect those health costs. Consumers
need never do any calculations259 Furthermore, to the extent that different
manufacturers' products pose greater or lesser health risks (through variation
of tar and nicotine levels, the presence, size, and type of filters, and so on),
consumers educated by the price mechanism would, all else being equal,
consume fewer relatively dangerous cigarettes and more relatively safe
cigarettes. 60
By incorporating the total costs, including the expected ill-health costs, of
each cigarette into the price of each cigarette,26' the addictive qualities of
cigarettes may also be overcome. The sources of addiction, it may be recalled,
are all related to the ways in which the consumer encounters the costs and
benefits of smoking. Presumably, if the costs and benefits were presented
simultaneously, these problems would not arise. Manufacturer liability for the
costs of cigarettes has the effect of presenting individual smokers with the
costs and benefits of smoking at roughly the same moment, the point of
purchase. The path dependence model of addiction would therefore pose less
of a problem: The consumer's initial path would need less reorienting because
she would take future costs into account. More concretely, higher prices would
be more likely to discourage nonsmokers from starting than they would be to
encourage current smokers to quit.262 Similarly, the problem of the temporal
259. This means of "informing" consumers through price is one that economists accept. See, e.g.,
Viscusi, supra note 102, at 56; Warner et al., supra note 28, at 381-82: cf VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 106
("[H]igher taxes will [by increasing prices] reduce the demand for cigarettes in much the same way as
would higher risk perceptions.").
260. We return to this point below. See infra Subsection V.B.l.
261. We are assuming here that the cost function of cigarettes is linear. This assumption, though
questionable, is common. See supra note 150.
262. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also Warner et al., supra note 28, at 385
("Taxation has been shown to be an effective deterrent to smoking, however, with the preponderance of
evidence suggesting that this is especially true among children, and even many smoking adults support tax
increases with the expectation that they will discourage children from initiating nicotine addictions."
(footnote omitted)); Philip J. Cook, Smoking Policy: Law Politics, and Culture, 262 SCIENCE 1750, 1750
(1993) (book review) ("[Tihere is definitive evidence ... that raising the... [price] on cigarettes
discourages youths from developing a smoking habit and causes some adult smokers to desist.").
Some might want to reject any liability proposal that is justified in part on the grounds that consumers
do not act in a way that is consistent with the rational actor model, for fear that doing so will create a
slippery slope toward a world of paternalistic laws. We are not similarly concerned, for a variety of reasons.
First, we are not certain that such a slope is undesirable, at least on efficiency grounds. See Hanson &
Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality, supra note 40, passim; see also Croley & Hanson, Enterprise
Liability, supra note 40, passim (making the case for mandatory absolute manufacturer liability for all
products). Second, even if we were certain, relying on multiple selves analysis in this context to justify
liability does not imply that liability would be justified on that basis for all products. Scholars have offered
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separation of costs and benefits would be mitigated. Consumers would confront
costs and benefits simultaneously, at the point of purchase. Finally, multiple
selves would also present less of a problem. The costs that would otherwise
be borne by a smoker's future selves would, under enterprise liability, be borne
by the present self in the form of an increased price. In sum, ex post incentive-
based regulation would address many, if not all, of the sources of consumer
misinformation.
Ill. THE SECOND SOURCE OF CONSUMER UNDETERRABILITY:
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
In Part II, our argument for implementing some form of ex post incentive-
based regulation in the cigarette market was based on informational
imperfections. More precisely, we relied on the claim that consumers, when
deciding whether to purchase and smoke the next pack of cigarettes, either
underestimate the long-term risks of smoking or do not fully take those risks
into account. That fact, we said, was a primary source of "consumer
undeterrability." In this part, we introduce a second source of consumer
undeterrability: the fact that many of the harms caused by cigarettes are not
internalized by smokers themselves but are instead externalized to third
parties.63 We describe the sources of those negative externalities in the
cigarette market, focusing on "insurance externalities" in Section III.A and
"noninsurance externalities" in Section III.B. In Section III.C, we mount a
response to the argument made by some economists that, given the external
social "benefits" of smoking from pension and other savings that occur when
smokers die relatively young, and assuming that many of the costs to smokers'
families are already fully internalized by smokers, there is a net positive
some guidelines for recognizing when the multiple selses problem svili be most signilicant See e ,
SCHELLING, supra note 183, at 70 (noting the need for "a s stematic xaN of anal).ing tfhe habit or
weakness along relevant dimensions: the vulnerabilties of its victim. the envionment in \thich it o-cur,.
and the information, communication, and institutional commitments that can be brought to bear", Mot of
those scholars view cigarettes as a paradigmatic example of a product for %hlich the multiple sele-,
problem plays a role. Schelling, for instance, frequently chooses cigarette smoking to make his more
general points. See, e.g., id. at 58; see also infra note 784 (describing other signitficant distinction, betsccn
cigarettes and other consumer products). Third. it is not clear that manufacturer liability can. under any
circumstances, be characterized as especially paternalistic. After all. liability does not purport to be, nor
does it necessarily have the effect of. a prohibition Liability simply ensures that the costs borne in the
future are internalized in the present. Consumers are still free to make the choice that the) %%ant to make
given those costs and benefits. For an argument that only an ex post incentc-ba5ed regulatory regime v, ill
ensure that consumers and manufacturers take personal responsibility for their actions. sce mfra text
accompanying notes 775-778. Finally. there is also the question of Mhich is the authentic sll-the one "ho
wants to smoke or the one who does not. For an argument that the authentic sell is file latter. se
SCHELLING, supra note 183, at 67-68.
263. An externality occurs when "the activity of one person affect[s] the clfare o another in a %%ay
that is not outside the market." HARVEY S. ROsEN. Pt tltc FiNANCL 53 t2d d 19881 Thus. a negatise
externality occurs when the activity of one entity imposes a cost on another in a %%a) that 1 not fully
reflected in market prices, and a positive externality occurs %%hen the eternal effect is a benefit that is not
reflected in prices.
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externality associated with smoking (and, therefore, that smoking should not
be regulated). Using those economists' data (but changing some key
assumptions), we show in Subsections III.C.2.a and III.C.2.b, respectively, that
the negative externalities are greater than these economists have estimated and
that the positive externalities have been overstated. We conclude that a smoker
externalizes approximately $7.00 of costs per pack on average.26 In Section
III.D, we explain how an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime could
internalize those costs, thereby leading to more efficient care levels (safer
cigarettes) and activity levels (less smoking).
265
A. Insurance Externalities
The presence of first-party insurance2 66 can cause many of the costs of
smoking to be externalized by smokers to nonsmokers or by heavy smokers
to light smokers, if the insurers fail to make premium or coverage adjustments
based on the insureds' smoking choices. Any of the costs caused by cigarettes
for which first-party insurance coverage exists can be externalized in this way.
Those costs include increased health care expenses because of smoking-related
illnesses, lost income (either lost income to the smoker due to smoking-related
absence from work or lost to the smoker's dependents due to the smoker's
illness or premature death), and property damage due to smoking-related fires.
To understand in general terms how the insurance externality works, start
by imagining a world of perfect first-party health, life, disability, and property
insurance, a world in which insurers could not only distinguish costlessly
between smokers and nonsmokers but could also make fine-grained distinctions
at all levels-for example, between light smokers and heavy smokers, and
between smokers of Camel filterless and smokers of Carlton Ultralights. In
264. Furthermore, we argue that in any event the so-called savings from smokers' premature
deaths-whatever their amount-should be ignored. See infra Subsection llI.C.2.b.iv
265. Others have made the argument that market externalities warrant regulation of tobacco. See, e.g.,
Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 48, at 945-48; Garner, supra note 48, at 272-73; Vandall.
supra note 48, at 417-18.
We should note that much of our analysis in this part depends in important ways on the imperfect
information arguments from supra Part II. For example, Subsection lll.C.2.a.iii draws heavily on those
arguments. Indeed, there is a sense in which the imperfect information arguments can be readily translated
into an externality argument-an "intrapersonal externality" from the smoker to her future selves. Cf.
Viscusi, supra note 102, at 53 (explaining that smokers might "ignore the externality to their future
selves"); id. at 66 ("[Tjhere is a time lag before the adverse effects of smoking will become apparent ....
[O]ne's future self may make different decisions than one would make if fully apprised of the long term
consequences of smoking."). But cf. id. at 66-72 (ultimately rejecting on empirical grounds the notion that
cigarette-related risks are externalized to smokers' future selves).
266. The phrase "first-party insurance" is often used to refer to insurance arrangements that cover
insureds against some loss to the insured other than legal liability. Although most first-party insurance is
sold to individuals-e.g., health, life, auto-collision, or homeowners' insurance-it can also be sold to
businesses---e.g., fire insurance or business interruption insurance. First-party insurance can be provided
privately through individual insurance policies or group policies, or it can be provided publicly through
government insurance programs. The phrase "third-party insurance" is often used to refer to coverage for
the risk of some type of legal liability.
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such a world, insurers would, in an effort to attract customers, charge different
premiums to different insureds based on the insureds' levels of smoking and
on the types of cigarettes smoked. Those premium differentials would perfectly
reflect the differences in expected costs posed by each insured, based on his
or her smoking habit. Consumers would thereby be induced through insurance
premiums to make efficient smoking decisions (whether to smoke at all, how
much to smoke, what brand to smoke), as they would bear the full costs of
their consumption choices with respect to cigarettes. Consequently, care levels
and activity levels would be optimized.
-2 67
But that is not our world. In reality, insurers make virtually no distinctions
in premiums (or, in the case of publicly provided first-party insurance, taxes)
or benefits between smokers and nonsmokers, or among different classes of
smokers. This means that most of the insured costs of smoking are
externalized; that is, the costs of smoking are not taken into account by
smokers. As a result, as compared with the world of perfect insurance (or as
compared with a world with no insurance but with perfect information),
tobacco companies are not induced to invest optimally in reducing the risks
posed by cigarettes, smokers are not induced to take all cost-justified steps to
smoke cigarettes carefully, and there are too many cigarettes produced and
consumed.268
Those inefficiencies can occur in connection with any cigarette-related risk
that is covered by first-party insurance. As it turns out, many cigarette-related
risks are in fact insured through first-party arrangements. Most of the increase
in health care costs caused by cigarette smoking is funded through some form
of first-party health insurance arrangement. Such arrangements include, for
example, fee-for-service policies, managed care contracts, or
gover ment-provided plans such as Medicare or Medicaid. "  Likewise, a
267. Cf Hanson & Logue, The First-Part" Insurance Externaltri. supra note 40. at 163-64 (cplaining
how perfect first-party insurance can produce optimal deterrence escn in a sorld suthout tort lau)
268. Cf. id. at 164-68 (explaining care level and activity lesel inefficiencie% resulting from the pre,cnce
of imperfect first-party insurance). There is also a second source of activity lesel meffictenc), but this one
is in the market for insurance rather than in the market for cigarettes This ineificcnicN follo%-s from the
first-party insurance externality because some nonsmokers wvho sould be insured in a %korld of perfect
insurance may, given the insurance externality. decide not to purchase insurance or decide to purchase less
insurance than otherwise; and some smokers who %%ould not hase purchased insurance ior as much
insurance) in a perfect-insurance world can be induced to buy tnsurance (or more insurance than othecrsse)
Those changes in the allocation of insurance coverage can produce a ,,elfare loss See Michael Rothschild
& Joseph Stiglitz. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance hlarkets Air Essa on tire Ecoionrut i ofIhnpeij ct
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 629 (1976). There is also a potential distrbutional issue, as %,ealth is
transferred from nonsmokers to smokers. This occurs because sonic smokers can continue to smoke (or
smoke at a higher level) and simply pocket the savings in insurance premtiums. hereas some nonsmokers
remain insured but at a higher premium These effects, in combination, produce a pure transfer from
nonsmokers to smokers and from light smokers to hea%) smokers
269. The vast majority of individuals in the United States are cosered for a large fraction of their
overall medical expenses either through employer-provided health insurance. indistdual health insurance
policies, or some form of government health insurance progranm See U S DIP'T OF COiMMERCE.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STTES-1996. at 120 (1996) (hereinafter STATSTIC.%L
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES] (reporting that approximatel) 8517c of Americans hse some form ol
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large fraction of the risk of lost income due to smoking-caused deaths and
illnesses is covered through life insurance or disability insurance policies or
through employer-funded sick leave. 270 And the risks of property damage
arising out of cigarette-related accidental fires are largely insured through
homeowners insurance or other types of property or fire insurance policies. 7'
Although some insurers attempt to charge higher premiums to smokers than
to nonsmokers, for the most part first-party insurers do strikingly little
classification of smoking risks. 72
Of all the types of first-party insurance, life insurance and disability
insurance do the best job of classifying smoking risks.273 For example, some
life insurance applications ask whether an applicant has smoked in the
preceding twelve months or, more generally, whether the applicant is a
"smoker. ' 274 If applicants answer positively to either question, they must pay
a somewhat higher premium for a given level of coverage than nonsmokers do.
A similar story can be told about individual disability insurance policies and
their applications. 75 Health insurers, on the other hand, have lagged far
behind life insurers in offering premium discounts to nonsmokers (or in
reducing benefits to smokers). According to a 1987 survey, only 14% of
commercial health insurers and only 16% of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans in
health insurance). Those insurance arrangements contain no exclusions for smoking-caused harm. See
TOLLISON & WAGNER, supra note 49, at 77-78.
270. A large number of individuals in the United States have some level of life insurance or disability
insurance. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 6 (1996) (reporting
that 67% of adult Americans in 1995 owned life insurance). Those insurance arrangements either contain
no exclusions for smoking-caused harm or do a poor job of drawing such distinctions. See infra notes 276-
278 and accompanying text.
271. Many buildings in this country have some level of fire or property insurance (as is required by
virtually all mortgage lenders). See Guy Halverson, Insurance Described as a Financial Necessity.
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 8, 1995, at 9 (reporting that 95% of homeowners in the United States have
homeowners' insurance, according to the Insurance Information Institute). We are aware of no instances
in which fire or property insurers have refused to pay a damage claim because the fire damages were
smoking-related.
272. It is, of course, next to impossible to "prove" such a negative. Nevertheless, based on our
assessment of insurance policies and based on our conversations with people in the insurance industry, it
is safe to say that the vast majority of private insurance companies do very little (and most do absolutely
nothing) in the way of risk classification on the basis of smoking status. Furthermore, virtually all the
economists writing on this topic seem to accept that there is an insurance externality of the sort that we
have described. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 27-28, 36, 62; Viscusi, supra note 102, at
75; Warner et al., supra note 28, at 381.
273. See Smoker Rates Same as Rest, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 7, 1993, at 8A (reporting that
the only types of individual insurance that provide nonsmoker discounts are life and disability coverage).
274. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 294 (1995) (reprinting a standard
life insurance application form that asks, "Have you smoked one or more cigarettes within the last 12
months?"); Gary Schuman, Misrepresentation of Smoking History in Life Insurance Applications, 30 TORT
& INS. L.J. 103, 108 (1994) ("The key question typically asks whether the proposed insured has smoked
cigarettes in the last twelve or twenty-four months.").
275. For life insurance and disability insurance sold to nonsmokers, the premium discounts tend to run
between 10% and 25%. See Jane Bennett Clark, Getting What You Need in Disability Insurance.
KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Feb. 1, 1993, at 98, 102. With respect to life insurance policies in particular,
it has been reported that nonsmoker discounts can go as high as 45%. See Erin M. Piorek, Neither Wind.
nor Rain, nor Laws Stop Smokers, PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS, Mar. 10, 1997, at 22.
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the United States attempt to adjust for the increased risks associated with
smoking.21 6 Although there is some evidence that these percentages may
have increased recently,2 ' most health insurers still do not make adjustments
for smoking in individual health policies. What is more, although it is
extremely difficult to come by evidence on this question, it is our impression
that, in the case of group health, life, and disability insurance, insurers are even
less likely to differentiate between smokers and nonsmokers in setting
premiums.27 8 The difficulty of verifying answers to questions regarding
smoking status is even greater in these settings, where the whole point is to
avoid much of the cost of individual underwriting by offering coverage to
entire groups based on where they are employed or some other association. As
far as we know as well, there are no employers who have sick-leave plans that
draw distinctions between smokers and nonsmokers, and there are no
homeowners' policies that offer discounts to nonsmokers.
Thus, relatively little risk classification based on smoking status is done
by private first-party insurers; and, with respect to some types of insurance,
virtually no such risk classification is even attempted. Moreover, even when
276. See Health Promotion and Cheincal Abuse (B) Tosk Forc. [2] 1987 PRoXc NT'L Ass'% Is
Comm'Rs 648, 687-97; see also Chris Leo Pashos. The Role of Health Insurers in Promoting Smoking
Cessation 53 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Harsard Uncrsit%. ton file .nth the Hl-ars.ard
University Library). Of the health insurers that offered discounts, the amount of the discounts ranged from
10% to 27.8%. See Pashos, supra. at 52; see also TOLLISON, & WAGER. supra note 49, at 81 il-ealth
insurance companies typically do not offer discounts to nonsmokers onl) about 15 percent of health
insurers offer nonsmoker discounts, and with those discounts running around 10 to 15 percent '
277. See Helen Halpin Schauffler, Health Insurance Poltui and the Poitics of Tobac co, tit SIoOKjG
POLICY, supra note 6, at 184, 191 (finding that of the 54% of companies responding to a 1993 sur.e. 35<
of the health insurance companies indicated that theN have sold indi idual health policies that citplo) either
smoker surcharges or nonsmoker discounts). But if Stephen D Sugarntan. Dtspartne Irratnrtnt of Sinerr,
in Employment and Insurance, in SMOKING POLICY. supra note 6. at 161. 161 *It is not ) et clear .. heiher
disparate treatment of smokers in these ways represents an important trend or ierel a modes.t, and perhap,
only temporary, deviation from traditional practice '*)
278. See Smoker Rates Same as Rest. supra note 273 (noting that group health inurers do %ituills
no risk classifying according to individual smoking status) Approxiiatel% 85% of those %% ith pri% ate health
insurance coverage in the United States are cosered under eiploer-pros.ided group policies See Pashos
supra note 276, at 60. It should be noted that some group health, disabilit%. and lite inurance is
experience-rated on a group basis. As a result, groups %%.ith fesser smokers %%ill. other thing, being equal,
sometimes be able to pay lower premiums as a grnp See, e" i,. Schauffler. .iupra note 277. at 191 (noting
that most Americans get their health insurance through emiplo.ers or other large groups. Ms0.ht hase not
traditionally classified risks on an individual basis, but that "pnate health insurance conpaiies, hase also
begun to experiment with nonsmoker discounts for group policies") For eample. it has been reported that
health insurance premiums for businesses that ban smoking in the ssorkplacc can be 25'1 to 35"i los.er
than the rates charged to businesses that do not institute a ban See Piorek. 5upra note 275 "rhos premiuni
discounts may give employers an incenti e to discourage smoking among their empioy ees, to ban smoking
in the workplace, or to avoid hiring smokers in the first place Although those sorts of citplo~er repone,
have more of an internalizing effect than nothing at all. the, do not pro% ide the ,,ite deterrence benetits
as would individually differentiated insurance premiums that are based on each ssorker', smoking
decisions--the number of cigarettes smoked, what brand, and the like It is also sorih ioting that .er, ft.
employers who use self-funded health insurance plans attempt to require dilering lesels of ciiiplooee
contributions on the basis of smoking status. See Helen Halpin Schauffler. litteriura'tic 3intniL ('oarol
Policies into Employee Benefits: A Surne. of Large Caihfornma Corporations. 83 A J it i lit --.tMI 1221).
1227 (1993) (finding that only around 2% of the companies responding to a sur"e\ indicated offering
nonsmoker discounts to employee participants in employer-prosided health plansi
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insurers do inquire about an applicant's smoking status in the insurance
application (to enable them to charge higher premiums to the smokers), the
questions they ask do not necessarily result in better risk classification. For one
thing, applicants may simply lie about their smoking status or smoking history.
Insurers who ask smoking-related questions will have considerable difficulty
monitoring the truthfulness of the applicants' responses." 9 Furthermore, if
an insurer discovers that an applicant has falsely represented her smoking
status, it is unclear how useful that information will prove to the insurer. If the
discovery is made during the underwriting process, the insurer can decline to
issue the policy. After the policy has been issued, however, to deny coverage
to the insured on the grounds of falsely answering the smoking questions, the
insurer will have to navigate the murky legal doctrines of misrepresentation.
To be sure, courts that have addressed the issue have held that
misrepresentation of smoking status on a life insurance application can provide
grounds for an insurer to rescind the policy.280 Unless the insured dies within
two years of the date of issuance of the policy (which is typically when the
incontestability clause found in all life insurance policies kicks in), however,
the insurer will not even be able to raise the misrepresentation defense."8 '
Therefore, although life insurance companies may attempt to charge higher
premiums to smokers, the success of their efforts turns largely on the honesty
of the applicants.2 82
Even if efforts at classification were completely successful at what they
sought to accomplish, the resulting level of risk classification and thus cost
279. See Schuman, supra note 274, at 109. Perhaps the best way for insurers to test the truthfulness
of applicants' answers during the underwriting process is to conduct a thorough medical evaluation of each
applicant. We are told by life insurance agents that there are blood and urine tests that can reliably reveal
whether someone has used any tobacco product within the preceding seven days. Thus, the result of such
tests could be used to determine not only the likely smoking status of the applicant, but also, after
cross-referencing against the applicant's answers to questions about that issue, the applicant's propensity
to lie or exaggerate her health status on an insurance application. If the applicant is able to go without
smoking (or using any other nicotine product) for more than seven days, however, those tests will reveal
nothing about prior smoking status.
280. See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. JMR Elec. Corp., 848 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988); see also
Schuman, supra note 274, at I ll n.63 (citing several cases holding that misrepresentation of smoking status
by smokers justifies voiding a life insurance policy); Taxin, supra note 49, at 237 n.104 (same). It is worth
noting, however, that there is a dearth of case law on the treatment of misrepresentation of smoking status
in the health insurance context. In fact, we have searched in vain for a single decision holding that
misrepresentation in that context permits an insurer to rescind coverage. The principal reason for the
absence of such cases may be that health insurers rarely ask their insureds or insurance applicants whether
they smoke.
281. See Schuman, supra note 274, at 130-31. All life insurance policies issued in the United States
contain incontestability clauses. See ABRAHAM, supra note 274, at 330. The following is an incontestability
clause from a typical life insurance policy: "'We cannot contest your policy after it has been in force during
the Insured's lifetime for two years from its Date of Issue, except for nonpayment of premiums."' i. at
284 (quoting a sample term life insurance policy).
282. Of course, most insureds are likely unaware of that rule and, hence, the fear of recision may, in
conjunction with the insureds' scruples, encourage honest responses. By the same token, however, less
scrupulous insureds may also be unaware of the potential consequences of material misrepresentation on
an insurance application in the first place and therefore may have a greater incentive to answer falsely.
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internalization to smokers would be very crude. For example, insurers never
make fine distinctions among smokers, distinctions that could affect
substantially the level of smoking risk that an insured poses. ' 3 In addition,
ex-smokers, who may pose disproportionately high risks to the insurance
pool, 2 4 are not segregated in any way, assuming they quit at least one or
two years before completing their policy applications such that they can answer
"no" to any smoking questions.285 Finally, even when some insurers do
attempt to segregate, a smoker is often able to find an alternative insurer that
does not. In that way smokers may be able to avoid at least some of the
additional premium that they would otherwise face.'
6
In sum, there are large negative insurance externalities associated with
smoking. Because private, first-party insurance policies distinguish only
crudely, if at all, between smokers and nonsmokers in their premiums and
benefits, nonsmokers bear a disproportionate share of the health care costs
associated with smoking. Moreover, as severe as this insurance externality
appears to be in the context of private insurance arrangements, it is likely to
be even more severe in the context of public or social insurance programs, on
which many smokers rely for health care and in which no effort whatever is
made to classify smokers into separate risk pools.2-7
B. Noninsurance Externalities
In addition to insurance externalities, there is an assortment of other costs
associated with smoking that are externalized onto nonsmokers. First, consider
the harm caused by "environmental tobacco smoke" (ETS), sometimes referred
to as "passive" or "secondhand" smoke. ETS is the name given to cigarette
smoke that is inhaled by people other than the smokers themselves. There is
a growing body of evidence indicating that ETS produces substantial costs to
society.-" Those exposed to ETS include not only the family members and
283. See Hanson & Logue, The Firsi-Purty hisurance Etitrnati. suipra note 40. at 147
284. See MANNING ET AL.. supra note 49. at 66-75
285. See supra note 274 and accompanying text
286. Insurers who do not adjust premiums to reflect smoking status kely, co'er a disproportionate
share of smokers, which in turn may cause their premiums to rise Assuming that some nonsmoker, remain
in the pool, however, their premiums will be lower than those charged to smokers by insurer- that do
segregate. For some indication of the savings enjoyed by smokers sho choose nonsegregating insurer. e
Pashos, supra note 276, at 54 tbl.3.
287. See, e.g., Schauffler, supra note 277, at 193 (-At present, none of the federall) tinanced health
insurance programs (Medicaid or Medicare) nsk-rate beneficiary contributions based on smoking status *'
Although we have found no data on this question. we would expect to find that smokers compose a
disproportionately large percentage of those who depend on public insurance to cover their health care
expenses, given that typically the level of one's smoking habit is insersely related to ogles socioecononic
status. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. supra note 3. at 272-74. Viscusi. sipra note 102. at
58-60.
288. See. e.g., OFFICE OF RADIATION & INDOOR AIR. U S E%%Ti. PROTnx'O\ Aut %CN. TilE CosTs
AND BENEFITS OF SMOKING RESTRICTIONS: AN ASSESSME\T OF Ttit- SMOKE-FRE E%% IRON'i-,itT A(- of-
1993 (H.R. 3434) (1994): U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTtt & Hi.'MAN SER\S. TIlE H-t.AL'ni CONSEQt E%(-tEs O-
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coworkers of smokers, but also subway riders, restaurant goers, and pool hall
frequenters who happen to occupy a space next to a smoker.89 Second, there
is the external pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm to the family and friends of
smokers resulting from the smokers' premature death and from the smokers'
years of ill health. For example, family members of a smoker may suffer
significant financial hardship as a result of the smoker's uninsured medical
expenses or as a result of the uninsured loss of the smoker's income on which
the family had been depending. Or the smoker's family and friends may
experience severe emotional costs (which they would ex ante have been willing
to pay a large price to avoid) as a result of watching their loved ones or
friends suffer the negative effects of smoking.290 Third, even the harm to the
smoker herself-that portion of the harm not compensated by first-party
insurance-can be viewed as a form of externalization. Costs are, on this view,
externalized by the smoker's current self to her future selves.29'
At this point, we should elaborate on how these noninsurance externalities
actually remain externalities and therefore a legitimate cause for government
intervention. In other words, we need to explain why the market itself does not
respond to internalize those external CoStS.29 2 For example, take the external
costs associated with ETS exposure. Why would nonsmokers and smokers not
arrive at some Coasean bargain regarding the efficient level of ETS exposure?
The standard transaction cost response, at least with respect to public ETS
exposure, comes immediately to mind. Except through the political process, it
is difficult to imagine such a deal taking place.
But for some types of public ETS exposure, that response is too simple.
Consider, for example, ETS exposure in the workplace. There, a Coasean
bargain between all nonsmokers and smokers would not be necessary. So long
as nonsmokers were informed of the risks posed by workplace ETS exposure,
and the labor market were otherwise efficient, those risks would be
internalized. Workers would demand either a higher wage to compensate them
for bearing the risk of workplace ETS exposure or a safer workplace. In turn,
employers (again assuming a perfect labor market) would respond either by
paying higher wages to employees exposed to ETS or by taking steps to reduce
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986) [hereinafter 1986 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT]; EPA, PASSIVE SMOKING, supra note 4. For a discussion of these costs, see infra
Subsection IIl.C.2.a.i.
289. Most of the empirical evidence to date regarding the harmful effects of ETS has concentrated on
exposure within the home and the workplace.
290. Note that some of the harms just mentioned may be compensated through the smoker's life
insurance policy. If that is the case, those costs would be externalized to the extent they are covered
through imperfectly classified first-party insurance arrangements. In contrast to the previous section of the
Article, however, we mean to emphasize in this section the harms not covered by the smoker's insurance.
291. See supra note 265; cf. Viscusi, supra note 102, at 66-72 (discussing, but ultimately rejecting,
the notion of cigarette risks' being extemalized to smokers' future selves).
292. For a discussion of why the market does not respond to correct insurance externalities, see
Hanson & Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality, supra note 40, at 148-50, 164-68.
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workplace ETS exposure, whichever approach was cheaper. Such steps might
include banning smoking in the workplace or limiting workplace smoking to
certain areas in the building where special ventilation systems have been
installed to whisk the smoke away from nonsmoker coworkers. Thus, a perfect
labor market would cause workplace ETS risks to be internalized, and, as a
result, the costs of workplace ETS exposure (including the costs of avoiding
that exposure) would be minimized.
The problem, of course, is that labor markets are not perfectly efficient in
this way. In particular, workers almost certainly do not take into account, at
least not fully, the costs associated with workplace ETS exposure. This is true
not only for the reasons that smokers fail to take into account the risks to
themselves of smoking,293 but also because the risks associated with ETS
exposure are much less well publicized than are the risks to smokers
themselves and because the studies documenting ETS risks continue to be
disputed 94 In any event, it seems to be generally agreed, even among
economists, that insofar as ETS does pose substantial risks, those risks are not
internalized through the labor market.2 95
A similar story can be told about why the costs borne by the families and
friends of smokers will not be internalized to smokers, about, that is, why
family members and friends do not enter into Coasean bargains with smokers
to achieve the optimal level of smoking. We take this issue up again in the
next section,296 but for now we say only this: Both because of imperfect
information on the part of smokers and nonsmokers about the risks of ETS
293. See supra Part II (discussing information problems). stq)ra Section III A (disussing isurancc
externalities).
294. See, e.g., Viscusi. supra note 102. at 78 (questioning the rehabilit) of EPA studies sho,,,ing nk,,
of ETS exposure). Of course, if Viscusi is right about the reliabilit, of the ETS cost estimates. and those
costs turn out to be small or nonexistent, then the need for a regulator-, response to ETS-related risks goe,
away. For the purpose of responding to the claim that smoking poses no net negatie externalit). ',e simply
adopt the ETS estimate given by Manning et al . although %%e b li¢e the actual number (ike the number
ultimately used by Viscusi for ETS risks) would likely be much higher See intra Subsection Ill C 2 a I
Later in the Article, where we describe possible pohcy responses to the negatise eternalitis precntcd b,
cigarettes, we suggest that the best way to deal ,,th ETS-related costs. .,hateser those co-sts are ultimatel
determined to be, may be some form of ex ante regulation-either command-and-control, performance.
based, or incentive-based. See ifra Subsection VC.3
295. As far as we have been able to determiie. none of the economists ,rittng on tile subject of ETS
risks has argued that, to the extent those risks are real. the, vould be internalized through the labor market
This omission seems especially important in \iscust's case gisen that he has deoted a fair amount of Is'
scholarly attention over the years to investigating the extent to %%hich labor markets respond to ,,orkplacc
risks in just this way. See W. Kip V ISCUSt. EMPLOYMIES-r HAZARDS A% I%,LSnGATIo's OF MARKET
PERFORMANCE (1979); W. Kip Viscust & Charles O'Connor. 11azard Warnings for Hbrkplace Risk
Effects on Risk Perceptions. Wage Rates. and Tirnoivcr. ti LiARI\G ABOL.r RisK COSL .iER AD
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 98 (V. Kip Viscusi & \Wesley A Magat eds. 1987, Based
on this earlier work, one would expect that Viscusi's tirst pohc) response to the public ETS risk sould be
to call for the dissemination of additional information about ihose risks in order to facilitate the market
response. Instead, however, Viscusi seems to suggest that the appropriate regulators responsc to public ETS
exposure is some form of direct regulation. See. eg. Vi%-usl. mtqpra note 102. at 102 (apparently fasoring
direct regulation of ETS over taxation).
296. See infra Subsection lll.C.2.a.i
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exposure, and because of insurance externalities, even the costs of in-home
ETS exposure are unlikely to be fully internalized to smokers.
To summarize, there are large external costs associated with cigarette
smoking, costs that will not be taken into account by the relevant
decisionmakers, unless there is some form of government intervention. In the
following section, we analyze, among other things, why economists writing in
this area have not called for such intervention.
C. A Review of and Critical Response to, the Economists' Rebuttal
Notwithstanding the arguments made in Sections II.A-B, few if any
economists have called for any sort of regulatory response to the negative
externalities associated with cigarettes. To state the point briefly, the
economists who have attempted to quantify the social costs and benefits of
cigarettes have concluded that, overall, the total social benefits of smoking
equal or even exceed the costs. In fact, some economists have even suggested
that cigarette consumption should be subsidized. 97 In this section, we contest
the economists' cost-benefit analyses, which wrongly exclude some important
costs (for example, those inflicted on smokers' families and friends) and
underestimate others. We arrive at an alternative figure of nearly $7.00 in costs
per pack. Our analysis in this part is also guided by a conviction that the
economists' calculations ignore important moral elements of the issue.
1. Summary of the Economists' Cigarette Studies
There is now a vast economic literature attempting to quantify the costs
and benefits of smoking. 98 The most significant recent contributions to that
literature can be found in a 1991 book by Willard Manning, Emmett Keeler,
Joseph Newhouse, Elizabeth Sloss, and Jeffrey Wasserman299 and a 1995
297. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75.
298. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGARETTE TAXES To FUND HEALTH
CARE REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3-17 (Congressional Research Service No. 94-214 E, Mar. 8,
1994); MANNING Er AL., supra note 49; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
SMOKING-RELATED DEATHS AND FINANCIAL COSTS, OTA STAFF MEMORANDUM (1985); GERRY OSTER
Er AL., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF SMOKING AND BENEFITS OF QUITING (1984); TOLLISON & WAGNER,
supra note 49; VISCUSI, supra note 49; W.F. Forbes & M.E. Thompson, Estimating the Health Care Costs
of Smokers, 74 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH 183 (1983); Robert E. Leu & Thomas Schaub. Does Smoking
Increase Medical Care Expenditure?, 17 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1907 (1983); Robert E. Leu & Thomas Schaub,
More on the Impact of Smoking on Medical Care Expenditures, 21 SOC. SCI. & MED. 825 (1985); Bryan
R. Luce & Stuart 0. Schweitzer, Smoking and Alcohol Abuse: A Comparison of Their Economic
Consequences, 198 NEw ENG. J. MED. 569 (1978); Dorothy P. Rice et al., The Economic Costs of the
Health Effects of Smoking, 1984, 64 MILBANK MEMORIAL Q. 489 (1986); John B. Shoven et al., Tile Social
Security Cost of Smoking, in THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 231 (David A. Wise ed., 1989); Virginia Baxter
Wright, Will Quitting Smoking Help Medicare Solve Its Financial Problems?, 23 INQUIRY 76 (1986).
299. See MANNING Er AL., supra note 49. To a significant degree, the book reproduces a Rand study
conducted by the authors in 1989. See Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and
Drihkers Pay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604 (1989).
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article by W. Kip Viscusi.30 For simplicity, we refer to those two studies in
the following discussion as the "economists' cigarette studies," and we refer
to any arguments associated with those two studies as the "economists'
arguments." ' "
Although the Viscusi study and the Manning et al. study differ in the
details, their policy conclusions are the same: Smokers should not be forced
to internalize any more costs than they already do.302 Indeed, if any
government intervention is required, their logic implies, it should take the form
of a subsidy to smokers. 30 3 How do the economists reach a conclusion that
is so divergent from ours? They claim that a complete cost-benefit analysis
should take into account not only the external costs posed by cigarettes but
also the external benefits of smoking, such as the social "savings" derived
from the pension, social security, and nursing home entitlements that smokers
leave unconsumed because of their premature deaths. ' Once one takes into
account those external benefits and the current level of federal and state taxes
imposed on tobacco products, the economists argue, smokers already more than
fully internalize any external costs they may be imposing on the rest of
society.
305
Manning et al. estimate the per pack external costs and benefits of
cigarette smoking under three alternative discount rates: 0%, 5%/, and 10%.i
300. See Viscusi, supra note 102.
301. It is our understanding that the main premises underl ing the Viscust and the Manning et al
studies, premises that we will criticize in some detail in the next subsection, are generally consistent %kith
the standard assumptions of the discipline of economics To attribute those premises to "'economists" qua
economists, as we do, therefore seems reasonablc. We should note, however, that some economists wsho
acknowledge these premises as being part of the discipline of economics also beliee (and state
emphatically) that in the debate over cigarettes noneconomic concerns are as important as economic ones
For example, the Office on Smoking and Health of the Centers for Disease Control and Presention
convened a meeting of top economists in 1995 "[Jio evaluate the cnitera for defining an optimal cigarette
tax, from the perspective of the discipline of economics." Warer ct al., supra note 28. at 380 (emphasis
added). Although the group adopted some of the same premises as Viscusi and Manning ci al . it concluded
that its final positions regarding what to do about cigarettes would depend largely on "considerations other
than those that derive from our professional expertise as economists." Id. at 386. Willard G Manning and
Joseph P. Newhouse, two of the authors of the Manning ct al. study. ,,ere among the economists who
participated in that 1995 conference and who signed the statement just quoted. Jeffrey Hams, a physician
and economist, is a self-described "warm" economist, for he refuses to consider some benefits of smoking
and includes some costs that are very difficult to measure. See Testimony" of Jeffrey E Harnis D PhD
Before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatit's (visited July 25. 1997)
<http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harrisitestimony.html>.
302. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 19; \riscust. supra note 102. at 75
303. See Viscusi, supra note 102. at 75.
304. See MANNING ET AL.. supra note 49. at 7: Viscusi. supra note 102. at 53, see also Warner et al.
supra note 28, at 382 (making the same observation).
305. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 19; Viscusi. supra note 102. at 54. 75. see also TOLLISO%
& WAGNER, supra note 49. at 92 ("Rather than the common allegation that smokers are 'oseruing"
publicly provided health-care programs, a more careful accounting of smokers' role in public transfer
programs would clearly show that, if anything, smokers should be candidates for a tax refund " (footnote
omitted)).
306. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 7-8 (describing the reason for discounting
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Because Manning et al. believe that 5% is the most accurate discount rate,307
their "best" estimates are as follows: total medical costs, $0.26; sick leave,
$0.01; group life insurance, $0.05; nursing home care, -$0.03; retirement
pension, -$0.24; fires, $0.02; and taxes on earnings, $0.09.308 The authors
summarize the data as follows:
Our best estimate is that the external cost per pack of cigarettes is 15
cents. Smoking leads to higher medical costs (principally hospital
costs), more covered work-loss days, less years of work and life, and
more disability retirements than not smoking. The external financial
impact of smoking is greatly reduced, however, by the effects of early
death. Because smokers die younger on average, they receive less in
pensions, Medicare benefits, and other long-term care. Thus, smokers
subsidize nonsmokers' Medicare and retirement benefits, while
nonsmokers subsidize smokers' medical care, disability, and sick leave
early in life.3"9
To this figure of $0.15 per pack, Manning et al. add the costs of
noninsurance externalities, which they estimate to range between $0.16 and
$0.39."t They thus conclude that the total external cost per pack of
cigarettes is somewhere between $0.31 and $0 .5 2 .3"' As Manning et al.
emphasize, this estimate of the external costs of smoking is around or below
the average combined state and federal excise and sales taxes on cigarettes,
307. Manning et al. say little about their choice of discount rates other than to observe that "[tlhe
.correct' discount rate is always a matter of controversy. The costs estimates in this part of the book reflect
a 5 percent (real) discount rate." Id. at 8. Based on the structure of their analysis it appears that they chose
5% because it falls midway between 0% and 10%. How they chose those benchmarks is not clear, however,
except inasmuch as they are focal points within a range of reasonable discount rates.
308. See id. at 79 tbl.4-16; see also infra Table I.
309. MANNING Er AL., supra note 49, at 127 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Under a 0%
discount rate, total net costs are -$0.91; under a 10% discount rate, total net costs are $0.24. See id. at 79
tbl.4-16.
To determine the costs that are fairly attributable to cigarettes, Manning et al. do not compare smokers
to nonsmokers; instead, they compare smokers to "nonsmoking smokers." Id. at 8. They "controlled for age,
sex, race, education, drinking habits, exercise habits, family size, income, self-assessed measures of
physical, mental, and general health, and seat-belt use. Thus (they could] calculate the external costs of
smokers if they had never smoked but had retained all their other characteristics"-that is, as if they were
"nonsmoking smokers." Id. at 29-30. Manning et al. express some concern that their $0.15 per pack
estimate may overstate the external costs of smoking inasmuch as they did not control for "bad dietary
habits or an affinity for high-risk activities." Id. at 30. Arguably, however, the $0.15 figure understates the
external costs they were attempting to measure inasmuch as the decision to smoke cigarettes may be
causally linked to smokers' other risky lifestyle choices. The more accurate comparison may be between
smokers and nonsmokers. That comparison, according to Manning et al., yields an estimate of $0.28 per
pack. See id. at 14. Nevertheless, we will, for the sake of argument, accept Manning et al.'s approach to
this issue.
310. See id. at 83-85, 133-34.
311. See id. at 85. Note that Manning et al. omit from this total any costs attributable to ETS exposure.
See infra note 360 and accompanying text. Also, there is a small discrepancy in the Manning et al.
numbers. Whereas in one place they state that the total external cost of cigarettes ranges from $0.31 to
$0.52 per pack, see MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 85, in another place, where they report
noninsurance and insurance externalities separately, the top number in the range would sum to $0.54 per
pack, see id. at 133.
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which they report as $0.37 per pack. "2 They therefore conclude that
"[s]mokers are already paying their way, if we judge solely on the grounds of
economic efficiency.
' 313
Viscusi's analysis has the same structure as that of Manning et al. Indeed,
Viscusi uses the Manning et al. study as a baseline and simply updates that
study in a number of ways.3 11 Using a 3% discount rate,3'5 Viscusi
calculates that smokers on net externalize $0.32 of benefits with each pack of
cigarettes they consume. The breakdown is as follows: total medical costs,
$0.50; sick leave, $0.01; group life insurance, $0.13; nursing home care,
-$0.22; retirement pension, -$1.10; fires, $0.02; and taxes on earnings,
$0.35.316 Viscusi therefore concludes: "In effect, smokers are already paying
their own way in the sense that there is a net externality cost savings to society
from their smoking because of the cost savings arising from their premature
deaths. 317 When Viscusi considers the external costs of secondhand smoke,
he concludes that the total external costs associated with each pack of
cigarettes range between -$0.18 per pack (i.e., that smoking on balance saves
society resources) and $0.41 per pack.3' In any event, he argues, smokers
more than pay their own way at current levels of taxation, which he estimates
at $0.53 per pack.319
As in the Manning et al. study, all of the external savings in the Viscusi
study come in the form of reduced amounts collected by smokers from private
pensions and social security and from reduced nursing home expenses. Given
this net external benefit of smoking, Viscusi (like Manning et al.) concludes
that current levels of federal and state taxation on tobacco are excessive. "-
In fact, under this analysis, any tax on tobacco would be excessive. In
Viscusi's words: "Taken at face value, these estimates indicate that, if one
312. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 18.
313. Id. at 19; see id. at 24 ("Taxes on cigarettes are at a leel such that smokers pay approximately
the costs they impose on others."). For their discussion of passive smoking costs, see Id. at 83.
314. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 72. Viscusi denves his table by taking Table 4-16 from Manning
et al., see MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4-16, and updating it for inflation, real cost increases.
and other trends. Viscusi's cost estimates are based on data asailable as of 1993. Viscusi's table also
includes columns showing how the various costs of smoking change if one attempts to take into account
the fact that, over time, the tar content of cigarettes has been reduced. Because se believe that the tar
content of individual cigarettes is a poor predictor of the health harms of smoking. se'-' supra notes 104-105
and accompanying text, we omit the tar-level-adjusted numbers from our tabulations that follow
315. Without commenting on Manning et al.'s choice of discount rates. Viscusi asserts that "the most
reasonable [discount] rate corresponding to the long-run real rate of retur in the U.S. economy is around
3 percent." Viscusi, supra note 102, at 73. If Viscusi had used the same discount rate as Manning et al
used (5%), Viscusi's results would have been strikingly similar to theirs.
316. See id. at 74 tbl.4; see also infra Table 1. At a 0% discount rate. the net cost per pack is -S1 57;
at 5%, it is $0.27. See Viscusi, supra note 102. at 74 tbl.4.
317. Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75.
318. See id. at 77 tbl.4.
319. See id. at 57: see also id. at 93 ("[C]igarette taxes already exceed the lescl of the estimatcd
externalities.").
320. See id. at 92-93.
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were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based in the 3-percent discount results,
cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed.,
32
1
Whether or not one takes Viscusi's suggestion at face value, the general
message of his and Manning et al.'s studies is clear: Any proposal for
internalizing the external costs of smoking through some form of regulation
should be rejected (or at least reevaluated) in light of the external benefits of
smoking.322
2. Critique of the Economists' Cigarette Studies
For a variety of reasons, we disagree with the economists' conclusions.
Broadly speaking, the economists' studies significantly understate the external
costs of smoking, greatly overstate (if not mischaracterize) the external benefits
of smoking, and mischaracterize the effect of current excise taxes. The
principal areas of disagreement come down to which costs and which benefits
of smoking should be considered external to the smoker, and which should be
considered internal. As will become clear, our conclusions with respect to
those issues derive largely, though not entirely, from the imperfect information
arguments that we detailed in Part II. Based largely on those disagreements
with Viscusi and Manning et al., we ultimately conclude that the economic
case for some type of government intervention in the cigarette market is
reasonably strong.
a. A Closer Look at Negative Externalities: Incorporating the
Imperfect Information Argument
One of the main reasons that the economists reject the goal of requiring
manufacturers to internalize more than they now do is that they grossly
underestimate the negative externalities created by smoking. As a starting
point, it bears noting that Manning et al. intend to generate a conservative
estimate of external costs. 32 3 As we argue, however, a better estimate would
include many costs that the study's authors sometimes recognize as potential
costs, but choose to exclude from their "best" estimate. In the next two
sections, we focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the Manning et al.
321. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
322. According to many commentators, the future of tobacco regulation will certainly be informed by,
and could well turn on, the evidence regarding social costs provided by these economists. See. e.g., Froma
Harrop, Smoking Is Becoming a Social Taboo, DENVER POST, June II, 1996, at B7; Laura Mansncrus.
Tobacco on Trial, Making a Case for Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, § 4, at I; Matthew Miller, Clean
Lungs at a Price: Do Smoking-Related Deaths Save the Nation Money?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
7, 1997, at 52; Robert J. Samuelson, Who Elected the Lawyers?, WASH. PoST, July 2, 1997, at A23.
323. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 4 n.195 (stating that their goal is "to provide
conservative estimates of the external costs"); id. at 13 ("We believe [our estimates] are reasonable, even
conservative.").
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estimates and methodologies. Because the Viscusi study relies on the Manning
et al. study's findings as a baseline, most of the criticisms that we make of the
Manning et al. study apply in roughly equal measure to the Viscusi study.
i. Costs to the Smoker's Family and Other Third Parties
Manning et al.'s "best estimate" assumes that smokers internalize all of the
costs that their smoking imposes on members of their families. '24 In the
authors' words, such costs are "internal because the family constitutes an
economic unit (it pools income). 325 Strikingly, neither Manning et al. nor
Viscusi carefully explores how plausible the assumption is. '26 Indeed, they
seem to rely on the fact that the assumption is conventional among economists.
Examined on its own terms, however, the assumption that smokers internalize
the costs of smoking imposed on their families seems implausible.
The prevailing model of the family as a single preference function with an
altruistic head of household allocating resources was developed by economist
Gary Becker.327 Neoclassical and feminist economists alike, however, have
levied a variety of criticisms against that model. '2 These scholars note, for
example, that because Becker fails to look within the black box of intra-
household bargaining, he does not explain intra-household allocation of
consumption choices.329
324. See id. at 4 n.5 ("[W]e are considering the family as a single dcision-making unit and treating
costs imposed on other family members as internal.").
325. Id. at 28-29.
326. Viscusi offers a somewhat more developed justification for the assumption He writes
Theories of the household typically assume that the household heads make decisions on behalf
not only of themselves but also on behalf of other family members. Thus. the husband or wife
would take into account his or her own welfare when making the smoking decision as well as
the implications that the smoking behavior would have for the well-being of other family
members. If individuals do in fact internalize these intrafamily externalites. then they will be
already reflected in the individual decisions. Rational individual decisions consequently will
imply that household externalities are internalized as well and need not be considered.
Viscusi, supra note 102, at 71-72 (citing GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON TIlE FAMiLY (enlarged ed.
1991), and MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. for the same assumption).
327. See BECKER, supra note 326.
328. A number of feminist scholars have criticized Becker's model. See. e g.. Barbara R. Bergmann.
Becker's Theor, of the Family: Preposterous Conclusions, I FEMINIST ECON. 141 (1995) (arguing that
Becker ignores intra-familial dynamics and power disparities): Frances Wooley. Getting the Better of
Becker, 2 FEMINiST ECON. 113 (1996) (describing a variety of alternatives to Becker's model of the family);
id. at 116 (noting that "[t]he common thread that links these models is a recognition that families cannot
be treated as if they were a single individual: there are complex interactions betseen the behavior of
different family members, and family life does not benefit all family members equally") Within the
neoclassical camp, see, for example, Pierre-Andre Chiappon. Collective Labor Suppls and Welfare. 100
J. POL. EcON. 437 (1992), which develops a collective model of household labor supply and resource
allocation.
329. See. e.g., Martin Browning et al., Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of lntrahousehold
Allocation, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1067, 1069-70 (1994) ("What recent empirical analysis points toward is that
multiperson households cannot be treated as single decision makers and that household allocations should
probably rather be considered as the outcome of some interaction between household members with
different preferences."); Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton. Sharing Mitlan Families Implications for
the Measurement of Poverty Among Individuals in Canada. 28 CAN J ECON 177 (1995) (demonstrating
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Even if the assumption that family costs are fully internal to individual
decisionmakers were plausible with respect to other types of costs, it is
implausible with respect to the costs of smoking. If the costs and benefits of
smoking were truly internalized across members of a family, one would expect
nonsmoking members of a family to be more encouraging of those family
members who smoke. Yet one does not hear statements of the following sort
from family members of smokers: "It's fine that my spouse (or child or parent)
smokes. In light of the fact that she has taken into account the costs to herself,
to me, and to other family members, it must be that she is benefiting greatly
from the cigarettes. I would not want to deprive her of that tremendous
pleasure. Indeed, given the net benefits, I am glad that she smokes." Similarly,
it would be astonishing to hear a smoker say: "It's worth it to me to smoke
even when I consider the costs to my loved ones of my dying earlier than I
otherwise would and of their dying earlier than they otherwise would." It is
likely that neither nonsmokers nor smokers frame the matter in those terms
because smokers do not, in fact, fully internalize the costs that they impose on
others.33 °
There is another way to put the point that smokers do not fully internalize
the costs their smoking imposes on their family and friends. Even if it is
assumed that smokers to some extent behave altruistically with respect to their
loved ones-that is, they derive utility from bestowing benefits on loved ones
and they experience disutility when they impose costs on loved ones-smokers
do not take into account the fact that those costs experienced by their loved
ones should, in and of themselves, count in the social welfare calculation.
Thus, even if smokers in some sense "feel the pain" they are causing others,
that is not enough from the perspective of overall social welfare. There is still
a need for incentive-based regulation. One could argue, therefore, that it is
through simulation how intra-household distribution can drastically affect the incidence of poverty
experienced by different family members, especially children); Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton,
SociallInstitutional Variables and Behavior Within Households: An Empirical Test Using the Luxembourg
Income Study, I FEMINIST ECON. 151 (1995) (analyzing social and institutional factors that influence
bargaining power within a marriage); Duncan Thomas, Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential
Approach, 25 J. HuM. RESOURCES 635 (1990) (noting that intra-household consumption decisions,
particularly those regarding the well-being of children, will vary depending on whether the mother or father
has control of resources); Frances R. Woolley & Judith Marshall, Measuring Inequality Within the
Household, 40 REv. INCOME & WEALTH 415, 425-28 (1994) (describing a study of household members'
inequality in control over expenditure and consumption decisions).
330. Cf. Financing Provisions of the Administration's Health Security Act and Other Health Reform
Proposals, Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong. 317 (1994) (statement of
Jeffrey E. Harris, Professor of Econ., Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.) [hereinafter Health Care Reform
Hearings] ('Cold' economists [those who ignore all difficult-to-quantify costs] assume that smokers and
their families privately, rationally, and voluntarily bear the costs from smoking-related disease and death.
This is a fiction that ignores the dual reality of teenage initiation into cigarettes and adult addiction to
cigarettes."); Linda B. Ford, M.D., President-Elect, American Lung Ass'n, Statement at News Conference
on Potential Tobacco Settlement, Wash., D.C. (June 17, 1997) (transcript on file with the Yale Lav Journal)
("I've seen the fear in the eyes of a child who suffers an asthma attack triggered by environmental tobacco
smoke. Since it is the child's parent who smokes, I know I will see this child again and again because of
a parent's addiction to tobacco.").
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appropriate for the societal cost-benefit calculus regarding smoking to take into
account both the cost to the smoker of her feeling that she has imposed a cost
on a loved one and, separately, the actual cost imposed on the loved one by
the smoker.33t
We should also note that the economists' assumption that family costs are
fully internalized by smokers is subject to the same types of critiques that we
made in Part II. For many of the reasons that we argued there that smokers
tend to externalize costs to their future selves,33 - they would also likely
externalize costs to their families. For instance, if smokers behave
optimistically with respect to the risks of smoking, then they would be just as
likely to behave optimistically with respect to the risks to their families. 3
Similarly, if smokers externalize some of the costs of firsthand smoke to their
insurers, then smokers' family members undoubtedly externalize some of the
costs of secondhand smoke to their insurers."
Finally, there are many more persons harmed by smoking than just the
smokers themselves and their immediate families. Among others, friends,
coworkers, and extended family members (those who do not share in the
household income pool) all bear some of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs
of smoking. For the most part, those third parties and the external costs they
bear are ignored in the economists' studies.
To their credit, Manning et al. seem to recognize that family costs might
properly be characterized as external.335 Consequently, they make an effort
to quantify how their estimates would change if some of those costs were
treated as external.336 At the same time, they briefly consider some of the
external costs to "those outside the smoker's family. ' 3" Using as a value of
life $1.66 million and treating all deaths as external, they estimate a per pack
331. This argument is a version of an observation made recentl) by Lotus Kaplow in the context of
altruistic gift giving. See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidzing Gifts, 58 J PtB. ECON 469 (1995) What
is interesting for current purposes is that Kaplow's point applies not only to the bestowal of gifts but also
to the avoidance of costs. As Kaplow points out. it may be controversial to count as a social cost-separate
from the cost to the loved one imposed by the smoker's premature death-the pain felt by the smoker
purely from knowing that she is imposing this cost on others. See id. at 475 & n.12. Such costs, howseer.
are not significantly different from the types of psychic costs that get included. uncontroermally. in the
social welfare function.
332. See supra Subsection II.B.4.d.
333. Note that Viscusi and Manning et al. do not even claim to provide eidence that smoker-, and
those around them are well-informed of the risks of passise smoke or fire or other risks facing the family
members of a smoker.
334. We know of no life, health, or disabilt) policy that adjusts premiums to take into account the
fact that one or more of an insurance applicant's family members smokes It is striking that the economists'
studies seemed to miss this fairly obvious point. Consider, for instance. the tension in the follo.,ing tio
statements, which are in close proximity to each other in Manning ci al 's book (I) "' tlo the extent that
passive smoking generates health care and other colleetisely financed costs, a portion of those cois is also
paid by nonsmokers"; and (2) "[w]e do not consider the costs of passie csmoking %% ithin families
as external." MANNING ET AL.. supra note 49, at 4,
335. See id. at 4. 32, 195 n.5.
336. See id. at 18.
337. Id. at 83.
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cost of $0.09 for lost lives in fires and another $0.14 for fetal deaths caused
by smoking.338 In addition, they estimate $0.02 per pack for smoking-caused
neonatal intensive care costs.339 Finally, Manning et al. estimate the external
costs of ETS to be $.014 per pack. 340
In sum, the economists exclude from their calculations substantial costs
imposed by smokers on those around them, even though there are good reasons
to count those costs as noninsurance externalities. Including those costs affects
the cost-benefit calculation significantly.
ii. Insurance Externalities
For the sum of the insurance externalities, we accept the numbers given
by Viscusi, with a few notable exceptions. Again, those numbers are based on
the Manning et al. study but were updated by Viscusi in various ways. Thus,
we accept per pack figures of $0.50 in medical costs, $0.01 in sick-leave costs,
$0.13 in group-life insurance costs, and $0.02 in fire-related property costs. We
deal with the positive externalities in Subsection HI.C.2.b below.341
iii. Costs to the Smoker
For all the reasons set forth in Part II, another cost that should be taken
into account in an incentive-based system is the costs to the smokers
themselves of their smoking habit. Although Manning et al. emphasize that
"[tihe biggest component of total costs is the cost to the smoker of premature
death and disability," they exclude that cost from consideration "[b]ecause this
338. See id. at 83-84.
339. See id. at 83-84; id. at 133 (summarizing their calculations of these costs); see also id. at 14 ("If
we were to expand our external cost definition to include the costs of passive smoking, neonatal
complications caused by mothers' smoking, and other costs to individuals other than the smoker, the
external costs would range up to 52 cents per pack.").
340. See id. at 83. In arriving at $0.14 per pack, Manning et al. assume that all ETS-caused deaths
are "external" and that the value of each life, on a willingness-to-pay measure, is $1.66 million. See id.
Viscusi provides a more thorough analysis of ETS costs than Manning et al. do, and Viscusi takes into
account government studies of ETS costs that were issued after the Manning et al. book was published. See
Viscusi, supra note 102, at 78-92. For two general reasons, however, we use the Manning ct al. estimate
of $0.14 per pack for ETS costs. First, we cannot determine what number Viscusi uses for overall ETS
costs in his final analysis of total external smoking costs. Viscusi states that the total passive smoking costs
that are included in his final calculations "are assessed as the low, median, and high numbers from Tables
6, 7 (lung cancer), and 9 (heart disease)." Id. at 93 n.19. Those tables have so many different numbers and
capture so many alternative assumptions, however, that we are unclear which numbers he means. We
suspect that the final numbers exceed the $0.14 estimated by Manning et al., but we cannot be sure. Cf
infra note 361 (discussing Viscusi's later estimate). Second, Viscusi omits all costs attributable to in-home
exposure to ETS. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 93 & n.19 (describing his table summarizing the external
costs of smoking as being derived from an earlier table that included only outside-the-home ETS cost). We
regard that omission as a serious mistake, for the reasons discussed in the text.
341. As we explain infra Subsection III.C.2.b, we regard those positive externalities as having zero
internalized value to the smoker. Note also that we omit the external costs attributable to lost tax revenues
because the assumption underlying the estimate of those lost taxes was that the entire amount would be
returned to the smoker in the form of government benefits.
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cost is borne by the smoker." 2 Implicit in the logic that those costs are
already internalized by smokers because they bear them is an assumption that
smokers are well-informed of the health risks and addictiveness of smoking
and that their smoking decisions take all of that information into account.
Unlike Viscusi, Manning et al. do not attempt to justify that assumption."
Indeed, they acknowledge that, if the assumption were false, then the negative
externalities (including the intrapersonal externalities to future selves) would
greatly exceed their estimates of $0.15 per pack.4 Specifically, the negative
externality from death and disability "would be on the order of $5 per
pack.",15 In addition, "[s]mokers also pay 7 cents per pack more on
out-of-pocket medical costs, and lose 86 cents in wages in salaries.'' 6
In Part II, we argued that smokers do not internalize those costs (even if
their future selves must bear them) because of numerous consumer-information
problems. Therefore, we conclude that those costs-for regulatory purposes
and from the perspective of economics-should be viewed as external to the
smokers. According to Manning et al.'s calculations, which we accept for
present purposes, those costs total $5.93 per pack."4
342. MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 82.
343. In his article measuring externalities. Viscust provides a thumbnail version of the arguments that
we summarized and criticized supra Part II regarding the nature and extent of consumer information- See
Viscusi, supra note 102, at 66-72.
344. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 21.
345. Id. The basis and precise meaning of this estimate is not clear to us. As far as %%e can tell. the
$5.00 figure is meant to represent only the externality to each smoker's future seles and thus would need
to be added to any other net negative externalities associated with smoking Elsewhere Manning ct al.
emphasize the imprecision of that number and suggest that the real number (as if there were such a thing)
may be lower.
What is the cost to a person and his or her family of losing 28 discounted minutes for each
pack of cigarettes smoked? In monetary terms, this is 93 cents of wages But surveys hase
shown that most people are willing to pay many times their expected increase in earnings for
additional safety. Thus, this component of costs may be as much as S5.00 a pack
Id. at 82 (citations omitted). Manning et al. appear to have discounted 137 minutes of lost life expectancy
per pack of cigarettes smoked to 28 minutes. See td. at 79 tbl.4-16. In another place. Manning et al. appear
to offer a different calculation. See id. at 134 ("For cigarettes the discounted cost is 0 4 hour per pack for
the smoker .... At $5 per hour, these costs amount to SI to $2 per pack . .."). Manning et al. do not
make clear where they got these numbers or how they fit with the S5.00 per pack number used earlier.
346. Id. at 8. Understanding the meaning and proper interpretation of Manning et al 's figures is not
easy. Indeed, they at times give different numbers for those that we have noted in the text See. e.g. td.
at 14-15 ("If we were to add the internal costs of disability and premature death to our estimate, the costs
could range from 78 cents to S5 per pack, depending on how we valued the lost years of life.-) In addition.
we are not clear on whether the costs of pain and suffering borne by the smoker are included in these
numbers. Cf id. at 28 (suggesting that pain-and-sufferng costs are excluded)
347. That estimate includes costs to the smoker of premature death and disability (55 00). out-of-
pocket medical expenses (SO.07), and lost wages ($0.86). See id. at 8, 21 Again, some might object that.
insofar as smokers are mindful of those costs, counting them as costs in an incentivc-based system of
regulation would produce overdeterrence-i.e., too little smoking. Below, we explain how some incentive-
based systems ameliorate the overdeterrence problem, whereas others do not. See infra Subsection IV.D.3.
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TABLE 1. ESTIMATED EXTERNAL COSTS PER PACK OF CIGARETTES
HANSON &
COSTS MANNING VISCUSI3 9  LOGUE'S
ET AL.348  ALTERNATIVE
ASSUMPTIONS
Medical Care $0.26 $0.50 $0.50
Sick Leave 0.01 0.01 0.01






Fire Insurance 0.02 0.02 0.02
Taxes on 0.09 0.35
Earnings
Total 0.15 -0.32 0.66
Insurance
Costs to - - 5.93
Smoker
ETS _ _ _ __0.14
Other 0.25350
Total 0.16 to 0.37 0.14 to 0.73 6.32
Noninsurance
Total 0.31 to 0.52 31 -0.18 to 0.41352 6.98
We also accept (without endorsing) Viscusi's estimates for the negative
insurance externalities associated with medical care, sick leave, fire insurance,
348. See MANNING Er AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4-16 (utilizing a discount rate of 5%).
349. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 74 tbl.4 (utilizing a discount rate of 3%).
350. This estimate, based on Manning et al., includes lives lost in fires ($0.09), fetal deaths ($0.14),
and neonatal intensive care ($0.02). See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 83-84.
351. See id. at 85. The "Total Noninsurance Costs" were derived by subtracting "Total Insurance
Costs" from "Total Costs."
352. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 93. The 'Total Noninsurance Costs" were derived by subtracting
'Total Insurance Costs" from "Total Costs."
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and life insurance.353 When it comes to the negative costs (or "positive
externalities") that Viscusi and Manning et al. attribute to nursing home
savings and pension savings, however, we part company with the economists.
As we discuss in detail in Subsection III.C.2.b.iv, we take the position that the
"savings" to society resulting from the fact that smokers tend to die at a
younger age than nonsmokers should not be included in the calculation of the
size of the net externality produced by cigarettes. For essentially the same
reasons, and in the interest of consistency, we also treat the external costs of
lost "taxes on earnings" because of smokers' premature deaths as being
zero354 whereas Manning et al. and Viscusi assign a positive number to those
costs, as is consistent with their view of the positive externalities associated
with smoking. 355 This leaves us with a total negative insurance externality
of $0.66 per pack. To that, we add the costs to the smokers themselves
($5.93), the total ETS costs ($0.14), and other assorted costs attributable to
cigarettes ($0.25). As Table 1 shows, we arrive at a total cost of almost $7.00
per pack, which greatly exceeds the estimates of both Viscusi and Manning et
al. 356
iv. Additional Concerns
At this point, let us emphasize that our decision to take at face value the
economists' estimates of external smoking costs (with the exceptions already
noted of family costs and costs to the smokers themselves) should not be
understood as an endorsement of those numbers or of the methodology used
in arriving at them. To the contrary, there are reasons to believe that those
numbers substantially understate the external costs of smoking. For example,
when Manning et al. calculate the total life insurance externality associated
with cigarette smoking, they limit their analysis to group life insurance."'
They justify this limited focus on group insurance by assuming that individual
life insurance policies adequately classify risks according to smoking status,
thus creating no insurance externality."' We strongly disagree with that
assumption. For many people, individual rather than group policies are their
353. For a discussion of our reservations about Viscusi's and Manning et al 's calculations, see uira
Subsection III.C.2.a.iv.
354. Our rationale is that, if the pension and nursing home sa s ngs due to the earl) deaths of smokers
are to be excluded, it makes sense to exclude from the analysis as "hell the taxes that .,ould hase been
collected had smokers lived a statistically normal nonsmoker lifespan
355. Manning et al. and Viscusi include only the lost taxes that vould have been used to fund the
costs accounted for in their numbers, such as medical care and pensions-
356. Our total cost numbers ignore existing federal and state excise taxes on cigarettes. though Viscust
and Manning et al. analyze these costs. See supra notes 312. 319. and accompanying text For the reasons
why we believe those taxes should be ignored, see infra Subsection 111.C.2 b is[
357. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 37-38. \'iscusi adopts the same approach, although he
updates the figures. See Viscusi. supra note 102. at 96.
358. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 37-38.
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major form of life insurance coverage, and, as we observed above in Section
III.A, those policies, even when they attempt to classify smoking risks, do a
poor job of it.
Another reason that we are inclined to doubt the reliability of Manning et
al.'s and Viscusi's numbers is their treatment of ETS costs. For instance,
Manning et al. estimate the total cost of ETS to be $0.14 per pack,359 but
they omit that number from their final calculations for reasons that are
unclear.360 Viscusi, on the other hand, includes a figure for ETS costs that
is based on more recent evidence, although we were not able to determine
from his tables precisely what the final number is or how exactly it was
calculated.36' More troubling with respect to Viscusi's ETS calculations are
the questionable assumptions upon which the calculations are based. For
example, Viscusi assumes that the morbidity costs associated with ETS are
zero.362 This seems especially odd, given that the studies upon which he
principally relies for his mortality-cost estimates also include substantial
morbidity-cost estimates.363 In addition, consistent with his treatment of
family members of smokers elsewhere, Viscusi omits all ETS-caused mortality
costs attributable to in-home exposure to ETS.3 4 When we attempt to
calculate the total ETS costs, using the EPA's estimates of total ETS-induced
mortality and morbidity costs and applying a plausible willingness-to-pay
measure of the value of a lost life, we arrive at a number in the neighborhood
of $1.00 per pack.365 Nevertheless, we have chosen simply to accept in this
359. See id. at 83.
360. See id. at 79 tbl.4-16 (omitting the ETS cost estimate from final totals). Viscusi claims that
Manning et al. omit the $0.14 because they concluded that "the evidence at the time of their study was too
fragmentary to make a reliable judgment." Viscusi, supra note 102, at 78. But Viscusi cites no specific
language in the Manning et al. studies to support that interpretation.
361. In a more recent summary of his earlier work, Viscusi writes: "Using the uppcr-bound EPA
estimates of the ETS body counts in conjunction with a figure of $5 million per life lost, I have estimated
that the external cost per pack of cigarettes is as high as 41€ per pack." Viscusi, supra note 150, at 46.
362. We take that to be Viscusi's assumption because his study does not mention ETS morbidity costs
and because the tables summarizing his calculations do not contain any morbidity cost estimates. For the
same reasons, we conclude that Manning et al. make the same assumption.
363. For example, the EPA study on which Viscusi bases some of his calculations estimates the total
annual morbidity costs of ETS to be between $2.7 billion and $6.5 billion. See OFFICE OF RADIATION &
INDOOR AIR, supra note 288, at 13. Those costs include the medical expenses associated with an assortment
of ailments, particularly asthma.
364. He omits inside-the-home heart disease mortality costs because they "may well be internalized
by the smoker" and because "the underlying scientific basis for these estimates is extremely fragile and
highly speculative." Viscusi, supra note 102, at 87. He omits inside-the-home lung cancer deaths from his
analysis for similar reasons. See id. at 85.
365. For the purpose of making this calculation, we used as a starting point the estimated mortality
and morbidity losses shown in OFFICE OF RADIATION & INDOOR AIR, supra note 288, exhs.2-6, 2-7. To
arrive at an annual dollar cost for mortality losses (discounted to present value to account for the fact that
tobacco-smoke exposure shortens one's life at the end, which will typically be years in the future), we used
a valuation of $924,000 per life lost due to ETS. Applying this approach, we found that the total annual
cost of in-home ETS exposure falls somewhere between $3.5 billion and $4.5 billion.
We should also note that Viscusi, in his calculation of total insurance externalities, includes a range
of estimated "ETS insurance externalities." Viscusi, supra note 102, at 91 tbl.I I. Again, we are not entirely
sure how he arrived at these numbers; the only discussion of his methodology that we can find is one
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part the Manning et al. number of $0.14 per pack for the external ETS-related
costs of cigarettes. 6
There are other examples of questionable calculations in both the Manning
et al. and Viscusi studies. From the positive externality side, when Manning
et al. (and thus Viscusi) attempt to compute the total external benefit
associated with pension savings attributable to smokers' dying young, they
assume unrealistically that all pension plans are defined benefit plans that
terminate when the smoker dies.3 67 A majority of people in this country who
have pension plans, however, have some form of defined contribution
plan.368 In contrast to defined benefit plans, the benefits of defined
sentence that reads: "The insurance externalities from ETS are the first estimates of this kind and reflect
the analog of the insurance externalities from smoker. themselves - Id at 87. Based on that sentence, and
because the ETS insurance externality numbers in Viscusi's table end up being positise externalities. we
assume that those numbers are the excess of the pension and nursing home "'savings*" associated %%ith the
premature death of those exposed to ETS over the medical, sick lease, life insurance, and lire-related
external costs of that exposure. Therefore. if we were to apply to the ETS insurance externality the
approach developed in this Article--that is, eliminating the pension and nursing home element from the
formula-the ETS insurance externalities would clearly be net costs rather than net benefits to societ) We
do not, however, attempt to quantify those additional external costs
366. The most recent reports suggest that there is growing esidcnce of heart disease risk associated
with ETS exposure. See, e.g., Denise Grady, Studs Finds Secondhand Smoke Doubles Ri1k of Ileart
Disease, N.Y. TimEs, May 20, 1997, at Al (reporting on the findings of a recent stud% b) llarasd
researchers suggesting that there may be 50.000 ETS-caused heart discasc deaths per )ear in the United
States). It is the connection between ETS exposure and heart disease that Viscusi suggests is most
questionable. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 85.
367. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 29 By a defined benefit plan. Manning ci al mean a
private pension plan that, upon the worker's retirement, pays her some annual amount that is a function
of her salary at retirement. What is key for our purposes is that Manning et al assure that. if the worker
dies prematurely (whether due to smoking or some other cause). tihe pension resources that would hase
gone to the worker are instead returned to the other participants in the pension plan, either in the form of
smaller required contributions or larger pensions. That effect is the supposed pension savings to society of
cigarette smoking. Viscusi does not mention specifically what his assumptions are regarding detined
contribution and defined benefit plans, but he seems to hase adopted the Manning ci al approach
368. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFrrs OF AMERICA% WORKERS NMi'
FINDINGS FROM THE APRIL 1993 CURRENT POPULATON SURVE) at B .19 (1994) According to that study.
of those workers in the United States covered by only one or the other type of pension plan. almost twice
as many report being under a defined contribution plan as report being under a defined benetit plan See
id. Additionally, when those wage and salary workers who reported participating in both defined benefit
and defined contribution plans were asked to identify which type of plan was "most important.'" 60% said
defined contribution and only 40% said defined benefit. See id at B-20 Finally, 75% of -Aorkcrs
participating in private pension plans report being vested: only 15% report being unsestcd (The rest
reported not knowing the answer to the question.) See id. at B-21.
A defined contribution plan, in contrast to a defined benefit plan. is more of an "'employer-cnhanced
private savings plan." MANNING Er AL., supra note 49. at 29. After some period of time. if the worker stays
on the job long enough, the contributions to a defined contibution plan and the accumulated earnings on
those contributions begin to vest to the worker. That means that those assets essentially become the
property of the worker: She can take those benefits with her if she changes jobs, and her estate should
receive the benefits if she were to die prematurely. With defined contibution plans. therefore, the %%orkcr's
benefits, to the extent they have vested, do not go back into the pension pool. See The Basics of Pension
Plans (visited Nov. 7, 1997) <http://wwwv.pensionappratsers.com/penbaLics html> Consequently, to the
extent private pension plans take the form of defined contribution plans, there is no positie evtemalit)
even under Manning et al.'s own analysis.
Manning et al. base their decision to ignore defined contribution plans on to rationales "()
[D]efined contribution plans are a minority of private pension plans, and (2) een in defined contibution
plans, the amount of the annuity is usually not a function of habit status " MANNING E'r AL. stpra note
49, at 29. The first rationale appears to be a product of the authors' reliance on no% -dated statistics. As
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contribution plans do not terminate at death and, according to the Manning et
al. analysis, would not be considered a positive externality associated with
smokers' dying young. We will address the concept of positive externalities
from premature death below. 369 Here we only mean to suggest why our
confidence in the economists' numbers, which we are taking as given for the
purposes of argument, may be unfounded.
In addition, although we follow Manning et al.'s and Viscusi's lead in
omitting a number of important categories of smoking costs, ideally those costs
should be included in the analysis. For example, wholly separate from ETS
costs, we would expect there to be large pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs
experienced by smokers' families and friends as a consequence of smokers'
protracted smoking-related illnesses and their smoking-caused premature
deaths.3 70 Neither Manning et al. nor Viscusi attempts to measure these costs
(which could, in theory, be quantified by using some combination of estimated
out-of-pocket costs together with a willingness-to-pay measure for the
nonpecuniary element). If those costs were taken into account, it is likely that
the external costs of smoking would be much higher than is reflected in the
third column of Table 1. Less significant than those suffering costs, but
perhaps more familiar, are the annoyance costs faced by nonsmokers. As at
least one commentator has correctly noted, many nonsmokers would be willing
to pay something for smoke-free and smoke-residue-free environments: "If
nonsmokers were willing to pay $50 a year for this privilege, it would add up
to $10 billion. That in turn could justify a 42-cent-per-pack tax, forcing
smokers to pay for their annoying habit."
37
Finally, there are also a number of non-health-related costs to the smokers
themselves that Manning et al. and Viscusi overlook. For instance, smokers
likely pay, on average, higher home cleaning costs, higher dry cleaning bills,
and higher amounts for teeth cleaning products and services. 72 Many of
them are also likely to spend more on breath mints and sprays and on repairing
or replacing scorched clothing or furniture.373 Because of lingering smoke
to the second rationale, we agree with the premise, but not with the conclusion. It is true that defincd
contribution pension plans and the annuities that are issued in connection with those plans do not typically
distinguish among beneficiaries on the basis of their smoking status. That fact, however, has no implications
for the question at hand. The point is that the "benefits" of early death are not enjoyed by other pension
plan participants; they remain with the decedent's estate. They are not, in other words, externalized. Those
pension payouts should therefore be excluded from any calculation of the positive externalities of smoking.
Manning et al. may have wrongly decided to treat pension payouts of this sort as an externality simply
because of their more general definition of externalities. See, e.g., id. at 45 ("(T]he concept of externality
is usually clear: a portion of the costs is generally external if costs are financed by a large pool of insured
individuals, and premiums (or taxes) do not depend on smoking status.").
369. See infra Subsection Ill.C.2.b.
370. See supra Section III.B.
371. Miller, supra note 322, at 53; cf. infra text accompanying note 404 (describing possible psychic
costs of "sin").
372. See Vivian Marino, Smokers Cough Up Big Bucks To Feed Habit, AP July 8, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 4874041.
373. See id.
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odors, smokers may also face additional costs in terms of reduced resale
market value of their homes and cars.174 Finally, a large number of smokers
have paid billions for various sorts of smoking-cessation aids."' It seems
doubtful that most smokers take those added costs into account when deciding
whether to smoke.376 Indeed, the fact that economists such as Manning et al.
do not even consider those costs provides some evidence that they are not
widely recognized as costs.
377
For all of those reasons (especially the apparent omission of in-home ETS
mortality costs and all ETS morbidity costs and, perhaps most significant, the
omission of any pecuniary and nonpecuniary harms suffered by smokers'
family and friends), it is likely that our final estimate of the total external costs
of smoking shown in Table 1-roughly $7.00 per pack-may understate by a
large amount the magnitude of the problem.37 In sum, even our conservative
estimate of $7.00 per pack of external costs dwarfs the numbers derived by the
economists. As we have stated, the main reason for the difference is our
decision to include the costs of smoking to smokers themselves, which we do
for the information-based reasons discussed in Part II. In the following section,
we explain the other principal difference between our final estimate and that
of the economists, namely, our decision not to include the social benefits of
smoking.
b. A Closer Look at the Positive Externalities
As we noted at the outset of this section, economists argue that the
external costs of smoking are offset (or more than offset) by the social
"benefits" of smoking. In the previous subsection, however, we explained that
the external costs of smoking have been drastically understated. In this
subsection, we explain that the external benefits of smoking have been at least
as drastically overstated. We argue further that the so-called social savings
374. See id.
375. See Health Care Reform Hearings. supra note 330. at 316 (statement of Jeffrey Hams). Eben
Shapiro, After Nicotine Patches: Sprays, Pills. hihalers'. WALL ST. J. Nov 8. 1993. at B I. see also
Parker-Pope, supra note 141 (reporting annual expenditures on smoking-cessation devices and programs
at S417.7 million).
376. See Health Care Reform Hearings. supra note 330. at 316 (statement of Jeffrey Hams)
377. Jeffrey Harris has criticized the sort of studies conducted by Manning ct al and Viscui for
focusing "only on the easy-to-measure costs." Id. at 316. This "cold approach." according to Hams.
assumes "that all unquantifiable costs somehow cancel each other out." Id. Hams adopts instead the "is arm
approach," which resists the temptation to "dismiss injury and suffering merely because it cannot be simply
calibrated." Id.
378. We omit some costs that other economists include. For instance. Jeffre) Hams calculates a loss
in personal income taxes of S14 billion per year due to premature deaths from smoking See id at 317
Similarly, Manning et al. calculate a per pack cost of SO.09 for lost income taxes. see MA-%N.%G lir AL..
supra note 49, at 75, while Viscusi estimates such loss at SO 35. see Viscusi. supra note 102. at 74 tbl.4
We exclude those costs, for reasons discussed supra note 354
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resulting from cigarette-caused deaths should, for economic and noneconomic
reasons, be excluded from the policymaker's calculus.
All of the alleged external benefits of smoking derive from the fact that
smokers, as compared to nonsmokers, tend to die near the end of their most
productive years and at the beginning of the years in which they will draw
down the various accounts they have accumulated over a lifetime of productive
work. As a consequence, the argument goes, when smokers die, large amounts
of resources (especially public and private pension entitlements as well as
nursing home entitlements) are, on average, left to be consumed by the rest of
society. This translates into lower pension and nursing home premiums for
nonsmokers during their lifetimes.379
Based on that rationale, and according to Manning et al.'s calculations,
smoking saves society $0.24 per pack in smokers' unclaimed pension
entitlements and $0.03 per pack in smokers' unclaimed nursing home
entitlements. 380 After making a number of updating adjustments, Viscusi
reports those per pack benefits at $1.10 for pension savings and $0.22 for
nursing home savings.38' Ultimately, the conclusion of the positive
externality story is that, instead of trying to deter cigarette consumption, we
should be subsidizing it.
352
When we first encountered this positive externality argument, it struck us
as bizarre and counterintuitive. Because we are responding primarily to
economic arguments, we emphasize here the economic flaws in the positive
externality story. This focus on economics and efficiency, however, should not
be interpreted to mean that we think the strongest responses against the
positive externality argument are economic ones. To the contrary, as we
suggest briefly below,383 we suspect that the moral objections to this story
are at least as strong as the economic objections.
379. See MANNING Er AL., supra note 49, at 28; Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75.
380. See MANNING Er AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4-16; see also supra Table I. Here, as elsewhere
in this Article, we use Manning et al.'s "best estimates"--i.e., the figures arrived at using a 5% discount
rate-in discussing their calculations. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. We use Viscusi's 3%
discounted figures in discussing his calculations. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
381. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 74 tbl.4; see also supra Table I; cf Viscusi, supra note 102, at
95-97 (discussing his updating adjustments to Manning et al.'s numbers).
382. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75 ("Taken at face value, these estimates indicate that, if
one were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based in the 3-percent discount rate results, cigarette smoking
should be subsidized rather than taxed.").
383. See infra Subsection III.C.2.b.iv.
384. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that there is a positive externality associated with the
lethal effects of smoking and that it has been properly measured (both of which claims we contest in the
following subsections), the positive externality identified by the economists' studies is still swamped by
the nearly $7.00 of negative externalities that we have identified, see supra Table I, using basically the
economists' own numbers. From an economic perspective, this fact calls for more internalization of costs,
not less.
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i. Assets Enjoyed (and Not Enjoyed) by Others
Even if we were willing to consider the savings from premature deaths in
our social cost-benefit calculation, the only possible positive externality
associated with the premature deaths of smokers would be the assets that the
smokers themselves would have consumed had they not smoked and, as a
result, had lived longer. Any assets that would have been consumed by anyone
other than the smokers had they not smoked cannot be considered part of the
externality. When the smokers die early there may be a transfer of those assets,
but this transfer should not go into the efficiency analysis. For example, assets
that would have been consumed by the family of the smokers (or by charities
to which the smokers would have made contributions, etc.) but that instead get
consumed by the smokers' fellow pension plan participants do not count as a
positive externality. (Our conclusion here assumes that everyone other than the
smokers, including the smokers' family members, is external to the
smokers.) 35 Therefore, the economists' estimates of pension savings should,
at the very least, be reduced to take into account the extent to which those
so-called savings represent such transfers.
Similarly, the positive externality story seems to assume that smokers die
leaving no liabilities. That is, the economists make no attempt to offset the
pension and social security savings associated with smokers' premature death
by whatever liabilities go unpaid when smokers die. It may be the case that
smokers, on average, have fewer liabilities when they die than nonsmokers do.
But no evidence to that effect is offered. In any event, some adjustment should
have been made to account for whatever liabilities smokers do tend to leave
when they die.
ii. Do Smokers Really Externalize Forgone "Benefits"?
The positive externality argument also seems wrong based on the fact that
information problems (such as the ones we discussed in Part II) prevent
smokers from experiencing the loss of future pension benefits as a current cost
in their decisions regarding whether to smoke the next pack. If the forgone
pension benefits of smokers are indeed to be understood as a positive
externality, then their loss must affect the incentives of the smokers." To
385. See supra Subsection III.C.2.a.i. If we were to accept the assumption made by Manning ct al and
Viscusi that costs borne or benefits enjoyed by a smoker's household member are intemal to the smoker.
their mistaken assumption that all pension plans are defined benefit plans would provide another basis to
criticize their estimate of positive externalities. See supra notes 367-368 and accompan)ing text
386. There is little doubt that Manning et al. are making a positive externality argument. See. e g.
MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 28 ("[S]mokmg leads to a shift in future claims or benefits from
smokers to nonsmokers, thereby yielding a postrive externality to nonsmokers "') Othcr language in their
book also indicates that they have this sort of incentive-affecting extematliy in mind instead of a transfer-
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see why this is so, take a standard example of a positive externality: paying to
have one's lawn beautifully landscaped. If we assume the cost of landscaping
to be $400, but the benefit to the homeowner herself to be only, say, $100,
then the homeowner will not make the investment. That would be inefficient,
however, if the landscaping would produce anything greater than $300 worth
of benefits to the homeowner's neighbors. The reason, in the absence of
government intervention, that the landscaping would not get done, despite the
overall social benefit of its getting done, is that the homeowner would
experience the full $400 cost of landscaping investment but would not
experience enough of the social benefits to justify the cost. Hence, it might be
appropriate for the neighbors (or the government on behalf of the neighbors)
to pay the homeowner a subsidy in an amount that is just enough to outweigh
the costs to the homeowner but not so much as to exceed the external benefit
to the neighbors. In such a situation, the positive externality would be fully
internalized to the landowner.
Now turn to the cigarette example and the potential external benefit to
nonsmokers of smokers' dying prematurely and leaving unconsumed pension,
social security, and nursing home entitlements. Recall our earlier example of
the consumer who values a pack of cigarettes at $3.00 and who must decide
whether to purchase the next pack of cigarettes faced with a nominal purchase
price of $2.00, which represents only the production and distribution costs of
the product.3 87 Assume also that there are no health costs, or other external
costs, to nonsmokers associated with smoking, but there are $2.00 of pension
"savings" to nonsmokers associated with each pack. From society's
perspective, therefore, the $2.00 is an extra benefit (just as the additional $300
of value to the homeowner's neighbors in the landscaping example was a
benefit). The problem, according to the positive externality story, is that the
consumer experiences the $2.00 transfer to nonsmokers as a personal cost to
herself with no offsetting benefit (just as the homeowner experiences the extra
$300 of the landscaping cost as a cost with no offsetting personal benefit).
Thus the consumer in the smoking example would inefficiently choose not to
consume the pack of cigarettes. Why is that outcome inefficient? For the same
reason it was inefficient for the homeowner not to make the landscaping
investment: There are social gains that could be made. The suggested solution
The customary arguments for ignoring transfer payments in assessing economic efficiency do
not apply here .... In the usual case, transfer payments do not depend on the behavior of the
consumer. Thus, they do not alter behavior unless the payment is large enough so that income
effects are considerable. In the case of smoking, however, receiving the transfer depends on
choices made by the consumer .... Suppose the government were to promise that everyone
who reached age 70 would receive a million-dollar payment (transfer). It seems likely that many
people would stop smoking (or never start) and engage in other less risky activities so that they
might receive the "transfer." The ability to change one's activities to get the million-dollar
bonus implies that it is not a pure transfer.
Id. at 27.
387. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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of the economists to this problem is to subsidize the consumer (by paying her
up to $1 per pack) to induce her to purchase and consume the pack of
cigarettes.
The problem with this argument is that the potential positive externality
associated with smoking is importantly different from other positive externality
situations, including the landscaping scenario. The difference is that, for all the
reasons explained in Part II, smokers do not experience (or take into account)
the lost pension, social security, and nursing home benefits as a $2.00 per pack
cost today.388 Either because they are optimistic with respect to those costs,
because they apply an inappropriately high discount rate, or because they
simply regard those costs as being zero (for example, expecting that they will
be able to quit smoking and reverse the effects of their habit), it seems
extremely unlikely that a consumer would take those costs into account when
making the pack-by-pack decision regarding whether to smoke.3 9 If such
costs are not taken into account, there is no positive extemality.390
If consumers did take into account the forgone pension benefits associated
with smoking, and if transaction costs were low, the market might produce a
Coasean bargain that would achieve the efficient result. One mechanism
388. If this particular efficiency argument were our only response to the positive externality story, we
might be running some risk of double-counting the external costs of cigarettes. in the following sense Ve
argued supra Section II.C that the costs to the smokers themselves of dying prematurely, measured in terms
of willingness to pay, should be internalized to cigarette companies and. through the price mechanism, to
smokers because smokers do not otherwise fully take those costs into account. owing to imperfect
information. That number, taken from the Manning ct al. study. came to as much as S5.00 per pack. See
supra note 345 and accompanying text. It may be the case. however. that the $5.00 figure mcludes the cost
to smokers of forgone pension, social security. and nursing home entitlements. That is to say. that S5-00
figure may represent, in per pack terms, what a consumer would be willing to pay to avoid losing the
relevant number of years at the end of her life. assuming she will rece ve all of her pension and other
entitlements during those Years. If that was what those consumers were thinking when they made the
choices that served as the basis for the $5.00 figure, then an efficiency argument for offsetting with pension
savings might be plausible. We do not know. however, what exactly that S5.00 figure includes: we would
not be surprised if the consumers whose behavior was the foundation for that number %,ere not thinking
about forgone pensions at the time. In any event, our other arguments in this section-especially those infro
Subsection III.C.2.b.iv---are more than enough on their own to justify ignoring the pension savings.
389. The difference with the landscaping example, of course, is that the costs to the homeowner of
getting the landscaping done are experienced fully by the homeowner at the same time as the benefit would
be bestowed upon the neighbors. That is, in the landscaping example, there is no temporal separation of
costs and benefits as there is in the cigarette setting. If there is any temporal separation, it would be in the
opposite direction--the cost to the homeowner would be felt before rather than after the benefits were
bestowed on the neighbors.
390. Although we have done only a casual investigation of the matter, no smoker to whom we have
talked has given any indication of consciously perceiving that his or her pension and nursing home
arrangements have influenced his or her smoking calculation. Moreover. in newspaper articles that we have
seen purporting to measure the costs of smoking to siokers. the forgone pension and nursing home benefits
are never included. See, e.g., Marino. supra note 372 (pointing out many of the obvious and not-so-obvious
costs to smokers, but excluding entirely any mention of forgone benefits resulting from early death). TIh
fact that the point we are here making has never before been made. together with the fact that Viscusi and
Manning et al. focus mostly (though usually implicitly) on cross-subsidization issues. see MAN.%G ET AL.,
supra note 49, at 127; Viscusi. supra note 102. at 51. may be indirect evidence that people do not typically
consider forgone pension and nursing home benefits as costs to be considered %%hen deciding shether to
take a risk.
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through which such a Coasean bargain could in theory be achieved would be
the labor market-specifically, the market for salary/pension packages. In
theory, workers who plan to be long-term smokers could negotiate with their
employers to receive more of their compensation in the form of up-front cash
and less in the form of pension benefits. Hence smokers and nonsmokers
would have different salary/pension packages. Interestingly, however, we do
not see such distinctions in actual salary/pension packages. One reason that
smokers do not attempt to negotiate such deals with their employers may be
that they do not think about the effects of their smoking habit on their ability
to claim pension entitlements.39'
Even if we were to assume for the moment that consumers do take into
account the general mortality risk of each cigarette they smoke, we doubt that
they take into account the accompanying forgone pension benefits. There is a
fair amount of evidence suggesting that, broadly speaking, individuals tend to
ignore or give less weight to costs that take the form of forgone benefits, even
when those same individuals would take into account costs of equal present
value that take the form of actual payouts. 392 This phenomenon is sometimes
391. We do not wish to overstate our reliance on this sort of rough-and-ready empirical observation.
There are obvious reasons, besides lack of consumer demand, for the absence of discrimination between
smokers and nonsmokers in employment packages. For example, there might be severe moral hazard and
adverse selection problems that prevent employers from making such distinctions. See Hanson & Logue,
The First-Party Insurance Externality, supra note 40, at 148-5 1. There may be some reason to believe that
the sort of market failures that prevent first-party insurers from reliably identifying smokers for the purpose
of charging them higher insurance premiums will not pose as significant a problem to employers who seek
to identify smokers for the purpose of "charging" them lower pension contributions. For instance, given
that, for pension contribution purposes, smokers would stand to benefit from being identified as smokers,
they would obviously have an incentive to divulge rather than to hide their status as smokers. The supply-
side problem in this context, therefore, would be nonsmokers seeking, for pension purposes, to make
themselves look like smokers. But smokers might be able to signal their status more reliably than
nonsmokers. For example, given the addictive nature of cigarettes, if a smoker can demonstrate she is
currently a smoker, she has provided a credible signal that she will continue to be a smoker; in the ease
of a nonsmoker, demonstrating that she is a nonsmoker at the time of her application for insurance suggests
less about her likelihood in the future of remaining in that status. Also, if a person could show that she had
a health condition that strongly correlates with smoking (such as emphysema or lung cancer), that showing
would constitute good evidence of smoking status. Moreover, if supply-side rather than demand-side
difficulties were responsible for the absence of smoking-based distinctions in compensation packages, it
is a little curious that we have not heard stories of workers at least attempting to negotiate such packages
with their employers. In the first-party insurance context, there is at least some attempt (albeit largely
ineffective) to segregate smokers from nonsmokers, which suggests a demand on the part of nonsmokers
for such a distinction. In sum, there is very little market evidence to suggest that smokers, under the current
regime, give much thought to the possibility of negotiating more favorable pension arrangements with their
employers.
If we shift to an enterprise liability regime, however, then once the full costs of cigarettes (including
the costs to the smokers of their foreshortened lives) are impounded into the sale price of cigarettes,
smokers may then be induced to give greater consideration to the possibility of negotiating more favorable
pension arrangements with their employers. This might happen both because the rise in cigarette prices
would make the issue more salient to smokers and because, for those who opt to continue smoking, the
price increase might necessitate "borrowing" against future pension claims in order to help fund the higher
cost of smoking.
392. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Status Quo Bias]; Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Jack
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called the "status quo bias."'3 93 In light of this bias, it seems implausible that
smokers would say to themselves: "I need to cut back on my smoking, lest I
give up too much of the pension and nursing home benefits that I will enjoy
if I don't smoke."
But perhaps the positive externality story is not an externality or efficiency
argument at all. One could reasonably interpret both Viscusi and Manning et
al. to be taking the following position: Regardless of whether the social
benefits of smoking are externalized by smokers (that is, regardless of whether
smokers' incentives are affected by the potential social savings attributable to
their smoking habit), so long as cigarette smoking in the aggregate produces
social benefits that exceed the social costs, there is no need for government
intervention.394 Such an argument is not an efficiency argument, since it does
not require cost internalization of any kind. Instead, it is a distributional
argument. Smokers as a group enjoy the benefits of smoking, the argument
goes, so they (as a group) should bear the costs of smoking as well. Therefore,
so long as smokers transfer sufficient funds to nonsmokers (via unclaimed
pension entitlements, for example) to offset whatever transfers go in the
opposite direction (via insurance externalities and passive smoke), there is no
distributional need for a regulation. That may be so.
The best justification for incentive-based regulation of cigarettes, however,
is not the need for redistribution, but the need for improved efficiency through
increased cost-internalization. Another way to put our response to the
distributional argument is this: As with other normative economic analyses of
accident law, we take as one uncontroversial objective of tort law, and of
safety regulation generally, the minimization of the costs of accidents.'" As
we explained in Section I.B, if there are market failures that give rise to care
level and activity level inefficiencies, achieving the goal of minimizing
accidents requires a regulatory response of some sort. Merely to determine that
the aggregate costs of an activity are borne ultimately by the parties
participating in the activity is, therefore, not a cost-minimizing response to the
problem. So, for example, if we determined that all of the harms caused by
automobiles were borne ultimately by the people who benefit from the
existence of the automobile, such a finding would not be an efficiency
L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nanreversible Indifference Curves. 79 AM ECo'N REV
1277 (1989). See generally David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch. Judicial Choice and Disparintes Between
Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALt L.J 737 (1992) (summanzing experimental evidence
indicating that people evaluate actual payouts and forgone gains differently and arguing that the la", should
and does take that difference into account).
393. E.g., Kahneman et al., Status Quo Bias. supra note 392
394. See, e.g., Viscusi. supra note 102. at 92 ("A comprehensive assessment of these costs suggests
that on balance, smokers do not cost society resources because of their smoking activities. but rather save
society money."). We should note. however, that the economits seem confused about w.hether they art
making a distributional argument or an efficiency argument See. e g.. NANNING ElT AL. supra note 49. at
19 ("Smokers are already paying their way. if we judge solely on the grounds of economic efficiency.')
395. See GUtDO CALABRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCtIDE%s 26 (1970).
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justification for abolishing tort law in this area or for eliminating auto safety
standards more generally. Such a response, rather than reducing the costs of
auto accidents, would likely increase those costs.
iii. What About the Current Level of Excise Taxes?
The economists, given their calculations of the external costs and benefits
of smoking, conclude that current levels of federal and state excise taxes on
cigarettes more than fully internalize any remaining external costs imposed by
cigarettes.396 Indeed, they go so far as to imply that current levels of
cigarette taxation are excessive, because cigarettes are socially beneficial on
net.397 Therefore, they argue, imposing any additional incentive-based
regulation would only worsen the overdeterrence problem.
We have several responses to that line of argument. The first and most
obvious response is that, based on our recalculation of costs and benefits, 398
current excise taxes appear to be drastically inadequate. According to Viscusi,
the combined state and federal taxes on cigarettes total, on average,
approximately $0.53 per pack.399 And, as we indicated in Table 1, the
external costs of cigarette smoking come in around $7.00 per pack-roughly
thirteen times the average combined federal and state tax rate.
It might be argued that because the excise tax does internalize some of the
costs, any proposal to add further incentive-based regulation should take the
existing level of deterrence into account. The argument initially seems
appealing.4°° Upon closer examination, however, the argument that future
incentive-based regulation should be adjusted to take the current excise taxes
into account seems flawed, for two general reasons. The first, which we will
discuss more fully in Section IV.C, is that excise taxes are a less efficient form
of incentive-based regulation than some other forms, such as enterprise
liability. There is a strong argument that the more efficient approach should be
adopted, and any overdeterrence that results from the presence of the
inefficient excise tax is best remedied by removal of the redundant excise
taxes. 40 1 The second reason that we are hesitant to adjust any new incentive-
based regulation to account for current excise taxes is that those taxes may
396. See, e.g., MANNING Er AL., supra note 49, at 24 ("Taxes on cigarettes are at a level such that
smokers pay approximately the costs they impose on others."); Viscusi, supra note 102, at 93 ("[Cligarette
taxes already exceed the level of the estimated externalities.").
397. Cf Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75 (arguing that, even without taxes, smokers more than pay their
way).
398. See supra Table I.
399. See Viscusi, supra note 102, at 57.
400. The deterrence objective of tort law would favor making adjustments to the level of tort damages
in order not to overdeter. See Hanson & Logue, Tort Law in Context, supra note 40, at 8. There may be
nondeterrence reasons such as insurance, however, not to adjust damages downward.
401. This argument seems especially strong in the current climate, when Congress is considering
adopting a comprehensive regulatory strategy.
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serve the purpose of internalizing a different set of costs than the ones we have
been discussing in this part. Indeed, there is agreement even among economists
that the current system of cigarette taxes was almost certainly not designed and
calibrated to internalize the costs at issue here."' 2
So what is the function of cigarette taxes? One might contend that
cigarette taxes are merely another source of government revenue, and a
relatively efficient (that is, nondistortionary) revenue source at that given that
consumer demand for cigarettes is relatively price inelastic compared to many
other products.""3 But demand inelasticity cannot fully explain why we have
such a high level of excise taxes on cigarettes as compared to the taxes
imposed on most other consumer products. There are many other products with
low demand elasticity that we do not tax at nearly the level we tax cigarettes
(for example, staple foods). In our view, one plausible explanation for the
current level of excise taxes on cigarettes is suggested by the name commonly
given to this type of excise tax: "sin tax." To put this idea in terms of cost
internalization, sin taxes serve to internalize the psychic cost that nonsmokers
(and perhaps some smokers) incur merely by living in a society where
cigarettes-a nasty, unhealthy, strongly addictive, ultimately debilitating, and
eventually life-shortening product-are marketed for profit and widely
consumed not only by adults, but also by children."" In any event, if the
current sin taxes are meant to impose those costs on smokers and tobacco
companies, then all of the external costs calculated above remain to be
internalized.
Even under this theory, of course, part of the reason for society's
disapproval of cigarettes may be the fact that smoking produces costs that
smokers externalize to their future selves as well as to nonsmokers. Thus,
current excise taxes on cigarettes probably do some of both things (some
internalization of the external costs discussed in Section III.B and some
internalization of the psychic or expressive harm just mentioned), but only in
a very rough way. In any event, for reasons that we discuss in Section IV.C,
there are efficiency reasons to use some other type of incentive-based
regulation to internalize the external costs of smoking.
iv. Morality and Social Norms
We have focused on the economic responses to the positive externality
402. See MANNING Er AL., supra note 49. at 18-22; Viscusi. supra note 102. at 54. 72
403. See supra note 254; see also. e.g., MANNING Er AL. supra note 49. at 24 ("[Cligarette taxes
cause relatively less distortion and tax evasion behavior than other taxes.")
404. Cf. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGiHTS REVOLUInON 44 (1990) (explaining that legal rules
can enhance social welfare by altering preferences in a way that "decreaslesl harmful behavior [such as
smoking], remov[es] the secondary effects of those harms, and produclesl more healthful and satisfying
lives"); Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28. at 12-13 (noting that many social norms condemn smoking)
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argument because this Article is, after all, an attempt to make the economic
case for incentive-based regulation of cigarettes. Because of the nature of the
positive externality story, however, it is appropriate at least to suggest the
possibility of equally powerful, and perhaps considerably more powerful, moral
objections. To adopt the positive externality argument, on this view, would
constitute a costly breach of social norms. Perhaps the most straightforward
and compelling support for that claim is that the positive externality argument
simply is not used (or at least is not taken seriously) in any other policy
context. For example, in debates over the appropriate response to
environmental hazards, we do not hear polluters urging policymakers to take
into account the many pension-saving deaths that would result if Congress
would only leave polluters unregulated. Likewise, opponents of gun control are
not heard to tout the enormous financial windfall to society from all the
premature deaths caused by handguns. And in no context other than smoking
that we can identify do we hear calls for affirmative subsidies to promote the
positive externality of premature death.405
Perhaps the most revealing societal rejection of the positive externality
story can be found in tort law-specifically, in the calculation of damages in
wrongful death cases. If the positive externality argument were fully
implemented in such cases, one would expect to see tort damages being
reduced by life insurance proceeds as well as by that portion of decedents'
pension benefits that go to compensate plaintiffs' losses. That, however, is not
the law. The collateral source rule has long forbidden courts from reducing tort
damage awards by the amount of any payments that have already gone to
compensate the plaintiffs' losses.4"6 What is perhaps more interesting, of the
ten states that have recently altered the collateral source rule legislatively, all
but one have drawn a distinction between health and disability insurance (with
respect to which the collateral source rule has been repealed) and life insurance
405. The economists' response to these observations might be that the activities mentioned would tend
to end lives before individuals have reached an age at which they begin to consume more of society's
resources than they produce. If, however, the only reason such proposals are not seriously considered is
this "target-age problem," we would expect to see some empirical analyses by policymakers and scholars
to determine what the optimal target age actually is. In addition, if retirement age did turn out to be the
target age, we would expect to hear some discussion of subsidizing activities (or not penalizing activities)
that tend to kill people in their post-retirement years. As far as we can tell, no such empirical investigations
are done, and no such proposals are seriously made.
Another objection to the handgun example might be that it lacks the element of voluntary assumption
of risk that exists in the cigarette context. We have two responses. First, we do not regard the cigarette
context as one that involves a clear case of voluntary assumption of risk, for all the reasons discussed supra
Part II. Second, even if voluntariness is present, we doubt that the positive externality argument would be
acceptable. See infra text following note 414 (discussing an extreme example of "voluntary" mass suicide
that seems patently objectionable).
Jeffrey Harris has made an argument very much like the one we make in this section. He compares
the economists' arguments to opposing breast cancer research. See Health Care Reform Hearings, supra
note 330, at 317 (statement of Jeffrey Harris). In his view, the positive externality argument is simply "not
the kind of calculation that a civilized society engages in." Id. We agree.
406. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1965).
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(with respect to which the collateral source rule has generally been
maintained). °7 Moreover, the American Law Institute in a recent report
advocated the repeal of the collateral source rule in every context except life
insurance.08 Likewise, a recent bill backed by the Clinton Administration
proposed eliminating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases as
the rule applies to disability insurance and health insurance, but not as it
applies to life insurance.
The extent to which tort law has rejected the assumptions underlying the
positive externality argument can also be seen in wrongful death cases
involving children.41° If the logic of the positive externality story were
applied strictly in such cases, the damage awards would typically be very
small, or even negative, because the pecuniary costs to parents of raising
children typically outweigh the pecuniary benefits. Indeed, in the late
407. The ten states are Arizona. Florida. Indiana, Michigan. Minnesota. New Jersey. New York. North
Dakota, Ohio. and Oregon. Arizona is the one state that did not draw a distinction between health and
disability insurance, on the one hand, and life insurance, on the other. See ARIZ- REv. STAT A.%, § 12-565
(West Supp. 1996) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source. including life insurance, in
medical malpractice actions). As for the other states, some statutes also repeal the collateral source rule as
it applies to pension benefits or social security payments. See FLA, STAT ANN. ch. 768.76 (Hamson 1994)
(allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source other than life insurance benefits): ID CODE
§ 34-4-36-2 (1996) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source other than life insurance,
social security, and workers' compensation); MICH. CoMp. LAws § 600.6303 (1996) (same as Florda).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West 1988) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source other
than life insurance, pensions, and social security): NJ. STAT ANN. § 2A 15-97 (West Supp 1997)
(allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source other than life insurance and ,%orkcrs'
compensation); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 1992) (allowing evidence of pa)ments from any collateral
source other than life insurance, some social security, workers' compensation, or employee benefit
programs); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (1996) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral
source other than life insurance, other death or retirement benefits, or any insurance or benefit purchased
by the recovering party), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317 45 (Anderson Supp. 1996) (same as Ronda); OR
REV. STAT. § 18.580 (1995) (same as Minnesota): see also Gary T Schwartz, A National Health Care
Program: What Its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law. 79 CORNELL L REV.
1339, 1345 (1994) ("Though many states in recent years have abrogated the collateral source rule. these
abrogations have typically excluded life insurance.").
408. See 2 AMERICAN LAWv INST., supra note 100. at 161. 165 Indeed. there seems to be almost no
support for repealing the collateral source rule as it applies to life insurance proceeds See. e g. Jerry J
Phillips, To Be or Not To Be: Reflections on Changing Our Tort Swseni. 46 MD. L Rtv 55. 58 (1986)
("Curiously, no one suggests that the collateral source rule should be eliminated with reference to life
insurance proceeds, although clearly such proceeds area collateral source in a wrongful death cas- ") Een
the most extreme opponents of the collateral source rule make an exception for life insurance proceeds See,
e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 100. at 182 ("We recommend virtually complete rccrsal of the
collateral source rule wherever such an approach is feasible A platiff's tort rccocr) should be reduced
by the amount of present and estimated future payments from all sources of collateral benefits etc'pt life
insurance." (emphasis added)).
409. See S. 1757, 103d Cong. § 5305 (1993), cited tn Schwartz. supra note 407. at 1345. see also
Schwartz, supra note 407, at 1345-46 (suggesting that one explanation for maintaining the collateral source
rule for life insurance is that "life insurance continues to be acquired in accordance with nineteenth-century
norms," by which he means that life insurance, in contrast with health insurance, is far from universal and
varies significantly from policy to policy).
410. Cf VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 138-68 (1985) (descnbing ho% the
evolution of damage calculations in child wrongful death cases demonstrates the law's eventual rejection
of the devaluation of children's lives): Croley & Hanson. supra note 22. at 1906-08 (using Zelzer's
discussion of child wrongful death damages to illustrate society's acceptance of the idea that. in certain
circumstances, quantifying pain-and-suffering damages is acceptable).
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the damage awards in such cases were
calculated in just such a manner-by netting the pecuniary costs and benefits
of raising children.4t t Over time, however, as that traditional formula began
to produce lower and lower awards, and as child labor laws increasingly
removed children from the workplace, the law moved in the opposite direction,
taking into account the nonpecuniary value of the lives of children. Indeed, tort
awards for the wrongful death of children increased significantly after 1920,
notwithstanding the declining pecuniary value of children during the same
period.4 t2 The relatively large damage awards in child wrongful death
cases-large relative to the damages that would be awarded under the
nineteenth-century formula-appear not to have abated (and perhaps have
continued to increase),413 a fact that strongly suggests society's rejection of
the positive externality argument in the tort context.
The positive externality theorists might offer the following response:
Subsidizing premature death to save on pension payments is not significantly
different from what our society does in other contexts. For example, the market
often pays premiums to compensate individuals for accepting unusually high
levels of mortality risk. Furthermore, the government in some circumstances
directly subsidizes the payment of such risk premiums. For example, some
portion of the salaries paid to firefighters probably constitutes a premium for
accepting the substantial risk of injury or death associated with performing
their jobs. Similarly, soldiers who are exposed to combat conditions typically
receive additional money in partial compensation for the special risks they bear
for defending their country. So, the argument might go, if we can pay people
in those contexts to take risks that, statistically speaking, shorten their lives,
why is it unacceptable to pay people (through subsidized cigarette prices) to
do the same thing by smoking?
The decision to smoke and the decision to accept a mortality-risk premium
for undertaking a dangerous job, however, are different in important ways. For
one thing, because of the information problems discussed in Part II, the
payment of a smoking subsidy looks less like a well-informed, voluntary
transaction than does the payment of a mortality-risk premium in connection
411. See ZELIZER, supra note 410, at 142.
412. See id. at 153 ("By 1930, it was estimated that a typical family with an income of approximately
$2,500 per year would spend an average of $7,425 to raise a child to age eighteen .... [Tihe deceased
child was a financial liability.... Yet, all evidence points to an increase in awards for children after the
1920s."). According to Zelizer, this trend reflected the increasing noneconomic or "sentimental" value of
children. See id. at 153-54, 164-65.
413. We have uncovered no recent systematic studies on the size of wrongful death awards in cases
involving deceased children. There are, however, numerous news accounts of extremely large jury awards
in child wrongful death cases. See, e.g., Michael Bradford, Largest Awards of 1995, Bus. INS., Jan. 22,
1996, at 3 (reporting a $500 million verdict in a wrongful death case in Tampa, Florida, involving the death
of a nine-year-old boy); Maggie Mulvihill, Couple Awarded $23 Million for Baby's Wrongful Death.
BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 25, 1995. at 25 (reporting a $23 million verdict in a wrongful death case in
Connecticut involving the death of a couple's infant daughter).
[Vol. 107: 11631258
The Costs of Cigarettes
with hazardous jobs. If, however, it could be demonstrated that individuals
who enter into transactions involving "hazard pay" do not understand or fully
take into account the mortality risks they assume by doing so, there would be
an argument for regulating those transactions in some way--either through tort
law, contract law, or direct regulation.
Even if we ignore the information problems and addiction problems
associated with cigarettes, there still seems to be an important intuitive
distinction in context between the typical employment transaction that involves
a mortality-risk premium and a smoking subsidy. 4 ' Specifically, the decision
to accept a mortality risk is part of a larger decision to accept a job, an
independently productive endeavor. The decision to smoke, on the other hand,
is pure consumption. In order to induce soldiers to accomplish a socially
valuable task, we compensate them with combat pay for assuming a risk of
death. With a smoking subsidy, by contrast, we would simply be paying people
to die early. The latter seems objectionable in a way that the former does not.
Before we leave the positive externality argument behind, let us consider
one final economic response to it. To the truly hard-core economist who
remains unpersuaded by the arguments in the preceding section, we offer the
following observation: As a matter of pure cost-benefit analysis, the
economists seem to have overstated the size of the positive externality
associated with smoking because they have ignored far less costly means of
achieving their desired goal. The goal, starkly described, is to create the
incentives necessary to induce a large group of people approaching retirement
age to commit suicide so as to maximize the pension windfall to everyone else.
Basic principles of cost-benefit analysis, then, require the adoption of the
lowest cost means of achieving that goal. Even if we were to assume for the
moment that the smoking decision is made "knowingly and voluntarily," there
must be cheaper ways of inducing people to kill themselves than through the
use of cigarettes.
One cheaper and more straightforward approach might be to offer a deal
to all American citizens on their sixtieth birthday: If they will agree to commit
suicide on their sixty-fifth birthday, their government will pay them an annual
financial supplement to make the last five years of their lives especially
pleasant and enjoyable. The only substantial costs would be the costs of
414. Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has wntten at length about the inportance of social context in
determining the appropriateness of including mortality nsk in social cost-benefit analyc!.
Because people's attitudes toward nsk vary with the social context, cost-benelit analysts are not
entitled to assume that the risk/money tradeoffs people make at work or in other market choice,
express how people think these tradeoffs should be made %%hen they are m oluntanly subjected
to risks by the state or third parties, or when they are subjected to nsks for the sake of
achieving purposes they do not value.
ANDERSON, supra note 134. at 200. Likewise. just because %%e as a society ma) allo% (or even encourage)
the use of mortality-risk premiums in some contexts does not imply that %%e should subsidize cigarette
smoking.
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whatever means were chosen to accomplish the task and the payments
necessary to induce some people to accept the deal. As long as those costs
remained less than the pension, social security, and nursing home savings
associated with killing people at age sixty-five, we would save money vis-a-vis
the cigarette alternative, which poses enormous additional medical costs.
Obviously we are not recommending government-subsidized mass suicide
as a way of economizing on resources. To the contrary, we believe that the
so-called external benefits of premature death-for moral as well as economic
reasons-should be excluded from the social cost-benefit calculus altogether.
(Or at least we are unpersuaded by the economists' arguments that these
benefits should be taken into account.) Our only point here is that, if such
considerations are to be given weight (as the economists clearly believe), it is
important that we do the cost-benefit analysis properly. Thus, even if the
benefits of causing early death exceeded the external costs of cigarettes,
choosing cigarettes as the means to achieve that goal would be economically
unjustifiable.415
D. The Potential Internalizing Effects of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation
How would an idealized ex post incentive-based system of regulation, such
as enterprise liability, respond to the problems of negative externalities? For
purposes of this analysis, we continue to assume away any difficulty in
determining the causal connections between specific harms experienced by
smokers and by third parties and the specific brands of cigarettes that cause
those harms.416 Given that assumption, an idealized incentive-based system
could produce optimal deterrence-both in terms of manufacturer care levels
and activity levels. For example, under enterprise liability, tobacco companies
would be held liable ex post, either by a court or by a regulator, for all the
harms caused by cigarettes. In addition, each manufacturer's ex post liability
would reflect the harms caused by that manufacturer's brand. Ex post liability
coupled with competitive market forces would give manufacturers incentives
ex ante to make all optimal investments in reducing the risks posed by their
415. We can illustrate this last point with a more traditional example of a positive externality: If we
wanted to create the external benefit of safe shipping in an especially treacherous harbor, we would choose
the least costly means of achieving that goal. Thus, we certainly would not spend $400 on a computer
navigation system that produced $500 in safe-shipping benefits if we could generate the same benefits by
spending only $200 on a lighthouse. What is more, if we were for some reason to adopt the more expensive
alternative-the computer navigation system-we could not say that we were saving society $100 (the
difference between $500 and $400). Instead, we would be costing society $200 (the difference between
$400 and $200).
416. We explore the implications of relaxing those assumptions infra Section V.A and compare how
alternative forms of incentive-based regulation might deal with problems of causation. In addition, infra
Section V.C we examine circumstances in which either ex ante incentive-based, performance-based, or
command-and-control regulation would be necessary or at least useful as a supplement to ex post incentive-
based regulation.
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brands of cigarettes. And because cigarette prices would reflect not only their
production costs but also their expected accident costs, something approaching
the optimal quantity of cigarettes would be produced and consumed. t7
Moreover, because enterprise liability would place the full costs of
smoking a particular pack of cigarettes upon the manufacturer of that brand
and, in turn, upon the smokers of that brand, it would go a long way toward
eliminating inefficient cross-subsidies within private and public first-party
health, life, disability, and property insurance markets. Manufacturers would
become quasi-insurers; in that capacity, they would charge more tailored
premiums to cover the risks associated with their products. Under such a
regime, nonsmokers would no longer subsidize the activities of cigarette
manufacturers and smokers: Whereas there would be a substantial increase in
cigarette prices (with all the beneficial deterrence effects just described), t '
there would also be a nearly commensurate reduction in premiums paid to
public and private first-party health, life, disability, and property insurers."1 9
To the extent such an idealized system of enterprise liability were able to
take into account expected-cost differences across brands of cigarettes, there
would be efficiency-enhancing segregation even within the population of
smokers. Manufacturers whose cigarettes were relatively risky would charge
higher "premiums" in the price of their brands to cover the greater liability
costs, while manufacturers of relatively low-risk cigarettes would charge
relatively lower premiums. Thus, whereas some private first-party insurers try
in whatever rough way they can to segregate smokers from nonsmokers, an
idealized system of enterprise liability would segregate and inform smokers
further according to the type of cigarettes they smoke. Indeed, perfect
enterprise liability would segregate smokers according to more than just the
417. For a fuller treatment of this general argument. see Hanson & Logue. 7he Firit-Parts Iu.1urance
Externality, supra note 40, at 187-88. Note also that once the inefficiencies m the cigarette market were
corrected by enterprise liability, the related inefficiencies in the market for insurance. see supra note 268.
would likewise be corrected. That is true because smoking rsks would. in essence, be transferred out of
the first-party insurance system and into the tort-law-qua-insurance system, in which there wsould be better
segregation of smoking risks than currently exists.
418. We assume that the excise tax and the expected costs of tort liabilty wsould be reflected fully in
consumer prices. This is a standard assumption in the literature on the incidence of excise taxes See, e g.
MANNING ET AL, supra note 49, at 170 ("Empirical evidence suggests that excise tax increases are in fact
passed on to smokers."); James M. Poterba, Lifetimue Incidence and tlte Distribuitonal Burden of £ gcce
Taxes, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 325, 327 (1989).
419. With this particular system of incentive-based regulation, we imagme that at least some of those
who suffer smoking-caused harms would continue to seek reimbursement initially fron their first-paty
health, life, disability, and property insurers. In those cases, either the injured party or the insurer. ssho in
most instances would be at least partially subrogated to the claims of the insured, would bring the tort suit
against the relevant cigarette manufacturer. To the extent there is subrogation to the first-party insurer, the
consumers' first-party premium would no longer need to reflect the nsks of smoking. First-pany insurance
premiums, however, would probably include a surcharge to cover the insurers' litigation eipensecs and
perhaps to cover the risk of judgment-proof defendants. In addition, under certain cireumbtances. we would
expect that the insurer and insured, for deterrence and insurance reasons, might agree nor to give full
subrogation rights to the insurer. In that case, first-pary premiums would rise to reflect this residual
retention of smoking risks by the insurer.
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type of cigarettes they smoke. It would also, for example, cause heavy smokers
to pay higher premiums than casual smokers.4"' And because the
consumption of cigarettes is a "pay as you go" activity, high-risk consumers
(in terms of activity levels) would contribute more to the tort-provided
insurance pools than would low-risk smokers, even within a given brand of
cigarette.
E. Summary
The large negative externalities produced by cigarettes, together with the
consumer-information problems discussed in Part II (which can also be
understood as a species of intrapersonal externality), create a prima facie case
for adopting some type of regulation of cigarettes. What is the magnitude of
these externality and information problems? In this part, we adopt the numbers
derived from the economists themselves (albeit with some important changes
in assumptions about whether some costs should be considered external or
internal to the smoker's decision to buy the next pack of cigarettes) to arrive
at a total external cost per pack of cigarettes of approximately $7.00. Because
we made no effort to arrive at our own calculation of the total costs and
benefits of cigarette smoking, and because there were numerous external costs
that were not included in this number (such as the large nonpecuniary costs to
families and friends of smokers resulting from the smokers' years of suffering
and their premature deaths), this $7.00 figure must be kept in perspective. It
is not even a rough estimate of the total external costs of smoking, much less
a precise measure. Instead, it is meant only to indicate that, contrary to some
economists' reports, there is a large and pressing need for regulation in the
cigarette market.
Notwithstanding that the $7.00 per pack figure may well understate the full
external cost of a pack of cigarettes, we expect that the vast majority of our
readers will find the $7.00 per pack figure to be surprisingly high. That
reaction serves, however, to confirm the principal claim made in this part and
Part Il-that consumers do not fully take into account the total costs posed by
cigarettes. In the next part, we offer a theoretical framework for comparing,
contrasting, and evaluating alternative regulatory responses to this failure in the
cigarette market. We discuss the serious informational disadvantages of
command-and-control, performance-based, and ex ante incentive-based
regulation; and we describe the advantages of an ex post incentive-based
regime. In addition, we provide a brief outline of a particular ex post incentive-
420. This is true given the nature of cigarettes-nondurable products that must be purchased in greater
quantities the more they are used.
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based approach, which we call smokers' compensation and which is modeled
loosely on the workers' compensation model. 42'
IV. CHOOSING AMONG REGULATORY APPROACHES
In Parts II and III, we concluded that the cigarette market is characterized
by significant market failures and is therefore very much in need of regulation.
Along the way, we showed how one form of regulation-an idealized regime
of enterprise liability--could counteract such market failures. Of course, in
order to make a strong case for any particular regulatory approach, we must
answer two further questions. First, are there other regulatory regimes that
could serve to correct the market failures just as well as, or better than,
enterprise liability? Second, might any real world factors cause our idealized
enterprise liability regime to perform less well (especially as compared to
alternative regulatory regimes)? This part provides a theoretical framework for
answering the first question; in Part V. we take up the second.
As noted in Section I.B, some scholars divide regulatory approaches into
three types: command-and-control regulation, performance-based regulation,
and incentive-based regulation. 22 In this part, we further divide incentive-
based regulation into two general types (ex ante and ex post), and we then
divide ex post incentive-based regulation into two general types (victim-
initiated and state-initiated).42 3 We argue that when it comes to certain
product-market failures (especially those in the cigarette market), one type of
421. One of the benefits of the ex post approach. as we show in the next part. is that making an cx
ante calculation of the external costs of cigarettes-%% hether it be S7 00 per pack or S3 00 or $ 0,00-is
unnecessary. All of the costs of smoking are imposed on cigarette manufacturers cx post. and the market
generates the right ex ante price increase or implicit tax. Thus. our smokers' compensation proposal does
not require the use of this figure.
422. Our description of the different types of regulation draws heavily from the wrntings of Susan
Rose-Ackerman. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN. RE-tttNKING TIlE PROGR-.SIVE AGENDA THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 19. 155-56 (1992) (discussing incentinc-based regimes
vis-A-vis command-and-control and performance-based forms of regulatton) The distinctions we draw
among the three types of regulation are not perfect and in some instances blur Thus. some cxanplcs of
command-and-control regulation begin to shade into performnance-based regulation. w hile some examples
of performance-based regulation begin to look like incentive-based regulation See Cropper & Oates. supra
note 38, at 699 ("[T]he dividing line between so-called Icomtnand-and-controll and incenti c-based policies
is not always clear."). It is probably more correct to understand the three categories of regulation as
demarcating three points along a continuum, with command-and-control regulation at one end. incentive-
based regulation at the other end, and performance-based regulation somewhere in between Nevertheless.
it is useful to maintain the conceptual distinctions among the three types of regulation in order to identify
more distinctly the costs and benefits of moving in one direction or the other along the continuum.
423. As far as we can tell, Donald \Vittman was the first to draw, explicitly the distinction between
ex ante and ex post regulation. See Donald Wittman. Prior Regulation %ersus Post LDabdat 7lte Choice
Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD 193. 193-95 (1977) (citing Gary S Becker. Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach. 76 J. POL. ECOr.. 169 (1968)) Steen Shaell also draw's the
distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation. See STEV N SltAVLL. ECONOiC A%ALYStS OF
ACCIDENT LAw 277-82 (1987). In addition. Shavell draws a distinction between state-mitiated and privately
initiated regulation. See id. at 278. 283-84: Steven Shavell. Liabtiht for Harn Versus Regulaton of Safety.
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
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incentive-based regulation-victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulation
(of which enterprise liability is one type)-has substantial efficiency
advantages over its alternatives.
A. The Disadvantages of Command-and-Control Regulation
Under command-and-control regulation, the regulator imposes specific
requirements on the regulated firm. In the pollution context, for example, the
command-and-control regulator might prescribe specific technologies that must
be used by manufacturers to reduce the level of pollution emitted into the
environment by their production processes.424 In the product safety context,
the command-and-control regulator might require manufacturers to implement
particular safety-related designs in the manufacture and distribution of their
products.42
The command-and-control regulator must tell the manufacturer precisely
what care level investments to make. Selecting the optimal level of care for a
given product, however, would be a virtually impossible task for a regulator.
This is because the question of what care level investments to make with
respect to a given product is just one of a series of complex and interdependent
questions of product design, manufacture, distribution, and marketing. To
know, for example, how "safe" to make a product-that is, how much money
to invest in making the product safer and how to spend that money-the
regulator must know not only what safety improvements could be made to the
existing product design, but also what design changes could be made to
improve safety and how much safety would be enhanced by those changes. In
addition, the regulator must know what those safety improvements or design
changes would do to the demand for the product. She must know how much
consumers would be willing to pay for the safety improvements and whether
the additional consumer demand would exceed the costs of those
improvements. That analysis would be especially difficult with respect to
products that present long latency periods between initial exposure and the
final manifestation of harm.
Essentially, then, to determine the optimal manufacturer care level for a
given product, the regulator must construct supply and demand schedules for
the product in question-indeed, for all the different designs of the product in
question, including substitute products.426 Such an analysis would require
424. See Hahn, supra note 38, at 95.
425. Command-and-control regulation is sometimes referred to as "input regulation." Other non-
cigarette examples of this type of regulation include requirements that manufacturers install scrubbers and
other pollution abatement devices or that smokestacks be constructed to a given specification. See JOSEPH
E. STIGLiTz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 226 (2d ed. 1988).
426. It turns out that choosing the proper care level requires all the same information as choosing the
proper activity level. In a previous article, we made a similar observation in connection with the question
whether a court in a products liability case can achieve optimal deterrence through an ex post negligence
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regulators to have an enormous amount of information that they typically do
not have at their disposal. 4 27 With cigarettes, a command-and-control
regulator would need to determine the exact safety-enhancing technologies
(e.g., a reduced-carcinogen cigarette recipe) that the industry could use in
making cigarettes as safe, and cost-justifiable, as possible. Such an analysis,
however, would require the regulator to conduct complete marginal-cost-benefit
analyses of every potential smoking technology at every level of cigarette
production, taking into account, among other things, the overall effect of each
technology on not only accident costs, including the costs of accident
prevention, but also cigarette demand. Thus, command-and-control regulation,
done properly, would require the regulator to evaluate both safety elements and
aesthetic elements of cigarettes, such as taste. 2'
What complicates the analysis further is that, to construct a demand
schedule for cigarettes, given the consumer information problems described in
Part I, the regulator would not be able to use the same sort of information that
might be used for other products. Smokers' revealed preferences through
purchasing decisions, for example, may not be especially helpful to the
regulator, given that smokers' consumption decisions are one of the sources of
market failure in the first place. Moreover, even if the regulator were able to
construct supply and demand schedules for cigarettes once, the regulator may
be slow in updating its calculations from year to year. If so, once a given set
of regulations were put into place and once manufacturers had responded to
those regulations in their production decisions, there would be a strong
disincentive for manufacturers to improve upon current technologies, at least
until the regulators got around to updating their regulations.
analysis that attempts to determine what precautionary measures a manufacturer would hae taken See
Hanson & Logue, The First-Party Insurance ExternoI,.. supra note 40. at 169-70 Such determinations
are arguably even more difficult when done cx ante rather than cx post. The framewsork of the current
Article makes clear that the ex post cost-benefit analysis performed by a court in a tort suit is a type of ex
post command-and-control regulation.
427. Furthermore, it is a type of analysis that we normally do not think regulators are competent to
undertake. After all. our decision to adopt a market economy rather than a planned economy represents a
recognition that, in selecting what products and services to make. hoss to make them. and what to charge
for them, the market rather than the government is the preferred means of generattng and sorting through
all the relevant information regarding costs and benefits. Of course. it is market failure% that have made
us look to a regulator in the first place. As we argue intfra Section IVD. however, for those who belese
generally in the market's superior ability to generate and assimilate vast quantities of information regarding
product and service supply and demand, the best means of correcting market failures is to find government
responses that are tailored to the market failure in question and that. to the extent feasible, rely on the
market rather than the regulator.
428. It is important to emphasize that the informational disadvantage of regulators would not be
limited to manufacturer care levels. Given that the optimal acti'.tty level will depend on the care leel
chosen, if regulators cannot choose the most efficient technology. then they cannot determine the efficient
activity level. (Other things being equal, the safer a manufacturer's technology is. the greater the
manufacturer's efficient level of activity.) The information problem seems relevant to virtually all aspects
of cigarette regulation, as past failed efforts to regulate the industry demonstrate. See supra note 9
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B. The Disadvantages of Performance-Based Regulation
Scholars and policymakers tend to prefer performance-based regulation to
command-and-control regulation. 429 The potential advantage of performance-
based regulation is that it can create incentives for manufacturers to choose the
best current technology at the time the regulation is implemented and to
develop better technologies over time. For instance, a performance-based rule
might, without specifying a particular technology to be used, prohibit cigarette
manufacturers from making cigarettes that expose smokers to more than a
given amount of nicotine or a given amount of carcinogens.430 Or a
performance-based rule might require either that the number of underage
smokers be reduced by a given percentage43 or that the number of cigarette-
caused deaths be brought down from 420,000 per year to, say, 50,000 per year.
As a means of enforcement, the regulator would then declare that failure
to meet those performance requirements would result in drastic consequences
for the manufacturers-for example, being shut down completely. The
consequence of an ideal performance-based regime would be that
manufacturers would, seeking to minimize their own costs, select the cheapest
technological option for complying with the relevant performance goal. That
many economists prefer performance-based regulations to command-and-
control regulations is a consequence of those scholars' assumptions that
manufacturers are better informed of their options and the costs and benefits
of those options than regulators are.432
429. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 121-28 (198 1)
(arguing for greater reliance on "ends-oriented" environmental regulation and less on "means-oricnted"
regulation); OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS: ACCOMPANYING REPORT
OF TIlE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 24 (1993) ("Performance standards are generally preferable to
prescriptive or design standards because they give the regulated industry the flexibility to determine the best
technology to meet established standards."), ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 422, at 19 (expressing preference
for performance-based regulations if financial incentives to manufacturers cannot be implemented);
STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 226 ("What society is concerned with is the level of pollution, not how the
pollution is produced. The firm is likely to know better than the government the best ways of reducing the
level of pollution (how to reduce the level of pollution at least cost)."). Much of what goes by the name
of incentive-based regulation would actually fall under our definition of performance-based regulation. For
example, one commonly cited example of incentive-based regulation is marketable permits for pollution.
In our framework, pollution permits would constitute a performance-based approach, given that such a
system requires an initial determination of a maximum quantity of permissible pollution.
430. Cf infra Subsection VI.D.2 (discussing performance-based standards in the tobacco settlement
that call for FDA-imposed nicotine target levels).
431. Cf. infra Subsection VI.B.3 (discussing performance-based standards in the tobacco settlement
that call for certain percentage reductions in the level of underage smoking by given target dates).
432. The following quotation from a popular textbook in public economics, written by one of the
nation's most prominent economists, captures this conventional economic wisdom:
It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the government has a fair estimate of the marginal social
costs associated with pollution. But it is likely that the government is not well informed about
the technology of pollution abatement and control, at least not as well informed as are private
firms. This is particularly true in those cases where the pollution control devices have not yet
been developed. Neither side has very good information: both are simply making guesses, but
since producers know more about the technology of their industries than does the government,
their guesses are likely to be more accurate.
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We agree with those assumptions of economists. It is not obvious,
however, that performance-based regulation would avoid any of the problems
of command-and-control regulation. For a regulator to set performance-based
regulations that fully correct market failures, the regulator would need all the
same information that is necessary to write fully efficient command-and-control
regulations.
Imagine that a regulator, rather than telling cigarette manufacturers how
to make their cigarettes (which would be a command-and-control approach),
told them that they must reduce the level of nicotine and that they could do so
in whatever manner they saw fit. Failure to achieve the goal, however, would
result in a very serious penalty, such as the banning of cigarettes altogether.
Such an approach would seem to have many of the benefits of a market-
oriented or incentive-based approach. (Indeed, one might include performance-
based regulation as a subset of market-oriented regulation.) But that
appearance, at least from an economic perspective, is an illusion. The choice
of the permissible level of nicotine itself-if done to achieve efficiency-has
built into it the same elaborate cost-benefit calculation that is required in
command-and-control regulation. How should the regulator choose the
permissible level of nicotine (or of carcinogens or of smoking-caused deaths
per year)? To reach an efficient number on any of those questions, and to
reach the prior decision to choose those measures of performance instead of
others, the regulator would have to include in her massive cost-benefit
calculation not only all the costs (including expected health costs) associated
with the different levels of nicotine, but also the costs of alternative designs
that might have been plausible substitutes to nicotine-reduction as ways of
reducing cigarette harms. In addition, the regulator would have to determine
the aggregate value to consumers of smoking cigarettes with different levels
of nicotine, taking into account all the other plausible cigarette-design
alternatives.
In sum, under fully efficient performance-based regulation-as under
command-and-control regulation-it would be necessary for the regulator to
be able to construct demand-and-supply schedules for every conceivable
alternative design of cigarettes. And to determine the answer to that question
would require all the same information that a fully efficient command-and-
control regime would require."3
This is not to say that there are no advantages of performance-based
regulation over command-and-control regulation. If, for example, society
STIGLIT-, supra note 425, at 230; see also Cropper & Oates. 3upru note 38. at 699-700 (explaining the cost
savings possible with incentive-based policy in environmental regulation); Hahn. supra note 38. at 96-97
(discussing theoretical efficiency gains from the use of marketable permits for pollution)
433. Cf. Cropper & Oates, supra note 38. at 682 (noting that. "in a world of perfect knowledge."
marketable emission permits, a form of performance-based regulation in our taxonomy. can replicate the
efficiency benefits of a Pigouvian tax).
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decided, for reasons not considered in the efficiency model being deployed
here, that it wanted to reduce the number of children who are smoking to some
de minimis amount,4" it might be useful to have a performance-based rule
that imposed huge fines (or, better yet, banned all sales to adults as well) if the
target level of underage smoking was not achieved. The additional layer of
performance-based regulation on top of ex ante policing would have the
following benefit: Given the political decision to eliminate underage smoking,
the approach would allow manufacturers, rather than the regulator, to
determine the most cost-effective way of achieving that goal.435
C. The Disadvantages of Ex Ante Incentive-Based Regulation
1. The Informational Demands of an Ideal Pigouvian Tax
Economists often contend that ex ante incentive-based regulation is
superior to command-and-control regulation (and perhaps even superior to
performance-based regulation) because, under such an incentive-based
approach, the regulator needs less information to counteract the relevant market
failures.436 Under this view, a regulator applying an incentive-based approach
need not know the marginal costs to manufacturers of taking additional
precautions. Instead, by forcing the manufacturers to take into account the full
marginal social costs of not taking precautions (that is, the amount of the
external cost), the manufacturer-who, by hypothesis, is better informed on
this question-would decide whether the benefits of prevention exceeded the
CoStS. 4 37 In contrast to that conventional economic wisdom, however, we
argue that, as between the idealized versions of incentive-based regulation (ex
ante versus ex post), it is usually only the ex post version that has the oft-
mentioned informational advantages over command-and-control and
performance-based regimes. Given these informational advantages, ex post
incentive-based regulation has both care level and activity level benefits over
its ex ante counterpart.
What we call an ex ante incentive-based system, an economist would call
a Pigouvian tax.438 Under a Pigouvian tax, the manufacturer is required to
pay, on each unit of production, an amount just equal to the marginal external
434. Cf. supra note 204 (indicating that the case for parentalistic laws may be especially strong where
consumers are children and the product is addictive).
435. For a discussion of how the performance-based provisions in the tobacco settlement agreement
having to do with reducing underage smoking fall short of this ideal, see infra Subsection VI.B.3.b.
436. See, e.g., STIGLIiZ, supra note 425, at 230.
437. This seems to be the conventional wisdom among economists. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, makes
the point in connection with pollution regulation, comparing fines (an incentive-based system) to command-
and-control or performance-based regulation: "The government need ascertain only the marginal social costs
of pollution. Then the firms decide whether the costs of the pollution control devices exceed the benefits
of the pollution control as measured by the penalties imposed for failing to control pollution." Id. at 230.
438. See, e.g., Cropper & Oates, supra note 38, at 680 (defining a Pigouvian tax).
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cost that the unit causes at the efficient level of output and at the efficient level
of manufacturer care.39 The difficulty that the Pigouvian tax presents to the
regulator lies hidden in the choice of the optimal tax rate. For the regulator to
arrive at the efficient tax rate, she must first determine what the efficient
activity levels and care levels are.
Imagine how the regulator would determine what the optimal Pigouvian
tax rate would be for cigarettes for a given year. It would almost certainly not
be exactly $7.00 per pack. At best, the $7.00 per pack figure represents a very
rough approximation of the average annual external cost of a pack of cigarettes
at roughly the current level of production and assuming essentially the current
design of cigarettes. For the Pigouvian regulator, however, that is the wrong
number, even in theory."0
First, if the Pigouvian rate were chosen without taking into account the
efficiently safe design, manufacturers would have no additional incentive to
make safer cigarettes beyond that which exists in the absence of regulation.
For example, if all manufacturers were charged the same per pack tax, there
would be no incentive for manufacturers to improve safety. After all, smokers
would have to pay the same tax regardless. By comparison, one could imagine
a theoretical ex ante tax regime under which manufacturers would be charged
not some flat, industry-wide tax but instead some amount commensurate with
the level of safety of each manufacturer's individual cigarette design. So, for
example, the manufacturer would have the burden of proving to the regulator
each year how safe its cigarettes were. Such a finely tuned Pigouvian tax, if
possible, could have a substantial corrective effect on manufacturer care levels.
For such a regime to work, however, the regulator would need a great deal of
information about the differing external costs associated with alternative safety
designs.44' Thus, to have such beneficial effects on manufacturer care levels,
the regulator using the Pigouvian tax must have all the information necessary
to determine what the efficient manufacturer care level is. That inquiry requires
the Pigouvian regulator to have all the same information required by the
command-and-control regulator.1
2
439. See ROSEN, supra note 263. at 131-33. Rosen's definition of a Pigouvian tax focuses on the case
of environmental pollution, and it focuses only on polluter activity levels, assuming away. for simplicity.
the possibility of changing polluter care levels. See id. at 128 n.7 ("[Tlhis model assumes the only way to
reduce pollution is to reduce output. If antipollution technology is available. it may be possible to maintain
output and still reduce pollution. However, the analysis is basically the same. since the adoption of the
technology requires the use of resources."). Because we are interested in both activity levels and
manufacturer care levels, however, we take both into account in our definition of a Pigouvian tax.
440. As we argue infra note 579. even under our proposed ex post incentivc-based regime, for reasons
of political and administrative feasibility, the implicit tax would likely be much lower than S7.00 per pack.
441. Such a system would also create incentives for manufacturers to decete the regulator regarding
the safety effects of their individual product designs.
442. In the next subsection, we discuss addittonal deterrence problems that are caused by a Pigouvian
tax that does not differentiate among individual brands.
The activity level point is more subtle. To make the argument clear. assume away manufacturer care
level issues for the moment; assume as well that cigarette designs are already as safe as they can possibly
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In sum, with respect to the information that she needs to do her job, the
ideal Pigouvian regulator is in essentially the same position as the ideal
command-and-control regulator.443 Both need to know enough to do precisely
that which we normally expect product markets to do for us-to produce the
optimal product design at the welfare-maximizing price and quantity. All of
this is not to say, however, that economists and others are wrong to prefer
Pigouvian taxes and performance-based regulation to command-and-control
regulation, or to prefer Pigouvian taxes over performance standards. 4" If, for
example, it were the case that monitoring tax compliance by manufacturers
were easier than monitoring output compliance or care level compliance, then
the Pigouvian approach might be the best alternative of the three. Alternatively,
if we had some noneconomic reason for choosing a particular performance
goal, then the choice of a performance standard could be defended on
economic grounds. 45 Finally, there may be occasions when neither the
Pigouvian tax nor the performance standard is as useful as a command-and-
control approach." 6 Regardless, we argue in Section IV.D that in most
be and that the external cost of a pack of cigarettes still turns out to be on average $7.00 at the existing
level of production, which is roughly 24 billion packs per year. Cf. Tobacco Settlement Review: Hearings
on the Tobacco Settlement and the Future of the Tobacco Industry, 105th Cong. 5 (1997) (statement of
Jeffrey E. Harris, Professor of Econ., Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.) (stating that the current level of annual
cigarette production is 24 billion packs), available in 1997 WL 14150659 [hereinafter Tobacco Settlement
Hearings]. In addition, assume (as most economists typically do when discussing analogous negative
externalities, such as pollution) that the marginal social cost of cigarettes increases with output. Cf. ROSEN,
supra note 263, at 127 (noting that he drew the marginal external cost curve in his supply-demand diagram
sloping upward to reflect the assumption that as people are subjected to additional pollution they are
harmed at an increasing rate). This assumption-that the tenth unit causes more harm than the first unit of
production-may be as plausible with respect to cigarettes as it is with respect to pollution, though we have
no independent confirmation of this. Under these assumptions, if a tax were imposed, some of the cost of
the tax would be passed through to consumers. This would, assuming less than perfectly price-inelastic
demand for cigarettes, result in a reduction in the quantity of cigarettes demanded and produced. That
reduction in quantity, under current assumptions, would cause the external costs of cigarettes to fall. Thus,
given that the tax would remain at $7.00, there would actually be too little smoking.
The intuition behind this point is simple enough. If cigarettes become relatively less harmful when
the quantity declines, then as production shrinks in response to the initial Pigouvian tax, there should be
an adjustment to the tax. Failure to anticipate that reaction in advance and to adjust the tax rate downward
accordingly would produce too much deterrence in terms of activity levels and too little smoking. If a
Pigouvian regulator wanted to anticipate all of these market reactions and choose a theoretically ideal tax
rate up front, she would need all the information that was required by the idealized command-and-control
regulator.
443. Economists seem to recognize the practical difficulty in choosing the optimal Pigouvian tax, but
they also seem to believe that the necessary concessions to practicality are less with such a tax than with
other forms of regulation. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 263, at 100 ("There are practical problems in
implementing a Pigouvian tax scheme. In light of the ... difficulties in estimating the marginal damage
function, it is bound to be hard to find the correct tax rate. Still, sensible compromises can be made.").
444. A number of noneconomists have called for increased use of incentive-based regulation. See, e.g.,
CHARLES SCHuLTzE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 57 (1977) (arguing for greater use of
"injury-rate taxes" and other "incentive-oriented" approaches, in place of existing "specific regulations");
SUNSTEIN, supra note 404, at 109 (calling for "market-oriented" and "incentive-based" approaches to
environmental and workplace safety regulation, including the possibility of a "tax" on employers for
workplace risks).
445. See supra notes 434-435 and accompanying text.
446. It is sometimes argued that command-and-control regulation is superior to performance-based
regulation where inputs are more easily monitored than outputs. See, e.g., STIOLITZ, supra note 425, at 226
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situations-and especially in the cigarette context-an ex post incentive-based
approach is preferable to any of the other three regulatory alternatives." 7 The
main reason is that ex post regulation requires less information on the part of
the regulator, because it relies instead on manufacturers and the product market
to make decisions about costs and benefits.
2. Additional Deterrence Problems with Current Ercise Taxes:
The Unraveling Effect and Errors of Omission and Commission
In the preceding subsections, we noted that an ideal Pigouvian regulator
would impose an ex ante tax on each cigarette manufacturer equal to the
expected external cost of that manufacturer's brand of cigarettes. As cigarette
taxes are currently designed, however, all manufacturers are taxed the same
amount per pack regardless of the specific risks posed by their particular
brands. 48 Even if we were to assume that current cigarette taxes reflect the
average external costs of smoking (which they almost certainly do not), and
even if we were to assume that future cigarette taxes would be changed to
reflect changes in the average external cost per pack of cigarettes (which is
also unlikely to happen), an excise tax presents significant deterrence problems,
both in manufacturer care levels and activity levels." 9
The manufacturer care level problem would result from the fact that
manufacturers would have less than optimal incentives to make investments in
cigarette safety: They would reap little of the competitive benefit of making
such investments because they would continue to pay the same excise tax as
their competitors. 40 Thus there would be an "unraveling" effect of sorts with
(suggesting that in some cases monitoring manufacturers' inputs , such as their use of scrubber, in
smokestacks, may be easier than monitoring the level of pollution emitted by each manufacturer). Wittman.
supra note 423, at 196-97. The argument has some plausibility. For example, if the regulator knew. that
adding at least one scrubber to a smokestack generally was a cost-effective means of reducing pollution.
but the regulator for some reason could not easily monitor the leel of pollution being emitted by any
particular manufacturer, the optimal response might be to require all manufacturers to install at least one
scrubber. Even in the situation just described, however, the command-and-control regulator would hae to
know a great deal about the overall external costs caused by the manufacturer's product when consumed
(or, in the case of pollution, in the manufacturer's production process) to be able to make a sound
judgment.
447. We also observe, however, that one or more of those approaches might be a useful supplement
to the ex post incentive-based regulation of clgarettes.
448. The same can be said of proposals in recent years to mcrea.e the federal excise taxes on
cigarettes. See Gary S. Becker & Michael Grossman. The Senate's Health Care Follies And CiVarrtur
Revenues up in Smoke. WALL ST. I., Aug. 9. 1994. at A 12 (discussing proposed increases in cigarette taxes
to help fund health care reform).
449. As we noted above, see supra note 402 and accompanying text. cigarette taxes are in fact set
without any regard to the expected external costs of cigarette smoking Instead. they are the re,ult primarily
of revenue-raising objectives. See supra text accompanying note 403 To the extent that there is anation
in tax rates, it is across states, not brands. See MANNING ir At. . supra note 49. at 170
450. There would be some competitive benefit from making safety investments. insofar as consumers
are uninsured and accurately perceive and process the differences among cigarette brands in tenns of safcty
characteristics. In our view, however, because of the consumer information problems discussed supera Part
1, this effect would be small.
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respect to manufacturer care levels. 5 ' Competitive forces-that is, smokers'
demand for, all else being equal, the cheapest available cigarettes-would
induce manufacturers to lower the overall price of their cigarettes by cutting
back on investments in safety, cutbacks that (we are assuming) consumers
would not perceive.52 Thus cigarette manufacturer care levels would be
suboptimal.453
The activity level inefficiency is a bit more subtle. Assume for the moment
that manufacturer care levels are not an issue so that we can focus on the
activity level effects of the excise tax. In a world with an excise tax on
cigarettes that is computed on the basis of their average risk, activity levels
(the number of cigarettes produced and consumed) may be, on average,
roughly optimal. Nevertheless, there would be welfare losses because some
individual consumers, compared with their perfectly informed selves, would
be smoking too much and some too little. These are the same kinds of welfare
losses that would occur in the absence of such an excise tax, if it were true
that consumers (on average, but not individually) accurately perceived the risks
of cigarettes.454
The problem with the excise tax solution is that consumers facing a higher
price would adjust their consumption decisions to reflect their own estimates
of risk given that they would not expect to be compensated by the
manufacturer for any harms that materialized. Their individualized risk
assessments would lead them to continue making errors of commission and
omission.
Nonetheless, even the imperfect excise tax takes us closer to efficiency
than no excise tax at all (assuming, of course, that some superior ex post
incentive-based system is not an available policy option). If manufacturer care
451. For discussion of how ex post incentive-based regulation responds to the unraveling problem, see
infra Subsection IV.D.3.
452. The discussion supra Part II regarding consumer information problems provides support for our
assumption that these cutbacks would not be perceived by consumers. Cf Hanson & Logue, The First-Party
Insurance Externality, supra note 40, at 176-77 (describing unraveling of manufacturer care levels under
circumstances of imperfect consumer information and imperfect insurance in the absence of excise taxes).
453. This is the same species of problem that we discussed supra Subsection ll.B.2 regarding the
problems of imperfect brand-specific information. Any time the incentive structure is not tailored to specific
manufacturers and specific brands, the incentive structure will be flawed in this way. Even economists and
policymakers who have recognized this unraveling problem with respect to markets and consumer
information have failed to recognize the numerous alternative ways in which other market and regulatory
mechanisms can lead to the same unraveling effect. As we describe below, see infra text accompanying
notes 641, 709-713, there are a number of ways in which the proposed national settlement reflects this
failure.
Interestingly, even the economists who support using excise taxes on cigarettes (at least as a
"component of a package of policy measures directed at discouraging smoking by children," Warner et al.,
supra note 28, at 385) acknowledge that "[tlaxation is a rather blunt instrument" and that higher cigarette
taxes might "encourage smokers to switch from higher priced branded cigarettes to lower priced (and often
higher tar and nicotine) generic and discounted brands, thereby possibly increasing smokers' exposure to
the toxic substances in cigarette smoke," id. at 385-86 (citation omitted).
454. Those welfare losses are sometimes referred to as errors of omission and commission. See Hanson
& Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality, supra note 40, at 177-79.
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levels unravel, the amount of the tax would rise; thus, the nominal price of
cigarettes would rise, which would cause a reduction in the aggregate amount
of smoking. Although in this scenario there would still be welfare losses from
errors of omission and commission, the aggregate activity levels may be closer
to the optimal levels than if no tax were imposed.
D. The Advantages of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation
1. The Reduction of Infonnation Problems
In contrast to any of the previously discussed forms of regulation, under
an idealized ex post incentive-based system (such as an idealized enterprise
liability regime), the regulator would not need to know anything, ex ante,
about the product's supply and demand curves. Instead, the regulator would
simply commit to charging the manufacturer, ex post, for any costs that the
product winds up causing. It would therefore be the manufacturer that would
make the ex ante expected cost calculation, and it would be the manufacturer
(and the product market) that would determine, ex ante, optimal product design
(including safety considerations) and optimal quantity. Thus, under an ex post
incentive-based system of cigarette regulation, the cigarette manufacturers
would, ex ante, take into account the fact that, ex post, they would be held
liable for any costs caused by their products. 5' They would build those
assumed costs into their design, production, and pricing decisions. Once an
equilibrium was reached in the market, the optimal quantity of cigarettes would
be sold at the optimal level of safety.
4 56
455. It should be clear that an ex post incentive-based regime does not entail any detemunation as to
the reasonableness of manufacturers' conduct. It is. in other words. a no-fault system. By contrast, a tort
regime that relied on fault-based principles of "'reasonableness" and the like would, under our taxonomy.
be considered an ex post command-and-control regime.
456. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 423, at 52-54 (arguing that. under certain assumptions. strct liability
with a defense of contributory negligence could lead to optimal activity levels and care levels in the product
market). In addition, because the price of cigarettes would reflect their full costs and because consumers
would anticipate being compensated ex post for cigarette-causcd harms, there would be no welfare losses
associated with errors of omission and commission.
Some readers might be tempted to argue that an ex post system of regulation would be more
expensive than an ex ante system because the cx post regulator would have to identify and measure the
harms that the product actually caused. That argument, however, is a red hemng. Any form of regulation
that seeks to internalize costs must measure actual damages. To argue otherwise is to misunderstand the
idea of internalizing costs. The real difference, as stated in the text, is this: Under ex ante regulation
(whether it be command-and-control, performance-based. or mcentive-based), the regulator would have to
estimate the fiaure costs and benefits of the product, in all of its various alternative designs Thus. in
addition to examining the costs as they occur today in making that estimation, the regulator would have
to examine how those costs were likely to change in the future. The regulator, therefore, would attempt to
measure the influence of a variety of mutable factors, including the product design, the consumer mix. the
medical system's ability to reduce or eliminate the threat of harm. the industry's ability to offer a safe and
viable cigarette substitute, and so on. Over a latency period of 25 to 60 years. such estimations would be
extremely speculative. Under an ex post approach, by contrast, the regulator would not need to make such
an estimate. Instead, the manufacturer would make the estimate. The regulator would have to ascertain only
the harm caused by the product after it had occurred.
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Not only would ex post incentive-based regulation use the manufacturer's
grasp of existing information to guide production decisions, it would also
encourage the production of more information. Some commentators argue that
under command-and-control regulation (and perhaps under performance-based
regulation), manufacturers have an incentive to conceal information about the
harmfulness of their products or about potential technologies for improving
their products' safety.457 Ex post incentive-based systems respond to those
types of problems. Under an ex post incentive-based regime, manufacturers
would use all the information they have. Moreover, because manufacturers
would have to pay for cigarette-caused harms once they occur, manufacturers
would learn something about the probability and magnitude of those harms as
a result of the process of regulation itself.
There is yet another information problem that ex post incentive-based
regulation reduces: Under an ex ante system of regulation, manufacturers
would have an incentive to convince regulators and consumers that the risks
of their products were lower than they truly were. By doing so, they could
lower the perceived costs of their products and benefit from a lower Pigouvian
tax rate.458 Under an ex post regime, in contrast, the manufacturer would not
escape paying those costs, no matter what regulators and consumers were led
to believe ex ante. Thus, manufacturers would have no reason to convince
regulators or consumers to be optimistic under an ex post regime. Cigarette
manufacturers under an ex post incentive-based scheme would, in essence, be
bonded.459
2. The Reduction of Overdeterrence Problems When Information Varies
Across Consumers
Another significant advantage that idealized ex post incentive-based
regulation has over idealized ex ante incentive-based regulation stems from the
possibility that some consumers may be better informed than others.
Economists typically assume that consumers are homogenous with respect to
information levels. So, for example, Viscusi premises his policy
457. See, e.g., STIGULTZ, supra note 425, at 230 (arguing that under direct regulation, private producers
"have every reason to try to persuade the government that the technology for pollution abatement will be
extremely hard to develop, so that it will be impossible to satisfy stringent regulations").
458. It might be argued that regulators could simply ignore the information provided by manufacturers
regarding product risks under an ex ante regime. Such a policy would come at a cost, however, because
manufacturers, as we have repeatedly argued, are typically better informed about their own products than
regulators are.
459. Cf. Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liabilit, supra note 40, at 786-92 (explaining the informational
benefits of bonding in the products liability context). Of course, an ex post approach may not eliminate the
information problem with respect to questions of causation or damages. Manufacturers would be able to
lower their costs if they could persuade regulators that their products caused fewer harms than they actually
did. That problem, however, would exist for any type of regulation that seeks to correct the market. But
see infra Subsection V.A.2.a (describing how an ex post incentive-based system could be employed to
overcome the causation problem).
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recommendations largely on consumers' average estimates of risk, "' even
though his own evidence shows that some people underestimate risks.-'
Viscusi would have to concede that his policy recommendations would be
inefficient with respect to such optimistic consumers. If one takes seriously the
possibility that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to information levels,
therefore, the question of which specific type of incentive-based regulation is
adopted becomes very important.
If the quality of information varies across consumers, any ex ante form of
incentive-based regulation, such as a Pigouvian tax, would create a problem of
either overdeterrence or underdeterrence. To understand this point, it is
necessary to distinguish between two categories of ex ante incentive-based
regulation, based on who receives the proceeds of the tax (or charge or fine)
that is collected ex ante. In one category, the potential victims would receive
the proceeds, based on the ex ante risks they face. We call this category
"victim-initiated ex ante incentive-based regulation." 62 One can imagine a
regime in which consumers, after buying their cigarettes, submit to the
regulator all receipts (or empty packs) for cigarettes purchased; and then,
before any injury occurs, they receive a rebate equal to their per pack share of
the tax collected.463 Although such a regime would raise the nominal retail
price of cigarettes, it would fail to have any effect on consumers' consumption
choices. The rebate would lower the price that consumers would have to pay
for cigarettes; the consumers, in making their decisions, would be responsive
only to the price net of the rebate. Optimistic consumers would continue to
behave optimistically, leading to an underdeterrence problem, while those
consumers who accurately measure or overestimate the risks of cigarettes
would continue to do so. As to those latter consumers, there would be no
deterrence benefits from this ex ante incentive-based system.
Now consider the effects of a different ex ante incentive-based system, one
in which the proceeds from the tax are paid to someone other than the
potential victims-most likely the state. Under such a state-initiated regime,
consumers who correctly estimate or overestimate the risks of cigarettes would
be overdeterred-or doubly deterred-from smoking. Not only would those
consumers pay the additional price to cover the ex ante tax charged to
manufacturers, but they would also continue to take into account their own risk
estimates of smoking because they would still fully bear those costs ex post.
460. See. e.g., Viscusi, supra note 102. at 70 (assessing ho %%ell consumers arc inlored on acrago.
id. at 92-93 (concluding that higher cigarette taxes would be inappropriate. in part because most smokers
overestimate the risks of smoking).
461. See VImscusI, supra note 49, at 124 & tbl.6-3
462. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 423, at 283-84 (discussing the tradeoffs bet%%cen "'prn.tely initiated"
versus "state initiated" approaches to regulation).
463. Such a system might operate very much like a bottle deposit system
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Thus only consumers who were purely optimistic (and thus who assume
cigarettes are riskless) would be optimally deterred from smoking."
This type of overdeterrence problem, coupled with an overly narrow focus
on ex ante incentive-based regulation, appears to be one of the main reasons
that economists who have studied cigarettes have not called for increased
efforts to internalize costs. 4 6 5 Those economists start with the assumption that
a large fraction of consumers are, even in the absence of any regulatory
intervention, already deterred or overdeterred regarding smoking risks (at least
with respect to those risks that are not externalized to third parties), because
those consumers are well-informed of or actually overestimate those risks. 66
Then the economists focus their analysis on only a single regulatory policy
tool, the excise tax,4 67 which is a very crude form of ex ante incentive-based
regulation. That approach creates the potential for overdeterrence, a possibility
that apparently motivates Viscusi and others to oppose the idea of internalizing
the negative externalities of smoking through higher excise taxes. 68
What those scholars seem to have overlooked, however, is that some forms
of ex post incentive-based regulation (namely, victim-initiated regimes) are less
464. The effect would not quite be that of double taxation, however, because the amount of the
implicit tax, averaged across all smokers, would be somewhat less than the explicit tax imposed by the
regulator. This is because the tax imposed by the regulator would include negative external costs not borne
by smokers (for example, ETS costs) as well as the costs they do bear, and the implicit tax felt by the
smoker would not (unless we were to assume, wildly unrealistically, that consumers for some reason fully
internalize all costs they impose on others).
465. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 19 (concluding that the current level of cigarette
taxes is adequate or even excessive); Viscusi, supra note 102, at 92 (same). The other main reason,
discussed earlier in the Article, is that economists working in this area have concluded that cigarettes, on
net, do not create negative externalities. See supra Subsection III.C. I.
466. See supra Section II.A (discussing Viscusi's argument that consumers are well-informed of the
risks of smoking).
467. In the recent studies by economists of cigarette-caused negative externalities, the only policy
option that has seriously been considered is an excise tax. See MANNING E7 AL., supra note 49, at app. F;
see also GRAVELLE & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 298, passim; VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 106-09; Viscusi,
supra note 102, passim; Warner et al., supra note 28, passim. For a discussion of the historical development
of cigarette taxes, and a description of the changing magnitude of those taxes over time, see MANNING fr
AL., supra note 49, at app. F. One can imagine a number of other plausible policy options, such as (I) a
complete ban on cigarette production and consumption; (2) a ban on cigarette smoking in public places:
(3) increased use of warnings and negative advertising; or (4) direct regulation by the FDA. Except in
connection with ETS (where limited smoking bans have been tried), the excise tax on cigarettes is the only
policy option that has been used or studied to any significant degree.
468. For example, when Viscusi addresses the topic of cigarette taxes, he describes such taxes as
substitutes for, or alternatives to, increasing consumers' perceptions of the risks of smoking. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Promoting Smokers' Welfare with Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 554 (1994); see
also Viscusi, supra note 102, at 54-57. Even those economists who have called for some increase in
tobacco taxes have done so only in situations where overdeterrence problems are not likely to be present
(such as with smoking among children), seemingly giving no consideration to the possibility of using other
incentive-based systems besides excise taxes as a means of internalizing the external costs of smoking. See,
e.g., Warner et al., supra note 28, at 385-86 (arguing that increased excise tax on cigarettes may be
appropriate as means of discouraging children from starting to smoke, but not mentioning the possibility
of using tort liability to the same effect).
If we allow for the possibility of imperfect information, the problem of overdeterrence under a tax
regime diminishes: If consumers do not perceive the risks of smoking, they will not add their implicit
premium to the price of cigarettes.
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susceptible to the problem of overdeterrence. Under an ideal ex post incentive-
based regime, for example, smokers would internalize the costs of cigarettes
once when they purchased the cigarettes, as the nominal price of the cigarettes
would rise to reflect their full expected costs. Smokers would not, however,
count those costs fully a second time by adding to the nominal price of
cigarettes their own estimate of the expected monetary harm to themselves of
smoking, because they could expect to be compensated for that harm ex post
via tort damages."
Even under such a regime, there could be some overdeterrence, depending
upon what damages are included in the ex post awards, but less overdeterrence
than with an excise tax. Overdeterrence under enterprise liability would occur
to the extent smokers themselves anticipate dying before having a chance to
collect their ex post awards. One cost of cigarette smoking that would, ideally,
be internalized to manufacturers and thereby into the price of cigarettes is
some willingness-to-pay measure of the value of the lost years of the smoker's
life. To the extent smokers fully appreciate the risks of smoking (including the
risk of a shortened life) and fully take those risks into account in deciding
whether and how much to smoke, however, adding a tort premium for the risk
of a shortened life could produce overdeterrence, since the smokers themselves
will not be around to enjoy that portion of the award.
There are a number of reasons, however, that this type of overdeterrence
would be relatively small compared to the overdeterrence associated with an
excise tax. The overdeterrence that stems from smokers' dying before receiving
their award would exist with the excise tax as well. 70 With respect to the
rest of the harms of smoking, however, enterprise liability would produce
significantly less overdeterrence. Smokers could expect to receive
reimbursement for at least some of those costs ex post in the form of a tort
judgment during their lifetimes. Such costs include the smoking-related
medical costs borne by smokers, all of the lost income to smokers due to
smoking-caused disability, and all of the pain and suffering experienced by
smokers during their lifetimes as a result of cigarette smoking. In contrast,
with an excise tax, no ex post reimbursement for those costs can be expected,
and thus all of those costs would contribute to overdeterrence. " '
469. We are assuming that consumers are aware of the stnct liability rule
470. Even overdeterrence stemming from the cost to the smoker of dying early would be mitigated
to some extent. Recall that we are currently assuming perfectly inforned smokers Under an enterpnse
liability regime, those kinds of smokers could take steps to reduce the amount of o~crdctcrrence For
example, since they can expect to live shorter lives. the) might decide to reduce their level of savings.
which would provide them with more money during their smoking lifetimes to help offset the mcreascd
price of cigarettes. Or they might be able to reduce their life insurance coverage since the shortfall would
be covered by the tort awards. Or perhaps long-term smokers who could demonstrate that the) already had
a serious smoking-related illness might be able to borrow against their future tort as, ards Although none
of those approaches would fully offset the overdetcrrence problem, they might significantly reduce it
471. None of the costs that are bome by third parties would produce overdeterrence under either
regime, if smokers did not take them into account. Economists typicall) assume that at least some of those
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It bears reemphasizing that any concern with overdeterrence exists only
insofar as there are smokers who are informed and who make rational
decisions regarding the long-term effects of smoking on their life spans. As we
argued in Part II, there are many reasons to doubt that smokers, in making
decisions about whether to smoke the next pack, behave with such a degree of
foresight. In addition, if, for reasons of administrative cost or political
necessity, ex post incentive-based awards were limited to purely economic
losses, the overdeterrence problem would be reduced.
3. The Prevention of Unraveling
An idealized enterprise liability regime (or some other idealized ex post
incentive-based regulatory mechanism) would, in theory, move us closer to
optimality with respect to cigarette-caused harms than the current and proposed
versions of a cigarette excise tax would. Under an idealized ex post regime,
manufacturers would have improved care level incentives because they would
benefit directly through increased sales from efficient reductions in the
expected costs (and hence the prices) of their own individual brands.472
Moreover, the activity level inefficiencies would be corrected as well,
inasmuch as the price of each pack of cigarettes would adjust to reflect that
pack's full expected cost.473 Thus, an idealized enterprise liability would be
a superior deterrent to a regime of excise taxes, even without considering
double-deterrence concerns.
E. The Advantages of Victim-Initiated over State-Initiated
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation
Enterprise liability is one example of a victim-initiated ex post incentive-
based system of product regulation. But what would a state-initiated ex post
system look like? Perhaps it would be a fine imposed ex post on cigarette
manufacturers for harms caused by past smoking; for example, a Pigouvian tax
whose amount was determined ex post rather than ex ante. Or perhaps it would
costs will be treated as internal to the smoker. We explained supra Subsection Ilil.C.2.a.i why that is a
highly questionable (and, in any event, largely undefended) assumption and that in the cigarette setting the
reverse assumption is usually more realistic.
472. Thus, manufacturers would effectively be bonded, creating an incentive to produce truly safer
cigarettes. See Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92; see also supra text
accompanying note 459.
473. The price of cigarettes would, under idealized enterprise liability, "inform" the consumer of the
risks posed by the brand of cigarette she was purchasing. See Hanson & Logue, The First-Party Insurance
Externality, supra note 40, at 175. More precisely, under such a regime, because consumers would be fully
compensated for the risks of smoking, they would not need to make their own individual assessments of
those risks. An excise tax, however, does not have the same effect. Because consumers will not be
compensated ex post, they must make assessments of risk ex ante and therefore, in addition to paying the
excise tax, may suffer from errors of omission and commission.
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be a lawsuit (much like the state attorneys general lawsuits) " - brought by the
government against manufacturers to recover for past cigarette-caused harms
imposed on the government. In any event, the key elements of a state-initiated
ex post system are (a) that the claims would be brought by the state; (b) that
they would be brought ex post; and (c) that the proceeds from the system
would not go directly back to smoking victims.
In Subsection IV.D.2 above, we described one of the advantages of victim-
initiated, as compared to state-initiated, incentive-based systems. The idea is
that a victim-initiated regime would avoid overdeterrence of those smokers
who accurately estimate or overestimate the risks of smoking, as they could
expect to get some of the ex ante cigarette tax refunded to them when they
bring their claims. A state-initiated approach, on the other hand, could create
overdeterrence for such smokers, because they could not expect a "tax refund"
ex post-except only very indirectly through, for example, lower income tax
rates.
Another advantage of the victim-initiated approach is that the system itself
would generate information about the harms of smoking, and this information
could then be used to fine-tune further the regulatory system. Smokers would
have an incentive to bring claims whenever their cigarette-related illnesses
began to manifest themselves.475 Under a state-initiated approach, in contrast,
there would be no such incentive for victims to come forward. Thus, the
government's factual basis for its ex post claims/fines/taxes would have to
come from some other source-perhaps, for example, from epidemiological
studies of the effects of smoking on general populations. Such studies are
certainly valuable, but they could be made available to any regulatory regime,
including the victim-initiated regime.476
One concern that is sometimes raised about victim-initiated approaches is
that they can give victims the incentive to behave with "moral hazard." Thus,
the argument goes, if the promise of an ex post award motivates victims to
come forward with their claims (thus revealing all sorts of helpful
474. See cases cited supra note 68.
475. Some economists have argued that incentNe-based regimes tend not to create incent'es lor
parties to volunteer relevant information. For example, consider the following quotation from Stightz
Under both schemes [direct regulation and fines] it is not in the interest of a steel company to
announce how much pollution it is creating. Nor is it in the interests of any of the users of steel
(to the extent that the market is competitive). since an) fines irposed as a result of esccssise
pollution or any expenditure on pollution-control desices mandated by regulations are simply
passed along to the user. And while it may be in the interests of consumers collectisely to
monitor, if monitoring is costly none will be willing to do it. We hase a classic public-good
problem.
STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 229. Our point in this section is that one of the potential benefits of vitim.
initiated ex post liability is that it helps to overcome this public good problem
476. To the extent the state were to attempt to strengthen its case for cx post fines, taxes, or awards.
by offering inducements to smokers to get them to come forward %kith helpful information. %e would then
be moving along the continuum from a stateimitiated system to a icltim-mitiated system That %%ould be
another type of hybrid regulation.
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information), it can also give them an increased incentive to engage in the
behavior-or a decreased incentive to avoid the behavior-that created the
claims against the cigarette companies in the first place. Put simply, the
availability of an ex post award-such as a tort award-may make people
smoke too carelessly and too much.477
This worry about the moral hazard effect on smokers of the availability of
bringing an ex post claim, however, is largely unfounded. First, cigarettes do
not pose a substantial consumer care level issue. There is not much that
consumers can do, in care level terms, to reduce the costs of smoking. There
is no "safe" way to smoke a cigarette, at least not as cigarettes are currently
designed.4 78 Thus, it is difficult to conceive how the existence of a potential
ex post claim would induce smokers to smoke each cigarette "less carefully."
Second, even if smokers knew of, and could plausibly be expected to take,
some care level precautions, a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system
of regulation would not create a moral hazard problem inasmuch as the
compensation that it provided would only substitute for compensation that is
currently provided through public and private insurance mechanisms. That is
true because current compensation is not adjusted to take into consideration
smokers' care levels. A liability system, therefore, would merely replicate any
existing moral hazard problem.4 79 Finally, ex post liability would largely
eliminate activity level problems. As we have argued all along, if
manufacturers are forced ex post to bear the full costs that their products
cause, they will have to charge a price that reflects the full cost of cigarettes.
Therefore, overconsumption in the hope of being able to bring an ex post
claim against the industry is prevented by the requirement that smokers fund
that ex post award up front in the form of increased cigarette prices.480
477. Cf Cropper & Oates, supra note 38, at 692-93 (suggesting that a Pigouvian tax may be superior
to a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regime as a means of internalizing the costs of polluters
because a Pigouvian tax does not involve behavior-distorting payments to the victim whereas ex post
liability does).
478. There may be ways in which smokers could reduce the risks of smoking. For instance, they might
try to inhale the smoke less deeply into their lungs. Or they might avoid covering the tiny holes around
the filters of some cigarettes that would otherwise allow some of the harmful constituents, including tars,
to escape into the air. The problem, however, is that consumers are unaware of those potential precautions
and, in any case, may not be consciously "deciding" how to smoke a cigarette. See supra notes 104-107
and accompanying text. Indeed, those precautions may be available to consumers primarily because
consumers are unaware of their self-defeating characteristics and manufacturers seek to take advantage of
that fact. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text; infra note 673.
479. It might well be true, as several readers of earlier drafts of this Article have noted, that smokers
could improve their long-term health-and, in essence, partially counteract the ill-health consequences of
smoking-by improving their diets or exercise habits. But that point can be made of smokers and
nonsmokers under the current regime. No compensation scheme of which we are aware goes very far in
encouraging potential claimants to eat better or exercise more. In addition, we are unaware of any studies
suggesting that diet and exercise have an especially significant effect on the health of smokers. Again, an
ex post liability system for smokers would not create a moral hazard problem.
480. Cf infra text accompanying notes 777-778 (responding to similar "personal responsibility"
concerns with ex post incentive-based regulation).
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F. Summary
In this part, we reviewed the arguments for different types of regulation.
Both command-and-control and performance-based regulation place huge
informational demands on regulators, demands worsened by the perverse
incentives under such regimes for manufacturers to conceal, or at least to fail
to seek out, better information. Without perfect information, regulators will set
prices too high or too low, and they will be unable to respond properly to
changes in the amount of harm a product does. Manufacturers will thus lack
incentives to make their products safer or charge prices that ensure efficient
activity levels. Ex post incentive-based regulation, by contrast, would harness
market forces and manufacturer information to avoid the inefficiencies of the
other regimes.
V. IMPLEMENTING A VICTIM-INITIATED Ex POST
INCENTIVE-BASED SYSTEM
As we have shown in previous parts of this Article, a system of victim-
initiated ex post incentive-based liability has significant advantages over other
forms of regulation in addressing the market failures associated with smoking.
In this part, we explore in greater depth the concept of a victim-initiated ex
post incentive-based regime. We begin by analyzing different alternatives to
such a regime. Throughout this Article, our model for ex post incentive-based
regulation has been enterprise liability. In this part, although we touch on
enterprise liability, we focus more on an alternative, administrative regime
based on the workers' compensation model.
A. Alternative Victim-Initiated Ex Post Incentive-Based Systems
So far, we have used an idealized version of enterprise liability to illustrate
the virtues of a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regime. Enterprise
liability, however, is only one form of such a regime-one that relies on courts
rather than agencies to do the relevant ex post damage determinations. In this
section, we describe an alternative ex post incentive-based regime: smokers'
compensation. Before doing so, however, we explore the idea of enterprise
liability further, relaxing some of the assumptions we have been making up to
now and addressing some anticipated objections. After discussing both
enterprise liability and smokers' compensation, we describe a technology-the
cigarette card-that could be used under either approach to allocate costs to
specific manufacturers (and to improve the efficacy of any regulatory
approach).
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1. Enterprise Liability
In this section, we relax some of the assumptions that were explicitly and
implicitly included in the notion of an "idealized" enterprise liability regime,
and we consider some of the common criticisms that are made of enterprise
liability as a system of deterrence. There are two types of criticisms that are
often levied against an enterprise liability regime: first, that it does a poor job
of measuring damages suffered by individuals48' and second, that it is an
extremely costly system to administer."' In our view, those criticisms are
often overstated.
The tort system, especially to the extent juries are used, is generally
criticized for being an unreliable means of determining the amount of damages
to be paid by defendants to plaintiffs.483 Some argue, for example, that there
is a tendency for juries to award irrationally exorbitant damages, especially in
cases involving wealthy, out-of-state, corporate defendants and sympathetic,
local, individual plaintiffs. 4 Such concerns, though perhaps valid in some
circumstances, are often vastly exaggerated.485 Indeed, in the cigarette
context specifically, juries have, if anything, been biased against individual
smokers and in favor of corporate defendants. 86 Nevertheless, if runaway
481. See infra notes 483-487 and accompanying text.
482. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 40-41, 127-48
(1989); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1560,
1587-90 (1987). Even the national tobacco settlement proposal seems to adopt the conclusion that the tort
system, as a means of regulating cigarette risks, involves unacceptably high administrative costs. See
Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 3 ("[C]ivil actions [against cigarette manufacturers] are complex,
slow-moving, expensive and burdensome, not only for the litigants but also for the nation's state and
federal judiciaries.").
There is a third type of criticism of enterprise liability, which is related to the mismeasurement of
damages point, though the criticism is more of an insurance argument than a deterrence one. The claim is
that enterprise liability, because it typically includes damages for nonpecuniary harms (so-called pain-and-
suffering damages), forces consumers to purchase insurance that they do not want and would not want,
even if perfectly informed. See Priest, supra, at 1552-53. This type of criticism, to the extent it applies
anywhere, would certainly apply to the proposal set forth in this Article. The argument that consumers do
not demand this type of insurance coverage, however, has, in our view, been drastically overstated. A
reasonably strong argument can be made that consumers do demand such insurance coverage and that
enterprise liability is an appropriate means of providing it. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 1857-
1914.
483. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES I l-IS
(1988) (describing the alleged failure of the tort system and attributing that failure, at least in part, to a
desire by jurors to be generous to tort victims at the expense of wealthy defendants).
484. See, e.g., id. at 11-12 ("If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant .... it will often
settle for a merely wealthy one."); JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES,
INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 23-32 (1987) (describing numerous alleged biases in civil juries'
decisionmaking); Good Riddance to Lotto Jury Awards, BUS. WK., June 3, 1996, at 134 (extolling a
Supreme Court decision striking down a $2 million award to an Alabama doctor who sued BMW for a
retouched paint job on his new sedan).
485. See Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform:
Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269, 279-81, 292-
310; Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109-12 (1996).
486. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 131, 139, 143-45.
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juries in tort cases remain a concern, there are reforms that would respond to
such concerns short of eliminating enterprise liability as a policy option.'87
Critics of enterprise liability also point to its supposedly high
administrative costs as a strong argument for choosing some alternative system,
such as a fault-based tort regime or a no-fault first-party insurance regime. "
Those criticisms often misunderstand the full effect of an enterprise liability
regime. For one thing, because enterprise liability would do away with the
need for an expensive trial on the issue of fault, it might actually be cheaper
to administer than, for example, a fault-based tort regime. " 9 In addition, to
compare the administrative costs of a no-fault first-party insurance regime with
an enterprise liability regime is to compare apples with oranges. A no-fault
first-party insurance regime is only that-an insurance regime. It focuses
exclusively on spreading the risks of product-caused harms, providing no
deterrence benefits to manufacturers. Enterprise liability, by contrast, provides
both product-risk insurance and product-accident deterrence. And it is the
deterrence element-which includes a factfinding exercise to determine
causation-that adds costs (though not necessarily costs in excess of the
accompanying benefits)49 to the system.
2. Smokers' Compensation
Notwithstanding the arguments just made in defense of enterprise liability,
if there remains substantial doubt that a jury can accurately calculate damages
and there remain concerns about the administrative cost of a tort-based regime,
then alternative victim-initiated ex post regimes should be considered. One
alternative to enterprise liability that may be more appropriate in the context
of tobacco-related injuries is smokers' conpensation, an administrative
compensation system. Under such a regime, instead of bringing a tort suit in
court, smoking victims (which could include smokers, their families, and
entities with subrogation claims, such as insurers) 92 would bring claims
487. For example, possible solutions might include reforming jur selection cteria (perhaps esen
placing some experts on juries), reforming jury instructions. taking the damages decision front the jury and
giving it to judges, placing caps on puntiive damages and noneconomic damages, and the like To be
absolutely clear, we do not recommend any of these refortms (except. perhaps, as an alemative to
eliminating tort law altogether).
488. See, e.g.. Priest, supra note 482. at 1560. 1587-90 (cnttciling enierpnse habilit) on those
grounds).
489. See Croley & Hanson. What Liabii nhv Cr1 33'. supra note 40. at 15-16 Which sstem w, ould be
administratively cheaper would depend upon the relative size of the cost.-per-casc effect (w% hich v, ould make
a fault-based system relatively costly) and the quantity-of-cases effect (%hich vwould make an enterpnic
liability regime relatively costly). See id.
490. See id. at 16.
491. We assume that victims of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) vould not be able to bnng a
smokers' compensation claim. For a discussion of how a %icitin-initiated cx post incenti, e-bascd regime
could be used to respond to public ETS exposure. see infra Subection V.C 3 As %e make clear below.
for a smokers' compensation system to hae a significant adsantage oer altemauise types of regulation.
the administrative body would need to make se',r'al causal deterninations that may not currently be
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before an administrative tribunal. The tribunal would decide whether and how
much the claimant was entitled to recover, basing its decision on (a) whether
the claimant had a compensable claim; (b) to what extent cigarette smoking
caused the injury; (c) what the claimant's damage award should be; and (d)
how the compensable injury costs should be allocated among tobacco
companies. The administrative factfinders would bring expertise to the
adjudication of smoking-injury claims.492 Perhaps supported by a standing
science panel,493 the agency would bring to bear the most current evidence,
epidemiological and otherwise, regarding the effects of cigarette smoking.
Research could be not only borrowed from private researchers, but also funded
or conducted by the agency itself.
Causation-based administrative alternatives to tort law are not strangers to
the legal landscape. Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for
employees injured on the job in every state. 94 And alternative compensation
systems have been used at the federal level on several occasions, including the
Black Lung Benefit Program for miners suffering from lung disease,495 the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for victims of illnesses
contracted from immunizations,496 and the Price-Anderson Act governing
liability in the event of a nuclear accident.497 Indeed, the notion of an
alternative compensation system specifically for smoking-related injuries is
itself not new. Over twenty years ago, Donald Garner proposed a system in
which welfare agencies could exercise no-fault claims against cigarette
manufacturers to recover direct medical costs and related transfer payments,
such as social security disability payments.498 Garner's system would involve
a special tribunal with expert factfinders to manage any complicated scientific
questions of causation.499 Claimants could invoke a rebuttable presumption
feasible with respect to ETS-related harms.
492. Administrative alternatives are frequently proposed in situations that involve complex scientific
or medical determinations, long latency periods, and large numbers of potential plaintiffs. See, e.g., Robert
L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD.
L. REV. 951, 952 (1993). This description is usually applied to mass toxic exposures, but fits tobacco
equally well.
493. One model for a "Tobacco Disease Panel" is Ontario's Industrial Disease Standards Panel, which
assists the provincial Workers' Compensation Board. Its mandate is to investigate potential diseases, to
make findings about causal connections, to specify criteria for evaluation of claims, and to advise the Board
concerning appropriate eligibility rules. The Board refers specific questions to the panel, but the panel may
also investigate issues on its own accord. The panel may appoint specialist scientific subpanels on particular
subjects. The full panel integrates the scientific findings with policy considerations to make
recommendations to the Board. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 100, at 335-37.
494. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1994 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS at vii
(1994).
495. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994); see also PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG:
FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1987).
496. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 10 to 300aa-34 (1994); see also Rabin, supra note 492, at 955-60.
497. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210; see also Rabin, supra note 492, at 955-60.
498. See Garner, supra note 48, at 314.
499. See id. at 319. He suggests the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Patent Office Board
of Appeals as possible models. See id. at 319 n.248.
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of causation based on how long the victim smoked,"" and liability would be
apportioned according to the approximate number of each manufacturer's
cigarettes that the victim smoked. 50' A presumption that all cigarettes are
equally dangerous would be rebuttable by a manufacturer's showing that its
brand is safer than others'.502
Since Garner's article, legal scholars have continued to keep the notion of
an alternative compensation scheme for tobacco in play. Richard Ausness, for
example, recently proposed creating an administrative board with rulemaking
and adjudicative authority to process tobacco-injury claims.? 3 As under
Garner's system, Ausness's board would set presumptions of causation,
perhaps even irrebuttable for certain diseases, and damages would be limited
to economic losses.5°4 Most recently, Paul LeBel advocated an administrative
system involving broad, categorical determinations of causation and damages
to minimize costs. 50 5 The program would be open only to individuals with
particular diseases and smoking patterns,-" who could collect only out-of-
pocket medical expenses. 7 LeBel would also allow a modest benefit to
families of smokers who die from smoking-related diseases, primarily for the
symbolic value.508 Both Ausness and LeBel would finance the payment of
damages through an excise tax.i°9
Those earlier proposals were not designed to address all of the deterrence
and cost-internalization goals that, in our view, should be central. 1 The
Ausness-LeBel excise tax, for instance, would impose costs on all
manufacturers, irrespective of their causal connection. As we emphasized
above, however, the goal of optimal deterrence requires that each manufacturer
bear that portion of the overall cigarette-caused harm that is attributable to
that manufacturer's brand.'5"  Only then will market forces lead
manufacturers to design, produce, and market safer cigarettes. And only then
500. See id. at 315.
501. See id. at 316.
502. See id. at 316-17.
503. See Ausness, Compensation, supra note 48, a[ I 124-25
504. See id. at 1127-29.
505. See Paul A. LeBel, Beginning the Endgaine: The Searrh for an Injury Compensation SYstem
Alternative to Tort Liabiliofor Tobacco-Related Harms, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 457. 474 (1997)
506. See id. at 490.
507. See id. at 491.
508. See id. at 492.
509. See Ausness, Compensation. supra note 48. at 1125; LcBel. supra note 505. at 493,
510. Alternative compensation systems generally have been proposed to srane insurance, administrative
efficiency, and corrective justice goals. See. e.g.. Ausness. Compensation. supra note 48. at 1088. 1125
n.178; Rabin, supra note 492, at 951. LaBel's and Garner's proposals are based in part on a cost-
internalization goal, but both have other aims that may pull in different directions. See Garner, supra note
48, at 277 (advocating the removal of government subsidies of tobacco and encouraging safety); LaBel.
supra note 505, at 466 (articulating as goals compensation, enhancement of safety, administrative
efficiency, and cost internalization).
511. See supra notes 99-101, 450454, and accompanying text
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will each brand of cigarette fully reflect its expected costs, thus leading to
optimal activity levels.
None of the actual or proposed causation-based compensation systems
provides a perfect model for a smokers' compensation system. They do,
however, usefully highlight some of the major considerations and tradeoffs in
designing an ideal smokers' compensation system. In a forthcoming article, we
(with Michael Zamore) provide a more fully formed, but still incomplete,
model of the smokers' compensation idea.5 t2 In this Article, we suggest only
a few of the major substantive issues that must be confronted in crafting such
a system.
513
In an ideal smokers' compensation world, three conditions would hold.
First, all smoking-related injuries would be "signature diseases." They would,
in other words, be caused exclusively, or nearly so, by smoking. Second,
smokers would be steadfastly brand loyal, sticking to their preferred cigarette
as long as they smoke. Third, all smoking-caused damages would be tangible
and easily measured. Under these conditions, if a claimant had one of the
signature diseases, the system would unerringly place liability on the
manufacturer that caused the harm, for the appropriate amount.
In many cases, this ideal may not be so far from reality. Certain diseases,
most notably lung cancer and emphysema, are very rare among nonsmokers
and might accurately be considered signature diseases. 514 There is also some
evidence that smokers are extraordinarily brand loyal.1 5 Moreover, a
substantial portion of the costs of cigarette smoking are economic and may be
easily and accurately measured.516 In many other cases, however, these
factors might be more variable. For instance, although smoking is known to
increase the risk of heart disease, there are many other common causes of heart
disease. Many smokers do switch brands. And many forms of damage are not
easily measured. As the real world begins to diverge from the ideal, it becomes
necessary to weigh the value of increased accuracy in tracing injury costs to
manufacturers and the administrative costs of achieving that accuracy. A
similar tradeoff exists with respect to calculating real-world damages.
512. See Hanson et al., supra note 40.
513. Procedural questions may loom large as well. For example, one threshold question is whether a
smokers' compensation system would partially or fully preempt tort law.
514. The portion of all lung cancer deaths caused by smoking in 1985 was 87%. See Patrick
Remington, Presentation at the Conference on the So-Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications
for Public Health and Public Policy, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School (Oct. 16, 1997) (outline
of presentation on file with the Yale Law Journal).
515. See Joe B. Tye et al., Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of a Causal Relationship,
8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 492, 493 (1987) ("Cigarettes enjoy one of the most tenacious brand loyalties of
any consumer product."); see also Philip H. Dougherty, A.M.A. 's Assault on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1985, at D29 ("Unlike most products you could name, cigarettes engender considerable brand loyalty.").
516. We describe losses as "economic" or "pecuniary" if they are conventionally characterized that
way. Many so called "economic" losses, however, are actually nonpecuniary losses that can be readily
measured. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 22. at 1857-61.
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a. Causation
i. General Causation
The first inquiry of a smokers' compensation board would be to determine
whether cigarette smoking could have caused the injury claimed. To lower
administrative costs, the system could be open only to certain claims. A
threshold definition of a compensable injury under smokers' compensation
might turn, for example, on the amount smoked and the type of disease.
Claims for certain diseases with known, constant latency periods might be
barred until a given period of time has passed. Finally, a determination that
smoking could have caused any compensable injury would not necessarily
imply that, in the given case, smoking did cause the injury.
Workers' compensation has long struggled with this problem in
occupational disease cases. It is often unclear, for example, whether a worker
who was exposed to toxic fumes developed cancer as a result of that exposure
rather than from genetics or environmental toxins. And, of course, long latency
periods complicate the inquiry. Workers' compensation systems generally
consider a disease "occupational" if the victim was likely to have contracted
it due to the nature of her work.5 17 A disease that may be common may
nevertheless become occupational if the employment facilitates its
transmission."' Moreover, the workplace need not be the sole or even
dominant cause of a worker's contracting a disease, so long as it contributes
to the disease's development 1 9 Despite these apparently liberal standards,
the workers' compensation system does not always get high marks for
responding to occupational disease. The American Law Institute reporters'
study on enterprise liability, for example, called workers' compensation
"notably unsuccessful in delivering compensation" to occupational disease
victims.
520
One option for addressing difficult questions of causation, often proposed
for mass toxic torts, would be probabilistic recovery."' In such a system,
recovery would be discounted by the likelihood that smoking did not cause the
smokers' injury. If, say, smoking has a 90% probability factor of causing lung
517. See I ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S ,VORKLRS' CoMI'E_%sATIoN 7-100 (desk ed 1976 & Supp
1997). The work may be distinctive in the type of nsk to uhich it exposes workcrm (c g . '%orking around
toxic chemicals) or in the degree to which workers must face cser),da) nsks (c g, contracting disabling
conditions from handling ice all day). See id. at 7-112 to -114
518. In one case, for example, a telephone operator who contracted tuberculosis qualilied for workers'
compensation because it was found that the close-fitting mouthpiece she used at v.ork continbuted to her
contraction of the disease. See id. at 7-107.
519. See id. at 7-124.
520. I AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 100. at Ill
521. For an extended early discussion of an ex post incentive-based regime along the lines descnbed
here, see David Rosenberg, The Causal Connectiot in Alass Exposure Cases A -Pubic Lm " Vstion of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984).
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cancer in smokers,22 one out of every ten smokers with lung cancer would
develop lung cancer without smoking. In theory, those individuals should not
be compensated, since smoking did not cause their injuries. The individual
attribution uncertainty of epidemiological evidence, however, makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify which ten claims should be
denied.523 Probabilistic recovery would address this problem by allowing all
claimants with lung cancer to collect damages-at 90% of their total. The
industry would thus pay the full costs of the injuries caused by its product,
albeit not to the exact victims.
5 24
A smokers' compensation system could adopt another commonly
recommended tool for simplifying the causal determinations as well:
evidentiary presumptions.525  Garner, Ausness, and LeBel all propose
presumptions of causation for certain diseases depending on the claimant's
smoking history.526 Moreover, presumptions of causation figure prominently
in many of the administrative schemes set up by the current federal law,
including the Black Lung Benefits Program527 and the National Vaccine
522. Our hypothetical estimate may be reasonably accurate, as 87% of all lung cancer deaths in 1985
were caused by smoking. Remington, supra note 514. Presumably, the percentage of smokers whose lung
cancer deaths were due to smoking would be well over 90% given that the rate of lung cancer among
smokers is approximately 20 times that of nonsmokers. Id.
523. Some might argue that making even the broad probabilistic determinations would be infeasible.
See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 492, at 962 (suggesting that the assumptions of scientific certainty underlying
probabilistic recovery are "problematic"). Some in the scientific community, however, are more optimistic.
Troyen Brennan and Robert Carter, for example, argue that probabilistic recovery comports with current
scientific thought. Science no longer looks for absolute, deductive explanations of occurrences, they write,
but allows for probabilities. See Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability
of Causation of Cancer and Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
33, 39 (1985). Brennan and Carter acknowledge the difficulty of establishing a statistically precise
probability factor, but they believe that with epidemiological studies and expert testimony factfinders could
generally "arrive at some good estimate of the probability of causation in the individual case." Id. at 58.
524. David Rosenberg has argued that underdeterrence or overdeterrence is the likely result in the
absence of a probabilistic recovery. The reliance on statistical evidence typical of mass toxic cases--and
smoking cases-means that a strong preponderance rule, requiring .'particularistic' proof' of causation as
to the individual, bars all mass exposure claims. Rosenberg, supra note 521, at 857-58. A weak
preponderance rule, one that allows statistical proof of causation provided the risk at issue accounts for
more than 50% of the total risk, would have the same result in nearly all cases, since the toxic risk rarely
exceeds the background risk. See id. at 858. Rosenberg cites cigarette smoking as an exception to the rule
that the excess risk rarely exceeds the background risk. See id. at 858 n.40. But Rosenberg compares the
risk associated with smoking against a background risk of exposure to asbestos. See id. We expect that the
excess risk of certain common tobacco-related diseases (such as heart disease) from smoking over a general
background risk is likely to be less than 50%. In those cases in which the toxic risk is so great, "imposing
full liability is no more desirable than denying liability altogether: to hold a defendant firm accountable not
only for disease losses caused by its own tortious conduct, but also for those attributable to background
risk, might inflict a 'crushing liability."' Id. at 858-59.
525. Depending on the system, such presumptions could be rebuttable or irrebuttable. Failure to satisfy
the conditions of the presumption could bar compensable claims from being brought, or it could simply
shift the burden of proving causation to the claimant.
526. See Ausness, Compensation, supra note 48, at 1127-28; Garner, supra note 48, at 315; LcBel,
supra note 505, at 490. Rabin proposes the use of presumptions in some mass toxic tort cases. See Rabin,
supra note 492, at 960-61.
527. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1994).
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Injury Compensation Program.5 28 The use of presumptions would reduce the
costly obstacles facing claimants. It would also expedite the claims process by
avoiding redundant litigation of scientific evidence. Although these
administrative-cost savings would come at the expense of additional deterrence,
such a tradeoff may be desirable.
ii. Specific Causation
If a claimant smoked only one brand of cigarette, establishing general
causation would be sufficient. When the smoking-related injuries must be
divided among multiple brands, however, a smokers' compensation system
would need to allocate liability. Ausness and LeBel do not address this
question; under each of their proposals, damages would be financed by excise
taxes.529 Liability, therefore, would effectively be determined by market
share. The Black Lung Benefits Program"O' and the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program 531 are similarly funded by taxes, with liability
allocated according to market share rather than causal share. In this subsection,
we identify five possible methods of allocating liability among cigarette
manufacturers other than market-share liability. We begin with the least
accurate and (probably) least expensive and move toward the most accurate
and most expensive. In presenting these methods, we remain agnostic as to the
proper tradeoff between accuracy and administrative costs; our goal is simply
to highlight a few of the possible options.
First, responsibility could be divided equally among the manufacturers that
produced cigarettes smoked by the claimant. This method would be the easiest
to administer, as it would require only the knowledge of which brands were
smoked and some basic arithmetic.532 Moreover, it is at least one step better
than an allocation based solely on market share in that only those companies
that manufactured the particular smoker's cigarettes would pay for that
smokers' harms. If consumers are reasonably brand loyal, then manufacturers
of relatively safe cigarettes should thrive and competition for safety should
emerge. Nevertheless, the nexus between causation and payment of damages
would be fairly attenuated, reducing the beneficial incentive effects of the
system.
528. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-13 to -14 (1994).
529. See Ausness, Compensation, supra note 48. at 1125; LeBel. supra note 505. at 493
530. See 26 U.S.C. § 9501(b)(1) (1994).
531. See id. § 9510(b).
532. Although we do not address the problem here. claimants under a smokers compensation system
may, depending on the nature of the program, have an incentive to overstate the amount that they smoked
and to lie about the brands of cigarettes that they smoked. A smoker's compensation program should.
therefore, be designed with that possibility in mind. We take up that issue more fully in Hanson ct al.,
supra note 40.
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Second, rather than dividing liability equally, a smokers' compensation
system could prorate liability according to the length of time a smoker
consumed each manufacturer's product. This method would require the
factfinder to establish additional information, and would thus add to the
administrative costs of the process. Pro rata liability, however, would represent
an improvement over the equal allocation method inasmuch as it would
allocate damages in a way that more closely approximated the harm done by
the respective manufacturers. This approach, too, may have problems. For
example, insofar as smokers systematically smoke disproportionately dangerous
cigarettes for disproportionately short durations, this equal-allocation-by-time
method would not create optimal ideal deterrence. To help address any such
problem, this allocation system could be combined with a rebuttable
presumption that all cigarettes are equally dangerous.533 Manufacturers of
demonstrably safer cigarettes would be permitted to rebut that presumption,
thereby reducing their shares of liability.
534
A third allocation system would involve estimating the number of
cigarettes smoked of each brand. Doing so would further refine the allocation
process, but at much greater cost. It may be that a smoker smokes a half-pack
of Brand X every day for ten years. If that person moves on to Brand Y for
another ten years, while also increasing consumption to a pack per day, she has
smoked twice as many Brand Y cigarettes, though the time frame for each
brand was the same. Recognizing this problem, Garner suggests the per
number means of allocating liability, coupled with a rebuttable presumption
that cigarettes are equally dangerous.535
Fourth, it may be desirable to allocate the damages in some way other than
purely on a pro rata basis.536 The allocation could, for example, be structured
on a "winner-take-all" basis. Such a system could assume any number of
forms. For instance, the manufacturer who produced the most cigarettes
533. Similar presumptions might be employed with any of the options described in this subsection.
That is, any of the proposed rules could simply be rebuttable presumptions.
534. Although the administrative board may lack information to judge adequately the relative riskiness
of cigarettes, manufacturers probably do not. By placing the burden on manufacturers, therefore, the
presumption forces the well-informed manufacturer to inform the poorly informed regulator. Furthermore,
it does so in a way that pits manufacturers against manufacturers in contrast to the current regime in which
manufacturers have common incentives to maintain one simple story-that there is no proof that any brand
of cigarettes causes cancer and that smoking cigarettes is not addictive. A code of silence in response to
a presumption that all cigarettes are equally dangerous, however, is certainly not unimaginable given the
industry's history, and would partially undermine the primary motivational impact of cx post incentive-
based regulation by sharply reducing care level considerations from manufacturing decisions. While this
behavior would not be in individual companies' best interests, oligopolistic decisionmaking might prompt
such action, particularly if the industry felt that the smokers' compensation system could be dismantled if
it failed to produce results. Even were it the case that manufacturers could not manage to cooperate in that
way, however, administrative regulators might not be sufficiently competent to sort out any informational
disputes and competing claims among manufacturers.
535. See Garner, supra note 48. at 316-17.
536. For example, if most long-term smokers tend to smoke the relatively safe brands of cigarettes,
then pro rata allocation would inefficiently penalize makers of the safe brands.
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smoked by the claimant could bear all liability. Such a method would reduce
the administrative costs associated with inter-manufacturer disputes. Or the
company producing the first brand smoked could bear a disproportionate share
of the liability. This "first-brand penalty" could be justified on the grounds that
first brands create the addiction and that their toxins linger in a smoker's body
for the greatest number of years.537
The final general approach to dealing with brand-specific harm would be
to establish a danger quotient for each brand of cigarette. A science panel, for
example, could create a formula that incorporated output factors believed to
lead to disease and epidemiological regression analyses by brand. Based on
testing, each brand of cigarette would be assigned a quotient indicating its
danger. After allocating liability, the tribunal would adjust the amounts based
on the relative danger quotient of the relevant brands. To refine the system
further, the panel could establish various danger quotients for each brand with
respect to different diseases. This approach has obvious deterrence benefits
over the other approaches, but those benefits may be outweighed by the
additional administrative cost.
The information-forcing effect of ex post incentive-based liability would
refine any of the methods suggested above over time.53- Though all of these
possibilities force tradeoffs between accurate causation measures and
administrative costs, any of them could feasibly be implemented, depending on
the resource constraints faced by adjudicators. Another factor in the choice
between the methods we have suggested is our initial estimates of how
individualized cigarette harms are: If we had good evidence that smoking
behavior was highly variable across smokers or that different brands varied
substantially in dangerousness, we would have good reason to invest more in
individualized causation determinations.
b. The Cigarette Card
The list of five options for allocating liability discussed in the previous
subsection is hardly exhaustive. Moreover, each option has many strengths and
weaknesses that we are unable to discuss in this Article. Nevertheless, in this
subsection we suggest a possible means of overcoming, or at least reducing,
many of the likely problems that implementation of the above options would
create. In this subsection, like the last, our discussion is only cursory and
suggestive.
537. If it turned out that smoking costs were not linear, Itabilit) could instead be %cighted according
to estimated marginal damage. If. for example. it turned out that smoking for li'e )car-, %ere relatively
harmless, and that the cigarettes smoked between year six and ten were more destructtse, the system might
put greater liability on the manufacturers of those brands smoked bctsecn )ears six and ten CJ supra note
442 (describing the typical assumption of economists that pollution has mcreasing marginal costs)
538. See supra notes 457. 475. and accompanying text
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One method of overcoming the difficult informational requirements of the
allocation models described above is by enacting a requirement that anyone
wanting to purchase cigarettes must first purchase a "cigarette card." The card,
which could be based on the same magnetic strip (or computer chip)
technology used for credit cards and ATM cards, would be issued to any legal-
aged smoker who wanted to buy cigarettes and would have to be presented by
the smoker each time she purchased cigarettes. The card could keep track of
a variety of potentially relevant risk factors, such as the number of packs
purchased by the smoker, which brands the smoker purchased, and the
smoker's age at the time of purchase. If that smoker were later to bring a
claim against cigarette manufacturers, the smoker's cigarette card information
could be used to help resolve many of the potentially difficult causal questions.
Moreover, the new data could be used by epidemiologists and biostatisticians
to expand what is known about the effects of smoking, the effects of different
brands (or ingredient mixes within those brands), the effects of different
smoking patterns, and so on. Using advanced statistical techniques, we could
learn a great deal more about the effects of cigarettes; that learning, in turn,
could be used to hone further the agency's causal determinations and
ultimately affect manufacturer product design.
A drawback of the cigarette card is that it would create significant
administrative costs. But the costs of this proposal seem less significant in
comparison to the costs that would be imposed by the variety of regulatory
restrictions that the national tobacco settlement proposal envisages. For
example, the proposal would:
• Mandate minimum federal standards for a retail licensing program
that federal, state, and local authorities would enforce;
539
* Impose penalties, both civil and criminal, for violations of the
licensure requirements; 540
• Impose licensing fees on sellers to cover administrative costs of
issuing licenses;...
" Set a minimum age of eighteen to purchase tobacco and require




" Ban all sales of tobacco products from vending machines; ban the
sale of tobacco products from opened packages; establish a
minimum package size of twenty cigarettes; ban the sampling of
539. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 12.
540. See id. app. II at 44. Selling tobacco products without a license, for example, would be a criminal
violation punishable at the federal level with a minimum penalty for individuals of $1000 or imprisonment
for six months or both; and for corporations, with a maximum penalty of $50,000. State and local penalties
could be more severe than these. See id.
541. See id. at 13.
542. See id. at 11.
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tobacco products; and ban the distribution of certain tobacco
products through the mail."3
Such provisions pose restrictions similar to those entailed by a cigarette card
system. Issuing the cards and creating a system that would collect the data
from the cards would create significant administrative costs, to be sure, but
not, we suspect, overwhelming ones.
The case for the card system is even stronger when one considers its other
potential benefits. For example, the use of the card could assist in imposing
age requirements on the purchase of cigarettes. That is, cards would be issued
only to consumers who are otherwise legally allowed to buy cigarettes." To
appreciate the potential ways in which a cigarette card might be helpful to a
cigarette seller, consider some of the "smart-card" technologies that institutions
concerned with correctly identifying people are beginning to employ. Some
companies are developing a card that is embedded with a microchip containing
detailed personal information."' Representatives of the biometrics industry
report that still better means of identification verification are now available and
will soon be widely used. 6 Biometricians are developing better and cheaper
ways of using unique human characteristics, such as fingerprints, hand prints,
facial imaging, or retina patterns, to identify people." 7 As the technologies
improve and costs decrease, the benefits of a "smart" cigarette card, measured
purely in terms of preventing underage smokers from buying cigarettes, could
well overwhelm the costs of the system.
There is a related potential benefit of a cigarette card. Any regulatory
regime that prohibits underage smokers from buying cigarettes, and that has
the effect of raising cigarette prices, will give rise to black market forces that
543. See id. at I 1-12.
544. The idea of an identification card to assist retailers in avoiding selling to underage consumers is
nothing new. British politicians are currently considenng whether national identity cards should be issued
in order to "stem the soaring crime rate and prevent minors buying cigarettes and alcohol - Helen Arnold.
Mistaken Identity: Identity Cards, SUPER MARKETING. Sept. 6. 1996. at 20. Moreoser. 16 European
countries already have identity card policies. 10 of which are mandatory. See id. The greatest advantage
of the cards in those countries is that they provide credible photo identfication of consumers Such cards
would represent less of an advance in the United States. howecer. inasmuch as photo identitication is
widely held by consumers in the form of a driver's license.
545. See Stephen Lynch, Life on the Line: Banking on ATM Cards. ORANGE Cot 'STy REG tCal . Feb
2, 1997, at K8. A 256-byte memory chip card is being used. for example. in Germany's health care system
See Dr. Otfrid P. Schaefer, Introduction of Clp Technology to Healthcare its German t isited July 22.
1997) <http://www.smartcard.co.uk/health.html>. The card contains information soch as the insured', name.
address, date of birth, status, the name of the insurance provider, and the expiration date ot the insurance
See id. For now, the primary goal of the chip card is to losker administratie costs, but the technology is
also being developed to assist the health care system in diagnosing and treating illness See id
546. See Geoff Naim, The Key to Your Idenittyr Fallig Costs Iill Allow Fingerprint ,rtfjcation To
Be Widely Used, FINANCIAL TIMES (London). July 15. 1997. at 12.
547. See id.; see also Evan Perez. Changing the Face of Security Svstems. COM. AP'PEALtL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Jan. 21, 1996, at 3C (describing a facial imaging system that "'uses your face as the key to access
automated teller machines and office buildings, or check the identity of %%elfare recipients and computer
network users").
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could undermine the goal of the regulation.548 The card could be used to
assist in preventing or reducing black market cigarette consumption and
production. It could, for instance, be utilized to limit the number of packs of
cigarettes that any one smoker would be permitted to purchase over a given
time period. If it were empirically determined that no individual smokes more
than three packs per day, for example, then that maximum could form the basis
of a buying cap for the month. To be sure, the adult might sell each of the
ninety packs per month, but the adult would not be able to sell more than that
amount. Moreover, the cigarettes would be purchased at the full, regulated
price. Thus, it is difficult to imagine how a profit could be made by reselling
those cigarettes, unless underage smokers not allowed to purchase cigarettes
legally were willing and able to pay more than the fully internalized price. But
such a possibility seems remote.549 On a more extreme level, anyone found
carrying cigarettes that could not be accounted for on their cigarette cards
could be subject to criminal penalties-analogous to the open-container laws
in many states.
The card could also assist individual smokers' efforts to quit smoking.
That is, a smoker could ask to have self-imposed limits on her card that would
prevent her from purchasing more than a specified number of cigarettes over
a specified time period. Thus, the card could serve as a personal hand-tying
technology for those smokers who want to cut down or ultimately to quit but,
absent such a tool, have great difficulty doing so. 55' Finally, the card could
be used to help eliminate the alleged "positive externality" associated with
smoking. With the card as a measure of people's conduct, pension plans could
more easily charge less to smokers.
Although the potential advantages of a cigarette card may be enormous,
we have thus far ignored a difficult to quantify, but nevertheless real, cost. A
reaction of many readers may well be that our proposal gives too much
information to governmental agencies, therefore creating a "Big Brother"
problem. We sympathize with that concern, but we believe the problem is not
as significant as it may initially appear. First, it is not clear that the sort of
information that the cigarette card system would generate is any different from
the sort of information that the American public already routinely provides to
governmental and private agencies. In other words, it may be too late to worry
about the sort of privacy concerns that this proposal raises.55' Moreover, to
548. See infra Subsection V.B.2.
549. The cap, whether it be three packs a day or four or whatever, would be set at a high enough level
that the cap itself would not create a demand for black market cigarettes.
550. Cf supra text accompanying notes 190-197 (describing smokers' common, but largely ineffective,
hand-tying strategies).
551. As one writer put it recently, "Stored in computer databases around the country are profiles
detailing what you buy at the grocery, where you spend your money, how much you paid for your home.
Your medical condition. Your credit card and Soci-I Security numbers. Almost every trait that makes you,
well, you." Sandy Smith, Instant Access, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 10, 1996, at IF.
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the extent that the "Big Brother" problem associated with the cigarette card
system is viewed as extraordinary, the system could be tailored to reduce or
eliminate the concern. For example, the means of identification could be
selected so as to reduce the amount of information that would be kept
centrally, information that might otherwise be used or misused against the
consumers who use the cards.552 Further, Congress could create very strict
controls and limits on what can be done with the information that is obtained
through the program.
Despite such modifications, some might object to any regulatory system
that keeps track of who is buying cigarettes. To that very basic criticism, we
have two responses. First, we suspect that, for some, it is motivated in part by
a kind of status quo bias. Consider a different reference point-something
other than the regulation of a currently unregulated product, such as the
decriminalization of some currently illegal product (for example, heroin). If we
were to lift the ban on such a product, the idea of imposing heavy point-of-sale
regulation, including the collection of information regarding who is purchasing
how much of the product, might not seem so extraordinary. Indeed, such issues
would presumably be considered an essential part of any proposal to legalize
a currently illegal drug. Second, for those still opposed in principle to
mandatory regimes of this sort, we offer the possibility that the scheme could
be voluntary. Those who wanted to use the card without having data collected
regarding their purchases could do so, though at some cost. For instance, they
might not be able to enjoy any of the ex ante savings to which they might
otherwise be entitled through their pension plans. Similarly, they might be
disallowed from collecting damages from the system for any smoking-related
illness or injury that they experienced.
c. Damages
Assuming a claimant proves causation, how much should that person
receive? There are two general sorts of losses that might be compensated,
economic losses and intangible losses. Taking deterrence as our only goal, an
ideal smokers' compensation scheme would, at least in an abstract world
resembling an economist's model, award full compensation for both economic
and noneconomic harms caused by cigarettes. In the real world, however, the
picture is clouded by a number of complicating political and administrative
considerations. In our forthcoming article (with Michael Zamore),5' we will
lay out some of those factors and their implications for the types of injuries
that should be compensable and the extent of compensation. For now, we
552. For instance, representatives of manufacturers de'eloping technologis for accurate hingerpnnt
verification claim that the data they collect cannot be isused because fingerpnnts cannot be generated
from the stored data. See Naim, supra note 546. at 12.
553. See Hanson et al., supra note 40.
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simply want to avoid any potential confusion by reemphasizing that the $7.00
per pack figure that we came up with in Part III does not represent an accurate
measure of the cost of cigarettes. Moreover, we do not take that figure to
represent an approximate measure of the damages that would be paid by
manufacturers under a smokers' compensation system."5
3. Summary
In this section, we have explored two possible ex post incentive-based
regulatory systems. One uses the traditional court-based tort model as its
starting point; the other looks to workers' compensation as a model. Either
type of system may be able to avoid many of the problems with conventional
regulatory responses to market failures, particularly if the information gathering
necessary to make the system work were enabled by something like the
cigarette card. We now turn to a discussion of the effects of an ex post
incentive-based regime on the behavior of cigarette producers and consumers.
B. What Might the Cigarette Market Look Like in a World with Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation?
1. Safer Cigarettes and Safer Smokers
If an ex post incentive-based approach-whether it be on the enterprise
liability or smokers' compensation model-were to be successfully
implemented, what might the cigarette market look like? There are many
possible outcomes, and we do not pretend to be able to predict with any
certainty which one would occur. Still, we can speculate about some of the
possibilities. For example, if we assume that cigarettes can indeed be made
substantially safer than they currently are, the cigarette market might look very
different from its current form.555 Manufacturers would have an incentive to
achieve the optimal mix of care levels (that is, investments in safer cigarette
designs) and activity levels, which would be regulated through the price
charged per pack. If the full costs of cigarettes were imposed on
manufacturers, they might discover that the best means of achieving optimal
product safety includes any of the following:
Substantially reducing nicotine levels in cigarettes so as to reduce
the lifetime amount of smoking by any given individual (that is,
to allow smokers to quit more easily) while also reducing
554. Cf. infra note 579 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate measure of damages that
cigarette manufacturers should pay).
555. For an illuminating recent attempt to imagine what may come of the emerging market in cigarette
substitutes, see Warner et al., supra note 106, at 1088-91.
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somewhat the levels of carcinogens and other dangerous
substances found in cigarettes;
" Alternatively, substantially increasing nicotine levels, and
moderately reducing carcinogen levels, to get the same result;" 6
• Substantially reducing or eliminating the carcinogens and other
harmful ingredients while only moderately reducing (or
increasing) the level of nicotine;
• Moderately reducing (or increasing) nicotine levels and
moderately reducing carcinogen levels, but marketing cigarettes
only to people over a particular age. Then, after a number of
years, offering to help those smokers stop smoking or switch to
some even less dangerous alternative "nicotine-delivery system";
or
* Developing a nicotine-free tobacco product (which, because of its
lack of nicotine and relatively high price, consumers would use
only sparingly) and producing an alternative, nontobacco,
nicotine-delivery system that would be sold in high quantities and
at low prices.
Which variant of those approaches manufacturers would pursue depends on a
number of factors-such as the cost of developing technologies for removing
nicotine and carcinogens from tobacco, the cost of developing alternative
nicotine-delivery systems, and the effect on consumer demand of any change
in cigarette design. Under an ex post incentive-based approach, the parties with
the best information on all of those questions-the tobacco industry-would
be given the incentives to make the right choices.
In addition to giving manufacturers incentives to choose the optimally safe
cigarette design, an ex post incentive-based regime would give them incentives
to market cigarettes to those consumers who are less likely to suffer long-term
harm from smoking. For example, given that smokers who start at a very
young age are significantly more likely to suffer the long-term health effects
of smoking,557 manufacturers might well stop marketing their cigarettes to
younger consumers. Indeed, they may even make substantial investments in
preventing underage smoking.
If we combine both of these possibilities-safer cigarettes (whether they
be less carcinogenic or less addictive or both) and safer smokers-we can
imagine an ex post incentive-based regime dramatically reducing the costs
imposed on society by cigarette smoking. Another, less likely possibility is that
cigarettes simply cannot be made significantly safer and cannot be marketed
in a way that is significantly safer than they currently are. If that were the
case, even after the industry was forced to bear the full costs of smoking for
some time, then the final outcome of an ex post incentive-based approach
556. It might be that fewer cigarettes overall would be smoked if each cigarette provided more, rather
than less, of the nicotine smokers crave.
557. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. supra note 3. at 44. 45 fig.3
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might be either that all cigarettes would be incredibly expensive (and thus
consumed only by the wealthy, unless subsidized by the government) or that
cigarettes would be priced out of the "legal" market entirely. In either case, the
main remaining regulatory concern would be how best to deal with the black
market for low-priced cigarettes.
2. Black Market Cigarettes
Some readers may be concerned that an ex post incentive-based regime
would create a large black market in unregulated cigarettes. When cigarette
prices rise once the full costs of smoking are imposed on manufacturers, there
will be strong market incentives for someone to produce and sell illegal
cigarettes that undercut those prices. For a number of reasons, we regard it as
unlikely that an ex post incentive-based system would substantially increase
black market concerns.
First of all, we should note that the potential for black market effects does
not distinguish ex post incentive-based regulation from any other type of
regulation. That is to say, any serious effort to regulate the market for
cigarettes through command-and-control regulation would suffer from black
market problems at least to the same extent as ex post incentive-based
regulation would. In addition, depending on what we mean by "black market"
cigarettes, an argument can be made that an ex post incentive-based system
would reduce rather than increase black market concerns as compared with the
status quo. For example, all underage smoking today arguably involves black
market transactions, given that there are laws against selling cigarettes to
underage smokers. If that is the relevant black market, we suspect that shifting
to an ex post incentive-based regime would substantially reduce rather than
increase the black market. Given that illegal cigarettes under our regime would
likely be more expensive than under the current system, there would likely be
far fewer underage smokers. Similarly, under an incentive-based regulatory
regime, manufacturers' incentives would change dramatically. Whereas
manufacturers under the current regime have many reasons to encourage, and
no reason to discourage, the sale of their cigarettes to underage smokers,558
manufacturers under an incentive-based regime would have a strong incentive
to ensure that purchasers of their cigarettes pay the full price so as to fund
potential future damages claims. They would, in other words, seek to
discourage black markets from emerging. Moreover, the threat of a black
558. Cf. John Schwartz, '73 RJR Memo Sought Youth Market, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc. (N.C.), Oct.
4, 1995, at Al (describing one manufacturer's considered strategy to attract young smokers). For similar
reasons, tobacco manufacturers have an incentive to sell their cigarettes on black markets in other countries.
See Raymond Bonner & Christopher Drew, Cigarette Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in Smuggling, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A5; Cigarette Smuggling Probe Eyeing Employees at RJR, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
23, 1997, at A5.
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market would increase manufacturers' incentives to design and market safer
cigarettes with lower total costs. Such cigarettes could be sold at a lower price
and could therefore eliminate some of the profit that would otherwise sustain
a black market.
Perhaps the black market concern is not the effect on underage smoking
but instead the effect of black market cigarettes on the efficacy of the ex post
regulatory regime itself. On this view, the black market in question is the sale
of cigarettes by companies that somehow expect to be able to avoid ex post
liability for the harms caused by their cigarettes. If avoiding liability is
possible, companies who expect to avoid liability would be able to undercut
the prices charged by companies who participate in the system and who expect
to pay their share of costs. As a result, the black market of unregulated
cigarettes would grow and the legal, fully internalized market would shrink.
How would manufacturers go about avoiding liability for the costs of their
brands? For one thing, they might try to disguise the brand of cigarette they
are selling (for example, by arranging to sell their cigarettes under a "front"
brand name owned by a shell corporation of some sort, perhaps a foreign
subsidiary), making it difficult to be identified. Similarly, they might engage
in a version of "hit and run"-that is, selling cigarettes for a number of years,
pocketing the profits, and then leaving the market before the health effects of
that brand begin to manifest themselves.
Those types of black market concerns may not pose an insurmountable
problem for ex post incentive-based regulation. First, both types of black
market concerns are limited by the fact that consumers tend to be quite brand
loyal559 and that entry into the cigarette market has long been notoriously
difficult.560 Manufactures may be unable to create significant demand for a
new brand of cigarette in time to profit from that cigarette before removing it
from the market. And insofar as there would remain a brand-disguising
problem, the obvious solution would be to monitor the major cigarette
manufacturers closely (perhaps even to audit them continuously) to keep track
of what brands they were selling and what revenues they were receiving from
those sales and then to impose stiff criminal penalties on companies (that is,
on management) for attempting to disguise brands."' The hit-and-run
559. See supra note 515 and accompanying text,
560. See Howell et al.. supra note 254. at 9 ("The barrers consist pnmanl) of the massivc advertising
expenditures necessary to achieve some level of brand recogntion and the huge capital expenditures
necessary to achieve the production efficiency scale enjoyed b) the six major domestic cigarette
manufacturers.").
561. In countries other than the United States. the principal black market concern appear, to be the
smuggling of illegal cigarettes into the country, often from the United States. See Bonner & Drew. supra
note 558. Given the sheer size and market dominance of the U S. cigarette manufacturers as compared with
foreign manufacturers, domestically produced black market cigarettes seem more likely than foreign-made
black market cigarettes. After the imposition of a strict ex post incentive-based regime on domestic
manufacturers, however, there would be an increased incentive for foreign manufacturers to sell their
cigarettes in the United States insofar as those companies might expect to asoid liabilit) for the harms
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concern, on the other hand, presents the issue of "judgment-proof'
manufacturers and retroactivity, issues that are discussed below.562 Basically,
to deter hit-and-run cigarette manufacturers, liability must somehow be
imposed on those companies, perhaps even on their shareholders, for the harms
their cigarettes have caused. Manufacturers could be required either to post a
bond or purchase full liability insurance coverage.563 In addition, it may be
possible to tie the amount of compensation that would be provided through the
smokers' compensation program to the number of legal cigarettes smoked by
each individual claimant. 564 If so, then consumers themselves might be given
some incentive to eschew lower-priced black market alternatives. Such a
solution, although partial, would be responsive to all potential sources of black
markets.
Finally, note that the concern about black markets in cigarettes is in part
motivated by the memory of Prohibition. The Prohibition analogy, however,
is inapt. Cigarettes and alcohol are different in a number of important ways.
To give one example, the production of low-cost alcoholic beverages can be
accomplished on a reasonably small scale. Indeed, many people brew their own
beer today, long after Prohibition's end. It is quite difficult (for us anyway) to
imagine a substantial number of consumers being able to raise enough tobacco
and manufacture enough cigarettes to be able to sustain even their own one-,
two-, or three-pack-a-day smoking habits. Indeed, the work and money that
such an operation would require would make buying the legal and regulated
cigarettes (or just quitting smoking) attractive alternatives.565 In addition,
cigarettes do not provide the intoxicating effects that help to explain the
demand for alcohol and marijuana (even among those not addicted to them).
If policymakers are nevertheless concerned about the potential of
incentive-based regulation to create a black market, they could respond by
reducing the amount of the ex post fine imposed on the manufacturers. This
would, of course, come at the expense of some deterrence; such is the tradeoff
necessary to determine how much, if at all, to reduce the payments. Moreover,
so long as the relative costs imposed on each manufacturer varied according
to the relative social costs caused by that manufacturer's brand, some of the
care level and activity level deterrence benefits of ex post incentive-based
caused by their cigarettes. That problem is no different from the general issue of how to impose domestic
product safety regulations (and products liability laws) on imported goods. Moreover, because under our
proposed regime the giant domestic manufacturers would be hurt competitively by the lower prices of
illegally smuggled cigarettes, they would have an incentive to assist in monitoring and preventing not only
illegal smuggling of foreign cigarettes, but also illegal home-grown cigarette production.
562. See infra Subsection V.C.2.
563. See infra text accompanying notes 595-600.
564. Such a program would be reasonably simple to implement, for example, if the cigarette card were
adopted. See supra Subsection V.A.2.b.
565. It might be argued that the widespread availability and use of marijuana is strong evidence that
a black market in cigarettes would emerge. Many people do grow and smoke their own marijuana. But a
marijuana smoker needs relatively little to satisfy her, unlike an addicted cigarette smoker.
1300 [Vol. 107: 1163
The Costs of Cigarettes
regulation would be retained, even if the total amount of damages imposed on
each manufacturer would be less than the total costs of that manufacturer's
brand.56
C. The Problem of Transition and the Case for Supplementarn
Ex Ante Regulation
To this point, we have focused mostly on the disadvantages of command-
and-control, performance-based, and ex ante incentive-based regulation and on
the advantages of ex post incentive-based regulation-with special emphasis
on the advantages of victim-initiated ex post approaches. Now we consider the
principal complaints about ex post regulation. The first is essentially a
transition question. The other three problems would present themselves even
after the transition had been made to the new regime. In the process of
discussing these potential problems, we identify the circumstances in which
such a regime might benefit from being supplemented with (though not
replaced by) command-and-control or performance-based regulations.
1. Making the Transition to Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation:
The Retroactivity Question
Even if we decide to adopt some type of ex post incentive-based regulation
of cigarettes, how to make the transition to su,.h a regime will present
significant issues of implementation. The biggest transition question is to what
extent we should impose on cigarette makers the costs of past cigarette
smoking-that is, smoking that occurred before the adoption of the new
regime. Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, we summarize the issue briefly here.
One way of putting the question is this: To what extent should cigarette
companies be made retroactively liable today and in the future for the harms of
past smoking? Surprisingly little has been written on the retroactivity question 56
566. If the cigarette card were adopted, there would be additional means of minimizing black markets.
See supra text accompanying notes 548-549.
567. Defining the concept of "retroactivity" in this context involves an element of arbitranness For
instance, retroactivity could mean applying the new regulator), regime to all cigarette-caused harms that are
manifested after the regime is enacted, even if those harms were caused by cigarettes that were purchased
and consumed before the new regime was adopted. That version of retroactivity could result in payments
being made by manufacturers for harms whose symptoms become apparent many years after the exposure
that gave rise to those harms. Alternatively. we could be some%% hat "less" retroactive by requirng that the
exposure have occurred within some set period before the adoption of the new regtme Or we could go in
the opposite direction, even further back in time. and apply the new regime to all harms ever caused by
cigarettes, even those harms that occurred and were manifested long before the regime was adopted, but
for which the statute of limitations has not yet run. Of course. een the choice of a tune limit for the statute
of limitations is arbitrary. Finally, one could imagine a "'completely" retroactive version of cx post
incentive-based regulation that would apply to all harms ever caused by cigarettes. een for cases in which
the statute of limitations has run and the victim is long since dead. All of those options might reasonably
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in the specific context of cigarettes, 56' although that may change as Congress
begins to focus more closely on the issue. One of the few scholars to have
written on the topic, Gary Schwartz, has argued that applying a rule of
absolute manufacturer liability retroactively in the cigarette context would have
no beneficial deterrence effects and would instead have the negative
consequence of bankrupting the tobacco industry. He acknowledges that
prospective absolute cigarette-manufacturer liability (that is, liability only for
harms caused by cigarettes produced after the adoption of the new rule) might
have some deterrence benefits.5 69 But, he argues, there would be no
additional deterrence benefits to applying the rule retroactively."' Indeed, he
argues that applying absolute liability retroactively would only destroy the
cigarette industry, thus eliminating future cigarette sales as a potential source
of compensation for those harmed by smoking. 7'
We have two general responses to Schwartz's conclusions. First, he seems
to ignore the deterrence benefits of the precedent that would be set for other
industries. The precedent would be that in circumstances such as this-when
it is determined that a product causes an enormous level of externalized
harm-the manufacturers of that product will be forced to internalize those
costs, even if those costs occurred in the past. If the government could adopt
such a rule, and could credibly commit to apply it to all future situations that
fall within the scope of the rule, the effect would be to force manufacturers to
take into account the full social costs caused by their products. 2
be called retroactive. Where one chooses to draw the retroactivity line will depend on issues of practicality.
We do not attempt to defend one of these versions of retroactivity over the others in this Article, though
we would probably agree that the practical problems associated with the most extreme versions of
retroactivity outweigh whatever benefits those approaches might provide.
568. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 48, at
950-52 (discussing the retroactive liability of the industry in the context of the failure-to-warn cause of
action).
569. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 157.
570. See id.
571. See id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 825 (1983) (arguing that applying strict products liability for harms caused by
products manufactured in the past has no deterrence benefits).
572. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 527-35
(1986). Kaplow was the first to provide a detailed argument for the proposition that, in all situations
involving legal transitions, there is a strong efficiency argument favoring full retroactivity. See id. at 615-
16. One way of putting the argument is that uncertainty about future government policy is no different from
market risks of various sorts. Because we generally allow market risks to be allocated through private risk-
transfer and risk-sharing arrangements, we should do so as well with respect to government risk, unless
there is a good argument for doing otherwise. That would mean no special transition relief to protect parties
from the effects of changes in government policy. See id. at 550-66. Kaplow's analysis applies to all legal
transitions; shifts in common law tort rules are but one example that he discusses in particular. See id. at
598-600.
As Kaplow points out, however, his thesis explicitly relies on a number of important assumptions.
See, e.g., id. at 520-21 (stating his assumptions that the transition policy was well-known in advance and
will be followed consistently in the future, that the reforms themselves are desirable, and that substantive
policy decisions are not themselves affected by the choice of transition policy). In addition, throughout most
of his efficiency analysis, Kaplow assumes away a number of "institutional concerns" that could serve as
justifications for transition relief in some contexts. See id. at 566-76 (relaxing some of those assumptions
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The principal incentive benefit of applying our proposed ex post incentive-
based regime retroactively would not be the effects on the tobacco industry
itself, but the effects on nontobacco industries that are watching the handling
of the tobacco situation by Congress and the courts. A decision in the tobacco
case to apply the new regime retroactively would send a message to
nontobacco product manufacturers. The message would be something like the
following: "If you manufacturer a product that is someday discovered to
produce anything like the external harm caused by cigarettes, this could happen
to you too. ' 573 Given the existence of uncertainty regarding whether their
particular products might become subject to significant government regulation,
all product manufacturers would have a greater incentive to make optimal
investments in product safety and to charge the appropriate price for their
products.574
It may be, of course, that how the proposed incentive-based regime treats
the harms of past smoking will not be taken as a precedent for how other
industries will be treated. It may be, for example, that the circumstances in the
cigarette context are sufficiently unusual as to blunt any deterrent message for
nontobacco industries. On the other hand, it may be that, precisely because the
cigarette industry is involved-with all of its lobbying clout-the deterrent
message to other industries would be especially strong. Again, this is a very
complex issue, and we do not attempt to resolve it here. As a practical matter,
however, even if our handling of the transition issue in the cigarette context
were to provide some precedential effect, we would not advocate trying to
impose all of the past harms of cigarette smoking on cigarette
manufacturers.5 5 Nevertheless, it is of critical importance-for incentive
and suggesting that future analyses of legal transitions should focus on such institutional concerns)
573. Cf. id. at 599-600 (describing the inccntisc benefits of applying coling tort law pnnciples
retroactively in the product context).
574. That these incentives would be efficient assumes, of course, that the regulatory shift-toward c-(
post incentive-based regulation-is a move in the efficient direction. If we grant that assumption. Kaplow,
would seem to reach the same conclusion as we do-at least regarding a shift from no regulation to a
system of victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulation such as enterpnse liability
Common law evolution of tort doctrine .. seems best served by a transition policy providing
no relief or mitigation for past investments and actions The economic analysis of inccnt11%s
presented ... suggests that such a policy would promote efficiency, and the additional
consideration of market imperfections and institutional factor. does not appear to warrant a
contrary conclusion.
Id. at 602 (footnote omitted). If, however, the anticipated shift in regulatory regimes is thought to be
inefficient, the optimal transition rule would be uhateser most inhibits, and minimizes the effects of. ihe
shift. See id. at 521. Given, therefore, that the desirability of a retroactise transition policy depends on the
desirability of the proposed change, the initial determination that the new rule is superior to the old rule
assumes added importance.
575. See supra note 567 (suggesting that we should not adopt the most extreme. i e . most backward
looking, definition of retroactivity). To get a rough sense of the siaggering size of ihe harm caused by
smoking over the years, the following thought experiment might be helpful. Wre calculated jupra Table I
the full social cost of a pack of cigarettes at the current levels of production to be nearly S7 00
Approximately 24 billion packs of cigarettes are sold in the United States each year See Tobacco
Settlement Hearings. supra note 442 (statement of Jeffrey Hams) That amounts to S168 billion in costs
per year. If we took just the past ten years of cigarette consumption, then, and assumed ihat cigarette
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reasons-that we impose at least some of those costs on the manufacturers, in
addition to a substantial portion of future costs. That is, without an effort to
impose some of the past harms on cigarette companies, the promise to apply
such a transition policy on other, future cases loses credibility.
7 6
Schwartz's second objection to holding cigarette companies retroactively
liable involves the likelihood of the industry's bankruptcy.57 7 At least from
a theoretical deterrence perspective, however, that possibility is not an obvious
problem. In fact, the eventual bankruptcy of the current cigarette companies
may be necessary in order to produce the sort of deterrence effect for other
industries that we just described. That is, if existing cigarette companies simply
do not have sufficient assets to cover the liability that is imposed on them by
the new ex post incentive-based regime, those companies should probably be
forced out of business. If the demand for cigarettes after the shift to an ex post
incentive-based regulatory regime is sufficient to maintain the market for
cigarettes notwithstanding the increase in prices, the bankruptcy of the current
companies would mean only a change in ownership of those companies. The
change in ownership might be from the current shareholders to the claimants
(that is, the smoking victims) themselves. Or it might be from the current
owners to some new group of investors. Either way, such a result would have
the beneficial effect of sending a message to stakeholders in other industries
that they run the risk of losing the entire value of their investment if their
product is found to have caused large-scale harm for many years.
578
Whether the current bankruptcy laws are the most efficient way of dealing
with companies that become insolvent is a separate question on which we do
not here take a position. The relevant question instead is whether there should
production in the United States has remained roughly constant over that time, that would amount to $1.68
trillion of costs. Trying to shift an amount that large from one set of parties in our economy (i.e., the
cigarette manufacturers, their shareholders and creditors, their insurers, and their employees) to another set
(i.e., smokers, families of smokers, first-party insurers of smokers, and the like) would present insuperable
judgment-proof problems as well as administrative problems. In any event, it seems clear that a fully
retroactive shift to ex post incentive-based regulation is simply not a politically practical possibility.
576. Interestingly, notwithstanding his arguments against holding cigarette makers liable retroactively,
Schwartz would not seem to have "fairness" qualms with doing so. For example, he observes both that the
evolution in tort law toward enterprise liability has been much more gradual than some commentators have
suggested (such that expansion of liability to include product manufacturers could hardly have caught
product manufacturers entirely by surprise), see Schwartz, supra note 571, at 797-811, and that judicial
decisions in tort cases have almost always been (and generally continue to be) applied retroactively, see
id. at 816-17. Thus Schwartz certainly does not view retroactive application of products liability law
generally as unfair. See id. at 819 ("[M]ost of the retroactivity implicit in product liability opinions is not
vulnerable to the charge of having subverted justified reliance.").
577. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 157 ("A rule of absolute liability, to the extent that it is applied
retroactively ... would quickly wipe out all existing cigarette companies.").
578. It is conceivable that this possibility has already been taken into account ex ante by investors in
cigarette companies, in which case the relatively low prices that they paid for their shares (and the
relatively high returns they have enjoyed in the meantime) were compensation for the likelihood of the
outcome that we are recommending. One reason, however, that the market may not have capitalized this
risk into the price of cigarette shares is that investors may have been (and may still be) betting on the
extraordinary political clout of the cigarette industry. See supra note II.
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be some additional protection, besides the normal bankruptcy laws, for
companies whose largest liabilities happen to result from ex post incentive-
based damage payments (such as products liability claims). We see no obvious
deterrence reason that such special protection would be warranted.
Of course, political reality may require that, for any new regulatory regime
to be adopted, some protection must be given to the existing cigarette
companies. If that is so, an ex post incentive-based regime could be adjusted
to accommodate that aim. For example, the damages assessed against
manufacturers could be reduced to the amount necessary to avoid the
companies' bankruptcy. One could ask how much the existing domestic
cigarette companies could afford to pay and still stay in business."' So long
as, within the appropriate annual cap, each manufacturer paid its relative share
(based not only on its market share but also on the relative harm caused by
that company's brands), the deterrence benefits of ex post incentive-based
regulation could still be achieved.
Perhaps, however, the bankruptcy concern is that, if the tobacco industry
were put out of business, we would lose the principal source of revenues for
579. Some have suggested that the maximum amount would be S7 6 billion per year. which
approximates the industry's current annual profits See Jeffrey E. Hams. A,,u'ranl Cigarette
Manufacturers' Ability To Pay Damages: Overvtew and a Rough Calculanon. 5 TOBACCO CO\-NOL 292.
292 (1996). As Professor Harris has observed. however. $7,6 billion dramatically understates what the
industry could afford. Moreover, he shows that. to amne at an accurate estimate of the indu5try's real
ability to pay. we must take into account the industr)"s ability to raise its prices in response to this new
liability. See id. According to Harris's rough calculations. the "'monopoly profit-maxomiing pnce of
cigarettes in the United States is currently about $4 per pack At such a pnce. annual pre-tax profits would
exceed $32 billion annually." Id. These calculations are based on assumptions about the shapes of
consumers' demand curves for cigarettes and on the assumption that the existing domestic producers would
not face competition from new market entrants. See d. at 293 If the new regime allowed competition by
new market entrants, competition would limit the existing companies' ability to raise their pnces to fund
the ex post payments.
Even Professor Harris's calculations, however, may miss the point First. tie assumes that the industry
will be allowed to engage in monopoly pricing. Although we concede that perfect competition in this
market is unlikely in any event, our hope still is to encourage competition among cigarette companies as
much as possible, along all dimensions including safety Second. and perhaps more important, ,hereas it
may be the case that $32 billion per year (or some smaller amount assuming competition is allowed and
encouraged) roughly approximates the mrinuamn anount of reveue that can be collected from the cigarette
industry via ex ante or ex post liability, the maximum pnce per pack at which cigarette- could trade without
completely bankrupting the industry is probably much higher than $4.00 (Indeed, cigarette pnces in some
countries have been reported to be as high as $7 00 per pack in recent years See mnfra note 582 ) Price,
higher than $4.00 per pack may not maximize the cigarette revenues available to be used to compensate
injured smokers or for whatever purpose, but those prices might more fully reflect the expected costs of
cigarettes. And that-intemalizing those costs, or coming as close to doing so as we can-is what our
proposed ex post incentive-based regime is intended to do. It is not intended to maximize tax revenueLs from
cigarettes.
We do not mean to suggest that, under our proposed regime, cigarette pnces would necessanly nc
higher than $4.00 per pack, although that is a possibility. The equiltbnum pnce of cigarettes under our
proposal-if the only goal is to achieve as much deterrence as is practically and politically posible-would
be a function of a number of factors, such as how responsive cigarette companies are to the incentive to
make safer cigarettes. At the very least, if maximally achievable deterrence is the only goal. it is unclear
that the ultimate equilibrium price of cigarettes would be the pnce that maximizes revenue
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compensating claimants who smoked before the industry failed.80 Thus, if
the industry were rendered bankrupt by the claims of those whose injuries
were, at the time of the shift to the new regime, already manifest, there would
be no smoking revenues available to provide compensation for future
claimants, whose injuries were not yet manifest. (It should be noted that, under
our proposed regime, victims of smoking would not be able to recover from
companies who never sold them cigarettes-for example, new market
entrants.)58 '
Our response is twofold. First, a bankruptcy court could, in theory, protect
future cigarette claimants to some extent by setting aside a portion of the
bankrupt company's assets (including future income potential) to cover such
claims. Second, insofar as those assets are not sufficient to satisfy all of the
claims, the excess liability could be covered through some compensation
regime other than the ex post incentive-based system-for example, through
some type of private or public first-party insurance. Thus, any such excess
liability poses a question of choosing the optimal system of compensation
rather than the optimal system of deterrence, which has been our focus.
Schwartz's bankruptcy concern might be that the prospective effect of
absolute manufacturer liability would mean the end of the cigarette industry
altogether. If that is so, our reaction is again twofold. First, it seems extremely
unlikely. It is true that new entrants into the cigarette market (if we structure
the system to allow new entrants) would have to charge a price that would
include the full expected costs associated with their brand of cigarettes. At
least initially (before safer designs were developed), this would be a sizeable
amount. But even at that price, it is conceivable that there would continue to
be a legal market for cigarettes. 82 Moreover, as manufacturers brought safer
designs to market, the price would drop commensurately. Alternatively, it
might be the case that after the adoption of the new regime and the
580. Cf Schwartz, supra note 28, at 156 (describing problems with liability-based compensation
schemes, including the problem of companies going out of business after the liability regime is
implemented).
581. It is worth emphasizing this point: The retroactive portion of the new cx post incentive-based
regime would, in theory, not be imposed on new entrants into the cigarette market. A new company would
nonetheless be affected by the new regime because liability would also be applied prospectively. Hence,
a new company-in making its decisions regarding what investments to make in producing safer cigarettes,
how much to charge for its cigarettes, and how to market them-would be induced by the new regime to
take into account all the expected harms that its products will cause.
582. See Harry Berkowitz, Jolt in Cigarette Price Eyed as Teen Care: Senators Ready Bill on
Immediate $1.50-Per-Pack Hike, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24, 1997, at A51 (noting average prices of cigarettes in
various countries: Denmark, $5.07; United Kingdom, $4.40; Australia, $4.08; France, $3.51; Canada, $3.34;
and Switzerland, $3.16); R.C. Longworth & Tim Jones, If Tobacco Deal Becomes the Law, Questions
Abound on Who Will Pay, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1997. at CI I (noting that the average price of cigarettes
in Norway is $7.00); John Mintz, Prices of Tobacco Company Stocks Surge on Report of Negotiations:
Threat of Lawsuits Had Depressed Shares of Cigarette Makers, WASH. POsT, Apr. 17, 1997, at A8 (noting
that there is no lack of smokers even though the average price of cigarettes in Europe and some Third
World countries is $4.00 to $5.00 per pack); Susannah Vesey Rauscher, Tobacco Under Fire, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Sept. I, 1996, at 8D (noting that the Canadian price was $5.53 per pack in 1991).
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development of new, safer cigarette designs, consumers would not be willing
to pay the price of cigarettes. Such a scenario would, indeed, spell the end of
the legal United States cigarette market. That result, in and of itself, would be
fine. In fact, it would be precisely the desired outcome (given the
unwillingness of consumers to internalize the costs). 5 '
2. The Judgment-Proof Problem
Perhaps the most troublesome disadvantage of an ex post incentive-based
regulatory system is the so-called judgment-proof problem. Whenever
manufacturers do not have sufficient assets (net of non-tort liabilities) to cover
all the potential harms caused by their products, those manufacturers are said
to be judgment proof. To the extent manufacturers are judgment proof, any ex
post incentive-based regime-such as enterprise liability or smokers'
compensation---could not have its full deterrent effect." Thus, enterprise
liability or smokers' compensation can provide optimal accident-prevention
incentives only if manufacturers have assets at least equal in value to the
magnitude of the loss they can potentially cause. If the value of those
companies' assets is smaller than the magnitude of the threat of loss they pose,
then the companies' care level analyses would be skewed, their incentives to
invest optimally in accident prevention would be impeded, and activity levels
would be nonoptimal.
583. The real problem in such a scenario would be the possible rise of an illegal or unregulated
cigarette market. As we discussed supra Subsection V1B.2. howeser, the adoption of e% post incentive-
based regulation is more likely to cause a nontrivial price increase in cigarettes. sonic safet) innotanion on
the part of cigarette companies, and some reduction in overall cigarette consumption There might be. under
such a system, some increase in certain kinds of illegal cigarette sales: but there also might be a decrease
in other types of illegal cigarettes-such as cigarettes being sold to children See supra note 558 and
accompanying text. That outcome seems quite plausible. and considerabl, superior to the current state of
affairs. Moreover, some versions of ex ante. command-and-control, or performance-based regulation could
be used to supplement the ex post incentie-based system to address the instances of illegal cigarette sles
584. See SHAVELL, supra note 423, at 167-68 (obsering that, %%hen injurers cannot pay fully for the
losses they cause, 'Itlheir incentives to take care may therefore be inadequate, since the) %%ill treat losses
that they cause and that exceed their assets as imposing liabilities only equal to their asscts," Although the
basic idea of the judgment-proof problem had been understood at sonic letel prior to Sha% ell', sork. see
Wittman. supra note 423, at 204: Comment. The Case of the Disappearing Defenhant An & anami
Anal ysis, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 145 (1983). it was Shavell iho formalized the argument and coined the term
"judgment proof problem." SHAVELL. supra note 423, at 167-70. 179-82. Stesen Shaell, he Judvment
Proof Problem. 6 IN'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986). Many others hae discusscd the problem since See.
e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman. Toriord lnhmired Shareholder Liabiltr for Corporate lrt.
100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1882-90 (1991) (explaining care le'el and actiit) leel inefficrenc s- as ,oxatcd with
the judgment-proof problem caused by limited shareholder liability). K:, lc D Logue. Sob t , ti e Jud 'ment-
Proof Problem. 72 TEx. L. REv. 1375, 1375 & n.2 (199-I) (describing the judgment-proof problem and its
relation to the deterrence and insurance goals of tort lak. , Lynn M LoPucki, The Death (f Labdrtt. 106
YALE L.J. I (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki. The Death of LiabiltsJ (describing numerous strategtes. including
parent-subsidiary ownership structure, that firms are using to render ihemsclse% judgment proof, James 3
White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response m Linn LoParia' The Detth ot Liabilit,. 107 Y.ti.
L.J. 1363 (1998) (providing evidence that LoPucki drastically oserstates the e.tent of the judgment-proof
problem); Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing A Rrjoinder, 107 YAtAu Li 1413 (1998.)
(responding to White's claims point by point).
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If one were to get serious about applying the new regime retroactively in
the strongest possible sense (that is, holding cigarette manufacturers liable for
all of the past harms of smoking), those manufacturers would almost certainly
be judgment proof with respect to a large fraction of those costs. The sum of
the costs of all past smoking is almost beyond comprehension.585 And the
value of the assets of existing and past cigarette manufacturers would be tiny
in comparison, perhaps only the value of the companies' machinery and
equipment in the hands of the new entrants to the cigarette market, who, not
being saddled with the liabilities for past harms, would likely be the highest
bidders for those assets.586
But the judgment-proof problem does not arise only in the case of
retroactive liability. A significant judgment-proof problem could arise in
connection with the transition to an ex post incentive-based regime even if that
regime were applied only to harms arising from future cigarette consumption.
In that situation, there would be a strong incentive for new entrants in the
cigarette market not to maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover their future
regulatory liabilities. Since those liabilities would require payment (sometimes
far) in the future, the incentive would be to enter the market and sell relatively
cheap cigarettes-that is, cigarettes that do not include the premium for future
ex post damage payments-for a number of years and then, when the first
claims against the company under the ex post regime began to roll in, to
declare bankruptcy. A company following that strategy could price its
cigarettes at a substantial discount compared with the cigarettes of other
companies and could conceivably generate enormous profits before the jig was
up-before the first ex post claims were actually filed against it.587 For the
plan to work, the companies would have to pay out the extra earnings over the
years in the form of dividends to their shareholders. Protected by the doctrine
of limited shareholder liability, these shareholders would be able to pocket the
money without worrying about the company's impending future regulatory
liabilities.
This judgment-proofing strategy is not just a theoretical possibility. Indeed,
the existing tobacco companies-like some other industries-have, at least to
some extent, already exploited the corporate form to limit the extent of their
potential liability.588  Moreover, the temptation for existing cigarette
585. See supra note 575.
586. Thus, bankrupting the existing tobacco companies would provide more deterrence than not
bankrupting them would, but it would provide less deterrence than if those companies had assets sufficient
to cover all of their liabilities.
587. We discuss this possibility briefly supra text accompanying notes 561-564.
588. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 584, at 188 1. Tobacco firms have publicly acknowledged
that the purpose of organizing themselves as subsidiaries has been to evade tort liability. See id. at 1881
n.3. It was reported that Phillip Morris, for example, created its holding company "to better insulate each
business from obligations and liabilities incurred in unrelated activities." Id.; see also LoPucki, The Death
of Liability, supra note 584, passim (describing numerous strategies, including parent-subsidiary ownership,
by which firms can, and according to the author do, render themselves judgment proof).
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companies to take steps to judgment proof themselves will increase as smoking
plaintiffs begin to have more success in courtrooms and as Congress begins
seriously to weigh alternative regulatory regimes.
It is sometimes argued that command-and-control regulation is less
susceptible to the judgment-proof problem than is ex post incentive-based
regulation. 589 The justification for this view is straightforward: Command-
and-control regulation can be enforced by means other than ex post liability or
fines. For example, a command-and-control regulator can impose care level
standards on a manufacturer ex ante and then enforce those requirements
through some type of ex ante fine or injunction, perhaps backed up with a
threat of criminal punishment. None of these mechanisms is as susceptible to
the judgment-proof problem as are ex post damages."' o
Before we describe the ways in which the judgment-proof problem might
be mitigated, we should first make one important, often-overlooked,
observation: Ex ante forms of regulation suffer from a judgment-proof problem
akin to the one associated with ex post regulation. If, under a command-and-
control or performance-based regime, the regulated manufacturer knows that
its assets are considerably less than any potential ex ante fine, the judgment-
proof problem would reduce the manufacturer's incentive to abide by the
regulations. Insofar as the regulator has alternative, nonmonetary means of
punishing such a manufacturer (e.g., shutting the firm down or imposing
criminal sanctions), however, and insofar as the regulator can detect the
manufacturer's violations before injuries occur, the judgment-proof problem
will not be as significant for ex ante regulation as it is for ex post regulation.
In any event, there are a number of potential responses to the judgment-
proof problem that, if successful, would strengthen the case for ex post
incentive-based regulation (and that, given the potential judgment-proof
problems associated with ex ante regulation, should be considered in any
case).59 ' One solution would be to eliminate or weaken the doctrine of
589. See, e.g.. SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 279-82. Sha.ell. supra note 423, at 60.61. 369 70
590. See SHAVELL. supra note 423. at 279-82. Sha.ell. supra note 423. it 361.63 Shaell il-o
demonstrates that, under certain assumptions , an ex post command-ind-control iapproiL -niiicl), a hault-
based tort system-can pose less of a judgment-proof problem than does a no-fault (or enterpnse liability)
system. See SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 281-82.
591. There is a possibility that some ponion of the tobacco tndustr)'s potential liability ,,ould be
covered under its property-casualty insurance policies, although there is controersy on thi% point See
Michael Prince, Louisiana Hope3 hisurers" Defense Sttngi Big Tobacco. BIts l., Mar 31. 1997. at I.
see also Leslie Scism. Tobacco Negoiators Mai Tn" To Target lnsurers, WA.t.t ST J . .May 28. 19"97. .t
A3 (reporting that state attorneys general have established a committee to n'.estigate the etent of propcrty-
casualty insurance coverage of cigarette compames potential liabilities) Properti -casualty insurance
companies insist that the liability policies they ha.e sold to tobacco companes o.er the pa.st 30 years
contain exclusions that clearly preclude coverage for the hartns caused to smokers and third partics by
cigarette smoke. See Scism, supra. Moreover. it has been suggested that the coerage issue may be less
clear with respect to suits brought by states than vmth respect to personal mjur) ,uits brought by
individuals. See Prince, supra, at I. In any event, few if any United States tobacco companies hase yet
sought products liability coverage from their insurance earners See Scism. suprta According to some
insurance executives, however, the reason tobacco companies hae not inolcd their insurer, in the recent
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limited shareholder liability. Cigarette claimants could then go after the assets
not only of the cigarette companies themselves but also of the tobacco
company shareholders. Such an approach would, of course, require a dramatic
change in current corporate law. Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, however, have made just such a proposal, advocating a form of pro
rata unlimited shareholder liability on efficiency grounds.59 Their proposal
would, among other things, reduce the incentive-dulling effects of the
judgment-proof problem in some contexts. Implementing such a regime,
however, would pose sizeable administrative difficulties, not the least of which
would be the problem of identifying which shareholders to go after (current
shareholders, past shareholders, or both) and then locating and securing
judgments against all of them. That problem would be especially acute given
that shares in publicly traded companies frequently change hands on the open
market.593 Whether or not the benefits of unlimited shareholder liability
would outweigh the costs as a general matter (a matter on which we do not
express an opinion), such a rule is, in our view, extremely unlikely to be
adopted. 594 Therefore, we do not consider the option further here. Instead, we
consider briefly two other reasons that the judgment-proof problem, at least for
future cigarette-caused harms, may not be an insurmountable problem for the
transition to an ex post incentive-based regime.
First, the judgment-proof problem, at least for future harms, may not be
as large as we have been suggesting. Specifically, accountants and nonequity
creditors play an important role in monitoring companies and in preventing
potential judgment-proof problems.595 To the extent cigarette manufacturers
have to borrow money from banks (for example, to finance the purchase of
equipment or inventory), those manufacturers' abilities to judgment proof
themselves would be substantially limited. The lenders, whose interests are
more aligned with those of the smokers' compensation claimants than with the
interests of the tobacco equity holders, could protect themselves by insisting
on loan covenants allowing them to put pressure on the companies if their
liability-to-asset ratios rise too high. To enforce the covenants, the lenders
litigation is that doing so would require them to relinquish some control of the lawsuits, including decisions
regarding settlement, to the insurers. See id. Regardless, the stakes of this controversy are large.
592. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 584.
593. Hansmann and Kraakman are aware of these administrative-cost objections to their proposal, as
well as other objections. They suggest reasons that those objections are overstated. See id. at 1899-901.
594. In fairness, Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal is not entirely unrealistic in the cigarette context.
if the rule of unlimited shareholder liability is, as they recommend, applied prospectively only. See id. at
1923. It is conceivable to imagine that, if Congress were to adopt a system of ex post incentive-based
regulation of cigarettes (especially a smokers' compensation regime in which damages were limited and
relatively certain), it would also adopt a rule that required all future shareholders in cigarette companies
to be, in effect, excess insurers on a pro rata basis for the tobacco companies. There would still be
administrative costs to keeping track of shareholders, but that problem may not be insurmountable.
595. See White, supra note 584, passim (giving reasons that Lynn LoPucki's claim that corporations
are judgment proofing themselves on a large scale is overstated).
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could rely on periodic audits to monitor those ratios.5 ' If those ratios were
to rise, the lenders at some point would insist that the companies retain more
of their earnings to fund the future smokers' compensation claims. If the
companies refused, the lenders would resort to the remedies in their loan
covenants. Ultimately, the cigarette companies who try this -hit-and-run" or
judgment-proofing strategy may still go bankrupt, but, because of the presence
of the monitoring lenders, that bankruptcy would come much sooner than
otherwise, a fact that would reduce the overall profitability of the judgment-
proofing strategy.
597
To the extent a judgment-proof problem remains, there is a potential
regulatory response short of unlimited shareholder liability. All cigarette
companies wishing to sell cigarettes in this country could be required to show
proof of financial responsibility for the potential harms that their products
might cause.5 98 Financial responsibility could take the form of a bond posted
with some agency of the government to be invested and held in trust on behalf
of future victims of smoking-related illnesses. Or it could take the form of a
liability policy with a highly rated property-casualty insurance company, a
policy that would be required to include language specifically and fully
covering any ex post liability imposed on the cigarette manufacturer.", Most
simply, financial responsibility could require that a company wishing to sell
cigarettes show that it has sufficient capital to cover the expected costs
associated with its product over time."r If, in the end, despite all the
potential reform efforts, the judgment-proof problem persists, it may be
596. Under our proposed smokers' compensation regime. at least some portion of the companies'
liabilities would be fairly predictable, based on the volume of sales and the aailable data on the link
between smoking and various illnesses. Therefore. the lenders should be able to determine Ilabilt)-asset
ratios, at least roughly.
597. Because cigarette companies generate such enormous cash resenues. it may be thit those
companies tend not to be heavy borrowers, and therefore there might be less monitoring by lenders than
occurs in other industries.
598. Hansmann and Kraakman suggest this option as a supplement to (but not a substitute for)
unlimited shareholder liability. See Hansmann & Kraakman. supra note 584. at 1927
599. It could be argued that cigarette companies would hase difficulth finding liability insurers sho
would be willing to write such policies. See supra note 591 (discussing the fact that elisting liability
policies owned by cigarette companies contain speci tic exclusions for such claims) One of the re.tlons that
insurers in the past may have insisted on such an exclusion. ho,,eser. is the uncertainty with regard to the
overall size of the potential liability. Under a smokers' compensation regime. the size of the cottpan-"s'
smoking-related liabilities would be more predictable than under the current regime; therefore, insurers may
be more willing to write the coverage. It may be the case that legal uncertainty is not the reason for the
exclusions in previous and existing liability policies. The reason for such exclusions might be the lack of
demand from cigarette companies, who expect ultimately to be judgment proof. See SiAVEiL 3upra note
423, at 240-42 (observing that being judgment proof undercuts the incenti%.e to purehase liability insurance
and suggesting that mandatory liability insurance may be an appropriate response)
600. This sort of capitalization requirement is not unusual Virtually all corporations in European
countries are subject to capitalization requirements. See Clark D Stilth. Federahsm and Compins Las A
"Rae to the Bottom" in tie European ConnmunitN. 79 GEo LJ 1581. 1584 n 9 (1991) In the United
States, insurers are subject to similar reserse requirements. See S S lit LB%ER iT" At . PROPLRn A\D
LIABILITY INSURANCE 607-14 (3d ed. 1982).
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appropriate to supplement ex post incentive-based regulation with some type
of ex ante regulation.
3. Widely Dispersed Harm: Dealing with Public ETS Exposure
Another potential disadvantage of victim-initiated ex post incentive-based
regulation is the possibility that the harm caused by the product may be so
widely dispersed that no single victim would have an incentive to incur the
comparatively large costs of bringing a claim ex post.6W' If that were the
case, the deterrence benefits of such a regime would not be realized. Perhaps
the clearest case of a widely dispersed harm problem would be air pollution.
The costs of air pollution resulting from automobile and other types of
emissions could not conceivably be internalized to polluters through a victim-
initiated ex post regime. Who would have an incentive to bring such a claim?
And against whom exactly would they bring it? To deal with the external costs
associated with many types of pollution, therefore, some form of government-
initiated ex ante regulation is necessary. The widely dispersed harm problem,
however, should not generally be a serious concern in the cigarette context, at
least with respect to the harms resulting from smokers' illnesses and deaths,
because the magnitude of the harm caused to smokers themselves and to their
family members would often exceed the costs of bringing the claims. In
addition, under the type of regime we are imagining-where causation and size
of damage are the only factual questions-the litigation costs for such claims
may be reduced.
Nevertheless, with respect to some of the harms associated with public
ETS exposure, such as the increased incidence of asthma, the dispersed harm
problem may be substantial. The standard way in which victim-initiated ex
post regimes respond to the dispersed harm problem is by the use of class
action lawsuits; the dispersed harm issue therefore becomes an issue of civil
procedure.6"2 To the extent that the dispersed harm problem cannot be
eliminated through the aggregation of claims, however, some state-initiated
601. See Shavell, supra note 423, at 363, 370.
602. See Rosenberg, supra note 521, passim (arguing that a class-based proportional liability rule
should be used to resolve mass exposure cases). One potential problem with the class action solution,
however, is that it may often pose a deterrence problem like that posed by excise taxes: Because the class
action mechanism would aggregate the claims of smoking victims (for example, victims of public ETS
exposure) and would also likely end up apportioning damages to the cigarette industry according to market
share, there would be the standard care level unraveling effect described above. See supra notes 450-454.
Although the industry in the aggregate would be forced to pay for those smoking-related harms,
manufacturers would have little or no incentive to invest in developing ways of reducing those costs
because the costs would be distributed pro rata across the industry (rather than according to brand-specific
causation). An alternative victim-initiated ex post approach in this setting would be to allow the claimants
to recover against either their employers (in the case of workplace ETS exposure) or the proprietor of the
public venue at which exposure took place (in the case of nonworkplace public ETS exposure).
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regulatory approach may be a useful supplement to a victim-initiated ex post
regime.6°
There are other potential problems that are peculiar to the case of public
ETS exposure. Indeed, the harms caused by ETS exposure in public
settings-such as the workplace, restaurants, bars, movie theaters, and the
like-are different in two important ways from the harms suffered by the
smokers themselves:6 First, with public ETS exposure, it is considerably
more difficult to determine brand-specific causation. A person exposed to ETS
in her workplace or in restaurants will have greater difficulty demonstrating
what portion of her overall ETS exposure was attributable to a given brand of
cigarettes than, for instance, a person exposed to ETS in the home, whose
exposure comes from one or two smokers and their brands. Thus brand-
specific cost internalization to manufacturers for public ETS exposure may be
extiemely difficult. 6°5 For this reason as well, therefore, there may be cause
to supplement ex post incentive-based regime with other regulatory approaches.
Second, in most public ETS exposure situations, there are at least two, and
potentially more, "deterrable" parties-that is, parties who would be responsive
to having smoking-related costs imposed on them: (I) the manufacturer; and
(2) the owner of the relevant business (which would be the employer in the
case of workplace exposure or the proprietor in the case of non-workplace
public exposure, as in a restaurant). The presence of more than one deterrable
party with respect to those risks raises the question of which party should be
forced to bear those smoking-related costs. We might try to impose the public
ETS exposure costs directly on the cigarette industry, either through a
smokers' compensation or enterprise liability approach. Alternatively, we might
place the workplace ETS exposure costs on employers, and the non-workplace
ETS exposure costs on the relevant business proprietors, thereby giving
employers and proprietors the incentive to develop and introduce cost-effective
restrictions on smoking in "public" settings (i.e., those outside the home) or to
603. One possible state-initiated ex ante command-and-control aaltcmati'.c .ould be go ,emment-
mandated restrictions on smoking in public settings That altemati'.e might also respond to concem that.
under a regime where the public ETS exposure costs are imposed on cmployer-propnetors instead of on
manufacturers, the employers and proprietors might be judgment proof. Whether such emplo er.proprtetor
judgment proofing is likely to be a problem wxould depend on the extent to xhich emiployerN hae an
incentive to provide an adequately funded (either through outside insurance or through internal. self-
insurance funds) health care plan for their employees and on the extent to %,hich proprictor, hase an
incentive to carry adequate liability insurance. Cf. supra text follo, , ing note 590 (explaining that judgment-
proof problems may also reduce the efficacy of command-and-control and performance-bascd regulatons).
604. When we use the term "workplace ETS exposure." v.e mean the exposure of employ,¢es in the
workplace to the passive smoke produced by other employees or by patrons of the employr When wve say
"nonworkplace public ETS exposure." we mean exposure of patrons at restaurants and the like to pa.ssise
smoke produced by other patrons or by employees.
605. This difficulty of determining brand-specific causition in public ETS exposure situations may be
somewhat reduced (though not eliminated) if the cigarette card. discussed supra Subsection V A 2 b. v.ere
introduced.
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provide a separate, well-ventilated space where all public smoking could take
place.
The choice of who should bear those costs depends upon who, as between
employer-proprietor and manufacturer, would be in a better position to develop
and implement cost-justified means of reducing public space ETS exposure.
The employer-proprietor might be in the better position. On the other hand, if
public ETS exposure costs were imposed on manufacturers, they might have
the needed incentive to find a cost-effective means of removing all toxins in
cigarettes, including those that contaminate passive smoke.6a6 Adding the
public ETS exposure costs to the price of cigarettes through manufacturer
liability might also have enough of an activity level effect that additional
public-smoking restrictions would be unnecessary. Choosing between those two
general approaches is, needless to say, not an easy call.60 7 Either approach,
606. This manufacturer care level effect is possible even though the public ETS exposure costs
probably could not be internalized to manufacturers on a brand-specific basis. Although there might be
some unraveling effect (and hence we are unlikely to see the development of cigarettes that emit no ETS),
there could still be a beneficial manufacturer care level effect, given that all of the other costs of smoking
would be internalized to manufacturers on a brand-specific basis.
607. Interestingly, to the extent that employers are already providing health, life, and disability
insurance coverage to their employees through group plans (and most employers do), it may be the case
that a large portion of workplace ETS exposure costs are already borne to some extent by employers, With
respect to workplace ETS exposure costs, employer-provided first-party health, life, and disability coverage
approximates a form of voluntary (market-generated) ex post incentive-based regulation. The problem with
relying purely on the market, with no government intervention, however, is that, given the existence of the
market failures we described supra Parts I-II1, we cannot be sure that voluntary employer-provided
insurance arrangements will fully internalize all of the costs of workplace ETS exposure. For example,
under the current system, employer-provided insurance generally fails to cover the nonpecuniary harms of
workplace ETS exposure, which means those costs are not internalized to the employer at all. Cf. supra
notes 292-295 and accompanying text (arguing that the market alone cannot be expected to internalize
workplace ETS exposure risk).
To the extent that employer plans currently operate as an ex post incentive-based form of regulating
workplace ETS exposure, it is understandable that some employers are already voluntarily attempting to
restrict workplace smoking. Of course, as we indicated above, employers effectively bear many of the other
smoking-related costs, too. See supra notes 247, 270, and accompanying text. Thus, it may also be in part
to reduce those costs, and not just to reduce the workplace ETS exposure costs, that employers have
voluntarily introduced workplace smoking restrictions. With respect to those other smoking-related costs,
however, it seems clear that manufacturers, rather than employers or proprietors, are the cheapest cost
avoiders. The main reason is that cigarette manufacturers, through care level and activity level adjustments,
are in a position to minimize the costs of all smoking-related harms, not just the harms caused by smoking
on the job or in other public spaces.
With respect to non-workplace ETS exposure-such as the ETS exposure of patrons of restaurants
and bars-there is nothing approximating an ex post incentive-based approach to deterrence, either for
pecuniary or for nonpecuniary harms to patrons. Thus, if we wanted to impose those costs on proprietors,
we would need to adopt something along the lines of a "patrons' compensation system" or "proprietor
liability regime." Again, we would not expect the market alone to internalize this sort of public ETS
exposure, for all the reasons discussed supra Part II and supra Section III.A. Moreover, even if those
particular market failures did not exist, it might still make sense to regulate public ETS risks. It may be.
for example, that the loss of customers due to ETS is not large enough to make it worthwhile for many
proprietors to do anything about smoking. In a world in which there is smoking allowed in most business
establishments, firms will have an incentive not to become one of the few that impose smoking restrictions.
New nonsmoking customers might not bother to shift to the smoking-restrictive business even if they were
well-informed, because so many of the other public spaces they frequented would still be full of passive
smoke. On the other hand, if a number of proprietors and employers could all agree to ban smoking, or
to confine it to certain places, the strategy might work. But collective action problems may prevent that
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however, could have substantial benefits over the command-and-control
alternatives-such as banning smoking in all nonresidential buildingsu -
because they both rely on parties with better cost-minimizing information than
regulators have.
D. Summary"
This part considered two possible ex post incentive-based regimes and one
specific method for getting the information necessary for effectively
implementing any regulatory regime (but particularly an ex post incentive-
based one). After briefly outlining the changes in manufacturer and consumer
behavior we would expect under our proposed system, we suggested some
ways to ease the transition to a new regime, cabining if necessary the full
retroactive sweep of liability. We concluded that, to the extent there are factors
that can weaken ex post incentive-based regulation as a means of correcting
market failures, alternative approaches-such as command-and-control,
performance-based, or ex ante incentive-based approaches-may be useful
supplements. If, for example, we thought that judgment proofing might be a
problem for some cigarette manufacturers but not others, it might make sense
to supplement an enterprise liability or smokers* compensation regime with
some minimal ex ante command-and-control rules." If such a mixed system
were to be adopted, however, the key. in our view, would be: (1) adopting and
maintaining a strong ex post incentive-based system in order to get all of the
deterrence benefits described throughout this Article; and (2) coordinating that
incentive-based system with whatever other regulatory regimes were in
operation so as to avoid underdeterrence or overdeterrence. "t "
from happening as well, justifying some form of ex ante regulation
608. See. e.g., Smoke-Free Environment Act of 1993. IH R 3434. 103d Cong i 1994
609. Another situation in which ex post inceniie-based regulation m.a± be interior to e. ante
command-and-control regulation is w hen the normal assumption that manufacturers are better intoriied than
regulators about the costs of (and the markets for) their product. does not appl, Sri Slta, cll. 5upra note
423, at 369. For example. a particular product market might consist entirely of small. muon-and.pop
operations that have neither the resources nor the expertise to mn e.t in determining the long-run safet , and
health effects of their products or alternatise dei,,gns for their products A regulator .,ho speciahies in the
regulation of such products might have better infornation about such things, in %% hich case some type of
ex ante regulation might be a useful supplement to ex post habilitN See ti Although this situation could
be important in other contexts. it would seem relatisely inapplicable in the case of the tobacco industry.
given the cigarette manufacturers' enormous size and large research budgets It ,ould be rele'ant in the
case of public ETS exposure. hoseser. since the goernment might posses'. better information about
reducing risks associated with such exposure than potential delendant-, such as small employers or
restaurant proprietors. In any event. such direct regulation should be used as a supplement. not a'. a
replacement. for an ex post incentive-based system
610. A number of scholars have argued that the optimal approach to controlling nk. e,pecmall, in the
area of product safety, likely entails a mixture of regulatory response'. See. e s: . Shaell. jupra note 423.
at 365 (arguing that a *'complete solution to the problem of the control of nk should insolse the joint
use of liability and regulation") For an extended discussion ol hov an e x post incentic-based s)stem could
and should respond to the existence of alternati%,e , stern, of deterrence (such as coinmnand-and-control
regulation or ex ante incentive-based regulation) to avoid under. and oser-determence. se Hanson & Logue.
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VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL TOBACCO SET'TLEMENT
On the basis of the forgoing analysis, we believe a strong case can be
made for instituting a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system of
regulating cigarettes-whether that system be an enterprise liability regime or
a smokers' compensation regime of some sort. Thus far, however, our analysis
has been fairly abstract. In this part, in an effort to be more concrete and
responsive to current events, we apply the framework that we have developed
to the proposed national tobacco settlement.
Although ours is the first law review article to analyze the proposed
settlement, we enter the debate as relative latecomers. Because of the salience
and significance of the agreement, many academics, commentators, and
policymakers have already weighed in.61t As opinions have solidified on the
question of how, if at all, the proposed settlement should be amended, a
powerful consensus has emerged among opinion makers that the settlement
proposal, or a modified version of it, represents the best hope for providing
meaningful regulation of cigarettes. With some tinkering, these parties have
argued, the proposal should be adopted, even (or especially) if doing so would
significantly reduce any role of tort law.6 12 Our goal in this section is to
Tort Law in Context, supra note 40.
611. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7, 22; sources cited infra note 612.
612. While there is disagreement among President Clinton's advisers, for example, those advisors have
relatively minor objections to the President's support of the pact. Secretary of Health and Human Services
Donna Shalala, rumored to be among the most skeptical of the President's advisers, nevertheless reportedly
sees the agreement "as an opportunity to get some things from the industry-a focus on nonsmoking that
goes beyond teenagers to all Americans, and substantial money for public health-that greatly exceeds what
the administration would have achieved solely with its FDA regulations." Michael K. Frisby, Opponents
of Tobacco Pact Face Big Hardle: Clinton, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1997, at A14; see also Laurie McGinley
et al., The Settlement: Foes Vow To Toughen, Not Trash, Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at
BI ("[V]irtually no one who matters is vowing to kill the deal. Even those who are most critical of the
terms seem[] determined to amend them, rather than try to scuttle the entire package."); Jeffrey Taylor &
Hilary Stout, Clinton Panel Likely To Bless Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1997, at A3 (predicting
that a panel convened by the President would recommend that the President embrace the basic deal, with
some minor changes). Some key players who are opposed to the deal in its current form also believe the
pact's shortcomings are surmountable. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and former FDA
Commissioner David Kessler, for example, are critical of the limits placed on FDA authority in the
agreement, but suggest that they might support the agreement if it were modified. See John M. Broder,
White House Sees Adverse Effects in Tobacco Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at Al. More importantly,
none of the key critics was, until perhaps very recently, significantly concerned about the tort law
implications of the proposal or about the type of regulations that the settlement would rely upon. See, e.g.,
id. (stating that Dr. Koop thinks "that a broad settlement with large payments for public health programs
and strict limits on cigarette advertising and promotion could outweigh the costs of limiting the industry's
legal liability"); Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton Urged To Review Tobacco Papers, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997,
at A3 (explaining that Koop and Kessler do not view industry immunity from punitive damages in civil
liability suits as a "deal breaker"). Indeed, some of the advisers said things to suggest that they may prefer
a settlement that reduces the role of tort law. See, e.g., Taylor, supra ("Dr. Kessler said he doesn't oppose
proposals to compensate farmers for settlement-related losses. 'I would much rather see money going to
them than to lawyers' for smokers who have sued tobacco companies, he said."). As this Article goes to
press, however, antismoking groups and public health advocates, including Dr. Koop, may be approaching
a consensus view in opposition to tort immunity for the tobacco industry. See Alissa J. Rubin & Myron
J. Levin, Anti-Smoking Groups Appear To Close Ranks, L.A. TIES, Jan. 23, 1998, at D3.
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destabilize that consensus view and to persuade readers that if any' reform is
to improve upon the status quo, it would need to look very different from the
reform envisaged in the settlement proposal. It would need to look more like
the tort system that the current proposal would, in essence, supplant.
Before beginning our analysis. we should note that the proposed settlement
appears to be premised on the assumption that the cigarette market is subject
to many of the very same market failures that we identified in Parts II-Ill. For
instance, a variety of the proposal's provisions, including enhanced warning
requirements, 6' 3 are intended to respond to the problem of imperfect
information. The agreement also reflects a concern about the sorts of
externalities that we identified. For instance, one provision is directed at
reducing ETS in workplace settingS64-a noninsurance externality. Insurance
externalities seem also to have played some role in the agreement. Indeed, the
very cases that led to the settlement-the cases brought by state attorneys
general to recover Medicaid expenditures for smoking-related
injuries6t-were themselves motivated by the fact that public insurance
programs do not adjust tax rates according to each potential claimant's
smoking status. 616 Moreover, several provisions regarding specific regulation
of cigarette designs and recipes appear to reflect a more general assumption
that the largely unregulated cigarette market fails to encourage safer
cigarettes. 617 In short, the proposed regulations appear to be motivated by tie
same sorts of concerns that we presented in Parts 11-II1.
Unfortunately, however, the regulatory instruments and devices that the
proposed resolution would employ are, roughly speaking, precisely the opposite
of what the basic lessons of Parts IV-V suggest. That is, the settlement would
rely almost entirely upon command-and-control regulations, to a lesser extent
upon performance-based regulations, and arguably not at all on ex post
incentive-based regulations. Rather than attempt an exhaustive analysis of the
agreement, we concentrate in this part on key provisions that appear intended
to address the information and externality problems that we have identified.
We employ the framework and lessons of Part IV to categorize each provision
and to identify a sample of its predictable flaws. Also in this part, we examine
the proposed settlement in terms of how well it addresses the transition issues
that we described in Section V.C.
613. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32. at 10. infra Subscotion Vi B 1
614. See Tobacco Settlement. suipra note 32. at 30-31
615. See cases cited supra note 68.
616. Cf. Sugarman. supra note 277. at 161 (noting that social inurainc program, fail to sort b)
smoking status). If social insurance programs charged higher premim, or taes, to siookcr,. the state
attorneys general would have been unable to sioy, damage,
617. See, e.g., Tobacco Settlement. stipra note 32. at 14-16. onlra Subsection VI D I
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A. The Complete Rejection of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the proposal from our perspective is
its nearly complete rejection of the ex post incentive-based approach. It rejects
this approach in two ways. First, it substantially weakens the threat of tort law
and, in any event, eliminates any beneficial deterrence effect that tort law
might have. Second, it does not adopt any alternative form of ex post
incentive-based regulation.
1. The Proposal's Civil Liability Provisions
The preamble of the proposal promises that the legislation, if enacted,
would "reaffirm[] individuals' right of access to the courts, to civil trial by jury
and to full compensatory damages. ''618 The details of the proposal, however,
tell a different story. Among the most important effects of the agreement on
tort law would be the following:
" Attorneys general actions, class actions, and all addiction-based
claims are settled;
61 9
" "[AIIl other personal injury claims are reserved"; 620
" For cases regarding past conduct that are not settled by the
agreement, no punitive damages are allowed (such damages are
included as part of the settlement),62' only individual trials are
allowed (no class actions and no aggregation of claims
whatsoever without the defendant's consent), 22 and "protocol"
companies 623 are to share liability costs, but will not be joint 4
and severally liable for liability of nonprotocol manufacturers;
64
" A damage cap is imposed for judgments and settlements, equal to
33% of the annual industry base payment (that is, a damage cap
of $5 billion in most years), subject to the following conditions:
* If judgments and settlements exceed that cap in a given year,
the excess does not have to be paid in that year and instead
rolls over to the following year;
625
* Any judgments or settlements run against defendants but give
rise to an 80% credit against the annual payment in the year
the money is paid to plaintiffs;
626
618. Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 2.




623. Protocol companies include the five tobacco companies that were parties to the agreement, as well
as future industry entrants who opt into the protocol.
624. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 39-40.
625. See id. at 40-41.
626. See id. at 41.
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" If an individual judgment exceeds $1 million, then any
amount in excess of $1 million will not be paid that year
unless every other judgment or settlement can be satisfied
within the annual aggregate cap. The excess would then roll
forward to the following year; '
" "In the event that the annual aggregate cap [of $5 billion] is
not reached in any year, a Commission appointed by the
President will determine the appropriate allocation of the
amount representing the unused amount of the credit."' 2'
These provisions, taken together, would quite clearly work an enormous
change in the status of tort cases, potential and actual, surrounding cigarettes.
2. The Effect of Civil Liability PIov'isions
To appreciate fully the effect of those provisions on cigarette lawsuits, it
is helpful to recall, briefly, the history of tobacco litigation. As many legal
analysts have observed, lawsuits against the industry were brought in two
"waves," both of which ultimately failed to overcome the industry's formidable
defenses. 629 Among the factors that combined to provide near immunity for
the industry were the huge success of the assumption-of-risk and other
plaintiff-conduct defenses, the federal preemption of warning-based claims, the
difficulty faced by individual plaintiffs in proving specific causation, and the
relatively low potential compensatory damages that individual plaintiffs could
expect to receive even if they won.
In recent years, however. a number of changes have impro~ed tihe
prospects of tobacco plaintiffs. For instance, evidence has emerged from
previously undisclosed industry documents suggesting that manufacturers may
have known and manipulated the addictiveness of cigarettes, actively targeted
their advertising at underage consumers, and publicly denied evidence that they
had regarding the health consequences of smoking. ' That evidence has had
a variety of interrelated effects. First, it has improved plaintiffs' prospects of
winning punitive damages. Second, in part because of the potential for
increased damage awards, the new evidence has also given rise to a number
of new substantive legal theories, man), of which hold the promise of finally
defeating the industry's heretofore invincible plaintiff-conduct defenses."'.
In addition to the new substantive legal theories, there have been significant
627. See id.
628. Id.
629. See supra note 14.
630. See Kelder & Daynard. supra note 3. at 71. Rabin & Suganian. s31pra note 28. at 16, Sch%%artz.
supra note 28. at 145, 153.
631. See vtepra notes 144. 161. 219. and accompaii itg text., se aI3o Kelder & D.%nird. "tpra note
3, at 64, 72-74. 76-80: Schwartz. siupra note 28. at 145. 153
632. See Kelder & Daynard. supra note 3. at 64. 72.74. 76. 80-85
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procedural innovations-such as the class action lawsuit-that permit plaintiffs
to cooperate and coordinate their efforts in a way that makes litigation against
the tobacco industry begin to look like a fair fight. 633 Those developments
have given rise to what legal scholars call the third wave of tobacco litigation.
Indeed, it is primarily because of those evidentiary, substantive, and procedural
developments-and, more generally, the threat posed by the third wave-that
the tobacco industry was, for the first time in its history, willing to negotiate
a possible settlement.
The limits on civil liability contained in the proposal would essentially
return plaintiffs to the position that they were in five or ten years ago, at the
end of the second wave. First, the proposal would eliminate punitive damages
for past industry conduct.634 That one change alone would dramatically
reduce the chance that any individual smoking plaintiff would ever bring a
case against the industry. The compensatory damages in the typical case
involving an individual smoker are relatively lOW,635 and most lawyers would
be unwilling to mount a challenge against an industry notorious for its
overpowering and relentless litigation style without any prospect of punitive
damages.636 Moreover, without the potential claim of punitive damages, a
plaintiff's attorney has little ability, and even less incentive, to bring into
evidence many of the recently released (and yet to be released) documents
detailing the most deceptive and culpable conduct of the industry. Without
those documents, jury antipathy toward, or lack of sympathy for, smokers may
place plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage in the courtroom.
637
633. See id. at 64.
634. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 39.
635. That is true simply because many smokers experience the worst of the ill-health effects of
cigarettes later in life, often after a smoker has retired and the smoker's children are grown.
636. The roll-over caps on compensatory damages, see Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 40-,11.
may also discourage plaintiffs from initiating suits. On the other hand, the fact that liability would not
substantially increase a manufacturer's costs-a point developed below, see infra notes 640-641 and
accompanying text-may remove or reduce manufacturers' incentives to defend against individual claims.
In other words, plaintiffs may be more likely to win a suit under the proposed settlement, all else being
equal, because manufacturers may be less averse to losing.
637. The elimination of punitive damages under the settlement seems to have been justified on two
grounds. First, manufacturers thought that eliminating punitive damages would provide greater predictability
in their liability payouts, since punitive damages are alleged to be especially difficult to predict. See
generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Vahnation
in Law), 107 YALE L.J. (forthcoming May 1998) (discussing the reasons behind wide variations in jury
verdicts for punitive damages). Second, as part of the settlement, the industry would be required to pay a
sizeable chunk of money that is understood by some to take the place of punitive damages. See Tobacco
Settlement Hearings, supra note 442 (statement of Gale Norton), available in 1997 WL 14150621.
If those are indeed the justifications for limiting punitive damages, however, there are other means
of dealing with those concerns that better serve deterrence goals. For example, the settlement might have
provided specifically that tobacco plaintiffs could not recover punitive damages but that they could put on
evidence of past industry conduct. Such an approach would give the industry the predictability with respect
to punitive damages that it seeks; the approach would also increase plaintiffs' chances of winning
meritorious cases against the industry, however, by reducing the effectiveness of plaintiff-conduct defenses.
The settlement, as currently written, arguably would permit evidence of past industry conduct on issues
other than punitive damages. After all, the agreement merely says that, for past conduct cases, no punitive
damages will be allowed. It says nothing about excluding evidence of past conduct for other purposes. See
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Even without the carrot of punitive damages. plaintiffs might be willing
to bring claims against manufacturers if they could continue to combine, and
thus lower the average cost of, their relatively small claims in the form of class
actions. But that option, too, is eliminated by the settlement," ' and with it
many of the legal theories that were economically viable only in class action
form.
6 39
Even if smoking plaintiffs were somehow able to overcome the forgoing
obstacles to bring successful individual cases against cigarette companies, those
suits would have virtually no deterrence value under the proposal because of
the way damage payments and defense costs would be allocated. According to
the proposal, defense costs and 80% of liability costs would be distributed
among the tobacco companies on the basis of market share. " Any incentive,
therefore, to develop safer cigarettes would be substantially reduced, because
of the unraveling problem described above." Moreover, most of those civil
liability costs would have been paid out by the industry even if no member
were held civilly liable. From each manufacturer's perspective, those costs are
fixed and therefore have no effect on ex ante accident-prevention incentives.
If the proposal were adopted. tort law would hereafter have no benelictal
deterrence effect in the cigarette market.
Tobacco Setleinent, supra note 32. at 39. (E\ idence of past conduct \.,ould presunabl>, be adiiiiblc tr
any theory of liability that required a showing of scienter on the part of indusir) official-s--,uh a.s fraud
claims.) It is nevertheless easy to imagine the Indusir) *, la\s ers raising colorable objections ill 1an cases
when plaintiffs attempt to get such evidence admitted Another approach to achieIng tie s.ime deterrence
and predictability objectives would be to eliminate or cap punit\e damages, .s the industrs %%ants, but
simultaneously to eliminate all plaintiff-conduct and varnmig-based delenses to indutr labilt,.
Perhaps the argument that really underlies fhe proposal*s treatment ol punitie damage, is thait tort
law punitive damages are, as a general pohcN matter, undesirable and should not be required ot ati)
industry. Although that argument has some plauibilit. \%e ultmnate)) lind it unpersuasise trt, or the
reasons already mentioned, if punittve damages are eliminated, other changes should also be made to ensure
that plaintiffs will still have incentives to bring claims Nlorcoser. from an efficienct) perpcctie. thi', ma)
be a context in which punitive damages are especially appropriate and should. therefore, not be clminaled
The principal economic justification for punitive damages is based on tie difticult% ot detecting and
attributing harm. Thus, under this rationale. punitl\e damages (or daimages in ecess ol tile harm,, caused)
are appropriate only in circumstances in which those harms are unlikel to be detected or are unhkcl to
be linked to the defendant who caused them. See VlILIAM M LADf S & Rinit RD A l'os\i R. -lt.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LA\\" 160-61 (1987). A Mitchell Polhnsk\ & Stesen Shaell. Pmmtu1-
Damages: An Economic Analysis, I Il HARV. L. Ri- 869 (1998) h"ose sorts of detcction-a.oidance
concerns would seem to be present in the cigarette contemt Gi.en recent reselation, about tile cigarette
companies' concerted efforts to keep hidden infornation about the harnfulntics and addicts.ene's ot
cigarettes, the argument for allowing punitive damages mta be especiall, strong s..th respect to tile past
harms caused by cigarettes.
638. See Tobacco Settlement. .lyura note 32. at 39 Tihe settlement agreement otler, no clear rationale
for this provision. As far as we can tell. it represents an effort impl% to reduce tile chaties, tttt the tobacco
companies will ever lose a tort case.
639. See supra note 68 (discussing class actions brought itn hich the aggregaiton ot claim, and
lawyers' fees would make the espense of fighting time tobacco companie, ssorhshilci
640. See Tobacco Settleneni, ,%upra note 32. at 41
641. See supra Subsection IV.C.2 (describing the utiraenlig pr)blem created b% e atme tax¢,C,. supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text (describing the unra.eling problem created b\ a tree market ,.hen
consumers have only generic risk information): 3upra note 602 (de scnbmg the poletittal unraeling problem
in class actions).
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B. The Proposal's Attempt To Inform Consumers
In place of tort law, or some alternative form of ex post incentive-based
regulation, the proposed settlement would rely almost entirely on command-
and-control and performance-based regulations to address the market failures.
For example, in response to the problem of imperfect information, the
agreement would implement the following: new warning requirements,
642
new marketing restrictions,643 and a "look-back" provision designed to create
incentives to reduce underage smoking.644 In this section, we describe each
of these proposed regulations and argue that each of them is deeply flawed, at
least as compared to an ex post incentive-based regime of regulation. Their
central flaws relate to the insight of Part IV above: that command-and-control
regulation (and, to a slightly lesser degree, performance-based regulation) relies
heavily on regulators to recognize the pertinent tradeoffs and how best to make
them, whereas incentive-based regulation relies instead on the regulated entity,
which is usually better informed than regulators. In analyzing the various
provisions of the proposed settlement, we attempt to highlight a few of the
ways in which that somewhat abstract drawback of command-and-control and
performance-based regulations would likely manifest itself in the proposed
regime.
1. Warning Requirements
a. Summary of Provision
The proposal's most obvious attempt to ensure that consumers are well-
informed is its requirement that each of the following warnings be included on
cigarette packaging and advertising (on a rotating basis):
" "WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive";
" "WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children";
" "WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease";
" 'WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer";
" "WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease";
" "WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby";
642. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 10-1I1.
643. See id. at 8-9.
644. See id. at 24-25. Categorizing these provisions poses a slight challenge. If those regulatory
responses were fully successful, they would solve the underlying consumer-information market failure and
would meet all the information-related deterrence goals that we seek to obtain through victim-mitiated ex
post incentive-based regulation. Thus, those categories of provisions arguably share the more ambitious goal
of incentive-based regulation: transforming a malfunctioning market into a well-functioning market. Because
the provisions take the form of command-and-control regulations, however, they constitute somewhat of
a hybrid between command-and-control-style regulation and incentive-based regulation. However they are
categorized, they contain all the drawbacks of pure command-and-control regulations.
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" 'WARNING: Smoking can kill you";
" "WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in non-
smokers";
" "WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks
to your health."'645
Those warnings would appear in white lettering on a black background and
would occupy at least 25% of the front of a cigarette pack, near the top.'"'
b. Critique
Although the proposed warning requirements are doubtless an
improvement over the current ones/'a7 that is not saying much. Like the
current warning requirements, the proposed warning requirements would be
largely ineffective as a means of overcoming the various sources of imperfect
consumer information.
For instance, most of the proposed warnings are phrased to influence
general, not personal. beliefs (thus failing to overcome the third-person
effect 648). Those warnings directed at the individual smoker, meanw\hile,
leave room for considerable doubt (and may even create doubts) regarding the
relative risks posed.4 9 Furthermore, the warnings do not specify qualitati%,ely
or quantitatively the actual risks posed by cigarettes in terms of either
probabilities or magnitudes. In short, the proposed warnings appear unlikely
to convey any health-risk information that most smokers do not already have
(which is not to say that consumers are now adequately informed of the risks).
Similarly, the problem of addiction is not addressed by the warnings. Only
one warning even mentions the addictiveness of cigarettes, noting simply that
645. Tobacco Settlement. supra note 32. at 10.
646. See id. at 10-11. In addition, the FDA vould be required under tile propos.il to promulgate a rule
governing the disclosure of tobacco smoke constituents. See id at II. 19-20 Manufacturers .,ould need
to disclose to the FDA all ingredients added to their cigarettes. Moreo.er. the, vould need to diclose
ingredient information to consumers as food manufacturers no, tnust disclose food a.dditics Se'e it
647. See infra note 649 (listing the current warnmng requirements)
648. See supra Subsection II.B.I. (describing the third-person effect and its implication,
649. Cf. HiLrs, supra note 12. at 12-13. 17-18 (detailing the indus ir'N use of ma-s,1ic public
relations campaign addressed both to doctors and to ordinjar citliens itiacking the scientil i data and the
scientists behind it as a means of raising doubt about the hazards ol cigarettes
Previous warnings were subject to the same riicisntisl The original vamirng mandaicd in 1965 did
refer to the consumer directly, but was quite unemphatic in its message *'Caution Cigarette Smoking Ma,
Be Hazardous to Your Health." Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad% crtising Act of 1965. Pub L No 89-92.
§ 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (codified as amended at 15 L' SC § 1333 t1994t41 lit 1984. tile requirement %.s
expanded to four rotating warnings: (1 "Smoking Causes Lung Cancer. hleart Di ase. Enpivscitia. And
May Complicate Pregnancy": (2) "'Qitting Smoking No%% Greitl Reduces Serious Risks to Your Ilealh*'.
(3) "Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injur). Premature Birth. And Lo.. Birth %%eight".
(4) "Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoide " Coinprehensie Smoking liducation Act ot 1984, Pub
L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200. 2201-03 (1984) (codilied at 15 U SC k 1333i 01 the four, onl) one
refers to the consumer's personal risk, Moreover. it is not clear \,.beiler that %,armng actuall% discouragcs
smoking. See supra note 157. One of the warnings addresses self onl. to a group (pregnant %,otietiI that
excludes most consumers.
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"[c]igarettes are addictive. ' 65° Acknowledging that cigarettes are addictive,
however, does little or nothing to respond specifically to the addiction
problems that we described in Subsection II.B.4: the problem of path
dependence, the problem of myopia, and the problem of multiple selves.
651
Indeed, one of the warnings continues to emphasize that serious health risks
can be reduced by quitting. As we explained above,652 such a warning could
have the perverse effect of lowering the impact of all the other warnings.
Finally, the greater number and more prominent display of warnings could
encourage smoking, particularly among children, by enhancing cigarettes'
image as forbidden fruit.653 Cigarette manufacturers would continue,654 as
best they could, to promote that image through their marketing and would
otherwise attempt to downplay the risks of their products. For those sorts of
reasons, the proposed warning requirements are likely to be ineffective or,
655worse, counterproductive.
2. Marketing Restrictions and Antismoking Advertising
a. Sumniary of Provisions
The second general way in which the agreement seeks to address the
information problem would be to "drastically curtail[]" the "advertising and
marketing of tobacco products '656 and to require the industry to spend
millions annually on antismoking advertisements targeted at young consumers.
650. Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 10.
651. Moreover, the meaning of the word "addiction" may be unclear to some potential smokers. See
supra note 256.
652. See supra note 157. A related problem may be created by the proposal's emphasis on the
financing of smoking cessation programs. Lowering the perceived exit costs has two effects. Sonic people
will exit while the going is good. Others will smoke more because they will have greater confidence that
they will be able to quit when they want.
653. There is growing evidence that warnings may actually give a product an enhanced gloss and
induce consumers, particularly young consumers, to purchase it. For example, several studies have
demonstrated a "forbidden fruit" effect of television parental advisory warnings for violent shows. See. e.g.,
Brad J. Bushman & Angela D. Stack, Forbidden Fruit Versus Tainted Fruit: Effects of Warning Labels on
Attraction to Television Violence, 2 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 207 (1996). Similar studies on the
labeling effects on alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks also support the theory that the warning itself may
serve to make the product appear more attractive. See, e.g., John M. Springer & Craig T. Nagoshi, Magical
Thinking and Alcohol Labels, 69 PSYCHOL. REP. 767 (1991).
654. The forbidden fruit effect of warnings is probably not news to cigarette marketers. See, e.g., RJR
Memorandum, supra note 161 (concluding that "a new brand aimed at the young group should not in atny
way be promoted as a 'health' brand, and perhaps should carry some implied risk" and stating that "the
warning label on the package may be a plus").
655. The warning requirements would likely also have a preemptive effect on civil liability claims
inasmuch as they would produce de jure preemption of inadequate-warning claims and de facto preemption
of other products liability claims. Cf Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (finding failure-to-warn claims preempted by federal law); supra note 9 (describing the irony of
the Cipollone decision in this regard). Manufacturers' assumption-of-risk defenses would be even more
robust, if that is possible, than they have been to date. To the extent that tort law would have any beneficial
deterrence effect under the proposed regime that effect would be further attenuated.
656. Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 8.
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Among other things, the new regime would, consistent with the FDA's tobacco
regulations of 1996:
* "Restrict permissible tobacco product advertising to black text on
a white background except for advertising in adult-only facilities
and in adult publications";6'
" 'Require cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertisements
to carry the FDA-mandated statement of intended use ('Nicotine
Delivery Device')",;658
* "Ban all non-tobacco merchandise, including caps. jackets or bags
bearing the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco
brand";
659
* "Ban offers of non-tobacco items or gifts based on proof of
purchase of tobacco products";'
* "Ban sponsorships, including concerts and sporting events, in the
name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand."'t"
Going beyond current FDA regulations, the new regime would also:
* "Ban the use of human images and cartoon characters-thereby
eliminating Joe Camei and the Marlboro Man-in all tobacco
advertising and on tobacco product packages; -62
* "Ban all outdoor tobacco product advertising"; "
" 'Prohibit tobacco product advertising on the Internet unless
designed to be inaccessible in or from the United States"; "
" 'Establish nationwide restrictions in non adult-only facilities on
point of sale advertising with a view toward minimizing the
impact of such advertising on minors":66
" 'Ban direct and indirect payments for tobacco product placement
in movies, television programs and video games": "
" 'Prohibit direct and indirect payments to "glamorize' tobacco use
in media appealing to minors, including recorded and live
performances of music";' 7
• "[Rlequire that the use ... of words currently employed as
product descriptors (e.g., 'light' or 'low tar') be accompanied by
a mandatory disclaimer in advertisements (e.g., 'Brand X not
shown to be less hazardous than other cigarettes') . . .
657. Id. at 8 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)-b) (1997))
658. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(c)).
659. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a)).
660. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. N 897.34(b)
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In addition to the limitations placed on advertising, the proposal would
require the industry to fund "a $500 million annual, national education-oriented
counter-advertising and tobacco control campaign seeking to discourage the
initiation of tobacco use by children and adolescents and to encourage current
tobacco product users to quit use of the products. '669 As with most of the
advertising limitations, this provision evinces a special interest in discouraging
underage smoking. 670
b. Critique
The goal of the marketing restrictions is not to inform consumers but to
protect them from being misinformed by manufacturers. The command-and-
control approach to the problem, however, contains all the predictable and
classic regulatory flaws. For instance, the restrictions may prevent
manufacturers from effectively marketing healthier cigarettes, thereby reducing
the companies' incentives to develop such cigarettes. 67, In contrast, if
manufacturers were forced to internalize the costs that their products pose
through, for instance, an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime, then
advertising restrictions would be less necessary since manufacturers would
market their cigarettes in a way that minimizes the total injury costs of
cigarettes.672 So long as manufacturers bear the total costs associated with
669. Id. at 3; see also id. at 37-38 (describing the public education campaign in slightly more detail).
670. The preamble strongly implies that the primary goal of the settlement is to discourage underage
tobacco use. See id. at 1. Nowhere does it explain, however, why that goal should have priority over other
potential goals. One expert has stated that it is likely that the prioritization of underage smoking reflects
the history of the politics of smoking. Antismoking groups have long recognized that their strongest
political playing card has been underage smoking. There were already laws against it, laws that were
largely unenforced. The fact that virtually all smokers pick up the habit when they are minors and the fact
that smoking is addictive and dangerous has made the case against underage smoking especially easy to
support. Interview with Richard Daynard, Chair of the Tobacco Products Liability Project, Northeastern
University School of Law, in Boston, Mass. (July 22, 1997).
671. Cf. VISCuSI, supra note 49, at 147-48 (arguing that governmental advertising restrictions have
discouraged safety innovations in cigarettes).
672. See Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92. Many commentators agree
that safer cigarette designs are viable. See, e.g., John Freeman, '60 Minutes' Stokes Cigarette Controversy.
SAN DiEGo UNION-TRIB., Apr. I, 1994, at E14 (describing a 60 Minutes episode that charged Philip Morris
with hiding for years its capability to produce a cigarette that could have prevented thousands of fire-related
deaths and injuries); cf. George Rodrique, 'Safe' Cigarette Ignored, Researcher Says, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 17, 1997, at IH (quoting former Philip Morris researcher Victor DeNoble alleging that for
decades tobacco companies have rejected plans to make cigarettes safer); John Schwartz, New Cigarette
Clears the Smoke, but the Heat Is Still On, WASH. POST, May 27, 1996, at A3 (quoting a former Brown
& Williamson research director alleging that tobacco companies have been rejecting designs for saler
cigarettes due to fear of legal liability). Critics of the tort system and defenders of the cigarette industry
place blame for the fact that those designs have yet to be marketed successfully on existing products
liability laws. See, e.g., Norihiko Shirouzu, Low-Smoke Cigarette Catches Fire in Japan, WALL ST. J., Sept.
8, 1997, at B I ("[l]f the liability issue gets settled, many expect the U.S. makers to devise new products
with safety features."). According to this argument, if manufacturers were to produce a safer cigarette, then
that cigarette would be used as evidence against them to prove that their older design was defective. Cf.
Freedman, supra note 161 (reporting the whistleblowing testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, in which he
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their products, they have a significantly reduced incentive to mislead
consumers with respect to the risk properties of cigarettes.67 Manufacturers
would have to pay for the costs that the), understate, and, in that sense, their
claims would be bonded. Moreover. even if they understate the risks, cigarette
manufacturers would still have to charge a price that reflects true risks. The
price would, in effect, inform consumers and, at least potentially, counteract
false claims.
Similarly, though cigarette manufacturers would still seek to target
consumers, their motives in targeting consumers would be very different than
they are now. Under an incentive-based regime, manufacturers would direct
their marketing to low-risk smokers. 674 There are a number of ways in which
consumers may be low-risk. For example, some consumers may be more
likely, other things being equal. to quit smoking before suffering many of the
ill-health effects of long-term smoking. There is some evidence, for example,
that quitting rates increase as education levels and age of initiation
increase.675 Different, identifiable groups may be more (or less) likely to
suffer serious ill-health effects of smoking. For instance, the younger a person
is when he or she starts smoking, the greater will be that person's chances of
developing lung cancer, other things being equal.676 Thus, under an
described how he was told by the CEO of Browsn & Williamson. for whom Wigand ,,as wsorking ait he
time, that "there would be no further discussion or efforts on an) , issues related to a safer cigarette.'"
because "[a]ny research on a safer cigarette would clearly expose every other product as unsale and.
therefore, present a liability issue in terms of any type of litigation"). Whether or not the argument is .alid
with respect to the current products liability regime. it is clear that an enterprise ihabilit regime, or some
other ex post incentive-based regulatory, mechanism. 'would greal) encourage safer cigarettes The
manufacturer would be liable for all cigarette-caused harms, regardless of the design of the cigarette Thus
manufacturers could lower their total costs only by making cost-justifiable safet improsements
673. See supra Subsection IV.D.3. The histoncal marketing strategy of "1o,, tar cigarettes." see
VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 37-41. is a perfect example of the problems that may anse when manufacturers
lack the incentives to take costs into their calculations. See stpra notes 102-107 and accompanying text
As Hilts points out, the "low tar cigarette" did not work as a health concept. because "'pluffing less or
differently on a high tar cigarette might well be more effective." HIL'S. supra note 12. at 61. but it was
nonetheless manipulated by the industry for its innately appealing "adertising concept." id Thus. "those
most concerned about getting less tar may not get less tar, but they feel better about it " Id
674. See supra Section V.B.I.
675. See Teen Smokers Find Habit Hard To Breal. Situh Sass. PtiOErIX GAzi./r. (Anz ). Feb 16.
1996, at A8 (quoting a study finding that the quitting rate was 4 4% for people vsho began smoking before
age 14, 9.6% for people who started between ages 14 and 16. and 13 6% for those viho started after age
16). Lloyd D. Johnston, the director of a major study of teenage smoking, said that "'the younger people
start smoking, the more likely their habit is to take hold " Don Colbum. Rise in reeti Smiokingi Has
Erperts Vexed, WASH. POST. Sept. 10. 1996. at Z7. The Surgeon General's Progress Report tracks quitting
rates between 1966 and 1985. See S'RGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS RtEPORT. suprtt note 3 'lhe study note,
that quitting in 1985 was highest among college graduates (61 %) and much lowser among those with some
college education (46.0%). high school graduates without college (40 5%). and those w ithout a high school
diploma (41.3%). See id. at 287 tbl.9. The report also notes a "iteklefold difference in the rute of decline
in smoking prevalence between the most and least educated groups in our society "" /d at 271
676. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. 3upra note 3. at 44 (''ht nsk of dev eloping lung
cancer was greatest for those who began smoking at an early age "). Luis G Escobedo. Sports
Participation, Age at Smoking Intttation. and the Risk of Stmokitng Atong U S tigh St hool Stundets. 269
JAMA 1391, 1393-94 (1993) ("It is also known that lung cancer mortality is highest among adults siho
began smoking before age 15 years.").
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 1163
incentive-based regulatory system, manufacturers would not only lose some of
their incentive to target children, they would also have an incentive to
discourage children from smoking.
Without some type of incentive-based regulation, however, advertising
restrictions merely create incentives for manufacturers to find loopholes
through which they can continue to target underage smokers or otherwise
"disinform" consumers. 677 Indeed, a common critique of the proposal is that
manufacturers would still be able to advertise effectively to kids.678 That
critique has significant empirical, as well as theoretical, underpinnings. In
countries that have previously adopted advertising restrictions equivalent to, or
greater than, those envisaged in the agreement, cigarette manufacturers
continue to target young smokers successfully. 679 Similarly, although many
commentators appear to have a strong intuition that current industry marketing
practices have had an effect on the number of underage smokers, the evidence
supporting that intuition is, at best, spotty.680 Evidence regarding the effects
of antismoking advertisements or public service announcements of the sort that
677. See supra Subsection IV.D.I. Arguments have been made that the industry relies heavily on its
underage consumer population. As one author expressed the point, "[l]f it were true that the companies
steer clear of children, as they say, the entire industry would collapse within a single generation." -tLTs,
supra note 12, at 65. In fact, a look at past efforts of manufacturers to deter underage smoking indicates
that many of the company-initiated programs were "useless and silly on their face. For example . . . 'Pack
notices. We will place a notice on all of our packs and cartons: "Underage sales prohibited."' lI. at 99.
To the extent that manufacturers would be prevented from advertising under the proposed regime, retailers
may be able to step in and fill that marketing void. Although there are licensing requirements in the
agreement that would appear to require sellers to comply with the terms of the agreement, it is not clear
whether conditioning a license on the licensee's consent to give up First Amendment privileges is
constitutional. See Hearings on the Global Tobacco Settlement Before the Senate Judiciar. Conm., 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe), available in 1997 WL 11234937 [hereinafter Tribe
Testimony]; Douglas J. Wood, Will Bans on Tobacco Ads Pass Muster?. NAT'L L.J., July 7. 1997, at B9.
678. Interview with Richard Daynard, supra note 670.
679. See. e.g., Brion J. Fox et al., Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of the United States Tobacco
Litigation 35 (Aug. 20, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Ltw Journal) (describing
common advertising practices in other countries with substantial advertising restrictions and concluding that
"[tihe advertising restrictions [in the settlement] are ... unlikely to significantly reduce the pervasiveness
of tobacco imagery in society"); John R. Garrison, CEO, American Lung Ass'n, Statement at the News
Conference on Potential Tobacco Settlement (June 17, 1997) (asserting that "[tlhe ability of the tobacco
industry to reinvent itself and circumvent ... restrictions" on targeting children is "remarkable"). In
reaction to the proposed settlement in this country, advertising finns are said to be working already on new,
effective ways to advertise within the limits of the settlement. See Yumiko Ono, Firms Scramble for Ways
To Sell Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at BI t.
680. According to some commentators, what little evidence there is suggests that the principal effect
of current marketing is on consumers' choice of which brands to smoke rather than on whether or not to
smoke. For example, Douglas Wood argues:
[N]o study has been conducted that proves advertising motivates any child to take up smoking.
Studies that have been performed show that peer pressure and sibling and parental examples are
primary reasons a child begins to smoke.
Nor, to date, is there any study showing that advertising causes children who have chosen
to smoke to continue doing so. Although advertising may cause someone to switch brands.
banning certain advertising methods to avoid brand switching, let alone the complete ban of
certain media proposed by the settlement, would probably not withstand constitutional muster.
Wood, supra note 677. For a summary of the evidence suggesting that advertising does encourage underage
consumers to smoke, see Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 65-66.
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would likely be implemented in the proposed regime is also mixed."'
California enacted a counter-advertising campaign in 1990, which served as a
model for the settlement proposal. "2 Teenage smoking rates in California,
however, have increased, not decreased, since 1990."' As with warnings,
counter-advertising may even enhance underage demand for cigarettes insofar
as they bestow on cigarettes a forbidden fruit quality." As much as
proponents of the agreement might believe that the advertising restrictions will
substantially reduce underage smoking, there is little e% idence to support that
belief.6 5 Indeed, the evidence suggests that by far the best means of
lowering underage smoking is a price increase.""t ' which, of course, is what
an incentive-based system would yield.
We have a more fundamental concern about the child-centric nature of the
marketing restrictions (and of the "look-back" provision"'). Even assuming
that the proposed strategies would be completely effective, it remains a
significant problem in our view that many of the underage consumers who
would have started smoking before the strategies were implemented might,
once the strategies were implemented, begin a few years later. Supporters and
opponents of the deal have argued that the trick to preventing people from ever
smoking is simply to make certain they do not begin smoking before they are
eighteen, because under the current regime most smokers begin well before
they are eighteen. 688 That argument, however, is based on an unproven and
681. See John Schvartz. OffictaLs Seek a Path To Cut into 1ac ( )Ailoth StnioLkuj 1h Bottvin Line
No One Knows What Warks. WASH. POST. No'. 2. 1997. al AI C'Despite all of the anti-tobacco etforts in
recent years, teenagers' attitudes to%%,ard smoking are groing more postie"
682. See Adelson. supra note 163.
683. See id.
684. See id. ("[Slome experts note that the more smoking comes under attack b), adults the more
attractive or 'cooler' it becomes to many teen-agers "). jupra note 653 and accompan) ing tet Idiscuinmg
the concept of "forbidden fruit" in the context of the settlement's %arming pro% ision)
685. Similarly discouraging results have recentl% been reported v, tth respect to the effort. in
Massachusetts to reduce underage smoking by more stnngentl enforcing la, s prohibiting ,ale, to minors
See Nancy A. Rigotti et al., The Effect of Eiforring "rbaco.Sale Lai%3 on, Ah4 cuent " Acess to
Tobacco and Smokbig Behavior, 337 NEW ENG. J MED 1044 (1997.n (reporting the reultvs of . t ,o-sear
study assessing sales of cigarettes to minors and Noung people' access to. and use ot. cigarettes in
Massachusetts communities and concluding that , ell-enforced tobacco ,s.le, las,, did not alter minors'
perceived access to cigarettes or their consumption lIcels)
686. See Schwartz. supra note 681: .ee albo Richard Toitkin,. Alter the Smoke Ra, ('hareI rte
Tobacco Industry May Have Got off Lghth in Itn Priposed Settlement i ith VS State,. iI."N's t. Posr
(N.Y.), June 25, 1997, at 8 (noting that other countnes hae found large price increascs to be particularl)
effective at reducing the demand for cigarettes among the %oung)
687. The look-back provision, vhch ts summarizd and crtiqued infra Subscction VI B 3. state', that
"[a] central aim of this legtslation ts to achieve dramatic and immediate reductions in the number of
underage consumers of tobacco products." Toba(o Settlement. 3upra note 32. at 24
688. See. e.g.. Thomas W. Merrill. Financial Penalties for Youth Smoking 3 (199 7 P tunpublished
manuscript, on file with the lde Law Journal) ("'Ve knov. that fe\, adults start smoking alter the age of
21. So if the tobacco companies agree to a program that vould actuall, reduce the micidence of underage
smoking by 60%. this would put them on a path pointing tow, ard the centual destruction of their donesic
market."); Gerald J. Thain. The First Amendment and Retnctions on Commercial Speech in the "Tobacco
Settlement": An Analysis 2 (Oct. 16, 1997) (unpublished manuscnpt. on file %kith the )ide Lan Journal)
("There is overwhelming evidence [that] the consumption of cigarette-, v, ll decline dratnattcall, if stmoking
does not begin until the age when it is legal.")
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dubious premise. Evidence of when smokers start under the current regime
reveals nothing about when they would start under the proposed regime. If one
assumes, as many industry critics do, that marketing efforts have been partially
responsible for encouraging underage consumers to start smoking, 69 and if
such marketing were successfully curtailed under the agreement, it seems likely
that manufacturers would begin targeting slightly older consumers. Advertising
and selling cigarettes to eighteen year-olds are perfectly acceptable activities
under the agreement. And if manufacturers can successfully target fourteen
year-olds, it seems plausible that they will be just as successful at targeting
eighteen year-olds.69° Indeed, the most recent Camel advertisements suggest
that that is precisely the strategy that R.J. Reynolds plans on adopting. The
animated Joe Camel campaign has been recently replaced with a variety of
other advertising campaigns, including explicitly sexual imagery.69,
Finally, although we understand and agree that protecting children from the
dangers of smoking is felt to be an especially strong need, the information
problems that we described in Part II do not apply exclusively to children.
Although some of those information problems may be more significant with
respect to underage smokers (for example, the problem of myopia), none of the
problems is age-specific. Thus the proposal's tendency to draw a bright line
at the age of eighteen creates distinctions that are legalistic and irrelevant. One
benefit of an incentive-based approach, by contrast, is that no such arbitrary
lines appear. Any distinctions in advertising practices under such a regime
would be based on the total costs caused by the cigarettes as marketed to a
particular group.692
689. See, e.g., Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 65-66; Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and
Public Health, Final Report 5 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal); supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
690. Under the current regime, there may be a sort of race to the bottom of the age groups of potential
smokers. If a manufacturer can hook a young child, that manufacturer not only gains revenues of that
smoker for the following three or four years, while the smoker is still a minor, but also for the years
following the time that the smoker reaches majority in which the smoker continues to smoke that
manufacturer's brands. Thus, the targeted marketing of manufacturers may not be motivated by an attempt
to hook the only age group that is potentially hookable, but to hook the hookable people at the earliest
possible moment. Assuming that the regulations succeed only in postponing the age at which many long-
term smokers initiate their habits, those regulations may still have a benefit. Specifically, smokers who start
at a later age may be, on average, less adversely affected by their habit. See supra note 676 and
accompanying text.
691. See Yumiko Ono & Bruce Ingersoll, RJR Retires Joe Camel, Adds Sexy Smokers, WALL ST. J.,
July II, 1997, at BI. R.J. Reynolds decided to end the Joe Camel campaign six weeks after the FTC
brought an unfair-advertising complaint against the company. See id. Some antismoking advocates claim
that the decision was made in an effort to avoid turning over certain internal documents. See id.
692. See supra Subsection IV.D.I. To be clear, we do not necessarily object to a regulatory regime
that includes some command-and-control regulations and some performance-based regulations to help
prevent underage consumers from smoking. Instead, we object to a regulatory regime that relies exclusively
on such regulations as opposed to one in which they serve to supplement incentive-based, cost-internalizing
regulation.
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3. The "Look-Back" Provision
a. Summary of Provision
To supplement the command-and-control regulation that we have thus far
described, the proposal includes a so-called "look-back" provision, which is a
form of performance-based regulation designed to reduce the level of underage
tobacco use.693 The performance targets are roughly as follows: Underage use
of cigarettes would have to decline by at least 30% by the fifth year after the
proposal is enacted, 50% by the seventh year, and 60% by the tenth year."
Those targets would be measured against the estimated underage smoking
levels that have prevailed over the last decade according to the University of
Michigan's Monitoring the Future study.695 If the targets are not met, the
proposal would authorize (and require) the FDA to impose a surcharge on the
tobacco industry in an amount that would approximate the "present value of
the profit the industry would earn over the lives of all underage users in excess
of the target," subject to an annual cap of $2 billion."'
b. Critique
The look-back provision was designed to ensure that, even if the other
proposed regulations aimed at underage smokers (for example, the advertising
restrictions) do not have their intended effect, the industry would nevertheless
have a powerful incentive to reduce underage smoking to acceptable
levels. 697 To use the taxonomy of this Article, the look-back provision can
be understood as a form of state-initiated ex post performance-based
regulation. 698 The look-back provision-or perhaps a modified version of
693. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32. app. V at 51 (sumianing the "look-back" prosision)
694. See id. at 52.
695. Although we focus, for simplicity, on cigarettes, similar targets sould be imposed for smokeless
tobacco products. Based on an analysis of the look-back pro% ison in the proposal and of the Monitoring
the Future study, Professor Hams estimates the "basc percentage" of underage daily smoker', (the 1986-
1996 historical average) to be 15.2%. See Jeffrey E Hams. Prepared Remarks at the American Cancer
Society's Press Conference on the Proposed Tobacco Industry -\ide Resolution 2 (Jul) 24. 1997) (transcript
on file with the ale Law Journal). Thus, for example, the fi\e- ear goal of a 30% reduction from the base
percentage would mean a target rate of 10.6% underage smokers. That target, as Hams points out. \Aould
amount to a 58% reduction from the current 1996 lesel of underage smoking. %%Inch is 18 2% See id
696. Tobacco Settlement. supra note 32. at 24. Under the agreement, the sureharge wAould be 580
million for each percentage point difference between the target percentage reductton of underage smoking
and the actual percentage reduction. See id. app. V at 53.
697. See id. at 24-25.
698. Presumably the provision is motivated either by the sorts of consumer-informatton market failures
described infra Part II or by a political or philosophical decision that people under the age of 18 simply
should not smoke. We are by no means against regulations motivated by a desire to provide special
protection to children. To serve that goal, we are not aserse to supplementing ex post incentise-based
systems of regulation with other types that are specifically directed at protecting children In many cases.
as in this one, however, we believe that ex post incentive-based regulations better sere that particular goal
than do the alternatives.
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it-is considered by most policymakers and analysts to be the most promising
means of ensuring that underage smoking is curtailed.699 That makes some
sense, in light of the weaknesses that we have already highlighted with respect
to the command-and-control regulations intended to limit underage smoking.
Unfortunately, however, all of the sorts of flaws in the proposed command-
and-control regulations afflict the performance-based look-back program as
well.
As we described in Section IV.B, performance standards may seem to
require less information on the part of the regulator than command-and-control
regulation does. When one considers the information necessary to choose the
standard in the first place, however, it becomes clear that fully efficient
performance-based regulations require all the same information that is required
of command-and-control regulations. To make this point clear, consider the
target reductions in underage smoking-30%, 50%, then finally 60%. Where
did those numbers come from? Why not target reductions of 100%, or 80%,
or 23%? As we indicated in Section IV.B, with performance-based regulation
the first necessary step is to justify the performance target. If the target
percentages in the proposal come from some political or philosophical
conclusion that a 60% eventual reduction in the level of underage smoking is
the best achievable end state, it would be helpful to have that spelled out along
with the arguments and the evidence behind those conclusions.7" In any
event, the look-back provision would provide absolutely no incentive to reduce
underage smoking rates by more than 60%, even if the costs to manufacturers
of encouraging further reductions were quite low.
If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the target levels of underage
smoking were well chosen, that does not imply that the proposed regulation
will generate the target outcomes. Indeed, a close examination of the look-back
provision reveals numerous reasons that it will almost certainly fail to achieve
the target goals. First, as some critics of the agreement have indicated, the
penalty imposed for failure to meet the targets is inadequate.70t The proposed
$80 million penalty for each percentage point by which the target is missed
represents an underestimate of what it is supposed to reflect, "the present value
699. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 688, at 2 (noting that the look-back program appears "to be the
crucial variable in deciding whether the global settlement is a tremendous breakthrough").
700. The fact that no one, as far as we know, has challenged those numbers is not necessarily evidence
of the fact that they are optimal percentages. More likely, the lack of criticism reflects the fact that no one
knows the optimal percentages, a fact that itself contributes to our case for an ex post incentive-based
regulatory approach.
701. See, e.g., Don't Revise Pact, Tobacco Firms Tell Clinton, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20. 1997, at A20
(quoting Bruce Reed, President Clinton's top adviser on tobacco issues: "We've made clear we want to
strengthen the penalties ... [since sltrict penalties for failing to meet reductions in smoking are absolutely
essential"); Michael K. Frisby, Tobacco Officials Balk at Changes Proposed To Beef Up Settlement, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 15, 1997, at B6 (summarizing a White House opinion that the surcharges were inadequate);
Jeffrey Taylor, Task Force Asks for Stiffer Tobacco Penalties, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at A2
(summarizing a similar view of the Koop-Kessler Committee).
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of the profit the cigarette industry would earn over the life of underage
smokers in excess of the required reduction.' 71 The arbitrary $2 billion per
year maximum also renders inadequate the surcharge's bite. 70 ' As some
analysts have observed, if the maximum surcharge were spread across all
cigarettes sold, the cost of noncompliance would be less than a dime per
pack.7°
Even assuming that the amount of the surcharge reflects what it is
supposed to reflect, that surcharge would not eliminate manufacturers'
incentives to market to underage smokers. When faced with the question of
whether or not to target underage consumers, manufacturers would realize that
if they did market to children, they would enjoy at least 40% (and, because of
the cap and the abatement scheme described above, probably more than 40%)
of the profits that they currently enjoy from selling to kids. Although the
incentive to attract underage smokers to their brands might not be as strong,
it would still be present.05 The problem stems from the fact that the target
is set below 100%.
But even if the target were set at 100%, the surcharge, properly measured,
would not create an incentive to discourage smoking. At best, it would make
manufacturers indifferent between selling to minors and not doing so." And
the problem is even more serious than just that. Even if the surcharges were
increased to provide some incentive for manufacturers to meet the targets, they
would possibly still be too low. It is not costless for the industry to prevent the
sale of cigarettes to people under the age of eighteen. To the extent there are
any costs associated with that effort (whether they be advertising expenses or
702. Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32. at 53: see also Susan Page. Clinton -tpected To Talk Tough
on Tobacco Pact, Child Protection, USA TODAY. Sept 16. 1997. at 6A ("Thc administration analysis
shows that the proposed penalties would be largely offset by the profits companies would make from a
higher level of cigarette sales to teens."): Carl T. Rowsan. Setlenient Coizunnes Tobacco's Devastatuon.
HOUSTON CHRON., June 25, 1997, at 22 ("Those vho distrust big tobacco . say it .,ill be more profitable
for the industry to go on addicting teen-agers to far more costly cigarettes and pay the lines ")
703. See Merrill, supra note 688. at 9. This discussion is intended to illustrate the more general point
that designing a performance-based regulation requires the same amount oi informnation as designing a
command-and-control regulation. See supra Section IV B. In the case of the look-back pro% ision. the unity
between the two types of regulations is especially clear, because the look-back provision contains a
command-and-control exception that could well swallowa the performance-bascd rule Under the proposal.
if the performance targets are not met and the surcharge is imposed on the industr). any manufacturer who
has paid its share of the surcharge can petition the FDA to have up to 
7 5% of the surcharge "abated-"
Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32. at 24. According to the abatement procedures. the manufacturer in such
a situation must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to an abatement-u hich would
depend upon. among other things, the manufacturer showing that it had "pursued all reasonably asailable
measures" to achieve the desired targets. Id. at 56. Thus. for up to 75% of the surcharge amount, the look-
back provision is not a performance-based regime at all. but is an cx post command-and-control regime
instead.
704. See, e.g., Fox et al.. supra note 679. at 14.
705. See Merrill, supra note 688. at 9-10.
706. We are assuming here. as do the proponents of tihe proposed settlement. see. e g. Mcrll. supra
note 688, at 3; Thain, supra note 688. at 2. that smokers who do not begin before the> are 18 years old
will not begin smoking at all. But see supra notes 689-691 and accompanying text (questionang that
assumption).
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forgone profits from older smokers discouraged from smoking by the effort),
the amount of the total surcharge must be greater than just the profit
attributable to the level of underage smoking in excess of the target level.
To take that point to its logical extreme, suppose that no plausible amount
of investment on the part of the industry in marketing and restricting youth
access would produce the target levels of underage smoking. In such
circumstances, the best way to achieve the targets (perhaps the only way) may
be through a price increase for all cigarettes.7 °7 If that were the case, the
amount of the surcharge would need to be large enough such that the price of
cigarettes sold to all consumers would reach an equilibrium at which the
quantity of underage smoking would approximate the target level. According
to one economist, achieving that effect would require an enormous payment
by the industry, a payment not only many times larger than the maximum
amount under the surcharge, but also almost double the total payments
required under the entire settlement proposal.708
Perhaps the most profound problem with the look-back provision has
nothing to do with the total amount of the industry surcharge, but rather with
the manner in which it is apportioned across the industry. The surcharge, like
virtually all the payments required by the proposal, is allocated among
companies according solely to their shares of the cigarette market.70" To see
707. This scenario assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that manufacturers cannot cheaply price
discriminate among smokers and charge significantly higher prices to underage consumers.
708. Professor Harris estimates, based on an analysis of the overall settlement proposal (including the
look-back provision) and plausible assumptions about the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, that the
sum of all the payments expected to be made by the industry under the proposal-$368.5 billion over 25
years, see Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34-would result in an implicit (or "virtual") unit tax of
S0.62 per pack of cigarettes. See Jeffrey E. Harris, Comments on Proposed Resolution (last modified June
26, 1997) <http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/ACScomments.html>, at 1-3 & tbl.2; see also Harris, supra note
695, at I. The implicit tax would be $0.41 per pack initially, and then rise to $0.62 per pack after the first
five years. See Harris, supra, at 1-3 & tbl.2. Professor Harris has shown that the face value of all the
payments to be made by the industry, once the "volume adjustment" provision in the agreement is taken
into account, is $304.3 billion. See id. at 3. He further calculates the present discounted value of those
payments (assuming a 7% discount rate) to be $194.5 billion. See id. at I. In arriving at these numbers,
Harris explicitly assumes that the marketing restrictions and the antismoking campaign directed toward
underage consumers would have no effect on the level of smoking. Instead, he assumes that the recent
historical trend of a 0.6% annual decline in overall smoking would continue. See id. at 3. He does,
however, run a sensitivity analysis, assuming a 1% annual decline in smoking, which produced total
industry payments of $289.3 billion, with a present discounted value of $186.4 billion. See id. According
to Harris's calculations, however, such an implicit tax would not be nearly enough to achieve the target
levels of underage smoking set forth in the look-back provision. A tax of $1.50 per pack (indexed to keep
pace with inflation) would, by itself, reach those targets. The face value of the total industry payments that
would be necessary, under the current proposal, to produce such a unit tax on cigarettes would be $653.2
billion over 25 years. See Harris, supra note 695, at 2. He also determines that the surcharge would reach
the $2 billion cap. See id. at 3 n.13. Note that Harris's calculations regarding the optimal unit tax for
achieving the performance target ignore the potential effect of safer cigarette designs. If Harris had tried
to take that possibility into account, and to imagine how alternative product designs would affect the
demand for cigarettes, his task would have been much more difficult. In fact, to do the analysis completely,
he would have required all the same information that would be needed to determine, on a command-and-
control basis, what the optimal cigarette design should be. This observation should serve to reemphasize
the benefits of an ex post, as compared with an ex ante, incentive-based approach.
709. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 54.
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the problem with that system of allocating the costs, suppose the aggregate
amount of the surcharge accurately measures the profit attributable to underage
smokers in excess of the target and that, except for those forgone profits,
manufacturers can costlessly meet the target. Under those assumptions, the
surcharge would still not produce the incentives necessary to achieve the target
reductions, because of an unraveling problem of the sort that we have already
encountered. 1 Each company would bear all of the costs of an investment
in curtailing underage smoking of its cigarettes. In contrast, the benefits of its
efforts would be shared by the entire industry; it would enjoy, at most, only
its market share of those benefits."' Thus, even were it in the industry's
collective interest to lower underage consumption of cigarettes to target levels,
it may not be in each company's interest to reduce underage consumption of
its own cigarettes. Because all the companies face roughly the same incentives,
they would all end up selling to underage consumers. The industry as a whole
would end up bearing the maximum surcharge. Given this unraveling problem,
the performance targets would not be met unless the targets and surcharges
were tailored to specific companies, 7t12  or unless the surcharge were
drastically increased.7 t3
710. See supra Subsection IV.C.2.
711. The manufacturer may not enjoy even that much \\'here indusitr) efforts fill short of the target.
no company will get to enjoy any benefits of its investments The ex post command-and-control exception
may be intended to mitigate that problem. See sulyra note 703 In light of the difficult) that the FDA vould
likely have in implementing that exceptton. however. it rtay create more problem,. than it solseN \W'here
the industry overshoots the target, no company will enjoy the benefits of the oscrinestment
712. The Koop-Kessler Committee apparently noticed the potential unr-aeling problem and. at least
initially, called for a change in the proposal so that the FDA would asses penalties on a company-by-
company basis. See Taylor. supra note 701. We have seen \er) little recent mention of the unraseling
problem with respect to any of the proposal's provisions.
713. The size of the necessary increase wx ill depend on the number of manufacturers in the industry
and their market shares. The fewer the number of manufacturers. other things, being equal. the Io%[er "x ill
be the necessary increase in the surcharge. Cf Croley & Hanson. Miat Labinhti Cists '. mup,a note 40,
at 102-03 (making an analogous point with respect to the size of the insurance pools)
Also worth mentioning are two potential enforcenent-rlated fla%%%s% xith the look-back pro% iion -ox
et al. have pointed out that the proposed settlement en% isages relying on data regarding the pre,.alence of
"daily smoking," despite the fact that there are man) underage smokers ., ho do not smoke dad), but smoke
"'frequently," and eventually become adult smokers. See Fox et al. supra note 679. at 14 Consequentl,
reductions in the daily smoking rates of underage smokers xould. under the proposed regime, almost
certainly overstate the actual reductions in the number of youths smoking. See id As the, explain. "It the
industry can keep frequent smoking rates relatively high x hile delaying daily smoking for just a )ear or
two, they will evade the surcharges completel). with little change in the oerall number of people .,ho
initiate smoking as youth and go on to become addicted smokers " It at 14-15
Second, it seems likely that underage smokers will be affected by many of the other pros ision, in the
proposed settlement intended to discourage them from stoking As already indicated. %%e arc doubtlul that
those efforts will succeed in substantially altenng underage smoking behasior Nccriheless,. they might
influence the way underage survey respondents descnbe their behaxior to surey taker, We can easily
imagine, for example, that the potential "forbidden fruit' effect of the planned antisinoking adxcrtisemnents
and warnings, see supra note 653 and accompanying text. might simultaneou'l) increase ,outh smoking
and decrease the willingness of youths to admit to adults that they are smokers For such reason, any
apparent reduction in underage smoking may. under the proposed regime. oserstate the true reduction C
SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. supra note 3. at 265-66 (summianzmng esidence regarding the
effect of the 'social acceptability' bias in self-reported data").
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Finally, even if the look-back provision were to work flawlessly, and
underage smoking rates were eventually to decline by 60%, it seems entirely
possible that smoking rates of legal-age consumers could increase to offset the
decline in underage smoking. As indicated above, we are quite skeptical of,
and concerned by, the widely held view that the current average age of
initiation is somehow predetermined by nature.714
As we detailed in Parts IV-V, under an ex post incentive-based approach,
in contrast to the look-back performance-based provision, most of these
problems would not emerge. There would be no need to decide ex ante upon
a target level of underage smoking or upon the appropriate level or allocation
of surcharges. Instead, the tobacco companies would be liable ex post for all
the harms caused by their products, and the market would do the rest.
4. The Proposal's General Price Effects: The Excise Tax Model
a. Summary of Provision
Most analysts estimate that the sum of all the payments expected to be
paid by the industry under the proposal-$368.5 billion over twenty-five
yearsT'5-would cause cigarette prices to rise by about $0.60 per pack.
71 6
It is possible, therefore, that, as a de facto excise tax, the proposed settlement
would internalize some of the costs that consumers otherwise underestimate or
externalize.
b. Critique
For a variety of reasons, the de facto excise tax will fail to internalize all
the costs to consumers and manufacturers. First, the amount of the payment
(and resulting price increase) is far too low. As we detailed in Part III, the
expected costs of cigarettes total, on average, approximately $7.00 per
pack-at least ten times greater than the predicted price effects of the proposed
regime. Moreover, our $7.00 estimate, which we believe is conservative on its
own terms, completely ignores the past costs of smoking, some of which
cigarette manufacturers should be required to pay.
717
714. See supra notes 687-691 and accompanying text.
715. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34. Jeffrey Harris has argued that the actual amount
paid will be significantly lower than that. See supra note 708.
716. See, e.g., Lauran Neergaard, Deal Seen To Give Big Profits for Tobacco: US Treasurv Does
Audit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 1997, at A I (discussing a recent internal Treasury Department audit. which
placed the figure at $0.62 per pack); Harris, supra note 708, at 1-3 & tbl.2 (estimating that cigarette prices
would rise SO.62 per pack after the first five years).
717. The issue of whether the agreement does or should deal with past costs or only future costs
presents all of the transition issues raised sapra Subsection V.C.I. We discuss the proposal in terms of
those transition issues in some detail below. See infra Subsection VI.E.l.
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According to Professor Harris's calculations (applying a 717c discount rate,
taking into account the "inflation protection" provision in the proposal, " ' and
assuming Medicaid costs will grow by a nominal rate of 5/ annually), the
$368.5 billion over twenty-five years may be just enough to cover the states'
future cigarette-caused Medicaid expenses.7 ', The proposal includes no
payments to cover any past smoking-related costs to the Medicaid system. Nor
does the proposal include any additional payments to cover the past and future
smoking-related costs borne by the Medicare system, which Harris believes
may exceed those borne by the Medicaid system. "2' In fact, viewed this way,
the agreement provides no cost-internalization payments for past or future
smoking-related health care costs borne by private insurers or by individuals,
no payments for ETS harms to third parties, and no payments for the
nonpecuniary harms suffered by smokers' families and loved ones who must
see the smokers suffer smoking-related illnesses and bury the smokers before
their time.
Even if the average per pack price effect were of adequate size. there
would remain, in this context too, a significant unraveling problem. The annual
payments are fixed and allocated to manufacturers according to market share.
Because those costs do not vary according to the risks of each manufacturer's
cigarettes, those costs will create no incentive to design safer cigarettes. In
sum, although $368.5 billion is, by almost any measure, a lot of money, it
comes nowhere close to internalizing the full costs of cigarette smtoking.
C. The Proposal's Attempt To Reduce Noninsurance Eternalitie.%
The proposal makes one direct attempt to deal with noninsurance
externalities. In a provision limiting smoking in public places, the proposal
provides an ex ante command-and-control response to the external costs of
public ETS exposure.72 ' That proposed regulation would have the predictable
drawbacks of all command-and-control regulations. For instance. it may
prohibit smoking in some workplaces where ETS costs are de minimls, such
as those with especially good ventilation systems or those where workers
themselves are widely dispersed. Less obviously, the command-and-control
718. See Tobacco Setetnent. supra note 32. at 34
719. See Jeffrey E. Harris. Written Tesimion. Before the Senate Judtciir Committee llearingN on the
"Proposed Global Settlement: Who Benefits
'
" I ul, 30. 1997) (on tile ,,ith the hilde l., Juirnitl) A,
Harris shows, however, the real face value of the total pa.iout under the igreemcint i, not S368 5 billion.
but a much smaller number (roughly S304.3 billion). once solume adju,,tment, are taken into attounlt See
Harris, supra note 708, at 3.
720. See Harris, supra note 719. at 3. Assuming thai onl% 5'- of .Medicare e.penditure, ie: atrtbutabie
to smoking (which he says is a consersati'e estimate). 1iam'. calculate, the i'.erage annual .iledicare
expenditure for cigarette-related illnesses (during 1995-1996) to be $9 3 billion "'Projected oer a 25-,ear
period, the present discounted value of such expendiiures 'ould come to S192 3 billion " Ii at 4 None
of those costs is covered under the proposal.
721. See Tobacco Settlement,. stqira note 32. at 30-31
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prohibition may reallocate or even increase the ETS costs borne by
nonsmokers. For instance, a ban on smoking in public settings would likely
have the effect of increasing the level of smoking at home, which would have
ETS-related health consequences for smokers' family members. The proposal
does nothing to respond directly to the problem of ETS exposure in the home
or to the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs borne by family and friends of
smokers on account of the smokers' ill health and premature death.7 2
One of the benefits of applying an ex post incentive-based approach to all
the costs of cigarettes (not just ETS costs) is that overall smoking levels,
public and private, would likely decrease dramatically (because of the price
effect) and cigarettes would likely become substantially safer, thereby reducing
the need for, as well as the cost of, command-and-control or performance-
based responses to public and private ETS exposure. Alternatively,
policymakers might consider something along the lines of the employer
liability plan (for workplace exposure) and patrons' compensation plan (for
non-workplace ETS public exposure) described in Subsection V.C.3. Under
those systems, the employers and the proprietors of public spaces themselves
would be given incentives to seek the least-cost means of reducing public ETS
exposure. If, however, any of the problems for ex post incentive-based systems
were to be present-such as the judgment-proof problem or widely dispersed
harm 723-something comparable to the proposal's public-smoking restrictions
may be warranted.
D. Specific Provisions Intended To Improve Manufacturer Care Levels
None of the provisions that we have examined thus far seems likely to
have a significant positive effect on encouraging manufacturers to design and
market safer cigarettes (that is, on manufacturer care levels). The proposed
settlement, however, contains a number of command-and-control and
performance-based provisions for regulating the design of cigarettes and the
manufacturing processes of cigarette manufacturers.
1. Command-and-Control Regulations
On the command-and-control side, the FDA would be given the "authority
to mandate the introduction of 'less hazardous tobacco products' that are
722. For a rough and, we think, conservative estimate of the current per pack costs associated with
all of these negative externalities, see supra Table 1.
723. See supra Subsections V.C.2-3.
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technologically feasible.' ' 2'4  This potential for commnand-and-control
regulations contains several drawbacks, at least when compared to an ex post
incentive-based regulatory approach. For instance, it is not at all clear how the
FDA is supposed to recognize a safer, technologically feasible cigarette that
is currently unavailable. The suggested solution to that problem appears to be
that the FDA will rely on manufacturers to provide such designs. "'  At first
blush, that makes sense because manufacturers are much better informed than
the FDA with respect to such options. Under closer inspection, however, the
policy does not make sense because it assumes that manufacturers will disclose
information about potential designs and perhaps produce (or license someone
else to produce) cigarette substitutes that they otherwise would not.72,
Consequently, the policy could create a strong disincentive to produce such
cigarettes, to disclose information about such cigarettes 2 7 or to create the
designs in the first 
place.
There are a number of factors that might explain a manufacturer's
unwillingness to design and produce viable cigarette substitutes under the
proposed regime. For instance, a manufacturer could, by offering an alternative
design, substantially destabilize the market for cigarettes. Cigarette substitutes
would supplant traditional cigarettes and the market share of each manufacturer
would be threatened. Insofar as the tobacco industry is aptly characterized as
engaging in some form of tacit or express collusion,7 2- such a destabilizing
act on the part of one manufacturer would be actively discouraged by other
industry members. 29  Perhaps only new entrants into the market--or
724. Tobacco Settlement, suqpra note 32. at 14 That is true onul **after a formial rule making subject
to the Administrative Procedures Act (*APA'). with the right of .udicial rc% e ,% " hi 'Ie proposal would
also provide for greater FDA oversight over the manufacturing process to precnt contamitation a.nd ensure
compliance with quality standards. See id. at 18
725. See id. at 14 ("The manufacturers %%ill be requtred to notif, FDA of ani technolog,, that thc,
develop or acquire and that reduces the risk from tobacco products and. for a commerciall, reasonable hee.
to cross license all such technology, but only to those companies also coered b,, tite same obligition, "I
726. The agreement provides in pertinent part:
ITjhe Agency shall have the authority to mandate that a manufacturer subjett to thi, A0zt ".ho
owns such technology (at such manufacturer's election) either introduce such products, or at
a commercially reasonable market rate. license such technolog, to a manufacturer ulto agfreC
to bring the technology to market in a reasonable time iratic lit the eent that no mianula.turcr
or licensee introduces such "less hazardous tobacco product%.- si.,thm a rea.onable time Irarie
set by [the] FDA. then the U.S. Public Health Service ma% produce either itsell, or through a
licensing arrangement, any such product.
Id. at 15.
727. With respect to past industry information of this sort. the proposal purpors to "ensure that
previously non-public or confidential [documents from] the tiles of the tobacco mdustr -in-luding internal
[health research] documents-are disclosed to [the] FDA. pn ate litiganisl. and the public] "" / at IS For
the details of those arrangements. see id. app. VIll. For a collection of critiques ol those arrangements. see
Tribe Testimony, supra note 677: Hubert Humphre Ill. Testinion, Before tle Senate Commerce
Committee (July 29. 1997) (on file with the Yale Ltt Jourmil). Alan Moms,.on. Serious HJa.%s in tobacco
Deal (July 23, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on tile .,tih t e Ktle Lt% Jinirrali
728. Cf. Anthony Flint, Collusion on Tobacco ti 64 Hmrid Report Sats Ciontnituis Jtnid ti
Strategies To Protect Documents. BOSTON GLOBE. Oct I. 1996. at A l
729. Cf DOUGLAS F. GREER, INDL STRIAL ORGA't..ATION AMt) Pt. BtiC POt."ic 278 m2d ed 94)
(noting that -it is not surprising that many cartels attempt to standardize their product. restrict ad'.ert,,ing.
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relatively small players with little to lose-would be willing to take such a
chance. For reasons discussed below, 730 however, the proposed regime
greatly discourages new entrants. In addition, there would be a disincentive to
produce safer cigarettes to the extent that tort claims remain viable and
evidence of safer cigarettes encourages courts and juries to find that the
manufacturers should be liable for harms caused by traditional cigarettes. 31
Moreover, even if the FDA could somehow manage to identify a safer
cigarette design, that does not imply that it should require that design to be
manufactured and sold. Even if a "safer cigarette" is, other things being equal,
safer than a traditional cigarette, other things may not be equal. As the
experience with low-tar or "light" cigarettes amply demonstrates, a design
change can lead to numerous changes that are difficult to anticipate and
measure, particularly when the "safer" alternative is still in the design phase.
Smokers may switch to the "safer" substitute and smoke more cigarettes, take
more puffs per cigarette, or inhale more deeply the smoke of safer cigarettes
than they did of the traditional cigarettes.732 Nonsmokers may begin smoking
and smokers may be slower to quit smoking because of the "low-risk"
alternative. For those sorts of reasons, it is easy to imagine that the risks posed
by the seemingly "safer" alternative would be as great or greater than those of
traditional cigarettes. To put this point in economic terms, cigarette costs
depend not just on manufacturer care levels, but also on activity levels and, in
a way, consumer care levels. The forces of command-and-control regulation
would likely affect manufacturer care levels alone. Under an ex post incentive-
based approach, however, the market would yield the optimal mix of care
levels and activity levels by internalizing the costs in the price of cigarettes
and creating a market for safer cigarettes.
2. Performance-Based Regulations
The proposed settlement also provides that, so as to "insur[e] that the best
available, feasible safety technology becomes the industry standard, [the] FDA
will have the authority to promulgate Performance Standards ... that require
the modification of tobacco products to reduce the harm caused by those
products. 733 Although the goal is ambitious, a closer reading reveals just
how anemic the FDA authority would be. For a minimum of twelve years, the
and regulate technological change, for standardization and stagnation are most conducive to cooperation").
730. See hnfra Subsection VI.E.2.
731. One provision in the proposed agreement provides that "[tlhe development of 'reduced risk*
tobacco products after the effective date of the Act is neither admissible nor discoverable." rabacco
Settleent, supra note 32, at 40. In light of that provision, manufacturers' liability-based disincentive may
be reduced. To the extent that courts or juries are already aware of safer cigarettes, however, they may on
their own draw the inference that older designs are unreasonably dangerous.
732. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
733. Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 15.
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FDA's ability to regulate nicotine would be limited by the following
conditions:
" Nicotine yields may be reduced but not eliminated; " -
" Traditional tobacco products may not be prohibited ; '
* Tobacco products may be modified, but only when the
modification (1) will result in a significant reduction of the health
risks to smokers; (2) is technologically feasible; and (3) will not
result in the creation of a significant black market 7 "t
* The authority to require modification can be exercised only upon
a complex and multidimensional showing of "substantial
evidence."'737
Most critics of the proposal have emphasized that this set of procedural
hurdles effectively weakens the FDA's current authority to regulate
nicotine.738 Indeed, that appears to be the primary objection of, among
others, President Clinton and the Koop-Kessler Committee.71, We suspect
that the problems with the performance-based rules will run deeper. Even if the
FDA could implement performance-based regulations on a whim, there is little
reason to believe that such regulations would be efficient. Again, the FDA
simply does not have the information that it would need to design efficient
performance-based standards. Indeed, the fact that the FDA has not, under its
current authority, implemented any form of significant cigarette design
regulation can be seen as an implied acknowledgement on the part of the FDA
of its own inability to regulate effectively.
" °
734. See id. at 15.
735. See id.
736. See id. at 15-16.
737. Id. at 16. As the agreement explains.
[A] showing of "substantial e',idence[l" [mut bel based upon air adiniistrati,, retord
developed through a formal rule making subject to the Adrmttraitie Procedures Act. %kith the
right of judicial review, and an) such modification -%hall be ubject to ihc curenit pro dures
of the Regulatory Reform Act of 1996 to pro% ide tlUe and a ptoce, for Congress tw inier, ene
should it so choose. In the event a party ,ubequenll files a petition seeking an adinui,tratle
review of whether a modification has. iu fact. resulted in the creation ol a agrtlltant deitand
for contraband or other tobacco products that do not iteet the .itei, standard and Ithel I-D-
denies the petition, the petitioner shall ha% e the nght to seek judicial re te,, ol tire deial of the
petition.
Id. The proposal also provides for the creation of a "Scientific Ad% ior% Comnutece" to stud, the clt.t,
of nicotine. Id. In addition, it provides for the reduction of tar leel in all cigarettes to 12 milligrams. as
currently measured by the FTC. See il. Although some of tire sub,,tani, and procedural conditions of
FDA regulation would be reduced after 12 )cars. 3ee id. the re%iction,, .,ould continue to be quite
substantial.
738. See. e.g., Freedman & Hwang. 3tupra note 7. Ltune McGiile.%. Thbau(o Dral Hit Ihudhlle ol
FDA Role, WALL ST. J., June 26. 1997. at A3: Dick Polmian. The Fire Print Lotin l.irte o(trr Sinokin2:,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 7, 1997. at G4
739. See Frisby, 3tupra note 701 (surnariing the \Vhte |louse cntiquer. Biarrm Mcier. Clinton
Ojficially Rejects Liti. on FD.A. or it baco Phn. N Y TiMI.s. Jul\ 10. 1997. at A20
740. Unfortunately it is impossible for us to be more specilic in our criticisms ot these pros isions
because the proposal says nothing about the specific terms of the possible periorntance-ba..cd regulations
that the FDA might try to implement.
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E. Transition Issues
The proposed settlement agreement raises a number of vexing transition
issues, along the lines of those discussed in Section V.C. What is distressing,
however, is that the proposal, in some places, appears to be completely
oblivious to the transition issues it raises. In other places, where transition
issues are at least recognized, the agreement appears terribly confused about
the appropriate response to those issues. In this section, we highlight a few
such examples.
1. The Distinction Between Past and Future Harms:
$368.5 Billion for What?
Under the proposal, the industry would pay out a total of $368.5 billion
over twenty-five years"' (not taking into account the effect of the volume-
adjustment provisions 742). Although this is far more money than most of us
are accustomed to contemplating, it is impossible to determine whether or not
it is the right amount of money without first asking: What is that $368.5
billion supposed to cover? Is it a payment by the industry for the past harms
caused by cigarettes? Or is it a series of payments designed to correct the
market failures in the cigarette market on a purely prospective basis? Or is it
something in between? The answers to those questions are critical to resolving
the transition issues posed by the proposal. Unfortunately, such answers cannot
be found in the text of the agreement.
One approach, discussed above,743 would be to regard all of the
payments as being designed to cover the future smoking-related Medicaid costs
(that is, as a purely prospective correction of the Medicaid insurance
externality). A rationale for taking this view would be that the amount of the
payments does roughly approximate the amount necessary to achieve that
future deterrence objective, though all the other past and future costs of
smoking would be left unaddressed, at least by the payments required under
the proposal. But, of course, the coincidence of the amount of the payments
under the agreement and the amount necessary to cover future Medicaid costs
could be just that-pure coincidence. It could be that the payments are
supposed to be in part for past and future smoking-related Medicaid costs, in
part for past and future Medicare costs, in part for past and future private
insurance costs, and so on. Either way, there is no doubt that the $368.5 billion
741. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34.
742. If the volume-adjustment provision is taken into account, a plausible estimate of the total industry
payouts under the proposal would be roughly $304 billion. See supra note 708.
743. See supra text accompanying notes 718-719.
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is far less than the amount necessary even to internalize fully the past harms
alone caused by cigarettes."
Perhaps the uncertainty about where the $368.5 billion figure comes from
and what specific harms it is supposed to cover stems from a deeper confusion
that characterizes the agreement: the apparent failure to understand the
distinction between punishment for past harms and the regulation of risk of
future harms, a distinction that is essential to optimizing both general and
specific deterrence goals. 745 As we noted earlier, political reality may require
that any new regime protect the existing manufacturers (or at least some of
them for some period of time) from bankruptcy. 7 6 Therefore, full cost
internalization may be impractical. But $365 billion over twenty-five years is
plainly inadequate, even taking into account bankruptcy concerns.7.7
2. Barriers to Entr.,
The proposal seems designed not only to protect the existing cigarette
manufacturers (at least the ones who were parties to the settlement agreement)
from bankruptcy, but also to protect them entirely from serious competition
from new market entrants. Although this portion of the proposal is especially
cryptic, the section dealing with "non-participating companies" would appear
to impose the following requirements on any cigarette manufacturer that is not
a party to the settlement agreement:
" They would be subject to all the same "access restrictions" and
FDA "regulatory oversight" that would be imposed on
participating companies; 7 '
" A "user fee" would be applied to their products to cover their
portion of the payments required under the agreement to fund
public health programs and state enforcement of access
restrictions;749
* To avoid constitutional challenges, they would not be subject to
the advertising and "corporate culture" provisions' that would
be imposed on participating companies, which have consented to
such restrictions;75 1
744. Cf sitpra note 575 (estimating roughly the costs of cigarettes oser just the past 10 year% to be
considerably in excess of SI trillion).
745. See stapra Subsection V.C.I.
746. See supra text accompanying note 579
747. See Harris. uapra note 579, at 292 (suggesting that the tobacco industry could afford to pay
roughly S32 billion per year, based on plausible assumptions)
748. Tobacco Settlenent. supra note 32. at 29
749. See id.
750. Id. at 21. These provisions essentially require that companies comply Aith the spint as ,.cll as
the letter of the settlement.
751. See id. at 28-29.
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* They would receive none of the protections from tort suits
afforded to participating companies;
752
" To ensure that these companies would not become judgment
proof, each nonparticipating company would be required to "place
into an escrowed reserve fund each year an amount equal to
150% of its share of the annual payment required of participating
manufacturers," exclusive of that portion of the payment allocated
to public health programs and federal and state enforcement, and
the manufacturer would be allowed to reclaim unpaid funds, with
interest, thirty-five years later;
753
" "[T]he exemption from civil liability applicable to distributors and
retailers of the products of participating manufacturers will not
apply to distributors and retailers who handle tobacco products of
non-participating manufacturers. 754
The effect of all these requirements is that any nonparticipating company,
presumably including any new market entrant, would have to pay one-and-a-
half times the amount that participating manufacturers would be required to
pay, even though new market entrants may have had no responsibility for the
past harms of smoking.755 As if that were not enough, nonparticipating
manufacturers would effectively be prevented from selling their products
through existing distribution channels because any distributor or retailer who
carries their products would lose its immunity for tort suits provided under the
agreement. Thus, to compete with the participating manufacturers, a
nonparticipating company must be prepared to provide its own distribution
system. Both of those requirements obviously act as barriers to entry into the
cigarette market, thereby serving to protect the existing, "participating"
cigarette manufacturers from suffering the competitive consequences of failing
to take into account, ex ante, the possibility of a transition to an ex post
incentive-based regime of regulation.756 By creating barriers to market entry,
752. See id.
753. Id.
754. Id. at 29.
755. The justification given for the large escrow payments required of nonparticipating manufacturers
is to avoid a judgment-proof problem-that is, to ensure that funds will be available to cover whatever tort
liability those companies end up having ex post. That is certainly a desirable goal. See supra Subsection
V.C.2. The problem with the provision as written, however, is that while it prevents judgment-proof
companies from entering the market, the settlement overall lets existing manufacturers off the hook for past
harms, sending the wrong general deterrence message to manufacturers in other industries.
756. Perhaps these provisions help to explain the fact that the stock prices of the major participating
tobacco companies fell only briefly when the settlement agreement was announced. See James F. Peltz &
Myron Levin, The Tobacco Settlement: How Will Firms Fare?, L.A. TIMEs, June 21, 1997, at DI. Indeed,
"[tlhe consensus among tobacco equity analysts is that a settlement would significantly boost tobacco stock
prices." Stuart Rossmiller, DMG Comments on Nabisco Holdings Corp., Nov. 25, 1997, available in
Bloomberg. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. Current News File. Of course, without a sophisticated event
study, it is impossible to know with any confidence whether the proposed settlement agreement has had
any effect on tobacco stock prices. And even if we could identify a significant effect, it would not be clear
what such an effect would mean about the market's interpretation of the settlement agreement. It would
depend on, among other things, what the market expects the eventual outcome of the tobacco litigation (and
threats of FDA regulation) to be. In any event, it seems fairly clear that the market does not expect that,
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a primary source of new ideas for developing safer cigarettes-the new, start-
up tobacco companies-is eliminated.
F. Assessing the Proposal from a Distance
We have focused thus far mostly on individual provisions of the
settlement. From that perspective, we have concluded that the proposal is
fundamentally flawed. The chief proponents of the proposal-particularly the
attorneys general who have endorsed it-have asserted that our vantage point
is inappropriate. They urge critics to step back and view the proposal as a
whole package. 7 57 They point out further that the settlement represents a
hard-fought negotiation against a savvy and wealthy industry that had yet to
pay a penny to anyone injured by cigarettes. "' There are, of course, some
imperfections in the agreement, they argue, but that is the nature of any give-
and-take process. And when one looks at the proposal pragmatically and
realistically, they claim, it is evident that much more was gained in the
negotiations than was lost.759 In the conclusion, we will take up the question
of whether, in fact, the settlement is preferable to what has been the status quo.
For the remainder of Part VI, we want to respond to the claim that the
proposal is somehow more attractive from a distance than it is from up close.
When one reads the entire proposal without focusing on the details, it is
hard to deny that it reads as though the settlement would, if enacted, usher in
a new age in the cigarette industry. In addition to the specific examples that
we provided already regarding the bright promises of many of the settlement's
specific provisions, the agreement has big-picture language of the sort that
at the end of the day, the existing tobacco companies % ill be held fully liable for all the harms causcd by
their cigarettes in the past or that they i.ll be left unprotected against unfettered competition fromn nc%
market entrants if a settlement is reached.
757. Christine Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington. %aid tt dcfensc of the settleticnt "It i,n't
perfect, but it's the best anyone has put fonvard." James Brooke. Attonneis Gen'rnl Defrend Landmark
Tobacco Pact, N.Y. TIMES, June 25. 1997. at D6 Grant \Wood,. Antona's Attome,,, General. adntonished
"'You've got to keep this thing in perspectte This i, the biggest public health and corporate
settlement in the history of this country.- Id. Tom Miller. Attorney General from lova and ,upportcr of
the settlement proposal, conceded that there may be some problems ,iith obtaining full dis-closure of
tobacco company documents, but urged critics not to let those problems 'dmsern attention from the broader
settlement." Barry Meier, Mtnnesota Official Invites Congressional Sc riln of TobaL co Imuhtstr' Files. N Y
TIMEs, July 28, 1997, at A10.
758. See. e.g.. Scott Harshbarger. WIha t Won in Tobc mco Deal. BOSTO\ G.o1tI. July 5. 1997. at
All (arguing that "'congressional criticism of our ,,ork is somtevhat like a group of AWOL soldiers
explaining how the war could have been .on better or faster" and concluding that "ilhis ai, an opportunity
that we must seize with both hands"). An unnamed tobacco represenmati,.e recently satd of the deal "'ltW
not perfect, but it's far better than \%hat the alematli\es are"" Saundra Ton. tirnnn Ag'aitnst Derlo.
Tobacco Aides Defend $368 Billion Settlement. WASii POS-. July, 18. 1997. at A 10
759. It is illuminating to consider, for instance, the initial reaction% to. and cnticisms of. the settlement
made by Drs. Koop and Kessler before the Senate Commerce Committee Koop and Kesler tirmi argued.
in effect, that the settlement should be scrapped and that Congress itself should draft a better set of
regulations. Supporters of the agreement argued in response that such proposal% vere simply unrealitic and
that the agreement represented a necessary compromise. See Sher% I Gay Stolberg. Kessler and Kimp ULme
Congress To Do Away ivtth the Tobacco Siilm'nent. N Y Tim:.s. Juls 30. 1997. at B7
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suggests something fundamental is about to happen to the incentives and
mindset of the captains of the cigarette industry. For instance, the opening
paragraph of the preamble reads as follows:
This legislation would mandate a total reformation and restructuring
of how tobacco products are manufactured, marketed and distributed
in this country. The nation can thereby see real and swift progress in
preventing underage use of tobacco, addressing the adverse health
effects of tobacco use and changing the corporate culture of the
tobacco industry.760
Similarly, Title I of the proposed settlement is named "Reformation of the
Tobacco Industry,"76' and Section G of Title I is called "Compliance and
Corporate Culture. '762 In that section, the proposal begins by observing that
[a] key element in achieving the Act's goals will be forcing a
fundamental change in the way the tobacco industry does business.
Accordingly, the Act will provide for means to ensure that the
industry will not only comply with the letter of the law but will also
have powerful incentives to prevent underage usage of tobacco
products and to strive to develop and market less hazardous tobacco
products.
763
The message in all of this seems to be that because of this agreement, the
industry can now be trusted. The culture of denial and deceit will be
fundamentally reformed.7 4 Manufacturers will want to comply not just with
the letter of the law, but also with the spirit of the law because the proposed
settlement, if enacted, will change their basic incentive structure.
The fairly close reading that we gave to some of the settlement details
suggests that claims regarding a change in corporate culture are grossly
exaggerated. But, as we have said, in this section we want to step back, if that
is possible, and take a more distant view of the settlement. If one imagines the
range of regulatory options that we have described in this Article as lying
along a continuum-with ex post incentive-based regulation at the left end,
command-and-control regulations at the right end, and performance-based
regulation somewhere in-between-and if one were to imagine stacking each
of the settlement's provisions on top of that continuum according to the
category of regulation that it represented, one could get an illuminating overall
760. Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at I.
761. Id. at 8.
762. Id. at 21.
763. Id.
764. For general accounts of the tobacco culture, see HiLTS, supra note 12: and KLUGER, supra note
9. See also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing the industry's basic strategies to avoid
meaningful regulation).
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picture of the proposed settlement. Because the vast majority of provisions are
command-and-control rules, the right side of the continuum would be stacked
high. The left side, in contrast, would be flat. In between, there would be one,
maybe two, examples of performance-based regulation, but even they would
be located well toward the right end of the continuum. That landscape, as we
have already stressed, is precisely the opposite of what would be ideal.
What makes this skewed landscape especially troubling, however, is that
it is probably no accident. It is, from the tobacco industry's perspective, ideal.
As we have emphasized throughout, command-and-control is the least effective
form of regulation. It requires the regulator to have an enormous amount of
information about the product, information that the regulator often must rely
on the industry to provide. Insofar as the industry is the source of the
regulator's information, it becomes relatively easy for the industry to
manipulate the process and to avoid really having to internalize the costs of
their actions. 765 Furthermore, the regulations themselves are severely limited
by the inability of the regulator to anticipate every countermove that the
industry might make in its attempt to save the money that would otherwise
have to be spent in complying with the spirit of the regulation. As we have
argued in this part, those criticisms certainly apply to the settlement's
numerous command-and-control regulations. To be sure, the agreement also
contains some elements of performance-based regulations, which, in theory,
might pose somewhat of a regulatory threat to the cigarette industry. As we
have noted, however, the performance-based aspects of the settlement are
rendered quite anemic by substantial ex ante and ex post loopholes and the
poorly calibrated and relatively minor surcharges for failing to meet
performance targets.
Considering the big picture, therefore, we have no trouble rejecting the
suggestion that the proposed settlement would somehow substantially alter the
culture or incentives of the tobacco industry. To the contrary, the basic
incentives of manufacturers would remain. They would still seek to find and
to create loopholes in the regulations. They would still seek to misrepresent the
risks to consumers and regulators. Under the proposed regime, their options
may be fewer, but not by that much. And we see nothing in the agreement
itself to indicate that there has been any sort of fundamental transformation in
the industry mindset. There was no public admission regarding the health risks
and addictiveness of cigarettes (except by the one manufacturer that was not
party to the agreement).7 67 There has been no apology for past conduct and
765. That phenomenon is known, generally. as the problem of *'capture." See W. Kip VIscrtSI E-r AL.
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 38-39 (2d ed. 1995).
766. See supra Subsection VI.D.2.
767. Bennett LeBow, CEO of Liggett's parent company. is regularly characterized as a tobacco
industry maverick for settling with the state attorneys general and for conceding that cigarettes kill and are
addictive (and that cigarette manufacturers intentionally targeted minors). See John M Broder. 20 States
Ask the White House To Spare One Cigarette Maker. N.Y. TimmS. Aug 21. 1997. at A19 In %cry recent
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no admission of wrongful conduct. Indeed, in the time since the proposed
settlement was made public, it has been business as usual for the industry:
Witness Camel's recent advertisements,768 the introduction and advertisement
of Winston's new additive-free cigarette,769 manufacturers' strong resistance
to any regulations requiring that they disclose additives and total nicotine
content,770 and their attack on Dr. Stanton Glantz.
771
Our very strong sense at the end of the day is that the proposed tobacco
settlement would accomplish precisely what previous efforts to regulate the
cigarette industry have accomplished. Specifically, the proposal would create
depositions in Florida, two tobacco executives made headlines by admitting that cigarettes may pose a
health risk. Geoffrey Bible, chairman and CEO of Philip Morris admitted that about 100,000 Americans
"might have" died from smoking-related diseases. Philip Morris Chief Says Smoking Deaths May Number
100,000, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at A4. The following day, Steven F. Goldstone, chairman of the
company that owns the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, testified that he believed that smoking plays a
"part in causing lung cancer." Barry Meier, Chief of R.J. Reynolds Says Smoking Has Role in Cancer, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1997, at A7. These recent admissions may have been intended to avoid outraging the
Florida jury by continuing to deny that cigarettes have ill-health effects in the face of, among other things,
LeBow's admissions to the contrary. See id.
As this Article went to press, there were reports that executives of the leading tobacco companies,
including Geoffrey Bible, had admitted in testimony before the House of Representatives that nicotine is
addictive, "as the term is commonly understood." Barry Meier, Tobacco Eirecutives Wlar Penitent Before
House Panel in Hopes of Preserving Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, at A 15. The executives also
conceded, "in dramatic contrast to the testimony of tobacco officials four years ago," that smoking either
causes lung cancer or is a risk factor in the disease. Id. The executives' concessions were apparently
intended to "rally support for the embattled [settlement proposal]." Id.
768. See supra text accompanying note 691.
769. R.J. Reynolds very recently introduced a reformulated Winston cigarette, apparently in response
to the growing public awareness of the nearly 600 additives-including licorice and ammonia-that
cigarette manufacturers commonly include in their cigarettes. See Sucin L. Hwang, Health Groups
Challenge Winston Ad Claims, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at B I. Public health groups have criticized the
ad campaign launching the new cigarette-a campaign that asks smokers, "What the heck have you been
smoking?"-as misleading and amounting to a health claim. Id. They view the campaign as "evidence that
the industry is still doing business as usual." Id.
770. Massachusetts was the first state in the nation to require manufacturers to reveal additives,
including total nicotine content, in cigarettes sold in the state. According to Gregory Connolly, head of the
Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program of the state Department of Public Health, the industry is "playing
games" in an effort not to comply. Richard Saltus, Makers To Reveal Cigarette Additives; Massachusetts
Order Is First in the Nation, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 1997, at BI.
771. In July 1997, the National Smokers Alliance, a new citizens group funded mostly by the tobacco
industry, filed a suit charging Dr. Stanton Glantz, a statistician and professor of medicine at the University
of California San Francisco, with scientific misconduct in an influential study concluding that smoking bans
in 15 communities produced no adverse economic impact on restaurants. Dr. Kenneth Warner, an economist
and public health expert at the University of Michigan and one of the original peer reviewers of Glantz's
study, made the following observation: "This seems like a two-sided strategy by the tobacco industry....
They're playing good guys in the settlement negotiations with the government, and they're playing the
game harder than ever with Dr. Glantz." Bill Richards, Pro-Tobacco Groups Step Up Attacks on a
Longtime Foe, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at BI; cf. Suein L. Hwang, Fire Fight: Doctor Whose Study
Tied Joe Camel to Kids Takes an Odd Journey, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at Al (describing R.J.
Reynold's aggressive and litigious reaction to Dr. Paul Fischer's famous study). Dr. Glantz's motion to
dismiss the complaint has been granted. See Tobacco Litigation at a Glantz: A Lawsuit To Silence an
Industry Antagonist Is Thrown out of Court, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1997, at A20. For a description of
how the tobacco industry has financed a variety of "fake grassroots ('astroturf') organizations," see Kelder
& Daynard, supra note 3, at 70. For another example of how the industry is employing those organizations
in an effort to push the settlement, see Tatiana S. Boncompagni & Jill Abramson, Tobacco-Funded Group
Gives Legislators Free Trips, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1997, at A20.
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the illusion of regulation (at least initially) while simultaneously protecting the
industry from having to internalize the costs of cigarettes. 2 In the words of
C. Everett Koop: "The tobacco industry has always been able to get around or
hurdle over measures we set up to try to stop them ... to make victories of




In this Article, we have attempted to offer a largely economic defense of
a number of claims. First, the cigarette market is characterized by severe
market failures-namely, information problems and negative externalities.
Consequently, immediate government intervention is required, especially given
the magnitude of the harms caused by cigarette smoking. Second, the best
regulatory response to those market failures is generally to rely as little as
possible on command-and-control regulation and to adopt some form of victim-
initiated ex post incentive-based regulation, such as enterprise liability or
smokers' compensation. Third, to the extent it is politically feasible, the
adoption of such a regime should be made retroactive so as to internalize not
only the harms caused by cigarettes in the future, but also the harms caused
by past smoking. Finally, the recently proposed tobacco settlement agreement
takes precisely the wrong approach in recommending the adoption of numerous
command-and-control, and limited performance-based, measures and by
eviscerating the only existing ex post incentive-based approach (tort law)
without proposing any alternative such regime.
Based on the analysis contained in this Article, we recommend that
Congress reject the settlement proposal and start over from scratch, this time
beginning with the following question in mind: How can we design an
effective ex post incentive-based response to the cigarette problem'? This
Article contains the framework for beginning that analysis, although much
work on the details obviously remains to be done. 7 4
Those who are interested in the cigarette problem might also ask, however:
What if the apparent momentum in Washington to enact a comprehensive and
preemptive federal regulatory response to the cigarette problem should die, and
we should return to the status quo of a few months or a few years ago? Based
on the arguments in this Article, if product-accident deterrence is our
overriding goal, we would strongly prefer existing products liability doctrines
to the proposed settlement.
772. That was the effect, for example. of the tvo most ,igmlicant prior efforts to regulate ctgareue
manufacturers. See supra note 9.
773. Taylor, supra note 612.
774. We take a step toward filling in some of these details in Hanson et Al. smprt note 40
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In contrast to this view, much of the recent discussion about whether and
how to regulate cigarettes seems to be based on the assumption that products
liability law--or, for that matter, any form of victim-initiated ex post
incentive-based regime-should be dropped altogether. For example, to the
question of whether cigarette manufacturers should be liable to smokers
through one or another mechanism, a common response is that smokers should
not be permitted to foist the consequences of their own decisions onto others.
Richard Epstein, for instance, recently argued that cigarette manufacturers
should not have to pay a penny to anyone and that, instead, "smokers should
own up to ... their actions." 775 Robert Samuelson expresses a similar
sentiment: "I don't smoke and would fight my children if they start. But
otherwise, people have a right to choose. Punishing them for their choice
denies their freedom. Rewarding them for the ill effects of their choice denies
their responsibility.
776
That sort of "take responsibility" rhetoric is powerful, particularly in the
United States, where we have long taken pride in our national ideal of rugged
individualism. (This is, after all, Marlboro country.) If the goal is to make all
parties "own up" to their decisions, however, several arguments can be made
that the appropriate policy response would be to adopt enterprise liability or
some other such victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulatory system.
First, although the critics of products liability currently seem to exercise
exclusive rights to the "take responsibility" rhetoric, it is not at all clear why
that rhetoric could not be deployed at least as effectively by defenders of tort
law. For example, a strong argument can be made that, without products
liability or some other type of ex post incentive-based regulation of cigarettes,
tobacco manufacturers would be allowed to avoid responsibility for their
actions.777 Indeed, some analysts have calculated that the proposed settlement
would, if enacted, increase the industry's net profits. 778 Second, even if we
are worried primarily about individual rather than corporate responsibility, the
only way to be sure that smokers take full responsibility for their actions
would be through the implementation of an ex post incentive-based regime of
775. Epstein, supra note 22.
776. Samuelson, supra note 22; see also Chapman, supra note 22 ("The war on the tobacco industry
is also a war on the right of individuals to make their own choices-and their obligation to take
responsibility for the consequences.").
777. See supra notes 12, 144, 161, 219, and accompanying text (providing examples of the industry's
most culpable conduct); cf Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075 passim (1996) (discussing several recent Supreme Court decisions on products
liability and calling for the Court to reconsider doctrine that encourages irresponsible manufacturer
conduct).
778. See John M. Broder, Industr Windfall Seen in Tobacco Deal, GREENSBORO NEws & REC.
(N.C.), Sept. 23, 1997, at AI (describing an FrC study finding that "the tobacco companies could reap us
much as $123 billion in additional profits in the next 25 years if the settlement plan is adopted as drafted");
see also Peter Passell, Tobacco Might Thrive with a $1.50-a-Pack Rise for Cigarettes, N.Y. TIM.S, Sept.
25, 1997, at D2 (describing a study by a Stanford economist indicating that even if President Clinton's
proposed $1.50 per pack tax were adopted, the market value of tobacco stocks would increase).
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regulation and its effects on the price of cigarettes. Otherwise, smokers would
continue to externalize substantial costs in the form of environmental tobacco
smoke, higher insurance rates, and the like.
Under a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system, there is no doubt
that smokers would be responsible for their decisions. For starters, they would
have to pay when purchasing each pack of cigarettes, in the form of higher
product prices, for their right to make a claim when a smoking-caused illness
occurs. The arrangement is virtually identical to the arrangement that exists
between insureds and their first-party insurers. Thus, they would not be getting
something for nothing and could not evade responsibility. Even to the extent
smokers or their families receive compensation for their harms, it is difficult
to say that the dead or seriously ill smoker would ever fully evade the ultimate
responsibility for her smoking decisions.
That is not the only misconception about the role of civil liability laws in
the cigarette context. Indeed, critics and supporters of the proposed settlement
share two flawed premises, which nevertheless seem to be dictating the terms
of the policy debate. First, both sides assume that the primary purpose of
products liability law in this context is not to serve public health goals, but
simply to compensate those injured by smoking. Second, both sides seem to
agree that civil liability laws have, to date, failed to serve that or any other
worthwhile goal. Consequently, most participants in the debate have indicated
in one way or another that the elimination of products liability law would be
no big loss, even for smoking plaintiffs. The proponents of the proposed
settlement, for instance, point out that, even if $368.5 billion does not cover
all the harms caused by cigarettes, it is a lot more than nothing, which is what
manufacturers are often said to have paid in tort damages to individual
plaintiffs to date.779 Critics are typically less explicit. They make their views
known either by not mentioning the effect of the settlement on tort law or by
indicating that they would not challenge that effect if only the settlement could
be adjusted to serve public health goals better.7 °
Arguably, however, the principal goal of products liability law is, broadly
speaking, public health, not compensation. In the cigarette context in particular,
the question then becomes whether the public health goal is better achieved
through products liability law or through the types of regulation envisaged in
the proposed settlement. Those who would sacrifice products liability law to
accept the settlement implicitly assume that the public health benefits of the
latter would outpace the public health benefits of the former. But, perhaps
because of the general anti-tort sentiment in this country, that presumption has
779. See, e.g., Benjamin Wieser, Tobaccos Trials. WASIt PosT. Dec 8. 1996. § W (Magazine). at
15 (stating that, of 800 suits filed against tobacco companies, only 12 went to tral and none tesulted in
the payment of damages to a plaintiff).
780. See supra note 612 (describing the consensus vtew that the ton la%% implications of the settlement
proposal are of little significance).
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been largely unexamined and is, for several reasons that we have already
noted, highly questionable.
Products liability law comes far closer, at least in theory, to providing an
ex post incentive-based type of regulation than any alternative form of
regulation now being considered (other than the smokers' compensation regime
we are proposing). Moreover, products liability law could have more than just
a theoretical impact. It is true that no substantial tort judgments have been won
against the tobacco industry. Nevertheless, products liability law is currently
in a state of flux or disequilibrium. In our view, the growing inevitability of
many large civil judgments against the industry helped push the manufacturers
to the negotiating table and thus made the $368.5 billion settlement offer
possible. In other words, to say that the settlement agreement would produce
$368.5 billion while tort law has produced nothing is to misunderstand what
moti-iated the agreement in the first place.
It would be more accurate to claim that command-and-control regulation,
not products liability law, has failed those who have been harmed by cigarette
smoking. The FDA has long declined to exercise its authority in this area,
presumably because of the political power of the cigarette industry78 ' and
because of the FDA's lack of expertise regarding how best to regulate.
Furthermore, it has been administrative regulation that has effectively derailed
otherwise viable tort claims against cigarette manufacturers.782 For example,
the FTC-promulgated warning labels have given rise to the preemption
defense 783 and greatly strengthened the assumption-of-risk defense in tort
law. Those defenses have until very recently proved an insurmountable barrier
to tort recovery. Thus, in light of this past experience with administrative
regulation, it is not clear that we should have much confidence in the expanded
role for administrative regulation contemplated in the settlement proposal.
Indeed, the American public should be troubled (though not especially
surprised) by the fact that the settlement proposal, which the tobacco industry
fully supports, would adopt a mix of regulation (lots of command-and-control
provisions, some limited performance-based standards, and essentially zero ex
post incentive-based regulation) that is entirely consistent with the interests of
the tobacco industry.
Although we believe the case for ex post incentive-based regulation to be
quite strong, we would not be surprised to learn that our analysis has
overlooked some important considerations that may weaken the case.71
781. See supra note II; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
782. See supra note 9.
783. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992) (plurality opinion) supra note 9.
784. Some readers may find our arguments persuasive but nevertheless reject our policy
recommendation. The biggest source of that turnabout seems to be the classic slippery slope problem. If
we adopt this form of regulation for tobacco, the argument goes, why not for alcohol, chocolate, attd fatty
foods? One commentator has captured that argument as follows: "Plenty of companies make money selling
goods and services that carry serious risks--including 130-proof whiskey, trips up Mt. Everest and cars that
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Nevertheless, at the very least we hope that our arguments have been
sufficiently provocative and developed to convince those in a position to enact
policies to slow down and consider all the regulatory alternatives. Cigarettes
and their immense ill-health costs have been, and will likely continue to be,
with us for many years. Now is no time for legislative myopia.
can travel twice the legal speed limit. But we don't let the family of a Corecte o.%ner sue Chesrolet
because he got killed trying to take a turn too fast." Chapman. jupra note 22. see also it C"McDonald's
and Burger King sell fat-drenched fare that many people find impossible to resist esen though it may
someday kill or cripple them.").
To that sort of challenge we have a vanety of responses There are. in our sie%. many relesant
distinctions between cigarettes and other products-disttnctions that. %shen taken together. add up to a
relevant difference. First, the magnitude of cigarette nsks are far greater than the risks posed b) an) other
consumer product. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text Second. ,,hile there as no senou, argument
that a lifetime of smoking, even if done in moderation. actually iniprues one's health. ire iealth Care
Refon Hearings, supra note 330. at 319 (statement of Jeffrey Hams) (responding to tis samc slippery
slope argument and asserting that "cigarettes are toxic to all smokers. at eser dose"l EPA, STI1; Tlit-
RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that there is no e.sdence of a threshold belo,% shich
smoking will not cause cancer), recent studies suggest that moderate alcohol consumption may hase
healthful effects, see Mafion Nestle. Alcohol Guidelnes r Chrontc Disease Prri ention From Prolhbtitin
to Moderation, NUTRITION TODAY, Mar. 13. 1997. at 86 Those iv.o reasons add up to a third By making
cigarette manufacturers pay, there is little or no risk of actually causing consumers to s.%tch to more
dangerous activity. Fourth, there is good evidence (though there could be much better brand-specific
evidence) regarding the causal link between cigarettes and the particular diseases itey cause Fifth, the
number of cigarette manufacturers is limited, and the source of a %ictim's injunes is relatm,.ely easy to
identify, thus facilitating a brand-specific causal analysis In contrast. it is not possible to identity the
particular health effects of the fat and cholesterol that sonic consumers dense from eating at McDonald's
or Burger King. Sixth, almost all of the relevant harms of cigarettes are temporall) distant from most ol
the benefits. While that may also be true of chocolate, it is less true of alcohol and eein less true of other
risky activities-for example, sky-diving or motorcycle rding Ses enth. cigarettes are chemically addeticse
See supra note 144. Finally, the tobacco industry has actm'.el nisrepresented the underlsing risks of
smoking. See supra notes 12. 58. 769. And after all is said and done. to the etent there are other products
that come close to cigarettes on a number of the above-lsted dimensions. %c hae no problem s.th sliding
down the slippery slope. See supra note 262.
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APPENDIX: A CLOSER LOOK AT VISCUSI'S SURVEY DATA
In Part II, we attempted to rebut the commonsense notion that consumers are well-informed of the
risks of smoking. In addition, we responded to the arguments and evidence presented by some efficiency-
minded legal scholars (principally W. Kip Viscusi) that purport to buttress that commonsense notion. At
the time, we postponed a more detailed critique of Viscusi's data and methodology. We take up that
critique now. In particular, we examine in some detail the flaws in the survey data on which Viscusi
primarily relies.
A. A Questionable Reference Point
In Section II.A, we described some of the findings of Viscusi's survey research (and his analysis
of tobacco industry survey data) on the question of what consumers estimate the risks of smoking to be.
One of Viscusi's central findings was that, to the question "[a]mong 100 cigarette smokers, how many
of them do you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?", 8 ' the average answer from survey
respondents was 43%. T7 This percentage is much larger than what Viseusi estimates to be the true
reference point (the actual risk of lung cancer to smokers), which he puts at 5% to 10% per year.'
7
Thus, he concludes, smokers may actually be overestimating, rather than underestimating, the risks posed
by cigarette smoking.
71
Even if one were to accept Viscusi's summary of estimated risks as described in Part !1, there is
reason to suspect that he significantly understates the actual risks that consumers believed they were
estimating. Viscusi calculates the reference point for assessing lung cancer risk by dividing the annual
smoking-caused lung cancer mortality figure in 1982 (93,500) by the number of people who smoked in
1985 (52.9 million). 7 9 The average annual risk of lung cancer mortality, by that measure, is
approximately .00177 per smoker. But the average annual risk figure is not a plausible true-risk reference
point. The survey respondents were asked how many of 100 "smokers" would get lung cancer because
they smoked. Although the survey respondents were not told what the survey question meant by the term
"smoker,"' it is unlikely that they would have had in mind the risks faced by an average smoker in
785. ViSCUS, supra note 49, at 155.
786. See id. at 68.
787. See id.
788. See id. at 145.
789. See id. at 68 & n.19. Careful readers may have noticed that respondents in the national survey
were not asked about lung cancer mortality; they were asked only about lung cancer (fatal or not). See id.
at 64. For this reason, Viscusi's true-risk reference point may be too low. Viscusi conducted two smaller
surveys in Durham, North Carolina. In one, he asked 53 respondents the same question as was asked in
the national survey. In the other, he asked 206 respondents about death from lung cancer. The average
response in the former survey was that 41% of smokers would get lung cancer because they smoke; the
average response in the latter survey was that 38% of smokers would die from lung cancer because they
smoke. See id. at 76-77. The difference was not statistically significant, and Viscusi concludes "that the
assessed lung cancer fatality rate from smoking is very similar to the assessed lung cancer incidence rate."
Id. at 77.
790. In describing one limitation of the underlying studies, Viscusi writes:
The character of the data requires the analysis to focus on static consumption decisions. What
are the individuals' risk perceptions and tastes, and how do these affect observed smoking
behavior? The nature of the data analyzed consequently does not permit consideration of
changes in smoking behavior, such as decisions to quit smoking.
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any single given year, inasmuch as the term implies a continuing status and would not be likely to elicit
a one-year risk estimate.
Viscusi nowhere explicitly acknowledges this key definitional problem with the survey data, but
he does implicitly acknowledge it in the following way: In his calculations to obtain a range for the
true-risk reference point, Viscusi multiplies the average annual risk figure (.00177) by the total number
of years that a "smoker" might smoke. He chooses thirty years for the low end of the range (05). and
sixty years for the high end (.10).7" It is this thirty- to sixty-year risk figure that he compares with
respondents' risk perceptions. In other words, Viscusi understands that, to compare the actual risk of
"smoking" against the respondents' estimates, the annual risk figure had to be multiplied by a substantial
number to reflect the fact that survey respondents likely imagined "'smoker" to refer to a long-term
smoker (i.e., someone who smokes for thirty to sixty years). Viscusi's solution to the definitional
problem, however, is inadequate. If survey respondents did understand "'smokers" to mean "long-term
smokers," then it is necessary to do more than simply multiply the average annual risk figure by some
"long-term" number of years. Recall that the average annual nisk figure is calculated with till smokers.
including short-term smokers, in the denominator. Short-term smokers, however, face a much lower
annual risk of lung cancer than do long-term smokers.' Consequently. the average annual risk figure
on which Viscusi relies significantly understates the risk of smoking to long-term smokers "
There is another reason to suspect that Viscusi's reference point understates the risk that survey
respondents believed they were estimating. The survey question asked only about the risk of ling can 'r
Many survey respondents might have, when answering the multiple-question. fise minute telephone
survey, T9 estimated total mortality risks (including, for example, the risk of heart disease)." Viscust
Id. at 87. Contrary to this statement, the studies reported by Viscusi do not measure "'observed smoking
behavior." Indeed, they do not even measure reported smoking behavior, they measure self-reported status
as a "current smoker," a "never-smoker," or a "former cigarette smoker." Id. at 155. Each respondent was
asked to characterize himself or herself, abstractly, in a way that he or she possibly had never consciously
done. Complicating matters further, both the risk-perception and smoking "behas tor" questions ,,ere
presented as if there were no difference, in terms of risk or self-definition, between smoking a pack per
week or three packs per day, see id., a variable that can have a significant effect on a smoker's health. see
SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-44.
791. See VIscusI, supra note 49, at 68. Our calculations, based on Viscusi's numbers, indicate that
the range is from .053 (30 years) to .106 (60 years).
792. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text (describing evidence that many smokers do
manage to quit); supra note 156 and accompanying text (citing evidence that quitting rcscrse s many of the
ill-health effects of smoking).
793. Viscusi reports more recent evidence suggesting that 117,000 people die yearly from smoking-
induced lung cancer. See ViscusI, supra note 49, at 84 n.20. Viscusi opts not to base his reference point
on that updated information because "[ilmposing such a standard retroactively is an inappropriate standard
for judging the soundness of earlier decisions." Id. at 67. We disagree. In our vies,. the relevant question
in this context is whether consumers are well-informed of the underlying risks of smoking If they are not.
then the market will not lead to the efficient outcome and enterprise liability (or some other form of
incentive-based regulation) may help overcome that market failure. See supra Section II C Using the
updated mortality figures, Viscusi calculates a lung cancer risk range of between .06 and 125 See VISCLSt,
supra note 49, at 68.
794. See ViSCuSi, supra note 49, at 153.
795. This possibility seems especially likely given the order and phrasing of the sur,ey questions
Immediately before the lung cancer question (Question 3). respondents were asked questions pertaining to
cigarettes' total risks. Question I read: "When I mention cigarettes, what comes to your mind" PROBE:
Anything else?" And Question 2 asked if respondents had heard (even if they did not agree) that smoking
"will most likely shorten a person's life," "is dangerous to a person's health," "is bad for a person', health,
but not dangerous," and "is not bad for a person's health." Id. at 154-55. The fact that Question 3 asked
only about lung cancer was a subtle change of orientation that might have gone unnoticed by the telephone
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implicitly acknowledges that possibility (as well as the possibility that consumers are more likely to
underestimate the less salient risks of smoking)."9 To correct for it, he calculates the "total smoking
mortality risk" to be a range between .16 and .36--"roughly triple the lung cancer mortality risk."
' 7
Other scientists using different methodologies, however, have estimated that the mortality risks of
smoking are significantly higher. For instance, a 1962 Royal College of Physicians study summarized
mortality studies indicating that approximately half of all adult smokers would die from a
smoking-related illness.7" A 1992 study found that "in each 5-year age group from 45 to 74 the death
rates of the smokers are more than double those of non-smokers," suggesting again that roughly half of
all smokers die of smoking-related causes." Those figures suggest that Viscusi's subjects
underestimate the relevant risks, and may, in Viscusi's words, "necessitate a change in the nature of the
discussion."' 0 In sum, Viscusi's "true-risk reference point" is probably too low, and his claim
regarding consumer overestimation of smoking risks is likely overblown. Moreover, it is really not
possible to construct an accurate true-risk reference point absent much better information regarding what
survey respondents thought they were estimating and regarding what the risks truly are to the specific
group of "smokers" that survey respondents had in mind. s'0
respondents, in part because lung cancer is the most salient risk associated with cigarettes. For a summary
of why lung cancer risks are the most salient, see id. at 77.
The order and wording of the survey, furthermore, likely biased respondents' estimates upward by
reminding them of negative information about cigarettes and encouraging them to commit to a negative
evaluation early on, before hearing other questions (including the lung cancer question). See generall'
HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATTITUDE SURVEYS:
EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDING. AND CONTEXT 23-77, 179-201 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing
the possible effects of survey wording and ordering on outcomes); id. at 203-30 (discussing "agreeing-
response bias" or "acquiescence").
Viscusi recognizes the potentially biasing effects of question order. See VIscusi, supra note 49, at
88. Moreover, he emphasizes the "overwhelmingly adverse sentiment" that the first question elicited "even
among current product users." Id. For whatever reason, however, Viscusi nowhere considers the possible
biasing effect that those extremely negative answers might have had on subsequent answers. Cf. infra note
824 (explaining that the absence of a "don't know" option may have had a biasing effect).
796. See VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 69-70.
797. Id. at 70.
798. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, supra note 60, at 44.
799. R. Peto et al., MortalitY from Tobacco in Developed Countries: idirect Estimation from National
Vital Statistics, 339 LANCEr 1268, 1270 (1992). The authors of that study explain further that "[i]f,
conservatively, it was assumed that 'only' two-thirds of the observed more-than-twofold mortality excess
is caused by tobacco then the [National Cancer Institute] study would still suggest that about 40% of all
regular cigarette smokers would eventually be killed by their habit." Id.
800. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 68. Survey respondents might also have, for the same sort of reason,
been estimating total smoking-caused mortality and morbidity (including, for instance, emphysema), a
possibility that Viscusi does not consider. If so, that probability would likely be substantially higher than
50%. See Medical-Care Expenditures Attributable to Cigarette Smoking-United States. 1993, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 469, 472 (1994) (noting that indirect losses associated with
morbidity totaled $6.9 billion in 1990); see also Jan J. Barendregt et al., The Health Care Costs of Smoking,
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1052, 1053 tbl.2 (1997) (concluding that smokers have a significantly higher
chance than nonsmokers of contracting many serious diseases).
801. Viscusi acknowledges that "[how one asks the risk-perception question can be of substantial
consequence," and that "whatever risk perception question wording is chosen should be well understood
by respondents." VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 74 (emphasis added). To determine whether results of the
national survey provided "a reliable index of smoking risk beliefs," Viscusi conducted a number of
telephone surveys in the Durham, North Carolina area to explore "the sensitivity of the risk responses to
variations in the question formulation." Id. at 76. Based on his summary review of those studies, Viscusi
concludes that they were probably reliable. See id. at 82-83.
For a variety of reasons, however, we remain concerned that the wording of the question did indeed
affect the outcome and that Viscusi's sensitivity tests were inadequate. First, many of the other surveys that
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B. Qualitative Versus Quantitative Data
There is a fair amount of survey data regarding consumers' risk perceptions of cigarettes For
instance, Gallup conducts annual surveys that track consumer awareness of smoking nsks -' Vtust,
however, downplays the significance of those surveys for the following reasons
The wording of the questions pertaining to the risk does not elicit a specific probabilit
judgment regarding the hazards of smoking. . The survey questions ascertain ahether
respondents believe that cigarette smoking is "harmful - However. the risk threshold as to
what constitutes harm may differ across individuals so that the implications of designating
any particular risk as harmful are not necessarily uniform across respondents In addition.
even for any particular respondent we do not know what it means for a product to be
-harmful."' '
For those reasons, Viscusi concludes that "'[alcross-person comparisons of qualitattse risk variables
may be invalid."'  They "cannot resolve the issue of whether the absolute level of rik perceptions
Viscusi conducted did not vary the wording of the question as much as the) sancd the questini being
asked. (We have not seen the actual surveys: we hase seen on., Viscusi's cursor) description of them
As far as we can tell, there were only two surveys that reworded the question asked on the national sur,,e)
In one of them, respondents were asked "how many among the 2 million cigarette sitokers in North
Carolina would get lung cancer because they smoke." and it another they %.ere asked "ho man> aniong
1,000 cigarette smokers would get lung cancer because the), smoke - I. at 76 Viscusi does not tell reader,
what the numerical responses were to those questions. Instead. he reports onl, that respondents tended to
give their answers in percentage terms. See id. That fact. he indicates, suggests that the sording of the
national survey is appropriate. Perhaps so. but. especially given that respondents translated their ansafers
into the same terms, it would be interesting to know %%hat their responses %ere If the responses %,ere
significantly lower than the ansswers provided in the national survey, that vwould tend to cast doubt on
Viscusi's conclusions. Moreover, Viscusi's other survey %anations seem targel. if not cntirely.
unresponsive to the basic critique in this section--that is. that the .aord "'smoker" %%as noahere defined
802. See id. at 48.
803. Id. at 48 (footnote omitted). Viscusi purports to offer "lain additional problem" ilth qualitati'.e
risk assessments-specifically. "that the subjective risk cutoffs for labeling an actisity nk) ar) across
individuals." Id. For example, college-educated workers described jobs ailh an annual injur) rate of 06
as "dangerous." while workers who had not gone to college labeled a job a tth an injur) rate of 09
"dangerous." See id. It is not clear to us that there is a difference betseen this "additional problem" and
the first problem that Viscusi identifies--that is. that "the risk threshold as to %%fhat constitutes harm lia
differ across individuals." Id. In any event. although Viscust finds this sanation across education lese.ls
"substantial," id., it is arguably insubstantial. The evidence suggests a difference of onl) three percentage
points between college-educated workers and ,orkers who did not go to college ti.th respect to ahethcr
a workplace was considered dangerous.
804. Id. at 48. Despite his criticisms of qualitative studies. Viscusi argues that the) ne ertheless "pro% ide
a mechanism for tracking the development of risk perceptions ocr titme" Id at 49 lie justifies that claim
by asserting that "comparison over time for relatively stable population groups should be more reliable" tiun
"[a]cross-person comparisons of qualitative risk s anables " Id. at 48. If Viscusi is correct that the qualitative
surveys are unreliable across persons, however, then there is no reason to beltese that they are reliable over
time. Contrary to his assertion, it is doubtful that population groups hase been all that stable, at least in terms
of the variables that he suggests might be significant across indisiduals. For instance, aserage education
levels, income levels, and age levels have changed signilicantl> since 1954, %%hen Viscusi's comparison
begins. In 1960, 41.1% of those 25 and older had completed at least four years of high school See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TE UNITED STATES. stpra note 269. at 159 tbl 2411 Per capita disposable
personal income was $8660 as measured in constant 1992 dollars, see ul at 448 Ibl 692. and the median age
of the resident population was 29.5. see d. at 14 IbI. 13 By 1995. 81 7% of those 25 an older had completed
high school, see id. at 159 tbl.241, while disposable personal inconte had risen to Sf8.757. see it at 448
tbl.692, and the median age of the resident population had increased to 34 3. see ul at 14 tbl 13
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is sufficient. Perceptions may be biased in either direction irrespective of a perception that smoking is
'harmful.' In contrast, according to Viscusi, the quantitative surveys on which he bases his
conclusions create "a meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric.""
To that line of argument, we have several responses. First, there is considerable evidence from
previous surveys that is not qualitative, and, hence, is invulnerable to his criticisms. For instance, one
of Viscusi's own tables reveals that as of 1981 (the last year summarized), nearly one-third of all
cigarette smokers polled believed that smoking was not "one of the causes of lung cancer."" In the
same year, over two-fifths of smokers believed that smoking was not one of the causes of heart disease
and two-thirds believed that smoking was not one of the causes of birth defects." s One-fifth of
respondents did not think that cigarette smoking was even harmful."w More recently, a 1990 survey
in Canada put to respondents the following question: "To the best of your knowledge, what, if any, are
the health hazards related to smoking?" ' Only 44% of the 1030 respondents included lung cancer in
their answers, and only 20% included heart disease."' Such survey results suggest that for a substantial
portion of the smoking population, underestimation of the risks of smoking is a significant problem."'
Second, although Viscusi claims that he has measured consumer risk assessments with a
quantitative, "meaningful, well-defined probabalistic metric," ' 3 the precision his data appear to provide
is likely an illusion. To be sure, respondents' answers to the survey questions were numerical. In that
sense, Viscusi is correct to claim that the "wording of the questions pertaining to the riskis] . . . clicit[sl
a specific probability judgment" from respondents." ' Those numerical responses, however, are unlikely
to be any more precise-and may be less precise-than are respondents' judgments regarding whether
cigarettes are "harmful." Cognitive psychology suggests that most people do not typically assess risks
805. Viscusi, supra note 49, at 48.
806. Id. at 49.
807. Id. at 49 tbl.3-1. Nearly one-third also believed that smoking was not one of the causes of throat
cancer. See id.
808. See id. at 50 tbl.3-2.
809. See id. at 50 tbl.3-2.
810. Environics Research Group Ltd., Awareness of Health Hazards Due to Smoking tbl.22C (Dec.
17, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
811. See id.
812. In anticipation of this sort of response, Viscusi offers the following reply:
The fact that some small segment of the population does not believe that smoking is harmful
does not mean that they equate not being harmful with being risk-free. One can view each
respondent as having some threshold risk value, above which a product is classified as harmful.
The fact that cigarettes may not be above this threshold implies only that the respondents
believe the risk is not so great that it passes the harmful-risk cutoff.
VISCUSt, supra note 49, at 50-51. In our estimation, however, such a view is implausible. It strains the
English language to suggest, as Viscusi seems to, that those respondents who answered that smoking is not
harmful may well accurately estimate or even overestimate the risks of smoking. Viscusi's claim, recall,
is that "[p]erceptions may be biased in either direction irrespective of a perception that smoking is
'harmful."' Id. at 48.
The view seems even less plausible when one considers the substantial percentage of the same group
of respondents who did not believe that cigarettes were one of the causes of lung cancer, throat cancer,
heart disease, or birth defects: Nearly one-third of smoking respondents did not consider smoking to be one
of the possible causes of lung cancer-which "has long been the best documented and most highly
publicized risk of smoking." Id. at 51. In any event, the view that respondents have some threshold below
which they classify a product as nonharmful does not alleviate the problem created by consumer optimism.
If the risk does not clear a consumer's harmful-risk threshold, it seems doubtful that the risk will influence
that consumer's consumption choices.
813. Id. at 49.
814. Id. at 48.
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in precise probabilistic terms. For example, one researcher sunnarizes the literature as follows
Intuitively, we seem to understand only four degrees of probability for an event vcre likel).
somewhat likely (more likely to happen than not). somewhat unlikely (more likely not to
happen), and very unlikely. Inside those four compartments all is gray No difference makes
any difference. [For example. a] 6 percent probability appears to us already sufficiently "'r
unlikely" that the significantly inferior probabilht of I percent is just "the same "'
Given that dynamic, it seems unlikely that survey respondents truly considered the problem in precise
numeric terms. More likely, they simply attempted to translate their vague qualitatle nsk Assc,,,menms
into numeric equivalents. Because this process of translation would only have been rough. respondents
would have been likely to translate their estimates into well-known. -'focal" numbers If one uere to
begin with the four-category hypothesis, one might predict that answers would be disproportionately
clustered at focal numbers representing the edges of the four quarters of 100 "' For instance, those
who believed that smoking poses virtually no risk might have chosen zero (or perhaps some other low
focal number such as 5% or 10%). Those who believed that smoking poses a relattvely slight risk might
have translated their estimate to 25%. Those who believed that smoking poses a tedlium-sized risk might
have chosen 50%. And those who believed that ,moking presents a very significant risk ight hai¢
chosen 75% or even 100%.
With that sort of prediction in mind. it is illuminating to examine with some care sec.ral notable
features of the survey evidence on which Viscui relies. The first question on the surNey %%as what
Viscusi describes as "an open-ended memory probe regarding individuals' reactions to cigarettes ""'
To summarize the responses to that question. Viscusi divides "reactions" into t,.enty-two categories. such
as "causes lung cancer." "shortens life, kills." and "trying/have tried to qut." Viscusi reports the
percentage of respondents who gave answers in each category as well as "the mean lung cancer risk
assessment .. corresponding" to each category."9 As Viscust stresses, the "adverse sentiment against
the product" is "stunning." even "overwhelning."' For our purposes, the most illuminating finding
is that 1.3% of respondents indicated that they did not believe. or at least were skeptical of claims, that
cigarettes are harmful.' 2' Among those nonbelievers and skeptics, the average probabahistic rtsk
assessment was approximately 25%. ' The fact that even those indisiduals overestimate the "true risk"
of smoking by a factor of between two and five should give pause to anyone who would treat the
respondents' numeric assessments as anything more than loose proxies for qualitative judgments That
point becomes especially clear when one carefully considecr the distributions. of probabalistic surve)
responses. Viscusi summarizes those distributions as follows
815. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. Probabdlmtv Bhndness Neither Rutiotaimr Cupru turn. Bos'rToA.
Mar./Apr. 1991, at 28, 32-33.
816. Cf. THOMAS C. SCHELLING. TIE STRATEGY OF CONLICI 11[-13 (1980 ed ) (discussmng focal-
point solutions).
817. VISCUSI, supra note 49. at 88.
818. Id. at 89.
819. Id. at 88.
820. Id.
821. See id. at 89.
822. See id. (The mean risk perception of those respondents ".as 26 6% Current smokers s%,ithmn that
group estimated 23.5%. See itd.)
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TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF LUNG CANCER RISK PERCEPTIONS
FOR CIGARETE SMOKING
s23
FRACTION WITH RISK PERCEPTIONS
IN INTERVAL
DISTRIBUTION OF LUNG CANCER FULL SAMPLE CURRENT
RISK PERCEPTION (RISK) SMOKERS
RISK < .05 .052 .092
.05 < RISK <.10 .046 .051
.10 RISK <.20 .117 .130
.20 < RISK < .30 .136 .146
.305 <RISK <.40 .090 .114
.40 < RISK < .50 .052 .050
.50 - RISK < .60 .239 .228
.60 < RISK < .70 .070 .056
.70 < RISK < .80 .084 .050
.80 < RISK < .90 .042 .027
.90 5 RISK < 1.0 .041 .028
RISK = 1.0 .030 .026
Mean RISK .426 .368
(standard error of mean) (.005) (.009)
Sample size 3119 779
Unfortunately, Viscusi's distributional categories do not permit us to determine the precise extent
to which estimates clustered around quartile cutoffs. Nevertheless the distributions do appear consistent
with the four-category prediction. Moreover, several points that Viscusi makes in his description of the
distribution indicate that, in fact, the distribution of survey responses is strikingly consistent with that
four-category prediction. For instance, Viscusi concedes that there is "clustering of responses around
salient risk levels, such as .25 and .50. ' 24 Viscusi's only response to this clustering is that "the
823. See id. at 69 tbl.4-2; see also id. at 124 tbl.6-3 (including numbers for respondents aged 16-21).
824. Id. at 68. Complicating matters further (and making Viscusi's data even less precise), the
clustering around 50% (approaching one-quarter of all responses) may partially reflect an attempt on the
part of some respondents to answer "I don't know." Cf. SCHUMAN & PRESSER, supra note 795, at 114
(explaining that significant random or systematic errors may be created by respondents "who really have
no views on the issues under inquiry and simply flip mental coins in order to satisfy the interviewer's
expectation of an answer").
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direction of bias imparted by such rounding is unclear." ' Thus. Viscusi's interpretation of the
evidence seems to be that the respondents did have precise quantities in mind. quantities that they merely
rounded off for purposes of the survey. Our claim, in contrast. is that the respondents did not operate
with precise quantitative risk assessments. Instead, they had only foggy qualitative assessments that they
forced into numeric terms for purposes of the survey. Insofar as our version is accurate, the numeric
responses do not mean what they appear to mean.
Viscusi unwittingly endorses our interpretation of the distnbutional data when he attempts to
explain "[a]n intriguing aspect of' the distributions-specifically. that a "reasonably large fraction of
smokers ... believe the risk level is 1.0 yet continue to smoke." Viscus explains "[A] contributing
factor [to this outcome] is that the assessed cases of lung cancer per 100 smokers tend to be clustered
at salient numbers. Respondents assessing a RISK of 1.0 may believe that lung cancer is highly likely
but not necessarily a certain outcome."' 2' Viscusi's point seems to be exactly ours Respondents may
well have chosen numbers that reflect nothing more than a rough approximation of their qualitative risk
assessments.
If, indeed, that was the tendency of survey respondents. then all of the problems that Vtscusi
identifies with qualitative surveys were present with his "quantitative" survey One cannot determine
whether a person who gave 25% as a response (because she believed that cigarettes pose only a slight
risk of lung cancer) is pessimistic or optimistic. Paraphrasing Viscusi, the risk threshold as to what
constitutes "a slight risk" may differ across individuals, making the implications of such designations
unclear and not necessarily uniform across respondents.
In light of the evidence regarding how individuals assess risks. the "qualitative" surveys that
Viscusi disparages may be superior to his favored "'quantitative" surveys, on at least two grounds. First.
such surveys better reflect the qualitative categories that many people use when assessing risk. and they
do not create survey noise by forcing respondents to translate those categories into a less familiar
language. Second, they do not create the potentially dangerous illusion of having employed "a
meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric."
825. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 68.
826. Id. at 124.
827. Id. at 124-25.
828. Id. at 49.
I
